Figure gallery

Every figure in the book, with its chart type and a link to the chapter that shows it.

350 figures in 42 chapters. line 139, county-map 11, dumbbell 40, tabs 9, table 30, dot 75, waterfall 4, bar 13, scatter 13, heatmap 6, beeswarm 2, world-map 2, circumplex 1, ridgeline 3, histogram 2.

Party, belief and the political map

Introduction

Figure 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveyslineWeighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year
Figure 2. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024county-mapChange in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections
Figure 3. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue countiesdumbbellGap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021

Party and ideology

Chapter 1.1 in Part I

Figure 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveyslineWeighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year
Figure 2. In the GSS, web respondents show a higher correlation than in-person respondentslineWeighted party-ideology correlation by interview mode among GSS respondents who answered both questions, 2004 to 2024; bands are 95% intervals for the in-person and web lines
Figure 3. The two parties' average placements moved further apart on all three surveyslineMean liberal-conservative self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers (leaners included, pure independents left out), in standard deviations (SD) of placement, with 95% intervals
Figure 4. The correlation rose inside every cohort, education and region group in the ANESlineWeighted party-ideology correlation by year within each group (solid lines) and among all ANES respondents (dashed line), 1972 to 2024
Figure 5. The correlation rose in every group, and less among college graduates than among other education groupsdumbbellWeighted party-ideology correlation estimated from all respondents in 1980 to 1988 together and in 2020 to 2024 together, by group, with 95% intervals; rows run by classification and, within each, by the size of the change
Figure 6. Larger shares of Democrats are liberal and of Republicans conservative than in the 1970slineShare of each party's identifiers (leaners included) who place themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, among identifiers who placed themselves, with 95% intervals; liberal and conservative include slightly liberal and slightly conservative on the seven-point scales of the ANES and GSS

Sort dates by attitude

Chapter 1.3 in Part I

Figure 1. By the point estimates, party gaps stay above 0.25 SD from 1986 on racial resentment, 1998 on abortion and 2012 on religionlineRepublican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of each attitude in that survey year, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals
Figure 2. Racial resentment, abortion and religion are dated in that order at every ruledumbbellFirst survey year in which the party gap exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey, by the point estimate (open dot) and by the lower bound of the 95% interval (solid dot), ANES
Figure 3. Web and face-to-face gaps differ by 0.174 SD or less, and the interval for the difference excludes zero only for racial resentment in 2012tabsParty gap by interview mode in the years that have both mode weights, difference and each mode, in standard deviations, with 95% intervals, ANES
Figure 4. The GSS abortion gap passes 0.25 SD 12 years after the ANES gap by the point estimate and 4 years after by the lower boundlineRepublican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of each survey's item in that year, ANES, GSS and CES, 95% intervals
Figure 5. Sort dates differ across surveys and items for the same attitudetableSurvey years in which the party gap passes the sort-date rule and stays above it, by survey and measure, all respondents
Figure 6. The share saying religion is important fell among Democrats and stayed level among Republicans, so the pooled trend hides the party gaplineWeighted percent giving one answer to the question chosen to stand for each attitude, by party (leaners included) and for all respondents, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals
Figure 7. The economic gap follows the president's party in all 18 survey yearslineRepublican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of the answer to whether the national economy got better over the past year, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals

Cohort change in partisan sorting

Chapter 1.4 in Part I

Figure 1. Cross-pressured partisans fell from 19.6% of placed partisans in 1972 to 6.3% in 2024linePercent of placed partisans who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans, ANES 1972-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 2. Every cohort born 1927 to 1974 fell, mostly after 1990lineCross-pressured share of placed partisans by birth cohort (solid) and for all placed partisans (dashed), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 3. The changes for the two oldest cohorts and the 1975 to 1990 cohort include zero, and the other cohorts felldotChange in the cross-pressured share of placed partisans from a cohort's first to its last plotted decade, ANES 1972-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 4. Freezing cohort rates predicts a 2020s cross-pressured share of 15.1% to 18.3%, against 5.6% observedlineCross-pressured share of placed partisans, observed and under two frozen-rate counterfactuals, ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% bootstrap intervals
Figure 5. The share of the fall due to the mix of cohorts ranges from −0.4% to 74.0% depending on the rates given to later cohortstableChange in the cross-pressured share of placed partisans from the 1970s to the 2020s that the mix of birth cohorts produces under five assumptions about cohort rates, with 95% bootstrap intervals
Figure 6. The education gap in the cross-pressured share was 5.4 points in the 1970s, 11.3 in the 1990s and 5.1 in the 2020slineCross-pressured share of placed partisans by highest education and for all placed partisans (dashed), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 7. Southern and other partisans converged as the Democratic share of conservatives fell from 48.6% to 9.3% in the South and 30.6% to 8.3% elsewherelineTwo shares of placed partisans by region (Census South and the rest of the country), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 8. The fall is 11.4 to 13.3 points under three bases and 6.3 points when unplaced partisans count as not cross-pressuredlineCross-pressured share under four bases, ANES study years 1972-2024, with 95% intervals for the Placed line
Figure 9. From 2008 to 2016 the ANES cross-pressured share fell while the CES share roselineCross-pressured share of placed partisans in the ANES (seven-point ideology scale) and the CES (five-point scale, even-year waves), 2004-2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 10. The CES share is above or below the ANES share depending on how the seven-point scale is mapped to the five-point onetableRatio of the CES cross-pressured share to the ANES share in the five shared study years under two mappings of the ANES scale, with 95% intervals; a ratio of one means equal shares

Feelings toward the other party

Chapter 2.1 in Part II

Figure 1. Partisans rated the other party 20.6 in 2024, down from 48.0 in 1978, and rated their own party 70.5lineMean feeling thermometer rating of the respondent's own party and of the other party, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100
Figure 2. The other-party rating changed by −6.9 points per decade and the own-party rating by −0.7dotSlope of the mean thermometer rating on survey year, points per decade, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024
Figure 3. The share of partisans rating the other party at zero rose from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024linePercent of partisans including leaners who rate the other party at the coldest possible answer of zero, 1978 to 2024
Figure 4. Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 4.9 points warmer than the all-interview average in 2024, and web respondents coldertabsRating of the other party by interview mode and the split of the all-interview fall, partisans including leaners, 2008 to 2024, 0 to 100
Figure 5. Change within groups accounts for 24.5 of the 27.4 points the other-party rating fellwaterfallDecomposition of the change in the mean rating between 1978 and 2024 over strength-of-attachment groups, partisans including leaners, points on the 0 to 100 thermometer
Figure 6. The other-party rating fell in all 12 groups of partisanslineMean feeling thermometer rating of the other party within groups of partisans including leaners, by strength of attachment, party, education and birth cohort, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100
Figure 7. Compared with 2020, the other-party rating differs by −1.3 points among 2024 web respondents and +6.3 among 2024 face-to-face respondentsdotChange in the mean thermometer rating of the other party from the 2020 all-interview mean to the 2024 mean, points, partisans including leaners, by 2024 sample
Figure 8. The other party's nominee was rated 13.3 in 2024, below the 20.6 for the party, while the own party's nominee was rated 75.2lineMean feeling thermometer rating of the other party, the other party's presidential nominee (other nominee) and the own party's nominee (own nominee), partisans including leaners, 1968 to 2024, 0 to 100

Negative partisanship

Chapter 2.2 in Part II

Figure 1. Partisans very cold toward the other party only went from 4.4% of partisans in 1978 to 1990 to 28.1% in 2012 to 2024, and partisans very warm toward their own party only went from 32.0% to 10.5%dotShare of partisans, leaners included, in each of four groups defined by rating the other party at or below 15 (cold) and their own party at or above 85 (warm) on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, three periods and two interview modes
Figure 2. Partisans very cold toward the other party only voted for their own party's presidential candidate more often than those very warm toward their own party only in each period, at 98.1% against 95.4% in 2012 to 2024dotShare of partisans, leaners included, who acted as the view names (first view: voted for their own party's presidential candidate), by whether they rated the other party at or below 15 (cold) and their own party at or above 85 (warm), three periods
Figure 3. Per rating point, coldness toward the other party went with more House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity than warmth toward the own party did in 2012 to 2024, while in 1978 to 1990 the two went with similar amounts of House voting and campaign activitydumbbellPercentage points of each behavior per 10 points on the 0 to 100 thermometer, from one linear probability model per behavior and period with both ratings and year fixed effects, partisans including leaners
Figure 4. The edge of coldness over warmth rose by 0.3 to 0.5 points per decade for presidential voting, House voting and reported turnout, with intervals above zero, and the yearly estimates are too noisy to date the riselineColdness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, one model per survey year, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024
Figure 5. In 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled, the coldness-minus-warmth difference has the same sign in face-to-face and web interviews for all five behaviors, and the two intervals overlap in every rowdumbbellColdness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, face-to-face and web respondents separately, partisans including leaners
Figure 6. Per rating point, the change since 1978 to 1990 in the difference between coldness and warmth is above zero for reported turnout in all interviews, in presidential years alone and within each interview mode, and for House voting and campaign activity only in all interviewsdotColdness minus warmth coefficient in a later sample minus the same difference in 1978 to 1990, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, partisans including leaners
Figure 7. In 2012 to 2024 the coldness coefficient exceeds the warmth coefficient for all five behaviors under each of four measures, every one of the 20 intervals lies above zero, and the measures disagree about the change since 1978 to 1990dotColdness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, partisans including leaners, by measure of the ratings, 2012 to 2024; units are percentage points per 10 rating points, per standard deviation, or between groups
Figure 8. In 2012 to 2024 the difference between coldness and warmth is positive in all 25 cells of five further checks, with an interval above zero in 21dotColdness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, partisans, by check, 2012 to 2024; percentage points per 10 rating points (log-odds in one panel, per scale point of the like-dislike scale in another)
Figure 9. In 2012 to 2024 coldness went with more persuading others and giving money than warmth did, and the two went with similar amounts of displaying a buttondumbbellPercentage points of each campaign activity per 10 points on the 0 to 100 thermometer, one linear probability model per activity and period with both ratings and year fixed effects, partisans including leaners

