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    Chapter 5.2

    Tolerance of speech

    In 2008 to 2018 Democrats allowed a racist speaker 6.8 points less often than Republicans did, while the party gaps on four speakers that conservatives are expected to object to were within 2.1 points of zero.

    DraftFigures and numbers may change as the analysis is rebuilt.what is still being checked

    Not yet done: intervals that use the GSS strata and clusters for the annual cells, the adjusted gaps and the family gaps.

    In the General Social Survey (GSS) of 2008 to 2018, Republicans were more willing than Democrats to let a speaker the question describes as one "who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior" speak in their community. The shares were 63%63.0% percent who would allow the speaker to speakEstimandweighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speakn2,879Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationRepublicans answering the racist item (leaners included)Period2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey of Republicans and 56%56.1% percent who would allow the speaker to speakEstimandweighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speakn4,175Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats answering the racist item (leaners included)Period2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey of Democrats.Democrats and Republicans include independents who say they lean toward a party, the leanersPartisan leanerA respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses., throughout this essay. The question is whether he should be allowed to speak, not whether the respondent agrees with him. On four of the other five speakers, the parties' answers in those years were close. Whether Democrats or Republicans allowed a speaker more often depended on the speaker.

    The party gap depends on the speaker

    The essay's labels for the other speakers are short names for the survey's own descriptions (Table 1). The chapter measures the difference as a party gap, Democrats minus Republicans, in pointsPercentage pointThe unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.. A negative gap means that Republicans allowed the speaker more often, and the chapter calls it a Republican lead. On the racist speaker the gap in 2008 to 2018 was −6.8−6.8 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans)Interval95% CI −9.7 to −4.0n7,054Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points, the largest in size of the six, though the interval on its difference from the militarist gap includes zero. The gaps for the Communist, the anti-religionist, the homosexual man and the Muslim clergyman, the four speakers the chapter codes as objectionable to conservatives, had point estimates within 2.12.1 pointsEstimandlargest absolute party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman itemsWeightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points of zero. The militarist, like the racist, kept a Republican lead.

    In 1976 to 1994 the party gap was negative for every speaker asked, so Republicans allowed each one more often than Democrats did. Figure 1 sets the two periods side by side. The leads that shrank are the leads on the speakers that conservatives are expected to object to. Ideology separates the sides on those four speakers. In 2008 to 2018 self-placed liberals allowed them 7.27.2 pointsEstimandsmallest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman itemsWeightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationliberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey to 13.713.7 pointsEstimandlargest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman itemsWeightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationliberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points more often than conservatives did, and for each of the four the party gap is smaller than the ideology gap.

    Figure 1

    Republicans allowed every speaker more often in 1976 to 1994, and by 2008 to 2018 only the racist and militarist leads remained

    Gap in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, in points, by speaker and period, with 95% intervals; the axis names the two groups

    • Objectionable to liberals
    • Objectionable to conservatives

    1976 to 1994

    2008 to 2018

    Democrats minus Republicans (points)

