The god gap in America

Among voters in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES) who reported a choice between the two major-party presidential candidates, 58%57.6% percent of two-party presidential voters who voted DemocraticEstimandweighted share voting DemocraticInterval95% CI 56.7% to 58.5%n29,642Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationreported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or neverPeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study of those who attend religious services a few times a year or never voted Democratic, against 30%29.9% percent of two-party presidential voters who voted DemocraticEstimandweighted share voting DemocraticInterval95% CI 28.5% to 31.3%n9,415Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationreported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or morePeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study of those who attend weekly or more. The difference, 2827.7 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 26.0 to 29.3n39,057Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationCES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequentlyPeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study pointsPercentage pointThe unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused., is the god gap, and a positive gap means that seldom attenders were the more Democratic group. In the other surveys here the frequent group also takes in those who attend nearly every week, an answer the CES does not offer.Attendance is self-reported, so each group is defined by how respondents answer and not by a count of visits. The gap describes who votes for whom and does not say why. The chapter keeps three comparisons apart, by attendance, by affiliation and with party identification held fixed.

The ANES gap has lain above zero since 1992

The American National Election Studies (ANES) carry the gap back to 1972. Pooled over the studies of 1972 to 1988, the gap among ANES voters was 5.55.5 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 2.9 to 8.1n5,572Weightsweight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study yearPopulationANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequentlyPeriodANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooledSourceANES Cumulative Data File points, and pooled over the studies of 2008 to 2020 it was 21.821.8 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 19.5 to 24.1n12,996Weightsweight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study yearPopulationANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequentlyPeriodANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooledSourceANES Cumulative Data File points. A pooled estimate combines the respondents of several studies into one estimate. The rise was not steady. The gap was above zero in 1972, and in 1980 it was 0.1 (95% CI −6.5 to 6.6)0.1 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI −6.5 to 6.6n849Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequentlyPeriod1980SourceANES Cumulative Data File points, an interval that includes zero; so do the intervals of 1984 and 1988. From 1992 on, every ANES interval lies above zero. The CES begins in 2008 and puts its gap above zero in every presidential year, and that gap did not move in one direction. It fell between 2012 and 2016 and was higher in 2020 and 2024, and the change from 2020 to 2024 came from the frequent end, a fall in the Democratic share among frequent attenders.

Figure 1

In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES), reported voters, percentage points, 95% intervals; ANES 1972 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024

