Chapter 3.4
The diploma divide
In the ANES, college graduates went from voting less Democratic than other voters to voting more Democratic, a gap of +23.3 points of the two-party presidential vote in 2024.
DraftFigures and numbers may change as the analysis is rebuilt.what is still being checked
The reasons the ANES and the CES give different education gaps in 2008, 2012 and 2024 are still being checked.
Among respondents to the 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES) who reported a major-party vote for president, 69%69.0% percent of the two-party presidential voteEstimandweighted Democratic share of the two-party voteInterval95% CI 66.1% to 71.9%n2,013Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduatesPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File of graduates said they voted Democratic, against 46%45.7% percent of the two-party presidential voteEstimandweighted Democratic share of the two-party voteInterval95% CI 42.5% to 48.8%n1,905Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduatesPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File of other voters. In most presidential elections from 1956 to 2012 the order ran the other way, and graduates were the less Democratic of the two groups. A graduate here holds a four-year or advanced degree, and everyone else, people with an associate degree included, counts as a non-graduate. The difference between the two shares is the graduate gap.
The ANES gap crossed from negative to positive
The gap is the Democratic share among graduates minus the share among other voters, in pointsPercentage pointThe unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused., so a negative gap means graduates were the less Democratic group. For most of the ANES record it was negative. In 88 electionsEstimandcount of electionsWeightsnone (count)PopulationANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval lies below zeroPeriod1956 to 2012SourceANES Cumulative Data File of the 1414 electionsEstimandcount of electionsWeightsnone (count)PopulationANES presidential elections with a graduate gap estimatePeriod1956 to 2012SourceANES Cumulative Data File presidential elections from 1956 to 2012 that have an estimate, the whole 95% interval around the gap lies below zero. In the rest the interval includes zero, and in none does it lie above. In 2012 the gap was −0.8 (95% CI −5.0 to 3.5)−0.8 percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates)EstimandDemocratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI −5.0 to 3.5n4,144Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential votePeriod2012SourceANES Cumulative Data File points, an interval that includes zero. From 2012 to 2016 it rose, and the 2016 interval is the first to lie above zero. In 2024 the gap was +23+23.3 percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates)EstimandDemocratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI 19.0 to 27.7n3,918Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential votePeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File points. Between 2012 and 2024 both lines moved, the Democratic share among graduates up and the share among other voters down.
The 2024 ANES figure needs a second survey beside it. The Cooperative Election Study (CES), an online survey whose vote series here begins in 2008, puts the 2024 gap at +12+12.3 percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates)EstimandDemocratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI 10.8 to 13.8n42,008Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationCES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential votePeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study points, positive as well. The ANES sample of 2024 voters is more Democratic than the certified national count, by +6+6.0 percentage points (ANES share minus certified share)EstimandANES weighted Democratic share minus the certified two-party share; the interval is the ANES Kish intervalInterval95% CI 3.8 to 8.3n3,948Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential votePeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File points. Against the CES the excess is concentrated among graduates, so the ANES level of the 2024 gap is read with the CES beside it.