    Show data
    Data for Republicans allowed every speaker more often in 1976 to 1994, and by 2008 to 2018 only the racist and militarist leads remained
    SpeakerPeriodGroupingGap (points)LowHighRespondents
    Racist1976 to 1994party−4.5−6.3−2.615,315
    Militarist1976 to 1994party−4.6−6.4−2.715,329
    Communist1976 to 1994party−4.3−6.2−2.515,275
    Anti-religionist1976 to 1994party−6.3−8.0−4.515,497
    Homosexual man1976 to 1994party−2.4−4.1−0.715,167
    Racist2008 to 2018party−6.8−9.7−4.07,054
    Militarist2008 to 2018party−3.8−6.4−1.17,069
    Communist2008 to 2018party+0.8−1.9+3.56,981
    Anti-religionist2008 to 2018party−1.4−3.8+1.07,098
    Homosexual man2008 to 2018party+2.1+0.1+4.07,063
    Muslim clergyman2008 to 2018party+0.5−2.4+3.47,062
    Racist1976 to 1994party_no2008−4.5−6.3−2.615,315
    Militarist1976 to 1994party_no2008−4.6−6.4−2.715,329
    Communist1976 to 1994party_no2008−4.3−6.2−2.515,275
    Anti-religionist1976 to 1994party_no2008−6.3−8.0−4.515,497
    Homosexual man1976 to 1994party_no2008−2.4−4.1−0.715,167
    Racist2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008−8.4−11.5−5.25,984
    Militarist2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008−3.8−6.6−0.95,998
    Communist2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008−0.1−3.0+2.85,911
    Anti-religionist2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008−2.7−5.3−0.26,019
    Homosexual man2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008+1.1−0.9+3.15,994
    Muslim clergyman2010 to 2018 (2008 left out)party_no2008−0.2−3.4+2.95,990
    Racist1976 to 1994ideology+6.2+4.1+8.410,399
    Militarist1976 to 1994ideology+9.2+7.1+11.410,398
    Communist1976 to 1994ideology+11.0+8.8+13.110,405
    Anti-religionist1976 to 1994ideology+8.5+6.5+10.510,504
    Homosexual man1976 to 1994ideology+10.5+8.6+12.510,322
    Racist2008 to 2018ideology+1.0−2.2+4.25,302
    Militarist2008 to 2018ideology+6.3+3.4+9.25,302
    Communist2008 to 2018ideology+10.3+7.4+13.25,240
    Anti-religionist2008 to 2018ideology+7.2+4.7+9.85,333
    Homosexual man2008 to 2018ideology+7.9+5.9+9.95,293
    Muslim clergyman2008 to 2018ideology+13.7+10.4+17.05,293
    Racist1976 to 1994party_adjusted−1.3−3.1+0.615,228
    Militarist1976 to 1994party_adjusted−0.7−2.5+1.215,243
    Communist1976 to 1994party_adjusted+0.2−1.6+2.015,190
    Anti-religionist1976 to 1994party_adjusted−1.7−3.40.015,406
    Homosexual man1976 to 1994party_adjusted+1.0−0.6+2.715,080
    Racist2008 to 2018party_adjusted−3.9−6.9−0.87,037
    Militarist2008 to 2018party_adjusted−0.3−2.9+2.47,052
    Communist2008 to 2018party_adjusted+4.8+2.1+7.56,965
    Anti-religionist2008 to 2018party_adjusted+3.0+0.5+5.47,082
    Homosexual man2008 to 2018party_adjusted+4.7+2.7+6.87,046
    Muslim clergyman2008 to 2018party_adjusted+5.8+2.9+8.77,045
    Racist1976 to 1994ideology_adjusted+5.7+3.5+7.910,338
    Militarist1976 to 1994ideology_adjusted+6.8+4.7+8.810,338
    Communist1976 to 1994ideology_adjusted+9.3+7.3+11.410,343
    Anti-religionist1976 to 1994ideology_adjusted+6.9+4.9+8.810,441
    Homosexual man1976 to 1994ideology_adjusted+8.7+6.8+10.610,261
    Racist2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+1.9−1.4+5.15,289
    Militarist2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+5.0+2.1+7.85,289
    Communist2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+8.6+5.8+11.55,227
    Anti-religionist2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+6.7+4.1+9.35,321
    Homosexual man2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+6.7+4.6+8.75,280
    Muslim clergyman2008 to 2018ideology_adjusted+13.4+10.3+16.55,280
    Note: The speakers are grouped by which side is expected to object to them: liberals for the racist and the militarist, conservatives for the other four. The grouping is a coding choice, and the rows let a reader regroup them.Note: The Muslim clergyman was first asked about in 2008.Note: Raw intervals use the effective sample size. Adjusted intervals come from a weighted linear regression with robust (HC3) errors on respondents with complete age, education, race and sex.Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size
    1. Step 1
      Find the colored dot in each panel, the racist speaker. It sits left of zero in both periods, at −4.5−4.5 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans)Interval95% CI −6.3 to −2.6n15,315Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod1976-1994 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points in 1976 to 1994, and is the farthest left of the six in the second panel. In the first panel every grey dot is left of zero. In the second only the militarist's interval stays entirely left of zero; the homosexual man's lies right of zero and begins near it.
    2. Step 2
      Right of zero now means liberals allowed the speaker more often than conservatives did. The four speakers objectionable to conservatives sit right of zero in every period in which they were asked. The racist dot moved from +6.2+6.2 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives)Interval95% CI 4.1 to 8.4n10,399Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationliberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the itemPeriod1976-1994 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey to +1.0+1.0 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives)Interval95% CI −2.2 to 4.2n5,302Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationliberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey, the one case in which the liberal lead is absent in 2008 to 2018.
    3. Step 3
      This view holds age, education, race and sex fixed. Every 1976 to 1994 dot is within 1.71.7 pointsEstimandlargest absolute adjusted party gap among the five speakers asked (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year)Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod1976-1994 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points of zero. In 2008 to 2018 the four speakers objectionable to conservatives sit right of zero, from 3.03.0 pointsEstimandsmallest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year)Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey to 5.85.8 pointsEstimandlargest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year)Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points, and the racist dot stays left at −3.9−3.9 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, Democrats minus Republicans, adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year (weighted linear probability model, HC3 errors)Interval95% CI −6.9 to −0.8n7,037Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey. Values in Table 4.