All votersWhite non-Hispanic votersProtestant and Catholic voters

Show data

Data for In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

Sample	Survey	Year	Gap (points)	Lower	Upper	Seldom, Democratic share (%)	Frequent, Democratic share (%)	Seldom voters	Frequent voters
All voters	ANES	1972	10.3	5.3	15.3	40.6	30.3	705	684
All voters	ANES	1976	7.5	1.5	13.5	53.5	46.0	536	578
All voters	ANES	1980	0.1	−6.5	6.6	38.8	38.7	441	408
All voters	ANES	1984	5.2	−0.3	10.8	43.0	37.8	621	580
All voters	ANES	1988	2.1	−4.1	8.2	47.1	45.1	522	497
All voters	ANES	1992	11.3	6.2	16.5	53.4	42.0	745	684
All voters	ANES	1996	14.6	7.7	21.5	61.3	46.7	459	496
All voters	ANES	2000	14.9	7.9	21.9	58.4	43.5	453	481
All voters	ANES	2004	12.6	4.5	20.7	55.9	43.3	371	316
All voters	ANES	2008	21.1	14.4	27.8	62.2	41.2	666	600
All voters	ANES	2012	20.5	16.2	24.8	61.2	40.8	2,198	1,543
All voters	ANES	2016	23.8	18.9	28.7	62.0	38.2	1,432	884
All voters	ANES	2020	21.9	18.2	25.7	62.3	40.4	3,950	1,723
All voters	CES	2008	25.5	23.9	27.1	63.4	37.9	13,147	8,021
All voters	CES	2012	27.3	25.7	28.9	62.3	35.0	22,397	11,984
All voters	CES	2016	18.9	17.4	20.4	56.9	37.9	26,471	10,902
All voters	CES	2020	23.5	22.1	24.9	60.0	36.5	30,080	10,434
All voters	CES	2024	27.7	26.0	29.3	57.6	29.9	29,642	9,415
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1972	6.3	1.1	11.5	36.4	30.1	604	677
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1976	4.5	−1.8	10.8	50.6	46.1	450	570
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1980	0.6	−6.5	7.7	39.4	38.8	340	402
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1984	2.1	−3.8	8.0	39.5	37.3	484	568
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1988	−1.7	−8.2	4.8	43.0	44.7	407	492
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1992	8.3	2.5	14.2	49.8	41.5	488	643
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1996	15.7	7.9	23.5	61.2	45.5	301	469
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2000	9.4	1.3	17.6	53.5	44.0	289	458
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2004	11.0	1.4	20.6	55.1	44.1	211	292
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2008	16.4	8.5	24.3	57.3	40.9	394	568
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2012	14.7	9.5	19.9	55.4	40.7	1,207	1,348
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2016	15.3	9.5	21.2	52.9	37.5	759	797
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2020	11.8	7.2	16.3	52.6	40.9	1,938	1,403
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2008	18.7	16.6	20.7	51.9	33.3	6,415	5,786
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2012	15.3	13.5	17.2	50.6	35.3	11,833	10,669
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2016	9.0	7.3	10.8	45.3	36.3	12,636	9,457
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2020	11.0	9.3	12.7	45.7	34.8	12,431	8,674
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2024	13.2	11.2	15.2	42.2	29.0	12,221	7,759
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1972	9.9	4.8	15.0	35.8	25.9	640	622
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1976	8.3	2.1	14.6	49.6	41.2	486	523
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1980	3.5	−3.2	10.3	33.6	30.1	384	346
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1984	9.0	3.2	14.8	39.4	30.4	545	483
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1988	6.5	−0.1	13.1	42.5	36.0	447	400
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1992	17.9	12.3	23.4	50.1	32.2	640	542
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1996	22.5	15.0	29.9	57.3	34.8	397	386
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2000	18.8	11.1	26.4	54.9	36.1	377	383
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2004	18.9	9.7	28.0	51.5	32.7	283	230
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2008	28.8	20.9	36.7	55.4	26.6	410	284
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2012	29.3	24.4	34.1	53.9	24.7	1,460	874
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2016	27.8	22.6	33.1	53.5	25.7	1,107	652
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2020	29.9	26.0	33.9	55.4	25.4	3,035	1,292
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2008	32.1	30.5	33.7	58.2	26.2	11,293	6,653
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2012	33.0	31.3	34.7	57.9	24.9	18,416	9,387
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2016	25.4	23.9	26.9	51.1	25.7	20,561	7,745
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2020	31.0	29.6	32.3	54.2	23.2	23,149	7,406
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2024	33.8	32.1	35.5	53.7	19.9	22,958	6,803

Two surveys that agree on the pooled gap

The ANES has interviewed a new set of Americans in each study; it has recorded denomination since 1952 and attendance since 1970. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its respondents chose to join. The vote in both is self-reported. Every estimate is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that the sample matches the population on known traits. Every interval is a 95% confidence intervalConfidence intervalA range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. that treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out strata and clusters. For the CES it also leaves out the error that comes from how respondents were recruited. The two surveys agree on the gap pooled over 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, which is 2323.4 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 22.7 to 24.2n133,436Weightsweight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each yearPopulationCES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequentlyPeriodCES 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooledSourceCooperative Election Study points in the CES, and in single years they differ in both directions. The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion and attendance codes cannot be used, so every ANES series here ends in 2020 and the CES supplies 2024. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.

The attendance gap has exceeded the Catholic-Protestant gap since 1992

The ANES records denomination from 1952 and attendance only from 1970, so the oldest religious line in the vote it can measure runs between Catholics and Protestants. In 1960, the year John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, was elected, Catholic voters were 4646.2 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus ProtestantsEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus ProtestantsInterval95% CI 38.7 to 53.7n847Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or CatholicPeriod1960SourceANES Cumulative Data File points more Democratic than Protestant voters. This is the second comparison, by affiliation. Pooled over the ANES studies of 2008 to 2020, the Catholic minus Protestant gap was 88.3 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus ProtestantsEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus ProtestantsInterval95% CI 5.6 to 11.1n9,666Weightsweight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study yearPopulationANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or CatholicPeriodANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooledSourceANES Cumulative Data File points. The attendance gap of the same studies, given above, lies above it with separate intervals, and the same holds for the studies of 1992 to 2004. Study by study, the attendance gap was the larger of the two in every ANES study from 1992 on and in every CES presidential year.