The two coalitions

Chapter 3.1 in Part III

Figure 1. In 2024 white voters leaned Republican and still made up most of the Democratic coalitiondotTwo shares for each group of two-party presidential voters in 2024: the Democratic share of the group's voters and the group's share of all Democratic voters, percent; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 2. In every presidential election since 1996 voters were more likely than eligible adults to hold a four-year degree and less likely to be in the youngest age banddumbbellShare of eligible adults (citizens aged 18 or older) and share of voters in each group, percent, by presidential election; CPS voting supplement; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 3. Democratic voters are more likely than Democratic identifiers to hold a four-year degree, and nonvoters are less likely than votersdotShare of each ANES population in four groups, percent, 2024 (the buttons show 2020); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 4. The Republican coalition once had the larger shares of degree holders and of high-income voters, and by 2024 the Democratic coalition didlineShare of each party's two-party presidential voters who belong to the group, percent, by election, 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 5. Four-year degree holders rose from 19.2% to 43.4% of Democratic voters and from 25.2% to 31.4% of Republican votersbarMake-up of each party's two-party presidential voters, percent, in 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024 (the buttons switch the dimension); pooled elections; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 6. The Democratic share rose more among four-year degree holders than in any other groupdumbbellDemocratic share of each group's two-party presidential voters, percent, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; pooled elections; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 7. Among Democratic voters the degree-holding share rose through group size (+15.5 points) and relative lean (+8.8 points)waterfallChange in a group's share of a party's two-party presidential voters from 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024, split into group size and relative lean, percent and percentage points; ANES; the buttons switch group and party
Figure 8. The mix of voters accounts for +2.9 points of the change in the Democratic share and change within groups of the same sex, race and age for +5.3 pointswaterfallChange in the Democratic share of two-party presidential voters from 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024, split into the mix of voters across sex, race and age cells and change within cells, percent and percentage points; ANES; the buttons switch the voters
Figure 9. The ANES shows the degree-holding share of Republican voters falling after 2008, the CES shows it rising, and the ANES web samples show no changelineShare of voters with a four-year degree, percent, by presidential election: all voters (CPS, ANES, CES), Democratic voters and Republican voters (ANES, ANES by mode, CES); the buttons show the white and Black shares of voters; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

The diploma divide

Chapter 3.2 in Part III

Figure 1. Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016lineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by degree, ANES, 1956 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 2. Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gaplineDemocratic share among graduates minus the share among other respondents, points, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; presidential vote (voters with a major-party vote) and party identification (identifiers, leaners included); all respondents (the button shows white non-Hispanic respondents)
Figure 3. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the certified count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.1 points of it in every electiondotDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among survey voters minus the certified national share, points, ANES 1976 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; all voters who reported a major-party vote, whether or not education is known (button: the graduate gap under each survey weight); 95% intervals
Figure 4. The vote gap rose after 2012 in both interview modes, and the in-person estimates are the larger ones in 2016 and 2024dotANES graduate gap in the vote and in party identification by interview mode, 2012, 2016 and 2024, points (button: issue gaps by mode, standard deviations); 95% intervals
Figure 5. In the CES the Democratic share rose at each step of education by 2016, while in 2008 a four-year degree did not differ from some collegelineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by highest degree, CES, 2008 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters)
Figure 6. The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positivedumbbellGraduate minus other respondents on each item, standard deviations of the item among all respondents; items oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer; ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: ANES in person only, GSS, CES); 95% intervals
Figure 7. The graduate gap on guaranteed jobs rose from below zero to about zero by 2020, while the gaps on abortion and immigration stayed positive in every studylineGraduate minus other respondents on one long-running item per domain, standard deviations of the item among all respondents in the study year; ANES 1970 to 2024 (the button shows the GSS); 95% intervals
Figure 8. Graduate Democrats stay more liberal than other Democrats on cultural, racial and immigration items, and graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans on economic itemsdumbbellGraduate minus other respondents on each domain index, standard deviations, for all respondents, Democrats, Republicans and net of party identification; ANES 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: white non-Hispanic respondents, in-person samples, items asked in every study, GSS, CES); 95% intervals
Figure 9. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the vote gap from 2012 to 2024 from +24.5 to +18.6 points and leaves most of itlineGraduate minus other voters in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, ANES 1956 to 2024, from weighted linear probability models on voters with a reported family income; all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% HC3 intervals

The income ladder

Chapter 3.3 in Part III

Figure 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highestdumbbellDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket, 2008 and 2024 (the buttons show other elections); two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0lineDifference in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote between an end bracket and the pooled middle three brackets, percentage points, by presidential election; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holdersdotDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket and education, 2024 by default; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zerodumbbellDemocratic share in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, 2008 and 2024, for all voters, within education groups, and net of education and race and ethnicity; 95% intervals clustered by state
Figure 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4%lineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among voters in the highest household-income bracket, by education, 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zerolineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, by election and survey weight; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state
Figure 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groupsdotChange from 2008 to 2024 in the Democratic share of the higher-income group minus that of the lower-income group, percentage points; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state
Figure 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3%dumbbellShare of each party's two-party presidential voters who live in a household in the highest income bracket, percent, 2008 and 2024; voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national resultdotDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote, CES respondents minus the certified national count, percentage points, by election; two-party voters whether or not they reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

The gender gap in attitudes and votes

Chapter 3.5 in Part III

Figure 1. The ANES vote gap estimate has been positive since 1964 and peaked at 14.9 points in 1996lineWomen's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, among voters for a major-party candidate; ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 2. In the CES the vote gap fell after 2020 in every age group except the youngesttabsWomen's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, by age group; CES 2020 and 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. The under-thirty vote gap was smaller than the older gap in 2008, 2012 and 2020 and not in 2024tabsWomen's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, by age group and election; CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 4. Among voters under thirty, few race-by-gender groups are large enough to comparedotWomen's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, voters aged 18 to 29, by race; single elections and 2020 and 2024 pooled; 95% intervals
Figure 5. Both young women and young men gave Democrats a smaller share in 2024 than in 2020dumbbellDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote, percent, voters aged 18 to 29; CES 2020 and 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 6. The under-thirty party-identification gap was 9.5 in 2006 and 3.1 in 2024, and the 2024 interval includes zerolineWomen's minus men's Democratic share of respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans, points, ages 18 to 29, even years 2006 to 2024; CES; 95% intervals
Figure 7. Party, or left-right group in the WVS, separates the traditional answer more than gender does in 3 of 4 surveystabsPoints and percent taking the traditional or hostile position on the one item each survey asks; most recent wave of each survey; 95% intervals
Figure 8. The GSS party gap went from −2.0 in 1977 to 11.3 in 2018, and the estimated gender gap never exceeded 12.1lineGap in the share taking the traditional or hostile position, points: Republicans minus Democrats (party gap) and men minus women (gender gap); GSS 1977 to 2024 and ANES 1988 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 9. Only Nationscape shows a larger attitude gender gap among adults under thirtydotMen's minus women's share taking the traditional or hostile position, points, by age group, and the difference between the two age groups; most recent wave of each survey; 95% intervals

Age and generation

Chapter 3.6 in Part III

Figure 1. The ANES age gap in the Democratic vote was above zero in every election from 2004 to 2020 and included zero in 2024lineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by age group (18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over), ANES 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 2. In every CES election from 2008 to 2020 the Democratic share was lower among voters forty-five to sixty-four than among voters thirty to forty-four, and lower again among voters sixty-five and olderlineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by age band (18 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over), CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. Between 2020 and 2024 the CES age gap in the vote changed by −7.1 points among all voters and by −0.6, an interval that includes zero, among matched voterslineDemocratic share of two-party voters aged 18 to 29 minus the share among voters aged 65 and over, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 4. Among party identifiers in the CES the youngest group was more Democratic than the oldest in every wave from 2006 to 2024lineDemocratic share of party identifiers (leaners included) by age group, CES even-year waves 2006 to 2024; the ANES view covers presidential-election years 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 5. The cohorts born 1943 to 1958 and 1975 to 1990 began with a Democratic lead over other voters in the ANES and held a smaller one in 2024lineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among voters in each birth cohort minus the share among voters born in other years, points, ANES 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals; the buttons switch survey and measure
Figure 6. The vote lead of the 1975 to 1990 cohort over other voters changed by −18.2 points in the ANES between 2004 and 2024 and by −9.1 in the CES between 2008 and 2024dumbbellDemocratic share of a cohort's two-party voters minus the share among voters born in other years, first and last cell with enough voters; ANES presidential elections 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals; the buttons switch survey and measure
Figure 7. In 2020 and 2024 the age gap in the vote was +20.2 points among white voters and −12.3 among Black votersdumbbellDemocratic share of two-party voters aged 18 to 29 minus the share among voters aged 65 and over, by gender and race, CES 2008 and 2012 pooled and 2020 and 2024 pooled; 95% intervals
Figure 8. In the CES the vote moved by −4.3 points per decade of age within an election, −1.2 per decade at a fixed age and −5.2 along a cohortdotChange in the Democratic share of the two-party vote per decade, three straight-line comparisons, voters aged 18 to 73, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals (HC3)
Figure 9. In the CES the age effect from the youngest to the oldest band is −22.2 points if birth years carry no trend, −27.3 if elections carry none and +1.0 if ages carry nonelineAge effect on the Democratic share of the two-party vote, points, 4-year age bands from 18 to 73, from a model with an effect for every age band, election and birth cohort, under three constraints; 95% bootstrap intervals