    How the GSS measures tolerance of speech

    The battery descends from Stouffer's national survey of 1954 [1] and keeps its wording across survey years. The descriptions of the speakers are the questionnaire's, dating from the 1970s except for the Muslim clergyman, added in 2008, and phrases such as "a man who admits that he is a homosexual" and "a man who admits he is a Communist" are the survey's language. The GSS has asked national samples of American adults the speaker questions since 1972, through interviewers, mostly in person, until 2021. In all, about 45,00044,878 respondentsEstimandcount of respondentsWeightsnone (count)Populationrespondents who answered at least one speak itemPeriod1972-2024SourceGeneral Social Survey respondents answered at least one of the six speak items between 1972 and 2024. Each share is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that the sample matches the population on known traits, and independents and moderates drop out of the group comparisons. Ideology uses the seven-point self-placement, with liberals at the three left points and conservatives at the three right points. The qualification that matters most is survey modeSurvey modeHow respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.. In 2021 the GSS moved mostly online, and 86%86% percent of respondentsEstimandshare interviewed on the web (unweighted count)n1,310Weightsnone (count)Populationrespondents who answered the racist speak itemPeriod2021SourceGeneral Social Survey of the respondents who answered the racist item that year were interviewed on the web; 2022 and 2024 mix web and interviewer-administered respondents. Mode can change answers to sensitive questions [2], so estimates from 2021 on carry a mode label. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.

    Web respondents allowed the racist speaker less often

    Figure 2 follows the party gap on the racist speaker one survey year at a time. The estimate is below zero in every survey year since 1976 but 2008, and it is farthest below zero in 2021, at −22.9−22.9 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans)Interval95% CI −30.3 to −15.4n990Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2021 waveSourceGeneral Social Survey points. In 2022 and 2024, when the GSS used both modes, 41%40.7% percent who would allow the speaker to speakEstimandweighted share who would allow the speechInterval95% CI 36.5% to 44.9%n1,153Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationadults interviewed on the web (Racist)Period2022 and 2024SourceGeneral Social Survey of web respondents would allow the racist speaker and 55%54.7% percent who would allow the speaker to speakEstimandweighted share who would allow the speechInterval95% CI 50.0% to 59.4%n1,118Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)Populationadults interviewed by an interviewer (Racist)Period2022 and 2024SourceGeneral Social Survey of respondents interviewed by an interviewer would. The difference is similar among Democrats and among Republicans. For the Communist, the anti-religionist and the Muslim clergyman, the mode differences in the share allowing the speech have intervals that include zero.

    The mode difference the data can detect is in the share allowing the racist speaker, not in the size of the party gap. The gap is negative in both modes, and the difference between the two modes has an interval that includes zero. Pooled across modes, the 2022 to 2024 gap differs from the 2008 to 2018 gap by −7.3 (95% CI −15.5 to 0.9)−7.3 points (2022-2024 party gap minus 2008-2018 party gap)Estimanddifference between the pooled 2022-2024 and the 2008-2018 racist party gaps, all interview modes (independent samples)Interval95% CI −15.5 to 0.9Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2022 and 2024 against 2008-2018SourceGeneral Social Survey points, an interval that includes zero. Every estimate for 2021 to 2024 is more negative than the 2008 to 2018 gap, but only the 2021 wave on its own separates from it, and the data do not separate mode from period. Nor can they say whether web respondents answer differently or are different people.