Figure 1
Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016
Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by degree, ANES, 1956 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size
Democratic share of the two-party vote (%)
Show data
| Population | Group | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 31.5 | 23.2 | 39.7 | 124 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 41.2 | 38.3 | 44.1 | 1,136 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 50.0 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 142 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 69.9 | 67.1 | 72.8 | 965 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 37.5 | 30.0 | 45.0 | 160 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 48.1 | 44.6 | 51.7 | 750 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 39.3 | 33.5 | 45.1 | 275 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 34.9 | 32.4 | 37.5 | 1,311 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 37.3 | 31.2 | 43.4 | 250 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 54.4 | 51.4 | 57.5 | 1,069 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 35.0 | 28.0 | 41.9 | 183 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 45.9 | 42.2 | 49.6 | 691 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 41.3 | 35.8 | 46.8 | 305 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 41.9 | 38.9 | 44.8 | 1,063 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 42.2 | 36.8 | 47.5 | 325 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 48.8 | 45.5 | 52.2 | 850 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 51.8 | 46.9 | 56.7 | 401 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 61.9 | 58.7 | 65.0 | 922 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 49.5 | 44.0 | 55.0 | 360 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 62.2 | 58.2 | 66.3 | 672 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 50.4 | 45.3 | 55.4 | 429 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 53.0 | 48.9 | 57.1 | 689 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 50.3 | 44.2 | 56.5 | 289 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 49.7 | 45.0 | 54.4 | 522 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 50.8 | 45.0 | 56.6 | 400 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 56.8 | 53.2 | 60.4 | 1,133 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 53.0 | 49.6 | 56.4 | 1,471 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 53.8 | 51.2 | 56.4 | 2,673 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 60.4 | 57.2 | 63.6 | 1,175 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 48.5 | 45.3 | 51.6 | 1,416 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 64.9 | 62.8 | 67.0 | 2,993 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 50.0 | 47.6 | 52.5 | 3,036 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 69.0 | 66.1 | 71.9 | 2,013 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 45.7 | 42.5 | 48.8 | 1,905 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 30.6 | 22.3 | 38.8 | 121 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 40.1 | 37.1 | 43.0 | 1,086 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 46.6 | 38.1 | 55.1 | 133 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 67.0 | 63.9 | 70.2 | 877 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 33.8 | 26.2 | 41.3 | 151 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 42.6 | 38.9 | 46.4 | 664 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 34.5 | 28.6 | 40.4 | 252 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 29.4 | 26.8 | 32.0 | 1,168 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 36.6 | 30.3 | 42.9 | 237 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 48.9 | 45.6 | 52.1 | 940 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 31.5 | 24.4 | 38.6 | 165 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 37.5 | 33.5 | 41.4 | 574 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 39.6 | 33.8 | 45.5 | 270 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 34.4 | 31.3 | 37.5 | 875 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 38.6 | 32.9 | 44.3 | 280 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 39.1 | 35.4 | 42.8 | 665 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 48.0 | 42.7 | 53.4 | 335 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 54.8 | 51.1 | 58.6 | 693 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 46.6 | 40.8 | 52.5 | 318 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 53.0 | 48.2 | 57.7 | 514 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 48.1 | 42.5 | 53.6 | 357 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 44.6 | 39.9 | 49.2 | 533 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 45.7 | 38.8 | 52.5 | 233 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 39.6 | 34.1 | 45.1 | 368 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 43.3 | 36.5 | 50.0 | 258 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 43.8 | 39.1 | 48.6 | 523 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 47.0 | 43.1 | 50.8 | 1,039 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 40.3 | 37.2 | 43.4 | 1,489 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 55.2 | 51.6 | 58.8 | 937 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 34.1 | 30.6 | 37.6 | 1,010 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 60.2 | 57.8 | 62.6 | 2,339 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 35.6 | 32.9 | 38.3 | 2,230 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 63.9 | 60.6 | 67.3 | 1,591 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 35.8 | 32.3 | 39.4 | 1,390 |
Follow the colored line, the Democratic share among graduates. It runs below the grey line for other voters in most elections through 2012, the two are close in 2012, and the colored line runs above from 2016 on. Each line is the weighted Democratic share of voters who reported a major-party vote, with its 95% interval; the horizontal rule is an even split. The second view shows white non-Hispanic voters, with the same shape and larger gaps. Values in Table 1.
Two surveys and one count
The ANES is a probability sample that has interviewed a new set of Americans in each study since 1952. The vote here is each respondent's own report of a Democratic or Republican choice, 32,00032,098 respondentsEstimandcount of respondentsWeightsnone (count)PopulationANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education, in the elections plotted (1952 and 1960 left out)Period1956 to 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File ANES voters in the elections plotted. The CES is an opt-in online panel, and its weights match it to the population. Every estimate is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that the sample matches the population on known traits, and every interval treats the weighted sample as a random sample. Certified returns give a benchmark for the level of the Democratic share, though not for the gap, because the count has no breakdown by education. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.11.1 percentage points (absolute CES share minus certified share)Estimandlargest absolute difference between the CES weighted Democratic share and the certified two-party shareWeightsweight_cumulativePopulationCES respondents who reported a major-party presidential votePeriod2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024SourceCooperative Election Study points of it in every election from 2008 to 2024. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.