Turnout

Chapter 3.7 in Part III

Figure 1. Turnout among citizens in 2018 to 2024 was higher than in any election of its type from 1994 to 2016linePercent of citizens 18 and older who reported voting, presidential and midterm elections, 1994 to 2024 (the second button counts all residents, 1976 to 2024); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 2. In 2024 turnout rose with age, education and family income, and Hispanic citizens had the lowest turnout of the racial and ethnic groupsdotPercent of citizens who voted, who were registered, and who voted among the registered, by age, race and ethnicity, education and family income, 2024 (buttons show other elections); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 3. Turnout was highest in the oldest and lowest in the youngest age group in every election, and the gap between them fell from 29.5 points in 1996 to 19.3 in 2008linePercent of citizens who reported voting, by age group, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years, 1994 to 2022); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 4. Black turnout went from above White turnout in 2012 to below it in 2024, and Hispanic turnout stayed below White turnout in every electionlinePercent of citizens who reported voting, by race and ethnicity, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (other buttons show midterm years and all residents, noncitizens counted as not voting); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 5. The turnout gap between citizens with a bachelor's degree and those without a high school diploma was wider in 2024 than in 1996linePercent of citizens 25 and older who reported voting, by educational attainment, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 6. Turnout rose with family income in every election, and the highest third voted at rates about the same distance above the lowest third in 2012 and 2024linePercent of citizens who reported voting, by within-year third of family income, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 7. Net of age, education and family income, the White-Black turnout difference was 3.4 points in 2024 and the Asian-White difference did not shrinkdumbbellDifference in turnout between the higher-turnout and lower-turnout group, percentage points, citizens 25 and older, 2024 (buttons show other elections); one characteristic alone against all four together; 95% intervals from standard errors clustered by state
Figure 8. Voting by mail rose to 43.0% of voters in 2020 and fell to 29.0% in 2024, while voting in person before Election Day reached 30.7%linePercent of persons who reported voting, by method and timing, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Figure 9. The CPS count of reported voters exceeded the ballots counted for president by 6.0% to 11.6% through 2000 and was within 3% of them from 2004 to 2024dumbbellMillions of persons: ballots counted for president against the CPS weighted number of adults 18 and older who reported voting, presidential years 1976 to 2024; the CPS interval is the 95% interval from the Kish effective sample size

The abortion sort

Chapter 4.1 in Part IV

Figure 1. Democrats and Republicans grew apart on legal abortion in both surveyslineDemocratic minus Republican share saying abortion should always be allowed (ANES) or legal for any reason (GSS), party identifiers including leaners, 1977 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 2. The party gap rose by similar amounts within each modedotDemocratic minus Republican gap in saying yes: change within one interview mode (top) and web minus in-person difference in the same study (bottom); leaners included; 95% intervals
Figure 3. Democratic support for legal abortion rose while Republican support felllineShare saying abortion should always be allowed (ANES) or legal for any reason (GSS), by party identification including leaners; 95% intervals
Figure 4. The party gap widened in every groupdumbbellDemocratic minus Republican share saying yes, 1980s against 2020s, by group; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals
Figure 5. Birth cohorts have similar party gaps in each yearlineANES Democratic minus Republican share saying abortion should always be allowed, by birth cohort (years of birth); party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals in the data table
Figure 6. Each party's out-of-step share fell, to near zero for DemocratslineANES share of Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted and of Republicans saying it should always be allowed; leaners included; 95% intervals
Figure 7. The correlation of abortion views with the vote rose to +0.59lineCorrelation between the four-category abortion answer (higher = more permissive) and a Democratic rather than Republican presidential vote, ANES presidential-election years, 95% intervals

Immigration

Chapter 4.2 in Part IV

Figure 1. Each survey asks about immigration in its own words and on its own scaletableQuestion wording or file label, answers offered, years used and the restrictive answer counted, by survey and item
Figure 2. Republicans and Democrats grew apart on wanting fewer immigrants in both surveyslineRepublican minus Democratic share wanting the number of immigrants decreased (ANES) or reduced (GSS), party identifiers including leaners, 1992 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. The Democratic share wanting fewer immigrants fell in every view, and the Republican path differs by survey and interview modelineShare wanting the number of immigrants decreased (ANES) or reduced (GSS), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals
Figure 4. The ANES gap opened within each interview mode, and ANES web respondents were more restrictive than in-person respondentsdotChanges in the Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode, and web minus in-person differences in the gap and in the Republican share; leaners included; 95% intervals
Figure 5. The party gap in warmth toward illegal immigrants widened more than the gap toward HispanicslineMean ANES feeling thermometer rating from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals
Figure 6. Democratic and Republican answers were close on four GSS items in 1996 and far apart in 2024lineShare giving the restrictive answer to four GSS immigration items, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; 95% intervals
Figure 7. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every CES item in every year, with independents between themlineShare giving the restrictive answer to nine CES immigration policy items, by party identification including leaners, 2007 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 8. Nationscape respondents divided by party on every immigration item in every week of 2019 and 2020lineWeekly share giving the restrictive answer to four Nationscape immigration items, by party identification without leaners, July 2019 to early 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 9. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every 2024 ANES immigration item, most on the border walldotShare giving the restrictive answer to the 2024 ANES immigration items, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; rows ordered by the all-respondent gap; 95% intervals

Guns

Chapter 4.3 in Part IV

Figure 1. Each survey words its gun questions differently and counts a different answertableQuestion wording or file label, answers offered, years used, the answer counted and the direction of the gap, by survey and item
Figure 2. Household gun ownership fell among Democrats and independents and changed less among RepublicanslineShare of respondents with a gun in the home, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; General Social Survey, 1973 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. Support for a police permit to buy a gun rose among Democrats and fell among RepublicanslineShare favoring a police permit to buy a gun (GSS) or favoring making it more difficult to buy a gun (ANES), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; 95% intervals
Figure 4. The party gaps on gun ownership and gun permits were at most 13.2 points through 1996 and at least 17.4 points from 2008lineGap between the parties in the share with a gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) and in the share favoring a police permit or making buying a gun more difficult (Democratic minus Republican); party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals
Figure 5. Republicans were more likely than Democrats to live in a household with a gun in every region and kind of communitydumbbellShare with a gun in the home among Democrats and Republicans, including leaners, by census region and community type, GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 pooled; 95% intervals
Figure 6. In the CES the party gap grew on assault rifles, concealed carry and owners' names and did not grow on background checkslineShare supporting each CES gun policy item, by party identification including leaners, 2010 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 7. In Nationscape the parties differed on every gun item and differed least on background checksdotShare owning a gun in the household or supporting each gun policy, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; July 2019 to December 2020 pooled; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 8. Every party gap is above zero within each interview mode, and web and in-person gaps differ by more than sampling error only on the 2024 GSS permit itemdotParty gap by interview mode for the GSS gun in the home and police permit items and the ANES buying a gun item; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals
Figure 9. Democrats changed more on owning and carrying guns and Republicans changed more on regulating sales, except for personal ownership and background checksdotChange in the share of Democrats and of Republicans, including leaners, giving the answer named, from the first to the last period of each survey; percentage points; 95% intervals

Perceptions of the economy

Chapter 4.4 in Part IV

Figure 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White HouselineShare of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; ANES, 1980 to 2024
Figure 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White HouselineShare of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; CES, 2006 to 2024
Figure 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 pointslineIn-party premium, percentage points; partisans including leaners; ANES 1980 to 2024 and CES 2006 to 2024
Figure 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990dotIn-party premium, percentage points, by survey and interview mode; partisans including leaners; 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024
Figure 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 pointstableAverage, lowest and highest yearly in-party premium in each presidency, percentage points; partisans including leaners; CES, 2006 to 2024
Figure 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got betterscatterIn-party premium against the share of the president's party saying the economy got better, one point per ANES survey, 1980 to 2024; percent and percentage points
Figure 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inaugurationlineShare of Democratic and Republican identifiers saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by interview week; Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021

Health care

Chapter 4.5 in Part IV

Figure 1. Each survey asks about government's role in health care in its own words and on its own scaletableQuestion wording or file label, answers offered, years used and the answer counted, by survey and item
Figure 2. The party gap on government's role in health care was above zero in every survey that asked about it and larger after 2010 than before 1993lineDemocratic minus Republican share on the government side (ANES, GSS help) or saying we spend too little (GSS spending), party identifiers including leaners, 1970 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. The Republican share on the government side was lower in the survey after each date than in the survey before itdotChange between the surveys that bracket the Clinton plan (1993 to 1994) and the ACA debate and passage (2009 to 2010) in the party gap and in each party's government-side share; leaners included; 95% intervals
Figure 4. In the ANES and the GSS help-pay question the Republican share on the government side was lower and the Democratic share higher from 2010 on than before 1993lineShare on the government side (ANES, GSS help-pay) or saying we spend too little (GSS spending), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals
Figure 5. Democrats opposed repealing the ACA more often than Republicans in every CES year, counting 2014 after a recode, with independents between themlineShare opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act, by party identification including leaners, 2012 to 2021; open points are the 2014 and 2016 questions, which are worded differently; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 6. Democrats gave the Democratic-side answer more often than Republicans on every other CES health item, with independents between themlineShare supporting each CES health proposal, by party identification including leaners, 2014 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel
Figure 7. The ANES gap was higher in 2020 than among 2016 web respondents, and the in-person GSS gap in 2022 cannot be told from its 2018 leveldotChanges in the Democratic minus Republican gap within one interview mode, and web minus in-person differences in the same year; leaners included; 95% intervals
Figure 8. The party gap was larger from 2010 on than before 1993 in every age and education groupdumbbellDemocratic minus Republican share on the government side, before 1993 against 2010 and after, by group; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals

Fifty years of racial attitudes

Chapter 5.1 in Part V

Figure 1. Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s, and explanation and policy answers other than will power were level from the mid-2000s to 2014 and then movedlineShare of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named at the right of each line, percent, by survey year, 1972 to 2024, in three panels by kind of item
Figure 2. Equal-treatment items changed most before 2008, and the policy items changed most from 2010-2014 onheatmapChange in the share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percentage points, between pooled periods of surveys; empty cells are items not asked in both periods
Figure 3. By 2024 white respondents rated Black and white Americans almost alike, after a fall in the rating of Black Americans from 2008 to 2012lineMean feeling thermometer rating of Black Americans and of white Americans among white non-Hispanic respondents, points on a scale from 0 to 100, 1964 to 2024, all respondents and by party including leaners
Figure 4. The best single step falls at the 2016 survey for each of the six dated items among white respondents and among white Democrats, and a kinked trend fits discrimination and will power bettertableBest-fitting single step in the yearly share, by item and group, in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, among white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included); step in percentage points, share of bootstrap replicates choosing each date, and the error of a trend with one kink
Figure 5. The post-2018 level depends on interview mode: in 2022 and 2024 web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of 9 itemsdotShare of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percent, in-person interviews of 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2022-2024 and web interviews of 2022-2024, 95% intervals
Figure 6. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white Democrats moved on each of the six dated items and white Republicans on 4, and the Democratic change is separable from the Republican change on 4lineShare of white Democrats and white Republicans (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included; leaners included) giving the answer named above each panel, percent, 2000 to 2024, all interviews and by interview mode
Figure 7. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white respondents moved on 6 of the six dated items and Black respondents on 3, with wider intervals for Black respondentsdotShare of white (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) and of Black respondents giving the answer named above each panel, percent, by pooled period of surveys, 95% intervals; all interviews and in-person interviews only
Figure 8. Among white voters the tie between racial resentment and the Republican vote rose from 1988 to 2004 and from 2012 to 2016, with no rise distinguishable from zero from 2008 to 2012linePercentage points of the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of each racial attitude, white non-Hispanic voters, ANES 1988 to 2024 and CES 2008 and 2012
Figure 9. The Republican share among the most resentful third of white voters rose from 79.4% in 2008 to 89.1% in 2016, and fell among the least resentful third from 28.8% to 17.1%lineRepublican share of the two-party presidential vote among white non-Hispanic voters in the lowest, middle and highest group of the racial resentment index (thirds inside each election year, or fixed index cuts), percent, ANES 1988 to 2024, 95% intervals

Racial attitudes and ideology

Chapter 5.2 in Part V

Figure 1. Among white respondents the correlation between resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.66 in 2024lineWeighted correlation of the racial resentment index with seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement, by ANES survey year, white non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 2. The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened from 4.2 index points in 1986 to 37.6 in 2024lineWeighted mean of the racial resentment index (0 least resentful, 100 most resentful) by party identification, leaners included, and, in the second view, weighted correlations, white non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 3. Average resentment fell from 2012 to 2024 in both interview modes and both parties, and web respondents score 4.8 to 9.5 index points higherdotWeighted mean of the racial resentment index (0 least resentful, 100 most resentful) by interview mode, with the mode weights, white non-Hispanic Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, 2012 and 2024
Figure 4. With party held fixed the slope is +0.23 in 1986 and +0.24 in 2024, against a total correlation of +0.27 and +0.66lineStandardized slope of seven-point self-placement on the racial resentment index, without and with the seven party-identification categories held fixed, and, in the second view, the correlation inside each party, white non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 5. Depending on the measure, 72% to 97% of the per-decade rise in the correlation disappears when party identification is held fixedtableChange per decade in the correlation, or in the standardized slope, of self-placement on the racial resentment index, and the share of the total change that disappears when party is held fixed, white non-Hispanic respondents, survey years 1986 to 2024
Figure 6. The ideology gap between resentment thirds is 2.1 points among white respondents, 1.1 among Democrats and 0.6 among RepublicansdotGap in mean seven-point self-placement (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) between the most and least resentful third of the racial resentment index; the other views show the mean in each third and the share conservative; white non-Hispanic respondents, 2012 to 2024 pooled
Figure 7. The correlation rose in both interview modes from 2012 to 2024, from +0.43 to +0.70 face-to-face and from +0.45 to +0.66 on the webdotWeighted correlation of the resentment index with seven-point self-placement by interview mode, white non-Hispanic respondents, years with mode weights
Figure 8. Each of the four resentment statements is more strongly correlated with conservative self-placement in 2024 than in 1986dumbbellWeighted correlation of each statement, recoded 0 to 1 so that 1 is the most resentful answer, and of the four-statement index, with seven-point self-placement, white non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 9. By 2020 the resentment index correlated with the health-insurance, government-services and defense-spending items at +0.53, +0.48 and +0.53lineWeighted correlation of the racial resentment index with three policy items, each oriented so that a high value is the conservative position, white non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 10. In 2012 web respondents' correlations with the health-insurance and government-services items were +0.42 and +0.40, against +0.28 and +0.26 face-to-facedotWeighted correlation of the racial resentment index with each policy item, oriented so that a high value is the conservative position, by interview mode, white non-Hispanic respondents, years with mode weights
Figure 11. Holding party identification fixed removes 56% to 67% of the per-decade rise in the three policy items, against 97% for self-placementdotChange per decade in the standardized slope of each policy item on the racial resentment index, with 95% intervals, white non-Hispanic respondents, survey years 1986 to 2024

Confidence in thirteen institutions

Chapter 6.1 in Part VI

Figure 1. The mean absolute party gap rose from 4.8 points in 1973-1980 to 6.7 in 2011-2018 and was 9.4 in person in 2022-2024lineMean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, by survey year (line) and by pooled period (steps), with 95% intervals; in-person, all-mode and web views
Figure 2. In person in 2022-2024 the estimated party gap is 10 points or more for 7 of thirteen institutionsdumbbellShare with a great deal of confidence in the people running each institution, percent, Democrats and Republicans including leaners, in-person interviews, 2022 and 2024 pooled, 95% intervals
Figure 3. Between 1973-1980 and 2022-2024 the share with a great deal of confidence fell for both parties in 8 of thirteen institutionslineShare with "a great deal" of confidence in the people running each institution, percent, by survey year, Democrats (solid line) and Republicans (dashed line) including leaners, 95% intervals; in-person and all-mode views
Figure 4. From 2011-2018 to 2022-2024 the Supreme Court gap moved from +1.1 to −16.2 points and the medicine gap from −1.8 to +10.4heatmapDemocratic share minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, by institution and period; positive means Democrats are more confident; in-person and all-mode views
Figure 5. The television gap has lasted since 1973-1980 and the medicine, Congress and Supreme Court gaps only since 2022-2024tableDemocratic share minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points with 95% interval, in 2022-2024 among in-person respondents, and the period from which the gap has lasted
Figure 6. The executive branch gap has the sign of the president's party in 33 of 33 survey yearslineDemocratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the executive branch of the federal government, percentage points, by survey year, 1973-2024, 95% intervals
Figure 7. The web science gap differs from the in-person gap by +14.5 points, before correcting for thirteen comparisonsdumbbellDemocratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points with 95% intervals, respondents interviewed in person and on the web, 2022 and 2024 pooled
Figure 8. The Supreme Court gap was on the Republican side by 2022 in both interview modeslineDemocratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, four institutions, in-person interviews (solid line) and web interviews (dashed line), 2014-2024, 95% intervals

Tolerance of speech

Chapter 6.6 in Part VI

Figure 1. The six speaker items began between 1972 and 2008, and the militarist and homosexual man items ended in 2021tableItem wording, the side expected to object to each speaker in this chapter's coding, GSS variable and first and last survey year
Figure 2. Tolerance rose for most speakers between 1976 to 1994 and 2008 to 2018, but not for the racistbarShare of all adults who would allow each speaker to speak in their community, independents included, by period, with 95% intervals
Figure 3. Party lines converged for three speakers and stayed apart for the racist and the militaristlineShare who would allow each speaker to speak in their community, by survey year, with 95% intervals
Figure 4. Republicans allowed every speaker more often in 1976 to 1994, and by 2008 to 2018 only the racist and militarist leads remaineddotGap in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, in points, by speaker and period, with 95% intervals; the axis names the two groups
Figure 5. Republicans allowed the racist speaker more often than Democrats did in 27 of 28 survey years, with the largest estimated leads in 2021, 2022 and 2024lineGap in the share who would allow a racist to speak in their community, in points, by survey year, all interview modes, with 95% intervals
Figure 6. Web respondents allowed the racist speaker 14.0 points less often; the other three speakers show no detectable mode differencedumbbellShare who would allow the speaker to speak (percent) or the gap in that share between groups (points), by interview mode, 2022 and 2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 7. By 2008 to 2018 the party gap on speakers that conservatives object to was +0.4 points, and on speakers that liberals object to −5.2dotGap between groups in the average share of a family of speakers a respondent would allow to speak, in points, by family and period, with 95% intervals
Figure 8. The racist party gap is negative on speech, teaching and the library, and party gaps on teaching are positive for three other speakersdotGap between groups in the share giving the tolerant answer, in points, by speaker and action, 2008 to 2018, with 95% intervals; the axis names the groups

Support for democracy

Chapter 6.7 in Part VI

Figure 1. Stated support for a democratic system held at 89.7% in the fixed set of countries while approval of a strong leader rose to 48.1%lineShare of adults calling each way of governing the country good (fairly or very good), equal-weight mean across the fixed set of countries, by wave, 1995 to 2023
Figure 2. The share calling a democratic system good rose in 18 countries, fell in 10 and held within sampling error in 11dotChange from Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) to Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) in the share calling the way of governing good, percentage points, by country, with 95% intervals
Figure 3. The share calling a democratic system good and rejecting both alternatives fell from 55.3% to 44.9% in the fixed setlineShare of adults by combination of answers on the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items, equal-weight mean across the fixed set of countries, by wave
Figure 4. In Wave 7 the United States is below the median country on a democratic system and a strong leader and at the median on army rulebeeswarmWeighted share of adults calling each way of governing good, or giving the top rating on importance, by country, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023)
Figure 5. Young adults went from less approving of a strong leader than older adults to level with them between Wave 3 and Wave 7lineShare among adults aged 18 to 34 minus share among adults aged 55 or older, percentage points, equal-weight mean across countries, by wave
Figure 6. Every birth cohort followed across waves became more approving of a strong leader, and the cohorts ended close togetherlineShare of adults calling a strong leader a good way of governing the country, by birth cohort and wave, equal-weight mean across countries
Figure 7. In 38 of 73 countries the interval for the right-minus-left difference in approval of a strong leader lies above zerodotShare calling a strong leader a good way of governing among adults placing themselves at the right end of the left-right scale minus the share at the left end, percentage points, by country, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023)
Figure 8. Where interviews stayed face to face, European ratings of whether the media are free to criticize the government fell by 0.38 points between Round 6 and Round 10heatmapChange in the mean rating of how far each feature of democracy applies in the country, and in satisfaction with democracy, ESS Round 6 (2012 to 2013) to Round 10 (2020 to 2022), points on the eleven-point scale, by country, countries that kept face-to-face interviews
Figure 9. The fixed set has 39 countries, and 30 of them meet the floors for the age and cohort comparisonstableFieldwork years, survey program and respondents answering the democratic-system question, by country and wave, for the countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7