    The exception year, 2008, opens the 2008 to 2018 window, and in that wave alone every party gap except the militarist's was positive. With 2008 included, the change in the racist gap between the two periods has an interval that includes zero. Without it, the 2010 to 2018 gap differs from the 1976 to 1994 gap by −3.9 (95% CI −7.5 to −0.3)−3.9 points (2010-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap)Estimandchange between the two periods in the party gap, 2008 wave left out (independent samples)Interval95% CI −7.5 to −0.3Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod1976-1994 to 2010-2018SourceGeneral Social Survey points, an interval that excludes zero. The persistence of the racist and militarist leads does not depend on that wave; whether the racist lead grew does.

    Figure 2

    Republicans allowed the racist speaker more often than Democrats did in 27 of 28 survey years, with the largest estimated leads in 2021, 2022 and 2024

    Gap in the share who would allow a racist to speak in their community, in points, by survey year, all interview modes, with 95% intervals

    Party gap, Democrats minus Republicans (points)

    Show data
    Data for Republicans allowed the racist speaker more often than Democrats did in 27 of 28 survey years, with the largest estimated leads in 2021, 2022 and 2024
    YearGapGap (points)LowHighRespondents
    1976Party gap−6.2−12.5+0.11,225
    1976Ideology gap+7.4+0.3+14.4830
    1977Party gap−3.4−9.5+2.71,310
    1977Ideology gap+7.4+0.4+14.4877
    1980Party gap−3.0−9.8+3.91,184
    1980Ideology gap+6.7−1.1+14.4830
    1982Party gap−6.6−13.20.01,561
    1982Ideology gap+9.2+1.8+16.61,022
    1984Party gap−6.6−13.4+0.21,257
    1984Ideology gap+4.6−3.7+12.8830
    1985Party gap−5.1−11.7+1.51,336
    1985Ideology gap+8.8+0.6+17.0880
    1987Party gap−0.3−6.3+5.81,558
    1987Ideology gap+9.7+2.5+16.81,018
    1988Party gap−5.6−13.0+1.7835
    1988Ideology gap+5.8−2.9+14.5594
    1989Party gap−3.2−10.5+4.1876
    1989Ideology gap−1.0−9.6+7.6573
    1990Party gap−8.7−16.3−1.1777
    1990Ideology gap−0.5−9.7+8.6549
    1991Party gap−4.3−11.7+3.1833
    1991Ideology gap−1.9−10.7+6.9561
    1993Party gap−1.6−8.8+5.5902
    1993Ideology gap+9.5+1.2+17.9625
    1994Party gap−4.3−9.5+1.01,661
    1994Ideology gap+6.7+0.6+12.81,210
    1996Party gap−3.9−9.3+1.51,554
    1996Ideology gap+2.6−3.8+9.11,094
    1998Party gap−4.5−10.1+1.11,482
    1998Ideology gap+8.2+1.9+14.41,125
    2000Party gap−5.0−10.8+0.71,429
    2000Ideology gap+1.8−4.8+8.31,033
    2002Party gap−3.1−11.3+5.0721
    2002Ideology gap+8.8−0.7+18.4522
    2004Party gap−5.5−13.7+2.6727
    2004Ideology gap−3.2−13.0+6.6530
    2006Party gap−1.5−7.4+4.41,512
    2006Ideology gap+9.9+3.2+16.51,190
    2008Party gap+1.6−5.5+8.71,070
    2008Ideology gap+9.2+1.1+17.3772
    2010Party gap−7.7−15.40.0990
    2010Ideology gap−1.5−10.1+7.2748
    2012Party gap−6.8−14.7+1.0983
    2012Ideology gap−1.0−9.5+7.6765
    2014Party gap−12.0−18.1−5.81,311
    2014Ideology gap−5.6−12.5+1.21,003
    2016Party gap−9.1−15.2−2.91,497
    2016Ideology gap+3.3−3.7+10.41,115
    2018Party gap−5.6−12.9+1.81,203
    2018Ideology gap+2.4−6.0+10.7899
    2021Party gap−22.9−30.3−15.4990
    2021Ideology gap−15.0−23.1−6.9835
    2022Party gap−15.0−26.8−3.3817
    2022Ideology gap−17.1−29.6−4.6697
    2024Party gap−13.6−23.3−3.8797
    2024Ideology gap−5.0−15.3+5.2683