The issue differences are older than the vote difference
The chapter pools the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and those of 2016 to 2024 into two windows and compares graduates with other respondents on each item. Every item is oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer. The gap is the weighted mean answer of graduates minus that of other respondents, in standard deviationsStandard deviationA measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. of the item among all respondents. That unit puts questions with different answer scales on one footing. On a cultural index of abortion, gay rights and moral traditionalism, graduates' answers sat +0.30+0.30 standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates)Estimandweighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI 0.25 to 0.36n8,405Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents, cultural indexPeriod1992 to 2000SourceANES Cumulative Data File standard deviations nearer the liberal end than other respondents' in 1992 to 2000. No ANES vote gap lay above zero until 2016. The racial index and the immigration item also had positive gaps in that window, and the racial resentmentRacial resentmentA survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. index has the largest point estimate of any item in both periods.
The economic items ran the other way. In 1992 to 2000 the economic index gap was −0.32−0.32 standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates)Estimandweighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI −0.37 to −0.28n8,626Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents, economic indexPeriod1992 to 2000SourceANES Cumulative Data File standard deviations, so graduates were more conservative than other respondents on guaranteed jobs, health insurance, government services and spending on the poor and on welfare. In 2016 to 2024 it was +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06)+0.02 standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates)Estimandweighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadratureInterval95% CI −0.02 to 0.06n17,568Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents, economic indexPeriod2016 to 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File, an interval that includes zero. Figure 2 shows every item. The cultural, racial and immigration gaps were in place before the vote gap crossed zero, and the economic gap moved toward zero between the two windows. The data do not settle whether the cultural gap grew. Its change between the windows has an interval that includes zero, and among respondents interviewed in person the cultural and racial gaps are larger in 2016 and 2024 than in the 1990s.
Figure 2
The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positive
Graduate minus other respondents on each item, standard deviations of the item among all respondents; items oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer; ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: ANES in person only, GSS, CES); 95% intervals
- 1992 to 2000
- 2016 to 2024
Graduate minus non-graduate gap (standard deviations; positive = more liberal answers among graduates)
Show data
| Survey view | Domain | Item | Early gap (SD) | 95% CI low early | 95% CI high early | n early | Late gap (SD) | 95% CI low late | 95% CI high late | n late | Change (SD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANES | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.18 | 7,299 | +0.03 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 15,657 | +0.25 |
| ANES | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.23 | −0.29 | −0.17 | 6,153 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 15,720 | +0.32 |
| ANES | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.29 | −0.34 | −0.24 | 6,985 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 15,279 | +0.25 |
| ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.36 | −0.42 | −0.30 | 5,810 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 17,496 | +0.31 |
| ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.05 | 7,492 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 17,475 | +0.19 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 8,731 | +0.32 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 16,947 | −0.05 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 3,741 | +0.24 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 17,295 | −0.08 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.17 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 4,989 | +0.24 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 17,386 | +0.07 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 8,200 | +0.22 | 0.18 | 0.27 | 15,550 | +0.15 |
| ANES | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.18 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 7,419 | +0.23 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 15,764 | +0.05 |
| ANES | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.01 | 7,977 | +0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 15,261 | +0.11 |
| ANES | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 6,692 | +0.48 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 15,748 | +0.04 |