The two gaps differ in who is compared. The attendance gap counts the unaffiliated in its seldom group, and the Catholic minus Protestant gap leaves them out. In the CES the unaffiliated voted more Democratic than Protestants by a margin whose interval lies above both gaps in every presidential year, and they are a growing part of the seldom group. Among Protestant and Catholic voters alone, the attendance gap and the denominational gap have overlapping intervals in the 2024 CES. The comparison of the two gaps therefore depends on which voters are included.

Figure 2

Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among reported voters; gaps in percentage points and shares in percent; ANES 1952 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals

Three gaps comparedAttendance within each tradition

Show data

Data for Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

View	Tradition or sample	Series	Year	Estimate	Lower	Upper	Voters
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1972	10.3	5.3	15.3	1,389
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1976	7.5	1.5	13.5	1,114
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1980	0.1	−6.5	6.6	849
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1984	5.2	−0.3	10.8	1,201
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1988	2.1	−4.1	8.2	1,019
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1992	11.3	6.2	16.5	1,429
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1996	14.6	7.7	21.5	955
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2000	14.9	7.9	21.9	934
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2004	12.6	4.5	20.7	687
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2008	21.1	14.4	27.8	1,266
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2012	20.5	16.2	24.8	3,741
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2016	23.8	18.9	28.7	2,316
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2020	21.9	18.2	25.7	5,673
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2008	25.5	23.9	27.1	21,168
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2012	27.3	25.7	28.9	34,381
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2016	18.9	17.4	20.4	37,373
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2020	23.5	22.1	24.9	40,514
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2024	27.7	26.0	29.3	39,057
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1952	15.3	8.7	22.0	1,104
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1956	9.9	3.4	16.4	1,181
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1960	46.2	38.7	53.7	847
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1964	16.2	10.2	22.1	1,035
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1968	21.8	14.6	29.0	963
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1972	8.2	2.7	13.7	1,469
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1976	11.5	5.1	17.8	1,219
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1980	1.3	−6.3	8.9	839
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1984	8.7	2.7	14.7	1,212
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1988	10.5	3.9	17.1	1,070
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1992	5.9	0.1	11.7	1,342
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1996	6.6	−1.0	14.1	912
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2000	1.4	−6.1	9.0	911
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2004	5.0	−4.2	14.3	610
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2008	9.2	1.2	17.1	1,195
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2012	9.5	4.4	14.7	2,927
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2016	8.6	2.8	14.4	1,799
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2020	7.3	2.8	11.8	3,745
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2008	10.1	8.1	12.2	13,915
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2012	7.9	6.1	9.8	25,252
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2016	10.8	9.0	12.5	24,840
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2020	10.7	9.0	12.5	23,634
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2024	10.4	8.3	12.4	22,174
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2008	36.7	34.7	38.6	13,283
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2012	32.3	30.5	34.1	25,423
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2016	30.1	28.5	31.6	27,239
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2020	35.4	34.0	36.8	29,897
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2024	38.0	36.3	39.7	28,512
within	Catholic	Frequent	2008	38.7	36.0	41.3	1,809
within	Catholic	Frequent	2012	37.5	35.0	39.9	3,002
within	Catholic	Frequent	2016	42.9	40.4	45.4	2,901
within	Catholic	Frequent	2020	42.3	39.7	44.9	2,434
within	Catholic	Frequent	2024	36.7	33.5	39.8	2,146
within	Catholic	Seldom	2008	56.8	54.5	59.1	2,705
within	Catholic	Seldom	2012	56.0	53.9	58.1	4,421
within	Catholic	Seldom	2016	51.4	49.5	53.2	5,220
within	Catholic	Seldom	2020	51.6	49.7	53.5	5,232
within	Catholic	Seldom	2024	47.1	44.9	49.2	5,074
within	Protestant	Frequent	2008	30.8	29.1	32.4	3,977
within	Protestant	Frequent	2012	34.5	32.9	36.1	7,667
within	Protestant	Frequent	2016	33.6	32.0	35.1	6,556
within	Protestant	Frequent	2020	32.3	30.8	33.7	6,240
within	Protestant	Frequent	2024	26.5	24.8	28.1	5,613
within	Protestant	Seldom	2008	48.0	46.1	49.9	3,710
within	Protestant	Seldom	2012	47.2	45.6	48.8	7,412
within	Protestant	Seldom	2016	41.4	39.9	43.0	7,416
within	Protestant	Seldom	2020	41.8	40.4	43.3	7,199
within	Protestant	Seldom	2024	38.9	37.2	40.6	7,147
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2012	54.5	46.0	62.9	266
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2016	53.5	46.8	60.3	386
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2020	59.5	52.9	66.2	369
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2008	76.6	75.0	78.1	4,351
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2012	74.7	73.2	76.2	7,904
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2016	69.3	68.1	70.4	10,803
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2020	73.8	72.9	74.8	14,096
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2024	72.1	70.9	73.4	13,762