    The line stays below the zero rule in every survey year but 2008 and drops farthest below it in 2021, the first year inside the grey band that marks the mostly web waves. Single-year intervals are wide, so the period averages and the mode comparison in the text are more precise. The ideology view, liberals minus conservatives, is above zero in most years before 2010, near zero in the 2010s and below zero from 2021, with a 2024 interval that includes zero. Values in Table 5.

    Note: The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (see the methods note at the end of the chapter). Estimates from 2021 on mix web and interviewer-administered respondents unless a figure says otherwise.Note: Years in which either group has fewer than 150 respondents or an effective sample below 100 are left out.Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size

    What the gaps mean, and what they do not

    The gaps describe who would let a speaker speak, and the answer moves with the speaker. The militarist item asks about speech, not about support for army rule, which Chapter 5.3, Support for democracy takes up, and willingness to let a speaker speak in principle is not the same as behavior toward a speaker. The raw party gaps also mix party with the traits that differ between the parties. Among people of the same age, education, race and sex in the same survey year, Democrats allowed the four speakers objectionable to conservatives more often than Republicans did in 2008 to 2018. Each of those adjusted gaps has an interval above zero, and the adjusted racist gap stayed negative, at −3.9−3.9 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, Democrats minus Republicans, adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year (weighted linear probability model, HC3 errors)Interval95% CI −6.9 to −0.8n7,037Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points. The racist party gap is negative on all three actions the battery asks about, speaking in the community, teaching in a college and keeping a book in the public library.

    A single average of which side allows more depends on which speakers are counted. Figure 3 averages each respondent's answers over the five speakers asked in every period, split into the two families. The party gap for the family that conservatives are expected to object to went from a Republican lead in 1976 to 1994 to an interval that includes zero in 2008 to 2018. The gap for the racist and the militarist stayed negative, at −5.2−5.2 points (first group minus second group)Estimanddifference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans)Interval95% CI −7.6 to −2.9n6,991Weightsweight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the itemPeriod2008-2018 waves pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points in 2008 to 2018, and was farthest below zero in the mostly web 2021 wave. Whether a pooled party gap over all five speakers has an interval that excludes zero depends on whether each speaker or each family counts once. One account links conservatism to needs for order and certainty [3]; another holds that liberals and conservatives are each intolerant of the groups that threaten their values [4] [5]. The battery cannot test the dispositions behind either account.

    Figure 3

    By 2008 to 2018 the party gap on speakers that conservatives object to was +0.4 points, and on speakers that liberals object to −5.2

    Gap between groups in the average share of a family of speakers a respondent would allow to speak, in points, by family and period, with 95% intervals

    • Objectionable to liberals
    • Objectionable to conservatives

    Objectionable to liberals

    Objectionable to conservatives

    Democrats minus Republicans (points)

