Chapter 3.8 · Report

The god gap in America

The Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders rose from 5.5 points in the ANES studies of 1972 to 1988 to 21.8 points in those of 2008 to 2020 and was 27.7 points in the 2024 CES.

Author: Vishal Singh
Affiliation: NYU Stern
Published: 30 September 2026

Every estimate of the chapter with its interval and every figure as a table, generated from the chapter's data files. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. The same report as Markdown: report.md.

Identification

Title

The god gap in America

Chapter

3.8 (Part III, Participation and coalitions; Coalitions and political differences)

Question

How large is the political gap between frequent and infrequent worshippers, and how much of it runs through party?

Dek

The Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders rose from 5.5 points in the ANES studies of 1972 to 1988 to 21.8 points in those of 2008 to 2020 and was 27.7 points in the 2024 CES.

Grain

individuals

Status

draft

Published

30 September 2026

Updated

not revised

Data sources

ANES Cumulative Data File. Time Series Cumulative Data File, studies 1952 to 2020 (2024 religion and attendance codes excluded); years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z)
Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, 2008 to 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative
General Social Survey. Cumulative file, 1972 to 2024, with interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use
World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005 to 2023; ten EVS country labels restored; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries
European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11; attendance and left-right self-placement; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: weight (analysis weight) within each country

Canonical URL

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america

Markdown

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md

BibTeX

@misc{singh2026thegodgapinamerica,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {The god gap in America},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}

Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. Every fact is in the table of all estimates below.

Estimand	Population	Period	Value	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Fact id
weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled	5.5	95% CI 2.9 to 8.1	5,572	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File	anes_dev_early
weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled	21.8	95% CI 19.5 to 24.1	12,996	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File	anes_dev_late
weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2024	27.7	95% CI 26.0 to 29.3	39,057	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	ces_gap_2024

Findings

Among voters who reported a choice between the two major-party candidates in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES), those who attend religious services a few times a year or never voted Democratic at a rate 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) points above those who attend weekly or more. This chapter calls that difference between seldom and frequent attenders the god gap. In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 1972 to 1988 the same gap was 5.5 points, and in those of 2008 to 2020 it was 21.8 points. The pooled gap is not uniform across groups. It is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics, and part of it is the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else.

The chapter keeps three comparisons apart. The first is by attendance, the gap above. The second is by affiliation, the Democratic vote among Catholics against Protestants, which the attendance gap has exceeded since 1992. The third holds party identification fixed and asks how much of the rise in the tie between attendance and ideology, measured as a slope of ideology on attendance, remains in the General Social Survey (GSS). The chapter then compares the United States with Europe and the rest of the world.

Frequent attenders go to services weekly or nearly weekly, and seldom attenders go a few times a year or never. The ANES records attendance in three categories only, so the other surveys are cut to match as closely as their items allow. The CES has no nearly-weekly answer, so its frequent group is weekly or more.Attendance is self-reported, so each group is defined by how respondents answer and not by a count of visits. The cut is the same in the ANES and the GSS and one answer narrower in the CES, and the levels of the groups are compared across surveys only where the text says so. A gap is the Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus the share among frequent attenders, in points, so a positive gap means that seldom attenders voted more Democratic. It describes who votes for whom and does not say why. A pooled estimate combines the respondents of several studies into one estimate.Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Shares use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out strata and clusters and can move an interval either way, and they describe sampling error within one survey and not differences between surveys. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its respondents chose to join; the same formula is used for it, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited. Studies of American party politics through the 1990s described a widening division between religious traditionalists and seculars in party attachments [2]. A later account of American religion documented polarization between religious conservatives and secular liberals [3]. The sections below measure that division in several surveys.

The ANES vote gap has been above zero since 1992

Table 1 plots the gap in every presidential year. In the ANES it was 10.3 (95% CI 5.3 to 15.3) points in 1972, 0.1 (95% CI −6.5 to 6.6) in 1980, an interval that includes zero, 11.3 (95% CI 6.2 to 16.5) in 1992 and 21.9 (95% CI 18.2 to 25.7) in 2020. The interval lies above zero in 8 of the 8 studies from 1992 on, and it includes zero in 3 studies, those of 1980, 1984 and 1988. Pooled over 1972 to 1988 the ANES gap is 5.5 (95% CI 2.9 to 8.1) points, and pooled over 1992 to 2004 it is 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points.

Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

The ANES and the CES agree in the gap pooled over 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, which is 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) points in the ANES and 23.4 (95% CI 22.7 to 24.2) points in the CES.In single years the two surveys differ in both directions. The CES gap was 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) points in 2012 against 20.5 (95% CI 16.2 to 24.8) in the ANES, with intervals that do not overlap, and the ANES gap was 23.8 (95% CI 18.9 to 28.7) points in 2016 against 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in the CES.

The CES gap did not move in one direction after 2008. It was 25.5 (95% CI 23.9 to 27.1) points in 2008 and 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) in 2012, fell to 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in 2016, was 23.5 (95% CI 22.1 to 24.9) in 2020 and stood at 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) in 2024. The change from 2020 to 2024 came from the frequent end. The Democratic share among frequent attenders went from 36.5% (95% CI 35.3% to 37.7%) to 29.9% (95% CI 28.5% to 31.3%), while the share among seldom attenders went from 60.0% (95% CI 59.3% to 60.7%) to 57.6% (95% CI 56.7% to 58.5%).

The gap is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics

The gap for all voters mixes several groups, and the other two views of Table 1 separate some of them. Among white non-Hispanic voters the 2024 CES gap was 33.8 (95% CI 32.1 to 35.5) points, so leaving out Black, Hispanic and other voters raises it. Among Protestant and Catholic voters it was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024, down from 18.7 (95% CI 16.6 to 20.7) in 2008.

The voters left out of the Protestant and Catholic view include the unaffiliated. In the 2024 CES the unaffiliated attended seldom in 96% (95% CI 95% to 96%) of cases and voted 70.9% (95% CI 69.7% to 72.2%) Democratic. They made up 34.2% (95% CI 33.2% to 35.2%) of seldom-attending voters in 2008 and 44.8% (95% CI 43.9% to 45.7%) in 2024, so a growing part of the seldom group is made up of voters who voted Democratic at that rate. See Planned, The rise of the nones (planned) for the unaffiliated and Chapter 3.9, Religious tradition and race for white evangelicals, Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and other traditions.

The attendance gap has exceeded the denominational gap since 1992

The ANES records denomination from 1952 and attendance from 1970, so the earliest religious line in the vote that can be measured runs between Catholics and Protestants.In the ANES the Catholic minus Protestant gap in the Democratic vote was 46.2 (95% CI 38.7 to 53.7) points in 1960, the year John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, was elected, and 20.6 (95% CI 17.4 to 23.7) points over the studies of 1952 to 1968 pooled. It was 8.5 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.3) points in 1972 to 1988. The Catholic minus Protestant gap was 5.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 8.6) points in 1992 to 2004 and 8.3 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.1) in 2008 to 2020, and it was 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) in the 2024 CES (Table 2). The pooled attendance gap was 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points in 1992 to 2004 and 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) in 2008 to 2020, and its interval lies above the denominational interval in both windows. By study, the attendance gap was larger than the denominational gap in 8 of the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on, against 1 of 5 in 1972 to 1988. The two intervals are separate in 3 of the 8 studies from 1992 on (those of 2012, 2016 and 2020). In the CES the attendance interval lies wholly above the denominational interval in 5 of 5 presidential years.The ANES cumulative file cannot supply 2024 religion or attendance. It codes 835 respondents as Protestant in 2024 against 3,180 in 2020, and 49% of 2024 respondents have an attendance answer against 99% in 2020. Every ANES series here stops in 2020, and the CES supplies 2024.

Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

The two gaps differ in who is compared. The attendance gap counts the unaffiliated in its seldom group, and the Catholic minus Protestant gap leaves them out. In the CES the unaffiliated voted 36.7 (95% CI 34.7 to 38.6) points more Democratic than Protestants in 2008 and 38.0 (95% CI 36.3 to 39.7) points more in 2024, against attendance gaps of 25.5 and 27.7 points. The unaffiliated-Protestant interval lies above both the attendance interval and the Catholic-Protestant interval in every presidential year. Among Protestant and Catholic voters alone, the two groups that the denominational gap compares, the attendance gap was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024 (the third view of Table 1) against 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) points for denomination, and the two intervals overlap. Across the 5 CES presidential years the attendance interval among these voters lies wholly above the denominational interval in 2 of them (2008 and 2012), and across the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on in 0. The comparison of the two gaps therefore depends on which voters are included.

The vote differs by attendance inside each tradition, by less than in the pooled comparison. In the 2024 CES seldom Protestants voted 12.5 (95% CI 10.1 to 14.8) points more Democratic than frequent Protestants, and seldom Catholics 10.4 (95% CI 6.6 to 14.2) points more than frequent Catholics, against 27.7 points among all voters. In 2008 the two gaps were 17.2 and 18.1 points. Denomination also separates voters at each level of attendance. In 2024 Catholics who attend often voted 10.2 (95% CI 6.6 to 13.8) points more Democratic than Protestants who attend often, and Catholics who attend seldom voted 8.1 (95% CI 5.4 to 10.9) points more than Protestants who attend seldom. Among the unaffiliated, those who attended weekly or more in 2020 voted 14.3 (95% CI 7.5 to 21.0) points less Democratic than the seldom attenders. The pooled attendance gap therefore combines a gap inside each tradition with the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else, and it is not a single gap that holds in every group.

Table 3 plots the Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers by attendance. In the GSS the share among frequent attenders was 37.4% (95% CI 35.5% to 39.2%) in 1972 to 1978 and 53.2% (95% CI 50.9% to 55.5%) in 2010 to 2018, the last in-person surveys, a change of 15.9 (95% CI 12.9 to 18.8) points. Among seldom attenders it went from 32.1% (95% CI 30.5% to 33.7%) to 37.8% (95% CI 36.2% to 39.5%), a change of 5.7 (95% CI 3.4 to 8.0) points. The gap between the two groups went from 5.3 (95% CI 2.9 to 7.7) to 15.4 (95% CI 12.6 to 18.2) points, so the Republican share rose in both groups and rose more among frequent attenders. The GSS has included web interviews since 2021, and the surveys from 2021 on are called the web era below. The surveys of 2018 to 2024, which include web interviews, give a larger gap of 19.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 22.8) points. In 2022 and 2024 the gap was 18.0 (95% CI 10.3 to 25.8) points among in-person respondents and 23.7 (95% CI 16.8 to 30.5) among web respondents, so part of the larger gap in that window is not separable from the interview mode.In the surveys of 2018 to 2024 the Republican share was 59.7% (95% CI 57.0% to 62.5%) among frequent attenders and 40.2% (95% CI 38.5% to 41.9%) among seldom attenders, changes from 1972 to 1978 of 22.4 (95% CI 19.1 to 25.7) and 8.1 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.4) points.

Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

The CES begins in 2008 and shows a different pattern. Its gap was 26.5 (95% CI 25.0 to 28.0) points in 2008 and 27.4 (95% CI 25.7 to 29.1) points in 2024. Frequent attenders were 61.5% (95% CI 60.3% to 62.7%) Republican in 2008 and 68.1% (95% CI 66.7% to 69.5%) in 2024, and seldom attenders 35.0% (95% CI 34.1% to 35.9%) and 40.7% (95% CI 39.8% to 41.6%), so the Republican share rose by similar amounts in the two groups. The CES gap of 2008 already exceeds the GSS gap of 15.4 points in 2010 to 2018 and of 19.5 points in 2018 to 2024. The two surveys differ in sample, mode and party items, so their levels are not comparable. The CES cannot say what happened before 2008.

Party identification accounts for part of the rise in the slope

In the GSS, party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise in the slope of ideology on attendance between the in-person surveys of 1974 to 1978 and those of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope was 0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.20) in 1974, 0.26 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.31) in 2008, 0.25 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.31) in 2018 and 0.32 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.37) in 2024 (Table 4). Each slope is the standardized slope of self-placed ideology on attendance in one survey year, with both variables standardized once on all respondents in the sample. It counts the standard deviations of ideology that go with one standard deviation more attendance.

Net of party identification, with leaners counted with their party and the fit made on the same respondents, the slope was 0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) in 1974, 0.19 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.24) in 2018 and 0.20 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.25) in 2024. The 2024 point falls in the web era of the GSS. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.30) and web respondents give 0.37 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.42), a difference of 0.13 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.22), so the 2024 slope differs by mode of interview.

The CES, which is online throughout, does not show a steady rise. Its slope was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.36) in 2008 and fell to 0.25 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.26) in 2010, and it was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.37) in 2024. Pooled, it was 0.26 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.27) over 2010 to 2017 and 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.35) over 2018 to 2024. The step between 2017 and 2018 coincides with a rise in the spread of the five-point ideology item, whose standard deviation was 1.00 in 2010 to 2017 and 1.21 in 2018 to 2024. The slope is standardized on all years together, so part of the step is a change in that spread and not in the tie with attendance. The correlation of attendance with ideology, which does not depend on the spread, was +0.29 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.29) over 2010 to 2017 and +0.32 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.32) over 2018 to 2024.

Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise

To ask how much of the rise is accounted for by party, the chapter fits each slope on one set of respondents, once raw and once with party identification added, and compares an early and a late window. The main comparison pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope rose by 0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.15) between the two windows and the slope net of party by 0.06 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.10), so party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise.The share is one minus the ratio of the two rises. Its interval comes from a bootstrap over respondents, which recomputes both rises on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement and reads the interval from the spread of the results. Four other specifications give shares from 50% to 64% (Table 5). Every specification puts the rise net of party below the raw rise, and the single-year comparisons have intervals wide enough to include the whole rise.

Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications

The share is an accounting of the slope. Party identification and ideology are answered by the same respondents in the same interview, and the tie between them tightened over these years (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology), so a party control can be expected to remove more of the slope in later years. In the GSS it removes 8% (95% CI 0% to 18%) of the raw slope in 1974 and 38% (95% CI 29% to 48%) in 2024, and in the CES 47% (95% CI 45% to 50%) in 2008 and 53% (95% CI 50% to 55%) in 2024. Panel studies find that religious behavior and identity respond to politics. Partisan identity that forms early can shape how often people attend and whether they identify with a religion [4], and religious and secular orientations respond to political orientations [5]. Cross-sections cannot separate the two directions, so the share is not an estimate of how much of the slope party causes or how much religion does.

Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic attitudes

The GSS asks questions on sexual morality and abortion (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, a pornography law and abortion for any reason) and on economic policy (help for the poor, help for the sick and government action on income differences). Averaging each set gives a cultural index and an economic index. The economic items are asked from 1975, so the comparison starts there. Over 1975 to 2024 the correlation of attendance with the cultural index is +0.44 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.45), with the economic index +0.11 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12) and with self-placed ideology +0.22 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.23). All three use the same survey years. The cultural and economic correlations use the same respondents, and the ideology correlation uses every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The cultural correlation was +0.37 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.40) in 1975 to 1984 and +0.46 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.49) in 2021 to 2024, and the economic correlation went from +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.11) to +0.18 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.22) (Table 6). The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items.

Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown

The two indices have similar internal consistency, meaning that their items agree with one another to a similar degree (standardized alpha of 0.70 for the cultural items and 0.69 for the economic ones). That similarity limits how far unequal measurement error can account for the difference in correlations. The cultural items ask about sexual morality and abortion, topics on which many religious traditions take positions, so part of the tie sits close to the content of religious teaching. For the abortion item by party see Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort, for whether the cultural items form one dimension see Planned, Two moralities (planned), and for the economic and cultural dimensions across the whole ideology scale see Chapter 1.2, Economic and cultural dimensions.

The United States sits above the European and world averages

The World Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS) ask how important God is in a respondent's life and ask for a left-right self-placement. Inside each country the two answers have a correlation, and in the United States it is +0.28 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.31). The mean across the 104 countries and territories with a usable estimate, counting each once, is +0.10 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12). It is +0.13 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.16) across 42 European countries and +0.08 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.10) across 61 countries outside Europe and the United States. 4 countries have a higher point estimate than the United States (Croatia, Greece, Slovenia and Spain), and in 2 of them (Croatia and Spain) the interval lies wholly above the United States interval (Table 7).The cleaned WVS/EVS file holds 118 countries and territories, and 112 were surveyed in 2005 or later. It leaves the country name blank for ten EVS countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. This chapter restores them from the country code, and 9 have a usable estimate. Without them the mean across 95 countries and territories is +0.10 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.12).

Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages

The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS, where every country answered the same question. Attendance gives the same contrast on other surveys. The correlation of attendance with self-placed ideology in the GSS from 2006 to 2024 is +0.25 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.26) in the United States, and the mean across 36 European countries in the European Social Survey (ESS) is +0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.14). The two projects also order countries alike. Across the 36 countries that both surveyed, the attendance correlations in the WVS/EVS and the ESS correlate at +0.81 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.90), with a mean absolute difference of 0.04.

In the GSS the correlation is higher in 2024 than in 2002

A rising correlation would make the United States a place where the tie between religiosity and the right is still growing, and the data do not settle it. In the GSS the correlation of attendance with ideology was +0.18 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.24) in 2002 and +0.30 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.34) in 2024. The 2024 value falls in the web era. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the correlation was +0.22 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) among in-person respondents and +0.33 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.37) among web respondents. The in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval, so the separation between 2002 and 2024 rests on the web-era point. In the CES the correlation was +0.34 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.35) in 2008, +0.27 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.28) in 2010 and +0.33 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.34) in 2024. In a fixed panel of 15 European countries present in every ESS round, the mean correlation was +0.17 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.20) in 2002 and +0.15 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.21) in 2023, a paired change of −0.02 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.03) (Table 8).The panel mean hides movements in both directions. The correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9, with the largest rise in Poland, from +0.20 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.25) to +0.38 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.43), and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) to −0.04 (95% CI −0.10 to 0.02). The direction of the United States series therefore depends on the survey and on the years compared. For attendance in Europe see Planned, Secularization in Europe (planned).

Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change

What these data cannot show

Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers. The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one. The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation. The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate.

The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation. The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode. The CES is an opt-in online panel. The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys.

The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs. The GSS design variables allow two checks. Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one. A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents. The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way. Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race. The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is. The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country.

Tables

Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES), reported voters, percentage points, 95% intervals; ANES 1972 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024

Sample	Survey	Year	Gap (points)	Lower	Upper	Seldom, Democratic share (%)	Frequent, Democratic share (%)	Seldom voters	Frequent voters
All voters	ANES	1972	10.3	5.3	15.3	40.6	30.3	705	684
All voters	ANES	1976	7.5	1.5	13.5	53.5	46.0	536	578
All voters	ANES	1980	0.1	−6.5	6.6	38.8	38.7	441	408
All voters	ANES	1984	5.2	−0.3	10.8	43.0	37.8	621	580
All voters	ANES	1988	2.1	−4.1	8.2	47.1	45.1	522	497
All voters	ANES	1992	11.3	6.2	16.5	53.4	42.0	745	684
All voters	ANES	1996	14.6	7.7	21.5	61.3	46.7	459	496
All voters	ANES	2000	14.9	7.9	21.9	58.4	43.5	453	481
All voters	ANES	2004	12.6	4.5	20.7	55.9	43.3	371	316
All voters	ANES	2008	21.1	14.4	27.8	62.2	41.2	666	600
All voters	ANES	2012	20.5	16.2	24.8	61.2	40.8	2,198	1,543
All voters	ANES	2016	23.8	18.9	28.7	62.0	38.2	1,432	884
All voters	ANES	2020	21.9	18.2	25.7	62.3	40.4	3,950	1,723
All voters	CES	2008	25.5	23.9	27.1	63.4	37.9	13,147	8,021
All voters	CES	2012	27.3	25.7	28.9	62.3	35.0	22,397	11,984
All voters	CES	2016	18.9	17.4	20.4	56.9	37.9	26,471	10,902
All voters	CES	2020	23.5	22.1	24.9	60.0	36.5	30,080	10,434
All voters	CES	2024	27.7	26.0	29.3	57.6	29.9	29,642	9,415
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1972	6.3	1.1	11.5	36.4	30.1	604	677
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1976	4.5	−1.8	10.8	50.6	46.1	450	570
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1980	0.6	−6.5	7.7	39.4	38.8	340	402
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1984	2.1	−3.8	8.0	39.5	37.3	484	568
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1988	−1.7	−8.2	4.8	43.0	44.7	407	492
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1992	8.3	2.5	14.2	49.8	41.5	488	643
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	1996	15.7	7.9	23.5	61.2	45.5	301	469
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2000	9.4	1.3	17.6	53.5	44.0	289	458
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2004	11.0	1.4	20.6	55.1	44.1	211	292
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2008	16.4	8.5	24.3	57.3	40.9	394	568
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2012	14.7	9.5	19.9	55.4	40.7	1,207	1,348
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2016	15.3	9.5	21.2	52.9	37.5	759	797
Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES	2020	11.8	7.2	16.3	52.6	40.9	1,938	1,403
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2008	18.7	16.6	20.7	51.9	33.3	6,415	5,786
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2012	15.3	13.5	17.2	50.6	35.3	11,833	10,669
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2016	9.0	7.3	10.8	45.3	36.3	12,636	9,457
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2020	11.0	9.3	12.7	45.7	34.8	12,431	8,674
Protestant and Catholic voters	CES	2024	13.2	11.2	15.2	42.2	29.0	12,221	7,759
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1972	9.9	4.8	15.0	35.8	25.9	640	622
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1976	8.3	2.1	14.6	49.6	41.2	486	523
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1980	3.5	−3.2	10.3	33.6	30.1	384	346
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1984	9.0	3.2	14.8	39.4	30.4	545	483
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1988	6.5	−0.1	13.1	42.5	36.0	447	400
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1992	17.9	12.3	23.4	50.1	32.2	640	542
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	1996	22.5	15.0	29.9	57.3	34.8	397	386
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2000	18.8	11.1	26.4	54.9	36.1	377	383
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2004	18.9	9.7	28.0	51.5	32.7	283	230
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2008	28.8	20.9	36.7	55.4	26.6	410	284
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2012	29.3	24.4	34.1	53.9	24.7	1,460	874
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2016	27.8	22.6	33.1	53.5	25.7	1,107	652
White non-Hispanic voters	ANES	2020	29.9	26.0	33.9	55.4	25.4	3,035	1,292
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2008	32.1	30.5	33.7	58.2	26.2	11,293	6,653
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2012	33.0	31.3	34.7	57.9	24.9	18,416	9,387
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2016	25.4	23.9	26.9	51.1	25.7	20,561	7,745
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2020	31.0	29.6	32.3	54.2	23.2	23,149	7,406
White non-Hispanic voters	CES	2024	33.8	32.1	35.5	53.7	19.9	22,958	6,803

Views: All voters (sample = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (sample = White non-Hispanic voters); Protestant and Catholic voters (sample = Protestant and Catholic voters).

Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion and attendance codes cannot be used, so the ANES line ends in 2020.

Note: Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item: frequent is weekly or almost weekly, seldom is a few times a year or never. The CES has no almost-weekly answer, so its frequent group is the top two answers, once a week and more than once a week.

Note: A study enters only when each attendance group has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json

Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among reported voters; gaps in percentage points and shares in percent; ANES 1952 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals

View	Tradition or sample	Series	Year	Estimate	Lower	Upper	Voters
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1972	10.3	5.3	15.3	1,389
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1976	7.5	1.5	13.5	1,114
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1980	0.1	−6.5	6.6	849
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1984	5.2	−0.3	10.8	1,201
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1988	2.1	−4.1	8.2	1,019
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1992	11.3	6.2	16.5	1,429
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	1996	14.6	7.7	21.5	955
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2000	14.9	7.9	21.9	934
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2004	12.6	4.5	20.7	687
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2008	21.1	14.4	27.8	1,266
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2012	20.5	16.2	24.8	3,741
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2016	23.8	18.9	28.7	2,316
gaps	All voters	ANES attendance	2020	21.9	18.2	25.7	5,673
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2008	25.5	23.9	27.1	21,168
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2012	27.3	25.7	28.9	34,381
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2016	18.9	17.4	20.4	37,373
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2020	23.5	22.1	24.9	40,514
gaps	All voters	CES attendance	2024	27.7	26.0	29.3	39,057
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1952	15.3	8.7	22.0	1,104
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1956	9.9	3.4	16.4	1,181
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1960	46.2	38.7	53.7	847
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1964	16.2	10.2	22.1	1,035
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1968	21.8	14.6	29.0	963
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1972	8.2	2.7	13.7	1,469
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1976	11.5	5.1	17.8	1,219
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1980	1.3	−6.3	8.9	839
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1984	8.7	2.7	14.7	1,212
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1988	10.5	3.9	17.1	1,070
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1992	5.9	0.1	11.7	1,342
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	1996	6.6	−1.0	14.1	912
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2000	1.4	−6.1	9.0	911
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2004	5.0	−4.2	14.3	610
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2008	9.2	1.2	17.1	1,195
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2012	9.5	4.4	14.7	2,927
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2016	8.6	2.8	14.4	1,799
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	ANES denomination	2020	7.3	2.8	11.8	3,745
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2008	10.1	8.1	12.2	13,915
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2012	7.9	6.1	9.8	25,252
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2016	10.8	9.0	12.5	24,840
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2020	10.7	9.0	12.5	23,634
gaps	Protestant and Catholic voters	CES denomination	2024	10.4	8.3	12.4	22,174
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2008	36.7	34.7	38.6	13,283
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2012	32.3	30.5	34.1	25,423
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2016	30.1	28.5	31.6	27,239
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2020	35.4	34.0	36.8	29,897
gaps	Unaffiliated and Protestant voters	CES unaffiliated	2024	38.0	36.3	39.7	28,512
within	Catholic	Frequent	2008	38.7	36.0	41.3	1,809
within	Catholic	Frequent	2012	37.5	35.0	39.9	3,002
within	Catholic	Frequent	2016	42.9	40.4	45.4	2,901
within	Catholic	Frequent	2020	42.3	39.7	44.9	2,434
within	Catholic	Frequent	2024	36.7	33.5	39.8	2,146
within	Catholic	Seldom	2008	56.8	54.5	59.1	2,705
within	Catholic	Seldom	2012	56.0	53.9	58.1	4,421
within	Catholic	Seldom	2016	51.4	49.5	53.2	5,220
within	Catholic	Seldom	2020	51.6	49.7	53.5	5,232
within	Catholic	Seldom	2024	47.1	44.9	49.2	5,074
within	Protestant	Frequent	2008	30.8	29.1	32.4	3,977
within	Protestant	Frequent	2012	34.5	32.9	36.1	7,667
within	Protestant	Frequent	2016	33.6	32.0	35.1	6,556
within	Protestant	Frequent	2020	32.3	30.8	33.7	6,240
within	Protestant	Frequent	2024	26.5	24.8	28.1	5,613
within	Protestant	Seldom	2008	48.0	46.1	49.9	3,710
within	Protestant	Seldom	2012	47.2	45.6	48.8	7,412
within	Protestant	Seldom	2016	41.4	39.9	43.0	7,416
within	Protestant	Seldom	2020	41.8	40.4	43.3	7,199
within	Protestant	Seldom	2024	38.9	37.2	40.6	7,147
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2012	54.5	46.0	62.9	266
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2016	53.5	46.8	60.3	386
within	Unaffiliated	Frequent	2020	59.5	52.9	66.2	369
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2008	76.6	75.0	78.1	4,351
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2012	74.7	73.2	76.2	7,904
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2016	69.3	68.1	70.4	10,803
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2020	73.8	72.9	74.8	14,096
within	Unaffiliated	Seldom	2024	72.1	70.9	73.4	13,762

Views: Three gaps compared (view = gaps); Attendance within each tradition (view = within).

Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion codes cannot be used: Protestants number 3,180 in 2020 and 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, so the ANES lines end in 2020. The CES gives a Catholic-Protestant gap of 10.4 points in 2024. The ANES religion item cannot separate the unaffiliated from other faiths, so the unaffiliated line is CES only.

Note: A group needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size in a study. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json

Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) among frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by year, percent, 95% intervals