The pooled gap differs by race and tradition

The gap for all voters mixes several groups, and two other views of Figure 1 separate some of them. Among white non-Hispanic voters the 2024 CES gap was 3433.8 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 32.1 to 35.5n29,761Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationwhite non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidatePeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study points, so leaving out Black, Hispanic and other voters raises it. Among Protestant and Catholic voters it was 1313.2 percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attendersInterval95% CI 11.2 to 15.2n19,980Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationProtestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidatePeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study points, so leaving out unaffiliated, Jewish and other-religion voters shrinks it. Inside each tradition the vote still differs by attendance, by less than in the pooled comparison. The pooled gap therefore combines a gap inside each tradition with the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else, and it is not a single gap that holds in every group. Chapter 3.9, Religious tradition and race separates white evangelicals, Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and other traditions, and Planned, The rise of the nones (planned) follows the unaffiliated.

The Republican share rose more among frequent attenders

Party identification shows a gap of its own. Figure 3 plots the Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers, leanersPartisan leanerA respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. included, by attendance in the General Social Survey (GSS). Pooled over 1972 to 1978, frequent attenders were 55.3 percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attendersInterval95% CI 2.9 to 7.7n7,613Weightsweight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey yearPopulationGSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequentlyPeriodGSS 1972 to 1978, pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points more Republican than seldom attenders, and pooled over the in-person surveys of 2010 to 2018 they were 1515.4 percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attendersInterval95% CI 12.6 to 18.2n7,754Weightsweight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey yearPopulationGSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequentlyPeriodGSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys)SourceGeneral Social Survey points more Republican. The Republican share rose in both groups and rose more among frequent attenders. The GSS has included web interviews since 2021. In 2022 and 2024 the gap was 18.0 (95% CI 10.3 to 25.8)18.0 percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attendersInterval95% CI 10.3 to 25.8n1,723Weightsweight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey yearPopulationin-person GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequentlyPeriod2022 and 2024, pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey points among in-person respondents and 23.7 (95% CI 16.8 to 30.5)23.7 percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attendersEstimandweighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attendersInterval95% CI 16.8 to 30.5n2,175Weightsweight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey yearPopulationweb GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequentlyPeriod2022 and 2024, pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey among web respondents. Part of the larger gap in the surveys of 2018 to 2024 is therefore not separable from the modeSurvey modeHow respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. of interview. In the CES, online throughout, the 2008 gap already exceeds the GSS gap of 2010 to 2018. The two surveys differ in sample, mode and party items, so their levels are not comparable. Studies of American party politics through the 1990s described a widening division between religious traditionalists and seculars in party attachments [1].

Figure 3

The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) among frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by year, percent, 95% intervals