| ANES | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.37 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 15,694 | +0.02 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.17 | 6,391 | +0.14 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 1,998 | +0.37 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.24 | −0.30 | −0.18 | 5,219 | +0.21 | 0.10 | 0.33 | 2,058 | +0.45 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.28 | −0.33 | −0.22 | 6,131 | +0.04 | −0.08 | 0.16 | 1,914 | +0.32 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.38 | −0.46 | −0.31 | 4,044 | −0.07 | −0.18 | 0.05 | 2,154 | +0.32 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.16 | −0.04 | 5,723 | +0.20 | 0.09 | 0.32 | 2,149 | +0.30 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,974 | +0.43 | 0.32 | 0.54 | 2,160 | +0.06 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.37 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 2,088 | +0.27 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 2,102 | −0.09 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.20 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 3,519 | +0.29 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 2,132 | +0.10 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 6,659 | +0.31 | 0.18 | 0.43 | 1,952 | +0.24 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.19 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 6,496 | +0.36 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 1,954 | +0.17 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.01 | −0.07 | 0.05 | 6,351 | +0.20 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 1,864 | +0.21 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.51 | 5,153 | +0.61 | 0.49 | 0.72 | 1,961 | +0.16 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | +0.07 |
| GSS | Economic items | Government should improve the living standards of the poor | −0.22 | −0.27 | −0.17 | 8,451 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,473 | +0.21 |
| GSS | Economic items | Government should help pay for medical care | −0.12 | −0.17 | −0.06 | 8,483 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,496 | +0.11 |
| GSS | Economic items | Too little is spent on welfare | −0.03 | −0.09 | 0.03 | 6,221 | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 7,822 | +0.09 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Legal abortion for any reason | +0.30 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 8,282 | +0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 7,928 | +0.03 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Sex between two adults of the same sex is not wrong | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 8,101 | +0.26 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 10,267 | −0.17 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Sex before marriage is not wrong | +0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 8,425 | +0.09 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 10,480 | −0.04 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Marijuana should be legal | +0.11 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 8,268 | +0.06 | −0.02 | 0.14 | 5,266 | −0.04 |
| GSS | Racial items | Government has a special obligation to help Black Americans | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 8,414 | +0.21 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 10,343 | +0.16 |
| GSS | Racial items | Too little is spent on improving conditions of Black Americans | +0.09 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 5,844 | +0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 7,587 | +0.03 |
| GSS | Racial items | Preferential hiring and promotion of Black Americans | 0.00 | −0.06 | 0.06 | 6,628 | +0.11 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 10,071 | +0.11 |
| GSS | Racial items | Disagree that Black Americans should work up without special favors | +0.39 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 6,980 | +0.49 | 0.43 | 0.54 | 10,528 | +0.09 |
| GSS | Racial items | Black-white differences are mainly due to discrimination | 0.00 | −0.05 | 0.06 | 8,212 | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 8,114 | +0.22 |
| CES | Economic items | Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act | +0.13 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 55,829 | +0.26 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 60,856 | +0.13 |
| CES | Economic items | Increase spending on welfare | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.02 | 48,648 | +0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 51,547 | +0.12 |
| CES | Economic items | Increase spending on health care | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 48,626 | +0.04 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 51,547 | +0.11 |
| CES | Cultural items | Always allow abortion | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 55,678 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 60,982 | +0.11 |
| CES | Cultural items | Oppose banning abortion after 20 weeks | +0.16 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 55,421 | +0.33 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 60,976 | +0.17 |
| CES | Cultural items | Oppose prohibiting public funds for abortion | +0.12 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 55,465 | +0.20 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 60,982 | +0.08 |
| CES | Immigration | Conditional legal status for undocumented immigrants | +0.14 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 56,200 | +0.07 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 60,944 | −0.08 |
| CES | Immigration | Oppose increasing border security | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 56,200 | +0.23 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 60,952 | +0.16 |
Read the economic rows first, which start left of the zero line and end near it. The cultural, racial and immigration rows sit right of zero in both periods, apart from affirmative action in the first, and the racial resentment row is the farthest right in both. The ring is 1992 to 2000 and the dot 2016 to 2024, each with its 95% interval. The buttons switch to in-person ANES samples only, to the GSS and to the CES. Values in Table 6.