    Show data
    Data for By 2008 to 2018 the party gap on speakers that conservatives object to was +0.4 points, and on speakers that liberals object to −5.2
    FamilyPeriodGroupingGap (points)LowHighRespondents
    Objectionable to liberals1976 to 1994party−4.5−6.1−2.915,078
    Objectionable to liberals1976 to 1994ideology+7.7+5.8+9.610,246
    Objectionable to liberals2008 to 2018party−5.2−7.6−2.96,991
    Objectionable to liberals2008 to 2018ideology+3.5+1.0+6.15,250
    Objectionable to liberals2021 (mostly web)party−16.3−22.5−10.0982
    Objectionable to liberals2021 (mostly web)ideology−5.0−11.9+1.8833
    Objectionable to conservatives1976 to 1994party−4.2−5.7−2.814,809
    Objectionable to conservatives1976 to 1994ideology+9.7+8.0+11.410,130
    Objectionable to conservatives2008 to 2018party+0.4−1.4+2.36,885
    Objectionable to conservatives2008 to 2018ideology+8.3+6.3+10.25,169
    Objectionable to conservatives2021 (mostly web)party+3.2−1.4+7.7976
    Objectionable to conservatives2021 (mostly web)ideology+13.6+9.0+18.1826
    All five, each speaker counts once1976 to 1994party−4.3−5.7−2.914,468
    All five, each speaker counts once1976 to 1994ideology+8.9+7.2+10.59,907
    All five, each speaker counts once2008 to 2018party−1.8−3.70.06,780
    All five, each speaker counts once2008 to 2018ideology+6.3+4.3+8.35,102
    All five, each speaker counts once2021 (mostly web)party−4.6−9.3+0.2969
    All five, each speaker counts once2021 (mostly web)ideology+6.2+1.3+11.0824
    All five, each side counts once1976 to 1994party−4.3−5.7−2.914,468
    All five, each side counts once1976 to 1994ideology+8.7+7.0+10.39,907
    All five, each side counts once2008 to 2018party−2.4−4.3−0.56,780
    All five, each side counts once2008 to 2018ideology+5.8+3.8+7.95,102
    All five, each side counts once2021 (mostly web)party−6.6−11.5−1.6969
    All five, each side counts once2021 (mostly web)ideology+4.3−0.8+9.4824

    In the top panel, the racist and the militarist, every dot is left of zero and the 2021 dot is farthest left. In the bottom panel, the Communist, the anti-religionist and the homosexual man, the dot moves from left of zero in 1976 to 1994 to right of zero in the two later periods. There its intervals include zero. Each dot is the party gap in the average share of a family's speakers that a respondent would allow, with its 95% interval. Values in Table 7.

    Note: The family of speakers objectionable to conservatives is the Communist, the anti-religionist and the homosexual man, and the family objectionable to liberals is the racist and the militarist. A respondent's family value is the share of that family's speakers he or she would allow, for respondents who answered all of the family's items. The Muslim clergyman is left out because the item began in 2008.Note: The data table also lists two combined averages of all five speakers that are not plotted: one counts each speaker once and one counts each family once.Note: The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (see the methods note at the end of the chapter). Estimates from 2021 on mix web and interviewer-administered respondents unless a figure says otherwise.Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size

    What these answers cannot tell you

    The gaps are differences between groups in one survey question, so they do not show why the groups differ, whether party or ideology shapes tolerance, or whether tolerance shapes party or ideology. After 2020 the mode of interview is tied to time, and the 2022 and 2024 samples are small once cut by party or ideology, so the size of the racist gap after 2020 is uncertain. The battery asks about a fixed list of speakers, and grouping them by which side is expected to object is a coding choice. The racist and Muslim clergyman items describe the speech itself, so the levels of the items are not comparable with one another.


    Go deeper

    • The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
    • Tables: every figure of the report as a table.

    Reading paths that include this chapter:

    Data sources

    • General Social SurveyGeneral Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2024, allow-to-speak items (spk), college-teaching items (col) and library-book items (lib); interview mode from the raw fileYears: 1972-2024 (35 study years) · Weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) · License: See the provider's terms of use.

    All data sources

    References

    1. Stouffer, Samuel A. (1955). Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind. Doubleday.
    2. Tourangeau, Roger; Yan, Ting (2007). Sensitive Questions in Surveys. Psychological Bulletin 133(5): 859-883. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859
    3. Jost, John T.; Glaser, Jack; Kruglanski, Arie W.; Sulloway, Frank J. (2003). Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition. Psychological Bulletin 129(3): 339-375. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339
    4. Brandt, Mark J.; Reyna, Christine; Chambers, John R.; Crawford, Jarret T.; Wetherell, Geoffrey (2014). The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science 23(1): 27-34. doi:10.1177/0963721413510932
    5. Crawford, Jarret T.; Pilanski, Jane M. (2014). Political Intolerance, Right and Left. Political Psychology 35(6): 841-851. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00926.x

    How to cite

    @misc{singh2026toleranceofspeech,
      author = {Singh, Vishal},
      title = {Tolerance of speech},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech},
      note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
    }