GSS, 1972 to 2024CES, 2008 to 2024

Show data

Data for The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

Survey	Attendance	Year	Republican share (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
CES	Frequent	2008	61.5	60.3	62.7	9,264
CES	Frequent	2009	62.6	60.7	64.5	3,447
CES	Frequent	2010	61.7	60.5	63.0	15,341
CES	Frequent	2011	58.2	56.2	60.2	4,711
CES	Frequent	2012	59.6	58.3	60.8	13,849
CES	Frequent	2013	57.2	54.8	59.6	3,336
CES	Frequent	2014	61.4	60.1	62.7	12,466
CES	Frequent	2015	57.0	54.6	59.4	3,019
CES	Frequent	2016	56.5	55.4	57.7	13,736
CES	Frequent	2017	59.3	57.0	61.6	3,608
CES	Frequent	2018	65.1	63.9	66.3	12,055
CES	Frequent	2019	63.9	61.9	65.9	3,690
CES	Frequent	2020	63.8	62.6	65.0	11,385
CES	Frequent	2021	63.5	61.7	65.3	4,609
CES	Frequent	2022	64.5	63.2	65.8	11,125
CES	Frequent	2023	58.2	56.4	60.0	5,168
CES	Frequent	2024	68.1	66.7	69.5	10,949
CES	Seldom	2008	35.0	34.1	35.9	15,164
CES	Seldom	2009	37.6	36.3	39.0	6,317
CES	Seldom	2010	40.8	39.8	41.7	26,251
CES	Seldom	2011	38.8	37.4	40.2	9,845
CES	Seldom	2012	33.8	32.9	34.7	25,858
CES	Seldom	2013	37.2	35.7	38.8	7,801
CES	Seldom	2014	40.1	39.2	40.9	26,501
CES	Seldom	2015	39.9	38.3	41.4	7,057
CES	Seldom	2016	39.1	38.4	39.9	31,636
CES	Seldom	2017	39.2	37.7	40.7	8,894
CES	Seldom	2018	38.7	38.0	39.5	31,182
CES	Seldom	2019	37.6	36.3	38.9	9,363
CES	Seldom	2020	40.3	39.6	41.1	32,768
CES	Seldom	2021	38.4	37.3	39.5	13,718
CES	Seldom	2022	40.0	39.2	40.7	32,774
CES	Seldom	2023	40.1	39.0	41.2	12,096
CES	Seldom	2024	40.7	39.8	41.6	34,618
GSS	Frequent	1972	33.7	29.5	37.9	575
GSS	Frequent	1973	43.0	38.1	47.8	468
GSS	Frequent	1974	36.9	32.1	41.8	473
GSS	Frequent	1975	38.9	34.0	43.9	467
GSS	Frequent	1976	33.3	28.5	38.0	452
GSS	Frequent	1977	35.3	30.5	40.0	482
GSS	Frequent	1978	41.4	35.7	47.1	458
GSS	Frequent	1980	38.6	33.1	44.2	438
GSS	Frequent	1982	39.7	34.3	45.0	579
GSS	Frequent	1983	39.9	34.3	45.4	513
GSS	Frequent	1984	47.8	42.2	53.5	489
GSS	Frequent	1985	45.4	39.8	50.9	507
GSS	Frequent	1986	47.1	42.1	52.1	466
GSS	Frequent	1987	46.3	41.1	51.5	549
GSS	Frequent	1988	51.6	46.5	56.7	444
GSS	Frequent	1989	50.1	45.0	55.2	476
GSS	Frequent	1990	52.8	47.5	58.1	429
GSS	Frequent	1991	50.9	45.7	56.0	458
GSS	Frequent	1993	53.5	48.5	58.6	487
GSS	Frequent	1994	51.1	47.2	55.0	810
GSS	Frequent	1996	50.0	46.0	53.9	748
GSS	Frequent	1998	51.2	47.3	55.2	763
GSS	Frequent	2000	53.9	49.8	58.1	688
GSS	Frequent	2002	54.1	49.9	58.4	705
GSS	Frequent	2004	53.7	49.5	57.8	786
GSS	Frequent	2006	55.3	51.9	58.6	1,165
GSS	Frequent	2008	53.0	47.9	58.1	527
GSS	Frequent	2010	50.7	45.2	56.2	507
GSS	Frequent	2012	50.8	45.2	56.3	496
GSS	Frequent	2014	54.6	50.0	59.3	587
GSS	Frequent	2016	52.2	47.7	56.7	681
GSS	Frequent	2018	57.9	52.1	63.6	489
GSS	Frequent	2021	54.6	50.3	59.0	813
GSS	Frequent	2022	60.7	54.2	67.3	606
GSS	Frequent	2024	66.2	60.9	71.5	623
GSS	Seldom	1972	31.4	27.2	35.6	579
GSS	Seldom	1973	34.3	30.3	38.4	625
GSS	Seldom	1974	29.4	25.3	33.4	571
GSS	Seldom	1975	30.7	26.6	34.7	587
GSS	Seldom	1976	30.8	26.8	34.9	620
GSS	Seldom	1977	32.8	28.7	36.9	631
GSS	Seldom	1978	34.7	30.0	39.4	625
GSS	Seldom	1980	33.2	28.5	37.9	587
GSS	Seldom	1982	38.1	33.7	42.5	753
GSS	Seldom	1983	37.9	33.2	42.7	639
GSS	Seldom	1984	40.5	35.4	45.6	576
GSS	Seldom	1985	44.4	39.7	49.1	650
GSS	Seldom	1986	43.1	38.5	47.6	560
GSS	Seldom	1987	43.5	39.1	47.9	706
GSS	Seldom	1988	40.2	35.8	44.6	612
GSS	Seldom	1989	46.3	42.0	50.7	643
GSS	Seldom	1990	44.7	39.9	49.5	528
GSS	Seldom	1991	49.5	45.1	54.0	596
GSS	Seldom	1993	43.4	39.1	47.8	630
GSS	Seldom	1994	41.8	38.8	44.9	1,250
GSS	Seldom	1996	44.9	41.8	48.1	1,187
GSS	Seldom	1998	41.0	37.8	44.3	1,108
GSS	Seldom	2000	40.4	37.2	43.7	1,110
GSS	Seldom	2002	40.9	37.5	44.4	1,083
GSS	Seldom	2004	42.7	39.3	46.0	1,140
GSS	Seldom	2006	39.3	36.6	42.0	1,733
GSS	Seldom	2008	35.3	31.5	39.1	857
GSS	Seldom	2010	37.1	33.0	41.1	842
GSS	Seldom	2012	36.3	32.2	40.5	788
GSS	Seldom	2014	37.1	33.7	40.5	1,069
GSS	Seldom	2016	36.2	32.9	39.5	1,240
GSS	Seldom	2018	42.3	38.4	46.1	1,055
GSS	Seldom	2021	35.0	32.4	37.6	1,977
GSS	Seldom	2022	43.6	39.9	47.3	1,690
GSS	Seldom	2024	42.0	38.5	45.5	1,452