The ANES and the CES disagree outside 2016 and 2020
Two surveys measure the vote gap from 2008. Figure 3 lays the ANES gap beside the CES gap, for the presidential vote and for party identification. The CES gap is above zero in every presidential election since 2008. It sits above the ANES gap in 2008 and 2012, when the ANES intervals include zero, and below it in 2024. The two surveys agree where their intervals overlap, in 2016 and 2020, and disagree before and after. They also disagree about the latest movement, since from 2020 to 2024 the ANES gap rose and the CES gap fell. Within a survey the choice of weight moves the gap by less than the difference between the surveys in 2024. The ANES web gap of 2024 also lies above the CES gap, so interview mode does not account for the difference between the surveys. The web minus in-person difference within the ANES has an interval that includes zero and is wide enough that the data do not rule out a mode effect.
Figure 3
Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gap
Democratic share among graduates minus the share among other respondents, points, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; presidential vote (voters with a major-party vote) and party identification (identifiers, leaners included); all respondents (the button shows white non-Hispanic respondents)
Graduate minus other respondents (points)
Show data
| Population | Measure | Survey | Study year | Gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.7 | −18.4 | −1.1 | 1,260 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −19.9 | −28.7 | −11.2 | 1,107 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −10.6 | −19.0 | −2.3 | 910 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +4.3 | −2.0 | 10.7 | 1,586 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −17.1 | −24.0 | −10.3 | 1,319 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −10.9 | −18.8 | −3.0 | 874 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | −0.6 | −6.8 | 5.7 | 1,368 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −6.7 | −13.0 | −0.3 | 1,175 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −10.0 | −15.8 | −4.2 | 1,323 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −12.8 | −19.6 | −5.9 | 1,032 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | −2.6 | −9.1 | 3.9 | 1,118 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.1 | 8.4 | 811 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −6.0 | −12.9 | 0.9 | 1,533 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | −0.8 | −5.0 | 3.5 | 4,144 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +11.9 | 7.4 | 16.4 | 2,591 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +14.9 | 11.6 | 18.1 | 6,029 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +23.3 | 19.0 | 27.7 | 3,918 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +3.7 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 23,585 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +5.6 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 37,789 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 40,891 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +15.3 | 14.1 | 16.5 | 43,872 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +12.3 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 42,008 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −18.5 | −28.1 | −8.9 | 1,602 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.0 | −20.9 | −3.0 | 1,528 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.2 | −31.9 | −12.5 | 1,266 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −8.8 | −17.6 | 0.0 | 1,132 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −18.1 | −26.3 | −9.9 | 1,407 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −21.2 | −30.8 | −11.6 | 1,101 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −22.6 | −30.2 | −14.9 | 1,364 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −16.2 | −24.4 | −8.0 | 1,290 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.4 | −8.7 | 2,293 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −12.7 | −21.6 | −3.9 | 1,290 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −17.9 | −24.1 | −11.7 | 1,869 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −17.3 | −23.2 | −11.4 | 1,893 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −12.5 | −19.5 | −5.6 | 1,365 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −11.5 | −18.6 | −4.5 | 1,216 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −8.3 | −14.2 | −2.5 | 1,938 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −8.3 | −13.9 | −2.8 | 1,845 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −11.3 | −17.0 | −5.5 | 1,751 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −9.9 | −15.7 | −4.1 | 1,702 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −11.8 | −16.7 | −6.8 | 2,099 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −17.8 | −23.8 | −11.8 | 1,555 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −11.1 | −17.0 | −5.1 | 1,546 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −8.0 | −14.9 | −1.1 | 1,119 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −13.3 | −19.0 | −7.6 | 1,566 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −12.4 | −18.8 | −6.1 | 1,363 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | −2.4 | −9.3 | 4.5 | 1,074 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −9.3 | −15.6 | −3.0 | 2,006 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −5.8 | −9.7 | −1.9 | 5,034 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +1.6 | −2.2 | 5.5 | 3,643 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +8.9 | 5.9 | 11.9 | 7,181 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +17.5 | 13.6 | 21.4 | 5,055 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | −1.6 | −3.0 | −0.2 | 28,600 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +0.5 | −1.8 | 2.8 | 11,436 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +1.9 | 0.6 | 3.2 | 47,861 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +0.2 | −2.1 | 2.4 | 16,696 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +0.8 | −0.7 | 2.2 | 45,847 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +0.7 | −1.8 | 3.1 | 12,834 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +1.5 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 44,776 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +3.6 | 1.0 | 6.2 | 11,559 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +4.5 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 51,986 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +4.8 | 2.5 | 7.2 | 14,360 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +8.2 | 7.0 | 9.4 | 49,327 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +9.1 | 7.0 | 11.2 | 14,767 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 49,769 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +12.1 | 10.4 | 13.9 | 20,584 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +11.3 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 49,520 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +8.9 | 7.0 | 10.7 | 19,715 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +9.4 | 8.0 | 10.9 | 50,847 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.5 | −18.2 | −0.7 | 1,207 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −20.4 | −29.5 | −11.4 | 1,010 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −8.8 | −17.3 | −0.4 | 815 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +5.2 | −1.3 | 11.6 | 1,420 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −12.3 | −19.3 | −5.2 | 1,177 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −5.9 | −14.1 | 2.2 | 739 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | +5.2 | −1.4 | 11.9 | 1,145 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −0.5 | −7.3 | 6.3 | 945 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −6.8 | −13.3 | −0.3 | 1,028 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −13.8 | 1.2 | 832 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | +3.5 | −3.7 | 10.7 | 890 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +6.1 | −2.7 | 14.8 | 601 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −0.6 | −8.8 | 7.7 | 781 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | +6.6 | 1.7 | 11.6 | 2,528 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +21.1 | 16.1 | 26.1 | 1,947 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +24.6 | 21.0 | 28.2 | 4,569 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +28.1 | 23.2 | 33.0 | 2,981 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +9.2 | 7.6 | 10.8 | 19,889 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +10.2 | 8.6 | 11.9 | 30,356 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +18.6 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 30,727 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +22.7 | 21.5 | 24.0 | 32,857 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +16.1 | 14.5 | 17.7 | 31,857 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −19.4 | −29.2 | −9.5 | 1,464 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.7 | −21.8 | −3.7 | 1,415 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.6 | −32.6 | −12.6 | 1,164 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −7.1 | −16.2 | 2.0 | 1,036 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −16.4 | −24.8 | −7.9 | 1,258 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −18.6 | −28.3 | −8.9 | 978 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −21.5 | −29.4 | −13.6 | 1,206 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −13.8 | −22.2 | −5.4 | 1,148 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.7 | −8.4 | 2,018 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −9.9 | −19.1 | −0.8 | 1,138 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −14.7 | −21.1 | −8.2 | 1,607 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −15.1 | −21.3 | −8.9 | 1,613 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −11.8 | −19.2 | −4.3 | 1,136 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −7.8 | −15.3 | −0.4 | 1,031 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −5.4 | −11.7 | 0.9 | 1,568 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −4.1 | −10.2 | 1.9 | 1,431 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −6.3 | −12.5 | −0.1 | 1,321 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −7.6 | −14.0 | −1.2 | 1,288 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −8.3 | −13.8 | −2.8 | 1,606 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −12.4 | −19.0 | −5.8 | 1,200 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −12.9 | 0.3 | 1,201 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −9.3 | −17.1 | −1.5 | 834 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −9.8 | −16.2 | −3.3 | 1,169 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −8.3 | −15.3 | −1.2 | 1,065 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.3 | 8.7 | 764 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −4.7 | −12.3 | 2.8 | 990 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −0.4 | −5.0 | 4.2 | 2,981 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +9.5 | 5.1 | 13.9 | 2,636 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +18.1 | 14.8 | 21.5 | 5,290 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +23.5 | 19.1 | 27.9 | 3,682 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | +3.8 | 2.3 | 5.3 | 23,608 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +6.8 | 4.2 | 9.4 | 8,366 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +8.0 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 35,480 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +5.6 | 3.1 | 8.2 | 12,698 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +6.8 | 5.1 | 8.4 | 33,444 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +7.0 | 4.2 | 9.8 | 9,468 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +8.1 | 6.6 | 9.6 | 32,357 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +11.1 | 8.2 | 14.1 | 8,233 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +11.6 | 10.3 | 12.9 | 36,202 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +12.2 | 9.5 | 15.0 | 9,458 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +16.5 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 36,733 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +16.6 | 14.3 | 18.9 | 10,414 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +20.8 | 19.5 | 22.1 | 35,942 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +21.3 | 19.3 | 23.4 | 13,665 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +18.2 | 16.8 | 19.6 | 34,004 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +15.6 | 13.5 | 17.8 | 12,444 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +14.8 | 13.2 | 16.5 | 34,772 |
In the vote panel the ANES line is mostly below zero through 2012 and above it from 2016, and the CES line sits above the ANES line before 2016 and below it in 2024. In the party-identification panel the ANES gap follows the vote, above zero from 2020. Each point is a gap between two weighted Democratic shares, with its 95% interval. Values in Table 2.