Survey	Attendance	Year	Republican share (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
CES	Frequent	2008	61.5	60.3	62.7	9,264
CES	Frequent	2009	62.6	60.7	64.5	3,447
CES	Frequent	2010	61.7	60.5	63.0	15,341
CES	Frequent	2011	58.2	56.2	60.2	4,711
CES	Frequent	2012	59.6	58.3	60.8	13,849
CES	Frequent	2013	57.2	54.8	59.6	3,336
CES	Frequent	2014	61.4	60.1	62.7	12,466
CES	Frequent	2015	57.0	54.6	59.4	3,019
CES	Frequent	2016	56.5	55.4	57.7	13,736
CES	Frequent	2017	59.3	57.0	61.6	3,608
CES	Frequent	2018	65.1	63.9	66.3	12,055
CES	Frequent	2019	63.9	61.9	65.9	3,690
CES	Frequent	2020	63.8	62.6	65.0	11,385
CES	Frequent	2021	63.5	61.7	65.3	4,609
CES	Frequent	2022	64.5	63.2	65.8	11,125
CES	Frequent	2023	58.2	56.4	60.0	5,168
CES	Frequent	2024	68.1	66.7	69.5	10,949
CES	Seldom	2008	35.0	34.1	35.9	15,164
CES	Seldom	2009	37.6	36.3	39.0	6,317
CES	Seldom	2010	40.8	39.8	41.7	26,251
CES	Seldom	2011	38.8	37.4	40.2	9,845
CES	Seldom	2012	33.8	32.9	34.7	25,858
CES	Seldom	2013	37.2	35.7	38.8	7,801
CES	Seldom	2014	40.1	39.2	40.9	26,501
CES	Seldom	2015	39.9	38.3	41.4	7,057
CES	Seldom	2016	39.1	38.4	39.9	31,636
CES	Seldom	2017	39.2	37.7	40.7	8,894
CES	Seldom	2018	38.7	38.0	39.5	31,182
CES	Seldom	2019	37.6	36.3	38.9	9,363
CES	Seldom	2020	40.3	39.6	41.1	32,768
CES	Seldom	2021	38.4	37.3	39.5	13,718
CES	Seldom	2022	40.0	39.2	40.7	32,774
CES	Seldom	2023	40.1	39.0	41.2	12,096
CES	Seldom	2024	40.7	39.8	41.6	34,618
GSS	Frequent	1972	33.7	29.5	37.9	575
GSS	Frequent	1973	43.0	38.1	47.8	468
GSS	Frequent	1974	36.9	32.1	41.8	473
GSS	Frequent	1975	38.9	34.0	43.9	467
GSS	Frequent	1976	33.3	28.5	38.0	452
GSS	Frequent	1977	35.3	30.5	40.0	482
GSS	Frequent	1978	41.4	35.7	47.1	458
GSS	Frequent	1980	38.6	33.1	44.2	438
GSS	Frequent	1982	39.7	34.3	45.0	579
GSS	Frequent	1983	39.9	34.3	45.4	513
GSS	Frequent	1984	47.8	42.2	53.5	489
GSS	Frequent	1985	45.4	39.8	50.9	507
GSS	Frequent	1986	47.1	42.1	52.1	466
GSS	Frequent	1987	46.3	41.1	51.5	549
GSS	Frequent	1988	51.6	46.5	56.7	444
GSS	Frequent	1989	50.1	45.0	55.2	476
GSS	Frequent	1990	52.8	47.5	58.1	429
GSS	Frequent	1991	50.9	45.7	56.0	458
GSS	Frequent	1993	53.5	48.5	58.6	487
GSS	Frequent	1994	51.1	47.2	55.0	810
GSS	Frequent	1996	50.0	46.0	53.9	748
GSS	Frequent	1998	51.2	47.3	55.2	763
GSS	Frequent	2000	53.9	49.8	58.1	688
GSS	Frequent	2002	54.1	49.9	58.4	705
GSS	Frequent	2004	53.7	49.5	57.8	786
GSS	Frequent	2006	55.3	51.9	58.6	1,165
GSS	Frequent	2008	53.0	47.9	58.1	527
GSS	Frequent	2010	50.7	45.2	56.2	507
GSS	Frequent	2012	50.8	45.2	56.3	496
GSS	Frequent	2014	54.6	50.0	59.3	587
GSS	Frequent	2016	52.2	47.7	56.7	681
GSS	Frequent	2018	57.9	52.1	63.6	489
GSS	Frequent	2021	54.6	50.3	59.0	813
GSS	Frequent	2022	60.7	54.2	67.3	606
GSS	Frequent	2024	66.2	60.9	71.5	623
GSS	Seldom	1972	31.4	27.2	35.6	579
GSS	Seldom	1973	34.3	30.3	38.4	625
GSS	Seldom	1974	29.4	25.3	33.4	571
GSS	Seldom	1975	30.7	26.6	34.7	587
GSS	Seldom	1976	30.8	26.8	34.9	620
GSS	Seldom	1977	32.8	28.7	36.9	631
GSS	Seldom	1978	34.7	30.0	39.4	625
GSS	Seldom	1980	33.2	28.5	37.9	587
GSS	Seldom	1982	38.1	33.7	42.5	753
GSS	Seldom	1983	37.9	33.2	42.7	639
GSS	Seldom	1984	40.5	35.4	45.6	576
GSS	Seldom	1985	44.4	39.7	49.1	650
GSS	Seldom	1986	43.1	38.5	47.6	560
GSS	Seldom	1987	43.5	39.1	47.9	706
GSS	Seldom	1988	40.2	35.8	44.6	612
GSS	Seldom	1989	46.3	42.0	50.7	643
GSS	Seldom	1990	44.7	39.9	49.5	528
GSS	Seldom	1991	49.5	45.1	54.0	596
GSS	Seldom	1993	43.4	39.1	47.8	630
GSS	Seldom	1994	41.8	38.8	44.9	1,250
GSS	Seldom	1996	44.9	41.8	48.1	1,187
GSS	Seldom	1998	41.0	37.8	44.3	1,108
GSS	Seldom	2000	40.4	37.2	43.7	1,110
GSS	Seldom	2002	40.9	37.5	44.4	1,083
GSS	Seldom	2004	42.7	39.3	46.0	1,140
GSS	Seldom	2006	39.3	36.6	42.0	1,733
GSS	Seldom	2008	35.3	31.5	39.1	857
GSS	Seldom	2010	37.1	33.0	41.1	842
GSS	Seldom	2012	36.3	32.2	40.5	788
GSS	Seldom	2014	37.1	33.7	40.5	1,069
GSS	Seldom	2016	36.2	32.9	39.5	1,240
GSS	Seldom	2018	42.3	38.4	46.1	1,055
GSS	Seldom	2021	35.0	32.4	37.6	1,977
GSS	Seldom	2022	43.6	39.9	47.3	1,690
GSS	Seldom	2024	42.0	38.5	45.5	1,452

Views: GSS, 1972 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES).

Note: Pure independents are left out. GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, so the 2018 to 2024 window is not comparable with the in-person window of 2010 to 2018. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the frequent-minus-seldom gap was 18.0 points among in-person respondents and 23.7 points among web respondents.

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json

Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise

Standardized slope of ideology on church attendance, by year, raw and net of party identification; 95% intervals