The third comparison holds party identification fixed. The chapter measures the tie between attendance and self-placed ideology as a slope, the standard deviationsStandard deviationA measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. of ideology that go with one standard deviation more attendance. It then asks how much of the rise in that slope between the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and those of 2010 to 2018 remains once party identification is held fixed. Party accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%)46% percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts forEstimandone minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondentsInterval95% CI 33% to 67%n17,849Weightsweight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey yearPopulationGSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identificationPeriod1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooledSourceGeneral Social Survey of the rise, and every specification the chapter tries puts the rise net of party below the raw rise. The share is an accounting of the slope and does not measure a cause. Party identification and ideology are answered by the same people in the same interview, and the tie between them tightened over these years (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology). Panel studies find that religious behavior and identity respond to politics [2], so cross-sections cannot say how much of the slope party causes or how much religion does. Attendance also correlates more closely with GSS answers on sexual morality and abortion than with answers on economic policy.

What these surveys cannot tell you

Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers. The gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, and the share of a rise that party accounts for does not say that party moves attendance or ideology. The surveys interview a new sample each time. They cannot say how much of a change comes from people changing their attendance, affiliation or party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate. The ANES gap is not split by interview mode, and every interval ignores the strata and clusters of the sampling designs, a check the chapter could run for the GSS only.

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Go deeper

• The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
• Tables: every figure of the report as a table.

Same question at another grain:

• Religion
  • Planned, Secularization in Europe (planned) Countries

Reading paths that include this chapter:

• Religion and morality

Data sources

• ANES Cumulative Data FileTime Series Cumulative Data File, studies 1952 to 2020 (2024 religion and attendance codes excluded)Years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: weight (VCF0009z) · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.
• Cooperative Election StudyCumulative Common Content, 2008 to 2024Years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years) · Weights: weight_cumulative · License: See the provider's terms of use.
• General Social SurveyCumulative file, 1972 to 2024, with interview mode from the raw fileYears: 1972-2024 (35 study years) · Weights: weight_use · License: See the provider's terms of use.
• World Values Survey and EVSWorld Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005 to 2023; ten EVS country labels restoredYears: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves) · Weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries · License: Free download with registration; users must cite the release.
• European Social SurveyEuropean Social Survey rounds 1 to 11; attendance and left-right self-placementYears: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024) · Weights: weight (analysis weight) within each country · License: Open access after free registration in the ESS Data Portal; follow the ESS data citation requirements.

All data sources

References

1. Layman, Geoffrey C. (2001). The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. Columbia University Press.
2. Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press.

How to cite

@misc{singh2026thegodgapinamerica,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {The god gap in America},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}