What the gap describes, and what it does not
The gap is a difference between two groups of voters in one election, and the groups themselves changed. Graduates were 6%6.4% percent of respondentsEstimandweighted share with a college or advanced degreeInterval95% CI 5.2% to 7.5%n1,790Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a known educationPeriod1952SourceANES Cumulative Data File of ANES respondents in 1952 and 34%34.4% percent of respondentsEstimandweighted share with a college or advanced degreeInterval95% CI 32.6% to 36.2%n5,465Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a known educationPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024, so the graduates of 2024 are a different slice of the population from the graduates of 1988. Education here is a credential, the highest degree a person holds, and the chapter does not measure occupation. Income is a separate measure, which Chapter 3.5, The income ladder takes up. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the ANES vote gap since 2012 and leaves most of it. In every election before 2024 the gap among voters of the same income rank is higher than the raw gap. Within the parties, the issue gaps are largest among Democrats, and on economic items graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans. A book-length account of the American case argues that Democrats became the party of highly educated voters with progressive social views and Republicans the party of white voters without college degrees [1]. A gap says how graduates and other voters differ and cannot say what a degree does to a person's politics. Companion 8.1a, The diploma map measures the same gradient across counties.
What these surveys cannot tell you
Every survey here interviews a new sample each year, so a rising gap can come from people changing their votes, from new voters replacing older ones, or from changes in who has a degree. The chapter compares groups and not people, and the graduates sampled in 1988 and in 2024 are different people. The vote is a self-report in both surveys, with no validated vote in either file. The certified count has no breakdown by degree, so it cannot show which survey is closer on graduates or on the gap. The gap leaves out nonvoters and third-party voters. The issue gaps rest on a few items per domain. A standardized gap depends on how answers spread in each period, so the same difference in the share giving an answer can be a different number of standard deviations in two periods.
Go deeper
- The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
- Tables: every figure of the report as a table.
Same question at another grain:
- Education
- Planned, Political knowledge and constraint (planned) Individuals
- Companion 8.1a, The diploma map Places
- Planned, Education and ideology (planned) Countries
Reading paths that include this chapter:
Data sources
- ANES Cumulative Data FileCumulative Data File 1952-2024: presidential vote, party identification, income rank and issue itemsYears: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for mode splits · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.
- Cooperative Election StudyCumulative Common Content 2008-2024: presidential vote and party identification; policy items for 2014 and 2020Years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years) · Weights: weight_cumulative · License: See the provider's terms of use.
- General Social Survey1993-2024 waves with the raw-file interview mode: issue items by degreeYears: 1972-2024 (35 study years) · Weights: weight_use · License: See the provider's terms of use.
- State presidential returnsMIT Election Lab state presidential returns 1976-2024: certified two-party Democratic share for the survey checkYears: 1976-2024 (13 elections) · Weights: none (full counts) · License: See the provider's terms of use.
References
- Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009057141
How to cite
@misc{singh2026thediplomadivide,
author = {Singh, Vishal},
title = {The diploma divide},
year = {2026},
url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide},
note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}