Survey	Series	Year	Slope	Lower	Upper	Respondents
CES	Net of party	2008	0.18	0.17	0.20	29,793
CES	Net of party	2009	0.17	0.16	0.19	12,123
CES	Net of party	2010	0.14	0.13	0.15	51,265
CES	Net of party	2011	0.15	0.13	0.16	18,198
CES	Net of party	2012	0.16	0.15	0.17	48,517
CES	Net of party	2013	0.16	0.14	0.17	14,509
CES	Net of party	2014	0.16	0.15	0.17	49,407
CES	Net of party	2015	0.17	0.15	0.19	12,719
CES	Net of party	2016	0.18	0.17	0.19	58,315
CES	Net of party	2017	0.16	0.15	0.18	16,175
CES	Net of party	2018	0.19	0.18	0.20	53,579
CES	Net of party	2019	0.16	0.15	0.18	16,287
CES	Net of party	2020	0.18	0.17	0.19	54,697
CES	Net of party	2021	0.19	0.17	0.20	23,134
CES	Net of party	2022	0.20	0.18	0.21	54,246
CES	Net of party	2023	0.18	0.17	0.20	21,693
CES	Net of party	2024	0.17	0.16	0.18	55,195
CES	Raw slope	2008	0.35	0.34	0.36	29,793
CES	Raw slope	2009	0.31	0.29	0.33	12,123
CES	Raw slope	2010	0.25	0.24	0.26	51,265
CES	Raw slope	2011	0.24	0.23	0.26	18,198
CES	Raw slope	2012	0.28	0.27	0.29	48,517
CES	Raw slope	2013	0.25	0.23	0.27	14,509
CES	Raw slope	2014	0.27	0.26	0.28	49,407
CES	Raw slope	2015	0.26	0.24	0.28	12,719
CES	Raw slope	2016	0.26	0.25	0.27	58,315
CES	Raw slope	2017	0.27	0.25	0.29	16,175
CES	Raw slope	2018	0.36	0.35	0.38	53,579
CES	Raw slope	2019	0.35	0.33	0.37	16,287
CES	Raw slope	2020	0.34	0.33	0.35	54,697
CES	Raw slope	2021	0.35	0.33	0.37	23,134
CES	Raw slope	2022	0.36	0.34	0.37	54,246
CES	Raw slope	2023	0.30	0.28	0.32	21,693
CES	Raw slope	2024	0.35	0.34	0.37	55,195
GSS	Net of party	1974	0.14	0.08	0.19	1,344
GSS	Net of party	1975	0.15	0.09	0.21	1,382
GSS	Net of party	1976	0.12	0.07	0.18	1,387
GSS	Net of party	1977	0.10	0.04	0.16	1,435
GSS	Net of party	1978	0.13	0.08	0.19	1,420
GSS	Net of party	1980	0.11	0.04	0.18	1,414
GSS	Net of party	1982	0.16	0.10	0.21	1,718
GSS	Net of party	1983	−0.02	−0.10	0.06	761
GSS	Net of party	1984	0.18	0.12	0.23	1,380
GSS	Net of party	1985	0.11	0.05	0.17	1,443
GSS	Net of party	1986	0.13	0.07	0.18	1,387
GSS	Net of party	1987	0.12	0.07	0.18	1,658
GSS	Net of party	1988	0.12	0.06	0.18	1,408
GSS	Net of party	1989	0.12	0.06	0.17	1,428
GSS	Net of party	1990	0.15	0.09	0.21	1,267
GSS	Net of party	1991	0.16	0.10	0.21	1,421
GSS	Net of party	1993	0.20	0.15	0.26	1,496
GSS	Net of party	1994	0.18	0.14	0.22	2,765
GSS	Net of party	1996	0.17	0.13	0.21	2,630
GSS	Net of party	1998	0.19	0.15	0.23	2,585
GSS	Net of party	2000	0.18	0.13	0.22	2,527
GSS	Net of party	2002	0.13	0.07	0.19	1,294
GSS	Net of party	2004	0.14	0.08	0.20	1,287
GSS	Net of party	2006	0.16	0.13	0.19	4,244
GSS	Net of party	2008	0.19	0.14	0.24	1,884
GSS	Net of party	2010	0.15	0.10	0.21	1,911
GSS	Net of party	2012	0.19	0.13	0.24	1,809
GSS	Net of party	2014	0.21	0.17	0.25	2,360
GSS	Net of party	2016	0.19	0.15	0.23	2,662
GSS	Net of party	2018	0.19	0.14	0.24	2,139
GSS	Net of party	2021	0.16	0.12	0.19	3,793
GSS	Net of party	2022	0.18	0.14	0.23	3,276
GSS	Net of party	2024	0.20	0.15	0.25	3,039
GSS	Raw slope	1974	0.15	0.09	0.20	1,344
GSS	Raw slope	1975	0.16	0.10	0.21	1,382
GSS	Raw slope	1976	0.14	0.08	0.19	1,387
GSS	Raw slope	1977	0.10	0.04	0.16	1,435
GSS	Raw slope	1978	0.15	0.09	0.21	1,420
GSS	Raw slope	1980	0.12	0.05	0.19	1,414
GSS	Raw slope	1982	0.17	0.11	0.23	1,718
GSS	Raw slope	1983	−0.02	−0.11	0.06	761
GSS	Raw slope	1984	0.19	0.13	0.24	1,380
GSS	Raw slope	1985	0.12	0.05	0.18	1,443
GSS	Raw slope	1986	0.14	0.08	0.19	1,387
GSS	Raw slope	1987	0.13	0.07	0.19	1,658
GSS	Raw slope	1988	0.15	0.09	0.21	1,408
GSS	Raw slope	1989	0.13	0.07	0.19	1,428
GSS	Raw slope	1990	0.17	0.11	0.23	1,267
GSS	Raw slope	1991	0.16	0.10	0.22	1,421
GSS	Raw slope	1993	0.23	0.18	0.29	1,496
GSS	Raw slope	1994	0.20	0.16	0.25	2,765
GSS	Raw slope	1996	0.20	0.15	0.24	2,630
GSS	Raw slope	1998	0.23	0.19	0.27	2,585
GSS	Raw slope	2000	0.22	0.17	0.26	2,527
GSS	Raw slope	2002	0.18	0.11	0.24	1,294
GSS	Raw slope	2004	0.17	0.10	0.24	1,287
GSS	Raw slope	2006	0.22	0.19	0.26	4,244
GSS	Raw slope	2008	0.26	0.21	0.31	1,884
GSS	Raw slope	2010	0.21	0.15	0.27	1,911
GSS	Raw slope	2012	0.24	0.18	0.30	1,809
GSS	Raw slope	2014	0.27	0.23	0.32	2,360
GSS	Raw slope	2016	0.26	0.21	0.30	2,662
GSS	Raw slope	2018	0.25	0.20	0.31	2,139
GSS	Raw slope	2021	0.26	0.22	0.30	3,793
GSS	Raw slope	2022	0.29	0.23	0.35	3,276
GSS	Raw slope	2024	0.32	0.26	0.37	3,039

Views: GSS, 1974 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES).

Note: Ideology is the seven-point liberal-conservative scale in the GSS and a five-point scale in the CES.

Note: GSS interviews were in person, with some telephone interviews, through 2018; 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 and web respondents 0.37.

Note: The GSS 1983 survey asked the ideology item of a subsample only, and that year's slope, marked on the chart, rests on fewer respondents. Years with fewer than 200 respondents are left out. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Regression intervals use HC3 robust errors.

Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json

Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications

Early and late GSS periods compared on one common sample of respondents, by specification; 95% bootstrap intervals

Table 5.1. Share accounted for

The share of the rise that party identification accounts for runs from 46% in the main specification to 64% when 1974 is compared with 2024

Share of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, in percent

Specification	Periods compared	Share accounted for by party (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
Pooled in-person windows	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	46	33	67	17,849
Seven party categories	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories	52	37	74	17,849
1974 and 2018 alone	1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode)	50	20	163	3,483
1974 and 2024 alone	1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews)	64	41	112	4,383
Late window with web	1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	63	49	82	19,215

Table 5.2. Rises in the slope

The rise in the slope net of party is smaller than the rise in the raw slope in every specification

Rise in the standardized slope of ideology on attendance, raw and net of party identification

Specification	Periods compared	Raw rise	Lower	Upper	Rise net of party	Lower	Upper	Respondents
Pooled in-person windows	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.06	0.03	0.10	17,849
Seven party categories	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.05	0.02	0.09	17,849
1974 and 2018 alone	1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode)	0.11	0.02	0.19	0.05	−0.02	0.13	3,483
1974 and 2024 alone	1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews)	0.17	0.10	0.25	0.06	−0.01	0.14	4,383
Late window with web	1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	0.14	0.11	0.18	0.05	0.02	0.09	19,215

Note: The main specification pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, and the seven-category row repeats that comparison with a finer party control. The single-year rows compare 1974 with 2018, the last survey before the web mode, and with 2024. The late window with web pools 2018 to 2024 against 1974 to 1978.

Note: The percentile bootstrap resamples respondents within each period 2,000 times and refits both slopes each time. The party control is two indicators (Republican, independent) unless the row says seven categories.