Political violence and democratic norms

Chapter 6.8 in Part VI

Figure 1. The ANES questions measure approval, expectation, perception and belief, and none records an actiontableEach question used in this chapter, with its variable, exact wording, answer scale, what it measures and what it is about; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews
Figure 2. Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zerodotShare of adult citizens saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at three cut points of the five-point answer scale, by party identification; pre-election 2024
Figure 3. Younger and less educated adults were more likely to say violence is justified than older and college-educated adults, in both partiesdotShare saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little, by age group and education, for all adult citizens and for Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024
Figure 4. Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more oftendotShare giving the doubting answer on six measures, by party identification; two measures from the pre-election interview and four from the post-election interview, 2024
Figure 5. Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%)dotShare saying the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner, by the voter's choice in each election; post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025
Figure 6. Strong Republicans stood apart from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only, and approval of violence did not rise with strength of identificationdotShare giving the answer named above each panel, by the seven categories of party identification; pre-election and post-election interviews, 2024
Figure 7. Colder ratings of the other party went with more doubt about the count among Republicans, and with no more approval of violence in either partydotShare giving each answer by the party member's rating of the other party on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024
Figure 8. Republican doubt about the count and Democratic doubt about the 2024 result were lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, and the party gap on the 2020 result did not differdotShare giving the answer named above each panel, by ANES sample group, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews
Figure 9. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to rate four democratic practices important and more likely to favor presidential freedom from Congress and the courts or limits on journalistsdotShare giving the stated answer on six norm questions, by party identification with leaners; pre-election 2024

Economic and cultural dimensions

Chapter 7.2 in Part VII

Figure 1. Each index averages three ANES items, and a higher value always marks the conservative endtableItems in the economic and cultural conservatism indices: ANES variable, scale as fielded, direction used and studies that asked the item, 1984 to 2024
Figure 2. The correlation between economic and cultural conservatism was at most +0.23 through 2008 and rose to +0.52 by 2020lineWeighted correlation between the economic and cultural conservatism indices by ANES study, 1984 to 2024, adults with at least two of three items on each index; 95% intervals
Figure 3. The Republican minus Democratic gap grew from +0.69 to +1.29 on the economic index and from +0.30 to +1.27 on the cultural indexlineMean of each index by party identification, leaners counted with their party, and for all adults, in standard deviations of the pooled 1984 to 2024 sample, by ANES study; 95% intervals
Figure 4. Items in each index agree more in recent studies, and the cultural items agree less than the economic items in 14 of 15 studieslineStandardized Cronbach alpha of each index by ANES study, adults who answered every item of the index that year, 1984 to 2024; 95% intervals from resampling respondents
Figure 5. Self-placed conservatism follows the economic and cultural indices about equally, and both coefficients grewdumbbellCoefficient on each index in a regression of 7-point liberal-conservative self-placement on both indices (in pooled standard deviations) with study fixed effects, 1984 to 1996 and 2012 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 6. The share of adults on opposite sides of the medians fell from 46.2% to 30.0% and stays within 3.3 points of the share the correlation implieslineWeighted share of adults by ANES study, 1984 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 7. In 2024 the two corner cells with both indices far left or far right hold more adults than the correlation impliesheatmapShare of adults in each cell (columns: economic index; rows: cultural index), in standard deviations from each index's 2024 median, ANES 2024; 95% intervals

Left and right across countries

Chapter 7.4 in Part VII

Figure 1. One attitude clearly leads in 51 of 104 countries, most often economic attitudesworld-mapAxis with the largest correlation with left-right self-placement among the axes whose 95% interval is above zero, shown where the lead is clear, by country, fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 2. Left-right follows economic attitudes in Sweden and Czechia, and religion and moral attitudes in Poland and SpaindotWeighted correlation between left-right self-placement (1 to 10, 10 = right) and the axis, within country; 95% intervals; six countries; fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 3. Each loading has an interval above zero in most countries and below zero in a fewbarCountries by the position of the 95% interval of the left-right loading relative to zero, by axis, fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 4. Most country loadings are small and positive, and the largest are economictabsWeighted correlation between left-right self-placement (1 to 10, 10 = right) and the axis, within country; 95% intervals; fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 5. The right-wing end of every item is fixed in advance from the wording of its answer scaletableItems used for the economic, moral and religious axes in the World Values Survey and EVS, with the answer that counts as right
Figure 6. The median economic loading runs from +0.02 to +0.12 depending on the itemsdotMedian across countries of the loading of left-right on each definition of the economic axis, the moral index and the importance of God, with 95% intervals from resampling the countries
Figure 7. Loadings on all three axes are higher in countries with higher human developmentscatterCountry loading of left-right self-placement (correlation) against the Human Development Index, countries with both, fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 8. Country loadings on religion in the ESS track those in the WVS and EVS, with a correlation of +0.88scatterLoading of left-right self-placement in the WVS/EVS (horizontal) and the ESS (vertical), countries in both surveys

Basic values and left-right

Chapter 8.1 in Part VIII

Figure 1. Across Western Europe universalism leans left and conformity, tradition and power lean rightcircumplexMean across countries of the correlation between each value's importance and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), Western Europe, with 95% intervals from resampling countries
Figure 2. Conformity, tradition, power, universalism and benevolence have the predicted sign in all 18 Western European countries, and only universalism does in as many as 15 of 18 post-communist countriesbarNumber of countries where the correlation between a value and left-right self-placement has the predicted sign, by value and country group; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024
Figure 3. Western European countries show one pattern of correlations and post-communist countries show severalheatmapCorrelation between each value and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), by country; columns run from the values predicted to lean right, through the values predicted to lean left, to hedonism; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024
Figure 4. By the 95% interval, conservation values go with the right in 4 post-communist countries and with the left in 7dotCorrelation between conservation values (conformity, tradition and security) and left-right self-placement, by post-communist country, with the Western and post-communist means; 95% intervals; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024
Figure 5. The mean correlation has the predicted sign for all 9 items with a predicted side in the highest-HDI third of countries and for 4 of them in the lowest thirddotMean across countries of the correlation between each value item and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), by third of countries on the Human Development Index (HDI); items centred on each respondent's mean rating; WVS waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016; 95% intervals from resampling countries
Figure 6. Values sit on their predicted sides in 30 of 71 countries and on the opposite sides in 9world-mapAverage correlation between eight values and left-right self-placement, signed so that a positive score is the side the theory predicts; WVS waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016
Figure 7. Alignment is higher in countries with higher human development, with a correlation of +0.60 across 70 countriesscatterAlignment of values with left-right self-placement against the Human Development Index, by country, World Values Survey, waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016

The obedience-autonomy disposition

Chapter 8.4 in Part VIII

Figure 1. Three surveys ask about children and one asks about values, and each fixes the obedience pole in advancetableQuestions, the answers that count as each pole and the measure built from them, by survey
Figure 2. The obedience side is largest in lower-income countries and shrinks across birth decades in richer oneslinePercent of respondents on the obedience side (more obedience-side than autonomy-side qualities), by birth decade and country income group; fixed country panels; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 3. The correlation is positive in 84 of 103 countries and +0.04 in the median countrybeeswarmWeighted correlation between left-right self-placement (10 = right) and the obedience measure, one dot per country; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023, ESS rounds 3 to 10
Figure 4. Religious faith alone gives a median correlation of +0.04, the same as the full index (+0.04), and independence or tolerance alone give +0.02 and +0.02dotMedian across countries of the correlation of left-right with each definition of the measure, with 95% bootstrap intervals over countries; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 5. The two surveys rank countries alike, with a correlation of +0.81 across 36 countriesscatterCorrelation of left-right with the WVS and EVS obedience index (horizontal) and with the ESS conservation values (vertical), countries in both surveys
Figure 6. The two surveys agree as closely on age and religiosity as on obedience, so agreement is not specific to the measuredotCorrelation across countries between the WVS and EVS and the ESS correlations of left-right with each predictor; 95% Fisher z intervals
Figure 7. The correlation with party rose among white and Hispanic and other respondents and stayed near zero among Black respondentslineCorrelation of the child-rearing measure with party identification among ANES respondents, by race and study year, with 95% bands; the other views add liberal-conservative self-placement and the GSS
Figure 8. Every attitude is more common on the obedience side of the index, and the gap is largest for moral conservatismdumbbellShare holding each attitude among respondents on the autonomy side and the obedience side of the index, average of country shares (each country counted once); 95% bootstrap intervals; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023
Figure 9. Dropping the faith item shrinks the gaps for moral conservatism and for homosexuals as neighbors, and leaves the gaps for immigrants, race, army rule and a strong leader no smallerdumbbellGap between the obedience side and the autonomy side of the index in the share holding each attitude, with and without the religious-faith item, on the countries that qualify under both; 95% bootstrap intervals; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023

The god gap in America

Chapter 9.1 in Part IX

Figure 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 pointslineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES), reported voters, percentage points, 95% intervals; ANES 1972 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024
Figure 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger stilllineDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among reported voters; gaps in percentage points and shares in percent; ANES 1952 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSSlineRepublican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) among frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by year, percent, 95% intervals
Figure 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the riselineStandardized slope of ideology on church attendance, by year, raw and net of party identification; 95% intervals
Figure 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specificationstabsEarly and late GSS periods compared on one common sample of respondents, by specification; 95% bootstrap intervals
Figure 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grownlineWeighted correlation of church attendance (never to more than weekly) with cultural conservatism, economic conservatism and self-placed ideology, by period, GSS respondents, 95% intervals
Figure 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averagesdotWeighted correlation between left-right self-placement and the importance of God or attendance, inside each country; the United States on two measures and equal-country means for Europe and the rest of the world; 95% intervals
Figure 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no changelineWeighted correlation between church attendance and left-right or ideological self-placement, by survey year; the United States in the GSS and CES and a fixed panel of European countries in the ESS; 95% intervals