Note: The web mode began in 2021. Rows that end in 2018 or use the survey years 2010 to 2018 contain no web interviews.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json

Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown

Weighted correlation of church attendance (never to more than weekly) with cultural conservatism, economic conservatism and self-placed ideology, by period, GSS respondents, 95% intervals

Outcome	Period	Correlation	Lower	Upper	Respondents
Cultural conservatism	1975 to 1984	0.37	0.34	0.40	4,196
Cultural conservatism	1985 to 1994	0.39	0.37	0.41	9,643
Cultural conservatism	1995 to 2004	0.42	0.40	0.45	6,963
Cultural conservatism	2005 to 2014	0.44	0.42	0.47	7,362
Cultural conservatism	2015 to 2018	0.47	0.44	0.51	3,317
Cultural conservatism	2021 to 2024	0.46	0.44	0.49	6,846
Economic conservatism	1975 to 1984	0.07	0.04	0.11	4,196
Economic conservatism	1985 to 1994	0.06	0.04	0.08	9,643
Economic conservatism	1995 to 2004	0.07	0.05	0.10	6,963
Economic conservatism	2005 to 2014	0.09	0.06	0.11	7,362
Economic conservatism	2015 to 2018	0.12	0.08	0.17	3,317
Economic conservatism	2021 to 2024	0.18	0.15	0.22	6,846
Self-placed ideology	1975 to 1984	0.14	0.10	0.17	3,565
Self-placed ideology	1985 to 1994	0.17	0.15	0.19	12,990
Self-placed ideology	1995 to 2004	0.21	0.19	0.23	10,527
Self-placed ideology	2005 to 2014	0.24	0.22	0.26	12,522
Self-placed ideology	2015 to 2018	0.24	0.21	0.27	4,983
Self-placed ideology	2021 to 2024	0.27	0.24	0.29	10,448

Note: The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items. All three outcomes use the survey years in which both indices were measured; the ideology points include every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The periods are 1975 to 1984, 1985 to 1994, 1995 to 2004, 2005 to 2014, 2015 to 2018 and 2021 to 2024.

Note: Cultural conservatism averages five standardized items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason); economic conservatism averages three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences). Each index needs at least two answers. The mean correlation among the cultural items is +0.32 and among the economic items +0.42.

Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, and 2015 to 2018 is the last period before them. Correlations use the Kish effective sample size for the interval.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json

Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages

Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement and the importance of God or attendance, inside each country; the United States on two measures and equal-country means for Europe and the rest of the world; 95% intervals

View	Row	Drawn in the chart	Correlation	Lower	Upper	Respondents	Countries
summary	US, GSS attendance	yes	0.25	0.23	0.26	27,953	n/a
summary	Europe, ESS attendance (36 countries)	yes	0.11	0.08	0.14	n/a	36
summary	US, WVS/EVS importance of God	yes	0.28	0.25	0.31	5,858	n/a
summary	Europe, WVS/EVS importance of God (42 countries)	yes	0.13	0.10	0.16	n/a	42
summary	Rest of the world, WVS/EVS importance of God (61 countries)	yes	0.08	0.06	0.10	n/a	61
summary	All WVS/EVS countries, importance of God (104 countries)	yes	0.10	0.09	0.12	n/a	104
countries	Albania	no	0.13	0.09	0.18	2,209	n/a
countries	Algeria	no	−0.02	−0.11	0.06	536	n/a
countries	Andorra	yes	0.22	0.17	0.26	1,813	n/a
countries	Argentina	yes	0.22	0.18	0.26	2,326	n/a
countries	Armenia	no	0.04	0.00	0.08	3,758	n/a
countries	Australia	no	0.20	0.16	0.23	4,456	n/a
countries	Austria	no	0.13	0.09	0.17	2,710	n/a
countries	Azerbaijan	no	0.04	0.00	0.09	2,152	n/a
countries	Bangladesh	no	0.01	−0.05	0.06	1,200	n/a
countries	Belarus	no	0.07	0.04	0.11	3,186	n/a
countries	Belgium	no	0.12	0.07	0.17	1,421	n/a
countries	Bolivia	no	0.05	0.01	0.10	1,803	n/a
countries	Bosnia Herzegovina	no	0.19	0.15	0.23	2,269	n/a
countries	Brazil	no	0.09	0.06	0.12	3,673	n/a
countries	Bulgaria	no	0.05	0.01	0.09	2,670	n/a
countries	Burkina Faso	no	−0.04	−0.09	0.02	1,109	n/a
countries	Canada	yes	0.25	0.22	0.28	5,628	n/a
countries	Chile	no	0.09	0.04	0.15	2,085	n/a
countries	Colombia	no	0.12	0.09	0.14	5,005	n/a
countries	Croatia	yes	0.36	0.32	0.40	2,354	n/a
countries	Cyprus	no	0.07	0.04	0.11	3,279	n/a
countries	Czechia	no	0.01	−0.02	0.05	3,856	n/a
countries	Denmark	no	0.06	0.03	0.10	4,678	n/a
countries	Ecuador	no	0.05	0.01	0.09	2,243	n/a
countries	Egypt	no	0.00	−0.04	0.04	2,721	n/a
countries	Estonia	yes	−0.06	−0.10	−0.03	3,216	n/a
countries	Ethiopia	no	0.11	0.07	0.16	1,914	n/a
countries	Finland	no	0.19	0.15	0.23	2,897	n/a
countries	France	no	0.18	0.15	0.22	3,845	n/a
countries	Georgia	no	0.05	0.02	0.08	4,283	n/a
countries	Germany	no	0.14	0.11	0.16	8,654	n/a
countries	Ghana	no	0.03	−0.02	0.07	2,330	n/a
countries	Greece	yes	0.29	0.25	0.33	2,118	n/a
countries	Guatemala	no	0.06	0.00	0.11	1,211	n/a
countries	Haiti	no	0.01	−0.03	0.05	1,929	n/a
countries	Hong Kong SAR	no	0.06	0.02	0.09	3,801	n/a
countries	Hungary	no	0.15	0.12	0.19	3,432	n/a
countries	Iceland	no	0.13	0.08	0.17	2,299	n/a
countries	India	no	0.12	0.10	0.15	5,785	n/a
countries	Indonesia	no	0.07	0.03	0.10	4,082	n/a
countries	Iraq	no	0.07	0.01	0.13	978	n/a
countries	Ireland	yes	0.22	0.14	0.29	682	n/a
countries	Italy	no	0.19	0.16	0.23	3,515	n/a
countries	Japan	no	0.13	0.10	0.16	3,386	n/a
countries	Kazakhstan	no	0.11	0.06	0.16	1,500	n/a
countries	Kenya	no	−0.04	−0.10	0.02	1,160	n/a
countries	Kosovo	yes	−0.06	−0.13	0.02	650	n/a
countries	Kyrgyzstan	no	0.18	0.13	0.23	1,458	n/a
countries	Latvia	no	0.05	0.01	0.10	2,033	n/a
countries	Lebanon	no	0.11	0.04	0.17	834	n/a
countries	Libya	no	0.03	−0.02	0.08	2,594	n/a
countries	Lithuania	no	0.12	0.07	0.16	1,812	n/a
countries	Luxembourg	yes	0.27	0.21	0.33	1,261	n/a
countries	Macau SAR	no	0.06	−0.01	0.12	996	n/a
countries	Malaysia	no	0.15	0.11	0.18	2,613	n/a
countries	Maldives	no	0.09	0.03	0.15	1,023	n/a
countries	Mali	no	0.01	−0.04	0.07	1,140	n/a
countries	Malta	no	0.07	−0.01	0.15	770	n/a
countries	Mexico	no	0.10	0.07	0.13	4,781	n/a
countries	Moldova	no	0.05	0.00	0.10	1,657	n/a
countries	Mongolia	no	0.20	0.15	0.25	1,611	n/a
countries	Montenegro	no	0.15	0.09	0.21	1,218	n/a
countries	Morocco	no	0.04	−0.01	0.08	1,914	n/a
countries	Netherlands	no	0.13	0.10	0.15	7,785	n/a
countries	New Zealand	no	0.13	0.08	0.18	1,361	n/a
countries	Nicaragua	no	0.02	−0.05	0.08	871	n/a
countries	Nigeria	no	0.04	0.00	0.08	2,929	n/a
countries	North Macedonia	no	0.09	0.04	0.14	1,729	n/a
countries	Northern Ireland	no	0.16	0.08	0.24	763	n/a
countries	Norway	no	0.09	0.06	0.13	3,144	n/a
countries	Pakistan	no	0.17	0.11	0.22	1,200	n/a
countries	Palestine	no	0.09	0.02	0.16	728	n/a
countries	Peru	no	0.08	0.04	0.11	3,339	n/a
countries	Philippines	no	0.07	0.03	0.12	2,388	n/a
countries	Poland	yes	0.28	0.25	0.31	3,703	n/a
countries	Portugal	no	0.15	0.09	0.20	1,954	n/a
countries	Puerto Rico	no	0.03	−0.03	0.09	1,042	n/a
countries	Romania	no	0.01	−0.02	0.04	4,728	n/a
countries	Russia	no	0.11	0.07	0.14	4,411	n/a
countries	Rwanda	no	0.00	−0.04	0.04	2,554	n/a
countries	Serbia	no	0.08	0.04	0.12	3,715	n/a
countries	Singapore	no	0.11	0.06	0.15	1,740	n/a
countries	Slovakia	no	−0.01	−0.05	0.03	3,257	n/a
countries	Slovenia	yes	0.33	0.30	0.36	3,098	n/a
countries	South Africa	no	0.07	0.04	0.11	5,568	n/a
countries	South Korea	no	0.06	0.02	0.10	3,631	n/a
countries	Spain	yes	0.36	0.33	0.39	4,244	n/a
countries	Sweden	no	0.03	−0.01	0.06	4,155	n/a
countries	Switzerland	no	0.09	0.07	0.12	5,138	n/a
countries	Taiwan ROC	no	0.02	−0.02	0.05	3,561	n/a
countries	Tajikistan	yes	0.27	0.22	0.32	1,200	n/a
countries	Thailand	no	0.02	−0.02	0.05	3,656	n/a
countries	Trinidad and Tobago	no	0.02	−0.04	0.08	1,210	n/a
countries	Tunisia	no	0.11	0.07	0.16	1,681	n/a
countries	Turkey	no	0.21	0.19	0.24	6,438	n/a
countries	Ukraine	no	0.10	0.06	0.15	4,601	n/a
countries	United Kingdom	no	0.12	0.09	0.15	6,155	n/a
countries	United States	yes	0.28	0.25	0.31	5,858	n/a
countries	Uruguay	no	0.20	0.16	0.24	2,586	n/a
countries	Uzbekistan	no	0.19	0.11	0.27	615	n/a
countries	Venezuela	no	−0.04	−0.09	0.02	1,190	n/a
countries	Vietnam	no	0.09	0.03	0.14	1,373	n/a
countries	Zambia	no	−0.02	−0.08	0.04	946	n/a
countries	Zimbabwe	yes	−0.04	−0.09	0.00	2,627	n/a