Religious tradition and race

Chapter 9.3 in Part IX

Figure 1. In 2024 the Democratic share of the two-party vote ran from 14.5% among white born-again Protestants to 83.1% among Black ProtestantsdotDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by religious tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2024 (buttons: five elections pooled, and party identification); 95% intervals
Figure 2. White born-again and Black Protestant voters attend weekly or more at 57.8% and 47.3%, against 26.7% of all voters, and voted 14.5% and 83.1% DemocraticscatterShare of reported voters who attend services weekly or more (horizontal) against the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote (vertical), by tradition and race, 2024; dot area is the group's share of voters
Figure 3. From 2008 to 2024 the Democratic share changed by −13.2 points among Hispanic Catholics and −10.3 among Black Protestants, against −6.2 among white born-again Protestants and −6.5 among white CatholicsdumbbellDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote by tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2008 and a later election (the buttons switch the later election); 95% intervals
Figure 4. Inside tradition-by-race groups the vote differs by attendance in different directions: seldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share was +13.7 points among white Catholics, +10.1 among white born-again Protestants, +1.9 among Black Protestants and −5.4 among white Protestants who are not born-again, a sign that the GSS and ANES do not reproducedumbbellDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote among frequent attenders (weekly or more) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2008 to 2024 pooled (buttons: single years and party identification); 95% intervals
Figure 5. Of the 27.7 point gap between seldom and frequent attenders in the 2024 vote, 14.6 points is a gap inside tradition-by-race groups and 13.1 points reflects which groups the two attendance levels containlineSeldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, percentage points, split into a within-group part and a mix part, 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 6. White born-again Protestants contribute 10.2 points to the mix part of the 2024 gap and Black Protestants −1.8 points, while the unaffiliated contribute 7.2 points to the within-group partdotEach group's contribution to the gap between seldom and frequent attenders in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, percentage points, split into the group's own gap and the mix of attendance groups, 2024 (button: five elections pooled); 95% intervals
Figure 7. In the GSS the Democratic share of party identifiers among white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants fell from 61.0% in 1972 to 1984 to 30.6% in 2010 to 2018, while Black Protestants stayed near 91.1%lineDemocratic share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) by RELTRAD tradition, for all members and for frequent and seldom attenders, five survey windows from 1972 to 2022, percent; 95% intervals (button: the ANES presidential vote, 1980 to 2020)
Figure 8. The ANES and the CES differ by +13.2 points for white Protestants who are not born-again in 2024, and only the CES puts their attendance gap below zerotabsTwo checks on the CES tradition-by-race coding: 2024 levels in the CES and the ANES Time Series, and the attendance gap for white Protestants under each survey and coding

Nationalization of the county vote

Chapter 10.1 in Part X

Figure 1. The spread of county swings was above 10 points in 28 of 29 pairs through 1984 and below it in 9 of 10 sincelineStandard deviation of county swings in the two-party margin, percentage points; one point per pair of consecutive presidential elections, plotted at the later election
Figure 2. Relative county swings lay far from zero in early pairs and sat in a narrow band just above zero in 2020 to 2024ridgelineRelative swing is a county's swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin minus the national swing, percentage points; height is the share of a pair's votes in each 2-point bin, nine pairs of presidential elections
Figure 3. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024county-mapChange in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections
Figure 4. The share of votes near the national swing was 73.3% in 2008 to 2012 and 73.1% in 2020 to 2024, the two highest of 39 pairslineShare of votes cast in counties whose swing is within 5 points of the national swing, percent; one point per pair of consecutive presidential elections, plotted at the later election
Figure 5. The spread of county swings was 33.5 points in the South and 11.4 elsewhere in 1960 to 1964, and 4.4 and 4.5 in 2020 to 2024lineStandard deviation of county swings within each region, percentage points of the two-party margin, weighted by votes; one point per pair of elections, plotted at the later election
Figure 6. County margins correlated with the previous election's margins above 0.9 in 3 of 29 pairs through 1984 and in all 10 pairs sincelineVote-weighted correlation between a county's two-party margin and its margin in an earlier election, plotted at the later election
Figure 7. 2020 to 2024 is the lowest pair under all 10 versions of the spreadtableSpread of county swings for 2020 to 2024 and for the next lowest pair under five measures, each weighted by votes and with each county counted once, percentage points

Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024

Chapter 10.2 in Part X

Figure 1. The share of votes cast in counties far from the national margin rose from 25.5% in 1976 to 58.8% in 2016 and was 56.5% in 2024lineShare of two-party votes, or of counties in the second view, at least 20 (upper line) and 40 (lower line) points from the national margin of the same election, percent, 1868 to 2024
Figure 2. The share rose by more than 7 points in 3 elections after 1976, in 1980, 2000 and 2016, and no other election moved it by more than 3.2barChange from the previous election in the share of two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percentage points, 1980 to 2024
Figure 3. The former Confederacy fell from 86.3% of its votes in far counties in 1904 to 58.0% in 2024, and the rest of the country rose to 55.7%lineShare of a region's two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percent, presidential elections 1868 to 2024
Figure 4. In 2024, 79.1% of counties were 20 or more points from the national margin, against 37.3% in 1976county-mapCounty two-party margin minus the national two-party margin of the same election, percentage points (positive is more Democratic than the nation), seven presidential elections from 1876 to 2024
Figure 5. In 2024, 229 far Democratic and 2,234 far Republican counties each cast 28.2% of two-party votesbarCounties at least 20 points more Democratic or more Republican than the national margin: share of two-party votes in the first view and count of counties in the second, 1976 and 2024
Figure 6. The share of votes cast within 5 points of the national margin was 22.9% in 1976, 9.4% in 2016 and 14.7% in 2024ridgelineShare of two-party votes, or of counties in the second view, by bin of the county margin minus the national margin, percentage points, seven presidential elections from 1876 to 2024
Figure 7. In a fixed panel of counties the share rose 38.5 points from 1976 to 2024, against 31.0 for all countieslineShare of two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percent, for all counties in each election and for a panel of 1,652 counties that report in every election from 1868, through 2024, with a second panel from 1872 in the second view
Figure 8. The spread of state margins around the national margin rose from 9.4 points in 1976 to 17.2 in 2024lineVote-weighted standard deviation of two-party margins, percentage points: county margins around the national margin, state margins around the national margin, and county margins around their own state's margin, 1868 to 2024

Down the ballot

Chapter 10.3 in Part X

Figure 1. Self-reported ticket splitting between president and House fell from 29.5% of voters in 1972 to 4.7% in 2024lineShare of voters who reported different parties' candidates for president and for the House (or Senate), voters with a major-party vote in both races, ANES studies 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 2. Web respondents reported more ticket splitting than in-person respondents for the House in 2016 by +7.2 points, against −1.9 in 2012 and −0.3 in 2024dumbbellShare of voters who reported different parties' candidates for president and the House (or Senate), by interview mode, ANES 2012, 2016 and 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 3. Voters who chose a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House were 25.0% in 1972 and 1.7% in 2024lineShare of voters with a major-party vote for president and for the House, by which party won each vote, ANES studies 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 4. Counties whose presidential and House winners differed fell from 31.0% of counties in 1992 to 2.8% in 2024lineShare of counties, and of presidential two-party votes, where the Democratic and Republican presidential winner differs from the House winner, counties with a contested House race, 1992 to 2024
Figure 5. Counties with different presidential and House winners were spread across regions in 1992, 32.5% of the South's counties and 29.9% of the other regions' countiescounty-mapCounties by the party that won the presidential vote and the party that won the House vote, counties in contested House races, each presidential election from 1992 to 2024
Figure 6. The correlation between county presidential and House margins rose from +0.65 in 1992 to +0.99 in 2024lineVote-weighted correlation across counties between the Democratic minus Republican margin for president and for the House (or Senate), counties in contested races, 1992 to 2024; 95% intervals
Figure 7. A shift shared by the counties of one district or state accounts for most of the gap between presidential and down-ballot marginslineVote-weighted root mean square of the down-ballot margin minus the presidential margin, in points of margin, and the part that varies among counties inside one district (House) or state (Senate), 1992 to 2024
Figure 8. Between 1992 and 2024 the share of ANES voters who split their ticket fell by 17.7 points and the share of divided counties by 28.2 pointslineShare of ANES voters whose presidential and House votes were for different parties (95% intervals), and share of counties in contested House races with different presidential and House winners, 1992 to 2024
Figure 9. The main House sample holds between 71% and 84% of the presidential votes of the contiguous states and the main Senate sample between 49% and 74%tableCounties, share of the 48 contiguous states' presidential two-party votes, and share of divided counties in the main House and Senate samples, by election

Precincts within counties

Chapter 11.1 in Part XI

Figure 1. Bucks County precincts cluster near an even split, while Centre County precincts form two groups, one on each sidehistogramShare of each county's 2024 two-party votes cast in precincts in each 10-point band of margin
Figure 2. Precincts are more often lopsided, and less often close, than counties or than random assignment of voters would make thembarShare of 2024 two-party presidential votes cast in units decided by each margin, in percent of votes
Figure 3. Spread inside counties is widest in Mississippi and Alabama and scattered across the Southwest and Plainscounty-mapVote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins inside each county, 2024, in points of two-party margin; counties with at least 5 reporting units
Figure 4. Spread of precinct margins falls from the largest metro counties to the least urban onesbarVote-weighted mean of county spreads by Rural-Urban Continuum Code group, 2024, in points of two-party margin
Figure 5. Spread rises from the reddest counties to about Trump +14, then levels offscatterVote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins inside each county against the county two-party margin, 2024; one dot per county, sized by two-party votes
Figure 6. Spread rises with Democratic lean, with or without controls for county size and statedotCorrelation between the spread of precinct margins and the county two-party margin, Democratic positive, across 2,853 counties, 2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 7. Spread falls with distance from an even split, except in vote-weighted comparisons of counties within 50 pointslineCorrelation between the spread of precinct margins and the size of the county margin, among counties with a margin at or below each cutoff, 2024, with 95% intervals
Figure 8. Near-tied counties differ widely in how much their precinct margins varyhistogramShare of the near-tied counties in each 5-point bin of spread of precinct margins, 2024; margin under 5 points and at least 20 precincts
Figure 9. Dropping ballot-bucket units moves each correlation by at most 0.02 and each vote share by at most 0.3 pointstableMain statistics in the full sample and in a side check that drops ballot-bucket units, 2024 two-party presidential returns

Five axes of the county vote

Chapter 12.1 in Part XII

Figure 1. Every comparison in the chapter uses the same outcome and the same counties within an election, and differs in what it holds fixedtableThe outcome, sample, period, weights and other variables of each comparison; the outcome is the county two-party margin, Democratic minus Republican
Figure 2. Vote-weighted, the correlation of college share with the county margin rose from +0.28 in 2000 to +0.66 in 2024, while the white share's moved from −0.52 to −0.57lineCorrelation between a county characteristic and the county two-party margin in the same presidential election, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes
Figure 3. Held together, college share's coefficient is +0.71 against a correlation of +0.66, and income's is −0.26 against +0.40, vote-weighted in 2024dotStandardized coefficients for the county two-party margin in 2024: each axis alone, all five axes together, and all five with a baseline for each state; two weightings
Figure 4. Held together, college share's coefficient rose from +0.25 in 2000 to +0.71 in 2024 and income's was below zero in every election, vote-weightedlineStandardized coefficients from a regression of the county two-party margin on all five axes, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes
Figure 5. Vote-weighted, the five axes reproduce 41% of the variance of the county margin in 2000 and 69% in 2024, and 87% in 2024 with state baselineslineShare of the variance of the county two-party margin reproduced by regressions on county characteristics, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes
Figure 6. Vote-weighted, the part of the county margin that the five axes leave over narrowed from 20.4 to 18.4 points while the part they fit widened from 16.9 to 27.2lineStandard deviation across counties of the two-party margin, the margin fitted by the five axes and the margin left over, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes
Figure 7. The vote-weighted correlation of college share exceeds the county-equal one by +0.18 in 2000 and by +0.11 in 2024dumbbellCorrelation of each axis with the county two-party margin when counties are weighted by two-party votes and when each county counts once, 2000 and 2024
Figure 8. The correlation depends on the measure within an axis in 2024, from −0.03 for the share without a high school diploma to +0.66 for college share, vote-weighteddotCorrelation of fifteen county measures, grouped by the five axes, with the county two-party margin in 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal
Figure 9. In 2024 the mean gap between a county's margin and the five-axis fit is −10.8 points in the Census South and +6.7 points in the rest of the country, vote-weightedcounty-mapCounty two-party margin minus the margin fitted by a regression on the five axes weighted by two-party votes, 2000 and 2024, in percentage points of margin

The diploma map

Chapter 12.2 in Part XII

Figure 1. Vote-weighted, the slope of the vote on county college share rose from 3.9 to 9.2 points per 10 points of college share, in steps before 2008 and between 2012 and 2016lineSlope of a county's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote on the share of its residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, 2000 to 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal
Figure 2. Vote-weighted, the slope rose from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016 in all six versions, and from 2016 to 2024 it changed by +0.4 to +1.1 in the five adjusted versions and by 0.0 with college share alonedotChange in the slope of the county Democratic share on county college share between elections, six versions of the slope, vote-weighted and county-equal
Figure 3. The most educated fifth of counties voted 29.8 points more Democratic than the least educated fifth in 2024, against 9.3 in 2000scatterDemocratic share of the two-party presidential vote against the share of residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, by county, 2024 and 2000, with the mean of five equal-sized groups of counties
Figure 4. Counting each county once, the 2000 slope inside large counties and inside other counties each had an interval that includes zero, and by 2024 both were above zerolineSlope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside large counties and inside other counties, with the all-county slope, 2000 to 2024, counting each county once or by two-party votes
Figure 5. Vote-weighted, the slope with state and race held fixed went from 0.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2024lineSlope of the county Democratic share on county college share alone, with race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, and within states with race and ethnicity held fixed, 2000 to 2024
Figure 6. The slope was higher in 2024 than in 2000 in all four groups of counties by white share, with the largest point change among counties 90% white or morelineSlope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside four groups of counties by non-Hispanic white share of residents at the election, 2000 to 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal
Figure 7. The vote-weighted slope was positive in every one of the 39 states in 2024, against 29 in 2000dumbbellSlope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside each state with at least 20 counties, 2000 and 2024, vote-weighted, with 95% intervals
Figure 8. Counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority fell from 325 in 2000 to 93 in 2024county-mapEach county by whether its college share is above the median of that election's counties and whether Democrats won a majority of its two-party vote, 2000 to 2024, Alaska excluded
Figure 9. Counting each county once, the correlation with 2000 college share was positive in 1972, negative in the point estimates from 1976 to 1996 and positive from 2000lineCorrelation of a county's share of residents with a bachelor's degree or more in 2000 with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in each presidential election, 1972 to 2024

Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote

Chapter 12.4 in Part XII

Figure 1. The swing rose with the capital-gains share and fell with the EITC sharelineVote-weighted mean change in the two-party margin, 2016 to 2020, by decile of ZIP codes ranked by share of returns; 95% intervals clustered on county; positive is toward the Democrats
Figure 2. The 2020 margin was most Democratic at both ends of each share and lowest in the middle of the rangelineVote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin, Democratic minus Republican, by decile of ZIP codes ranked by share of returns; 95% intervals clustered on county
Figure 3. The two end deciles that swung toward the Republicans are the poorest of the fourtableVote-weighted mean swing, 2020 margin and demographic profile of the lowest and highest deciles of each share; positive swing and margin are toward the Democrats
Figure 4. Controls take the EITC coefficient to about zero and change the sign of the capital-gains coefficientdotWeighted regression coefficient of the 2016 to 2020 swing on the share of returns, one set of controls per row; 95% intervals clustered on county in the first view and on state in the second
Figure 5. The EITC share is highest in the Mississippi Delta, Alabama's Black Belt and along the Rio Grandecounty-mapShare of returns claiming the earned income tax credit by county, IRS tax year 2022, averaged from ZIP codes within the county
Figure 6. At county grain the intervals are wide and the capital-gains coefficient with college held fixed includes zerodotWeighted regression coefficient of the 2016 to 2020 county swing on the county share of returns, one set of controls per row; 95% intervals clustered on state
Figure 7. Investors voted more Republican than non-investors with the same education in 2016 and 2020dumbbellDemocratic minus Republican margin among voters for the two major parties, by year, education and whether the respondent reports investments; 95% intervals; positive is toward the Democrats
Figure 8. The ZIP-code sample is 27,144 areas in 3,088 counties and the county sample is 3,080 countiestableCounts of ZIP code tabulation areas and counties at each step from the vote file to the two analysis samples
Figure 9. Two of the partial correlations change sign when every ZIP code counts equallytablePartial correlation of the 2016 to 2020 swing with each share, with vote weights and with every ZIP code counted equally; ZIP-code sample

Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024

Chapter 12.7 in Part XII

Figure 1. Vote-weighted, the college correlation fell after 2016 while the Hispanic and foreign-born correlations turned negativelineCorrelation between a county characteristic at the start of a pair of presidential elections and the county's swing in the two-party margin, 6 pairs from 2000 to 2004 through 2020 to 2024
Figure 2. In 2020 to 2024, 75.6% of counties were within 5 points of the national swing, and the counties furthest below it were high-Hispaniccounty-mapCounty swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national swing, in percentage points, for the pairs 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024
Figure 3. The 2020 to 2024 college correlation is similar in large and other counties and is near zero only across all counties weighted by votestableCorrelation of the college share and the foreign-born share with the county swing, with the mean college share and mean swing of each group of counties, for 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024
Figure 4. County swing relative to the nation fell with Hispanic share in 2020 to 2024, and fell faster at higher sharesscatterEach dot is a county with characteristics for 2020; the vertical axis is its swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin between 2020 and 2024, minus the national swing, in percentage points
Figure 5. With the other three shares held fixed, college share tracks the 2020 to 2024 swing although its vote-weighted correlation alone is near zerodumbbellCorrelation of each characteristic with the county swing, alone and as a standardized coefficient in one regression on the four characteristics; two pairs of elections and two weightings
Figure 6. ZIP code areas give Hispanic and foreign-born correlations similar to counties for 2016 to 2020, and a larger college correlation with a different college measuredumbbellVote-weighted correlation of four characteristics with the swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin between 2016 and 2020, at county and ZIP code area grain
Figure 7. High-Hispanic counties swung 4.2 points further toward the Republicans than the average county, vote-weightedbarMean county swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin minus the national swing, minus the mean over all counties of the same weighting, in percentage points, by county type, weighted by votes and counting each county once
Figure 8. The Democratic margin fell among Hispanic and Black respondents in 2020 to 2024 and among white and Black respondents in 2012 to 2016dotChange in the Democratic minus Republican margin among White, Black and Hispanic respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, in percentage points, with one panel for each pair of elections

Measures of hardship compared

Chapter 13.1 in Part XIII

Figure 1. The Social Capital Atlas drops ZIP code areas that voted 40% Democratic against 53% for those kept, and missing controls drop tracts in the District of ColumbiatableUnits dropped at each step of the tract sample and the ZIP code area sample, with the votes they carry and their Democratic share of the two-party vote, 2020
Figure 2. Raw associations with the Democratic vote split in sign across 24 hardship measures, and adjusted ones are smaller and mostly positivedumbbellDemocratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation of each measure, tracts, raw and with race and ethnicity, education, density and state held fixed
Figure 3. Race and education move the coefficients most, and density and state fixed effects move them lessheatmapCoefficient of the tract Democratic two-party share on each standardized measure, points per standard deviation, as controls are added from left to right
Figure 4. Race, education and density share 40% to 80% of the within-state variance of the PLACES health measures and 2% of the variance of toxic releasesdotShare of the vote-weighted variance of each measure shared with the controls, in percent: within states for race and ethnicity shares, the college share and density; across all tracts for race, age and county effects in the second view
Figure 5. Friend clustering, volunteering and the unemployment compensation share change sign once the controls enter, while the earned income credit share keeps its raw signdumbbellDemocratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation of each measure, ZIP code areas, raw and with race and ethnicity, education, density and state held fixed
Figure 6. The same measure gives raw coefficients within 1.5 points on tracts and ZIP code areas but adjusted ones up to 3.4 points apart, and up to 2.8 points apart without the college sharedotDemocratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation, Area Deprivation Index and nine PLACES measures, tracts and ZIP code areas
Figure 7. Two existing chapters use a different outcome, sample, weights or controls, so their coefficients cannot be set beside the ones heretableOutcome, unit, weights, controls and interval method of this chapter and of the two chapters that use the same atlas files
Figure 8. Under each of 9 changes to the specification the adjusted sign agrees with the common specification for at least 21 of the 24 measurestableTract measures, number of measures whose adjusted interval lies above zero, below zero or includes zero, and agreement with the common specification

Air pollution and the vote

Chapter 13.6 in Part XIII

Figure 1. The Democratic margin rises from −29.8 points in the tenth of tracts with the least diesel exposure to +49.1 points in the tenth with the mostdotDemocratic minus Republican share of the two-party 2020 presidential vote, percentage points; vote-weighted mean by decile of tract diesel particulate exposure, each row labeled with the decile and its median exposure in micrograms per cubic meter; 95% intervals clustered by county
Figure 2. Higher-diesel tracts are denser, less white and more Hispanic, and income peaks at decile 6 while college share stays nearly flat after ittableCharacteristics of the tracts in each decile of diesel particulate exposure (8,113 or 8,114 tracts per decile): shares of residents (percent), income (dollars) and deprivation rank averaged by votes, density and exposure as medians
Figure 3. Controls shrink the Democratic gap for every pollutant, and with all four exposures in one model traffic proximity keeps 8.7 points while diesel falls to 1.3dotDifference in the Democratic two-party margin (percentage points) per standard deviation of tract exposure, by pollutant and set of controls; 81,134 tracts; 95% intervals clustered by county
Figure 4. The residual margin after race, income and education averages −15.9 points in southern counties and +14.5 points in northeastern counties, weighted by votescounty-mapResidual margin: tract Democratic two-party margin minus the margin predicted from tract race, income and education, averaged over each county's tracts by votes, percentage points; county diesel exposure in micrograms per cubic meter
Figure 5. County diesel exposure correlates at +0.26 with the residual margin after race, income and education, and at +0.08 (interval includes zero) with density addedscatterEach dot is a county: its mean diesel exposure (averaged over tracts by 2020 votes) against its residual margin, the Democratic two-party margin minus the margin predicted from race, income and education, in percentage points; correlations across 3,096 counties weighted by county votes
Figure 6. Support for EPA enforcement rises with county diesel exposure, but the rise shrinks within party and its interval includes zero with county density held fixeddotPercentage-point difference in support for strengthening EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs, per standard deviation of county diesel exposure; 57,411 respondents in 2,630 counties, 2020; 95% intervals clustered by county

The ideology of the donor pool

Chapter 14.4 in Part XIV

Figure 1. The share of donors near zero fell and donors left of zero became the majority between 1980 and 2024ridgelineCFscores of reliable individual donors active in each election cycle, 1980-2024; a donor counts in every cycle in which they gave
Figure 2. The share of donors near the center fell from 13.0% in 1986 to 9.6% in 2002, then to 1.2% in 2024linePercent of active reliable donors with a CFscore within 0.25 of zero, by election cycle
Figure 3. Donors who joined the pool account for most of the fall in the near-center sharewaterfallChange in the percent of active reliable donors within 0.25 of zero, 1980 to 2024, split into donors who left and donors who joined between consecutive cycles
Figure 4. Every group of donors that first gave from 2010 on has 3.0% or less near the center, against 11.8% to 13.4% for the groups of the 1980slineReliable donors grouped by the cycle of their first itemized gift: percent within 0.25 of zero (first and second views) and share of each cycle's active pool (third view)
Figure 5. The fall in the near-center share holds for every center band and recipient filter checked, and for dollars once each donor is cappedlinePercent of active reliable donors within a band of zero, by election cycle; one choice varied per view
Figure 6. The share of federal candidates near the center fell from 13.3% in 1980 to 2.0% in 2020 and was 3.1% in 2024linePercent with a CFscore within 0.25 of zero: reliable donors, House and Senate candidates with a score, and seated winners, by election cycle
Figure 7. The parties moved apart on both scales, but CFscores show the Democratic median moving further and roll-call scores the Republican medianlineMedian score and 25th to 75th percentile range of House and Senate candidates by party, by election cycle; other views: seated members by CFscore and by roll-call votes
Figure 8. The donor share near the center fell from 7.8% to 1.2% while self-described moderates stayed between 30.8% and 39.0%lineEach series as a percent of its own 2006 value: reliable donors within 0.25 of zero (DIME) and adults who call themselves moderate (CES), by election year

Counties where donors and voters diverge

Chapter 14.7 in Part XIV

Figure 1. Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors cluster in the South; Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are in every regioncounty-mapCounties classed by whether the 2020 two-party presidential vote and the mean CFscore of the county's reliable donors lean the same way (negative CFscore is left, positive is right)
Figure 2. Donor lean falls as the Democratic share of the vote rises, and the divergent counties lie in the two quadrants where the two measures disagreescatterMean CFscore of reliable donors against the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, one dot per county (n = 2,839 counties), 2020 vote
Figure 3. Right-leaning donors are more common in Democratic-voting counties that are at least 30% Black: 58.7% of them, against 6.5% of the restbarShare of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by non-Hispanic Black share of residents, for Democratic-voting and Republican-voting counties, 2020 vote
Figure 4. At every pool floor, a larger share of Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black than of the rest have right-leaning donorsbarShare of Democratic-voting counties whose donor pool leans right, by whether the county is at least 30% Black, among counties with at least the stated number of reliable donors, 2020 vote
Figure 5. Among Democratic-voting counties, donor lean rises with Black share, and less steeply when counties are weighted by votesscatterMean CFscore of reliable donors against non-Hispanic Black share of residents, Democratic-voting counties (n = 498), 2020 vote and demographics
Figure 6. The adjusted Black share slope is above zero when each county counts once and includes zero when counties are weighted by votesdotRegression coefficients of county donor lean, per 10 points of Black share or college share, Democratic-voting counties (n = 498), 95% intervals from standard errors clustered on state
Figure 7. Mississippi holds 7 of the 10 Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donorsdotThe 10 Democratic-voting counties with the highest mean CFscore of reliable donors and the 10 Republican-voting counties with the lowest, among counties with a pool large enough to rank, 2020 vote
Figure 8. Democratic-voting counties diverge mostly in small pools, Republican-voting counties in large onesbarShare of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by number of reliable donors in the county, for Democratic-voting and Republican-voting counties, 2020 vote
Figure 9. Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are 63.5% of Northeast counties and 12.5% of Southern onesbarShare of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by Census region, for Republican-voting and Democratic-voting counties, 2020 vote
Figure 10. The number of divergent counties runs from 112 to 1,030 across the definitions testedtableCounties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote under the chapter's definition and under changes to the donor pool, the pool floor, the vote year, the neutral point of the donor scale and the divergence rule
Figure 11. Counties at least 30% Black sit to the right of other Democratic-voting counties in every donor cohortdotMean CFscore of reliable donors, or the difference between two groups of counties, by the election cycles in which donors first gave, Democratic-voting counties with a large Black share and other Democratic-voting counties, 2020 vote

Party and place

Chapter 15.1 in Part XV

Figure 1. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue countiesdumbbellGap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 2. The party gap is between 3.6 and 15.5 times the place gap, depending on the issuedotParty gap divided by place gap, by issue, with 95% intervals; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 3. The party gap exceeds the place gap under every definition, and the ratio falls as the county cutoff risestableAverage party gap and place gap over the issues, in points (share taking the Democratic side), and their ratio, with 95% intervals; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 4. Within each party, support changes less across county margins than it differs between the partieslineShare supporting the policy (%) by party and two-party margin of the respondent's county, seven bins of counties; five issues; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 5. The Republican place gap is larger on most issues, but the interval for the average difference includes zerodumbbellPlace gap in points (deep-blue minus deep-red counties, share taking the Democratic side) for Democrats and Republicans, by issue; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 6. The average place gap is larger among independents with no lean than among Democrats and RepublicansdotPlace gap averaged over the issues, in points (deep-blue minus deep-red counties, share taking the Democratic side), by party group, with 95% intervals; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 7. Support for background checks rises with county margin among independents and Republican leaners, not among DemocratslineShare supporting universal background checks (%) by party identification and two-party margin of the respondent's county, seven bins of counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 8. The party gap rose on 3 of these 4 issues across presidential cycles and stayed above both place gapslineGap in points (share taking the Democratic side) by presidential cycle, Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; four issues; CES surveys 2006 to 2021
Figure 9. The party gap rose on 8 of 12 issues over spans that differ by issue, and fell on background checksdotChange in the between-party gap in points (share taking the Democratic side), first to last presidential cycle in which each issue was asked, grouped by span; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES surveys 2006 to 2021
Figure 10. In both surveys the party gap is larger than the place gap on every measuretabsParty gap and place gap at the state level, and their ratio, by measure; ANES waves 2012 to 2024 and CES survey years 2013 to 2021
Figure 11. The party gap averages 45.7 points across states and shows no clear relation to a state's partisanshipscatterState party gap averaged over the issues, in points, against the state's mean two-party presidential margin; Democrats and Republicans; CES survey years 2013 to 2021