Views: Averages (view = summary); Country ranking (plotted = yes, view = countries).

Note: The WVS/EVS file holds ten EVS countries with no country label; they are restored from the country code, and 9 of them enter here. Without them the world mean is +0.10.

Note: Europe in the WVS/EVS excludes Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. A country needs an effective sample of 300 or more. Northern Ireland is a separate WVS/EVS entry.

Note: The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS rows, where every country answered the same question.

Source: General Social Survey, 2006-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 3-11 (2006-2023); World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted, with equal weight for each country in averages

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json

Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change

Weighted correlation between church attendance and left-right or ideological self-placement, by survey year; the United States in the GSS and CES and a fixed panel of European countries in the ESS; 95% intervals

Series	Year	Correlation	Lower	Upper	Respondents
Europe, ESS	2002	0.17	0.14	0.20	26,103
Europe, ESS	2004	0.15	0.12	0.20	25,153
Europe, ESS	2006	0.18	0.14	0.22	25,528
Europe, ESS	2008	0.15	0.12	0.20	25,843
Europe, ESS	2010	0.17	0.13	0.21	25,234
Europe, ESS	2012	0.15	0.11	0.20	26,600
Europe, ESS	2014	0.14	0.09	0.20	25,084
Europe, ESS	2016	0.14	0.09	0.19	24,898
Europe, ESS	2018	0.15	0.10	0.21	23,263
Europe, ESS	2020	0.15	0.09	0.21	29,750
Europe, ESS	2023	0.15	0.10	0.21	22,401
US, CES	2008	0.34	0.32	0.35	29,793
US, CES	2009	0.32	0.30	0.34	12,123
US, CES	2010	0.27	0.26	0.28	51,265
US, CES	2011	0.28	0.26	0.30	18,198
US, CES	2012	0.31	0.30	0.33	48,517
US, CES	2013	0.28	0.25	0.30	14,509
US, CES	2014	0.29	0.28	0.31	49,407
US, CES	2015	0.28	0.25	0.30	12,719
US, CES	2016	0.29	0.28	0.30	58,315
US, CES	2017	0.29	0.27	0.31	16,175
US, CES	2018	0.33	0.32	0.34	53,579
US, CES	2019	0.31	0.29	0.33	16,287
US, CES	2020	0.31	0.30	0.32	54,697
US, CES	2021	0.32	0.30	0.33	23,134
US, CES	2022	0.33	0.32	0.34	54,246
US, CES	2023	0.28	0.27	0.30	21,693
US, CES	2024	0.33	0.32	0.34	55,195
US, GSS	2002	0.18	0.11	0.24	1,325
US, GSS	2004	0.17	0.11	0.23	1,305
US, GSS	2006	0.23	0.19	0.26	4,322
US, GSS	2008	0.26	0.21	0.31	1,926
US, GSS	2010	0.21	0.16	0.26	1,968
US, GSS	2012	0.24	0.18	0.29	1,868
US, GSS	2014	0.28	0.24	0.32	2,438
US, GSS	2016	0.23	0.19	0.28	2,748
US, GSS	2018	0.24	0.19	0.29	2,235
US, GSS	2021	0.25	0.21	0.28	3,916
US, GSS	2022	0.25	0.20	0.30	3,395
US, GSS	2024	0.30	0.25	0.34	3,137

Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews: 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. The 2024 point falls in that period, and the in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval. The three surveys use different attendance and ideology items, so levels are compared less safely than trends.

Note: ESS rounds are placed at the year fieldwork began; round 10 ran from 2020 to 2022 and round 11 began in 2023. The panel is the 15 countries present in every round: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia.

Note: The panel mean hides opposite movements: the correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9. The largest rise is in Poland, from +0.20 in 2002 to +0.38 in 2023, and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 to −0.04.

Source: General Social Survey, 2002-2024; Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 1-11 (2002-2023); weighted

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json

All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (175), sorted by id. The same values as JSON: facts.json.

Fact id	Value	Unit	Estimand	Population	Period	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Note
alpha_cult	0.70	coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha)	standardized alpha of the five cultural items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation	GSS respondents	1972-2024			weight_use	General Social Survey
alpha_econ	0.69	coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha)	standardized alpha of the three economic items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation	GSS respondents	1972-2024			weight_use	General Social Survey
anes_att_valid_2020	99%	percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer	share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted)	respondents in the ANES cumulative file	2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_att_valid_2024	49%	percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer	share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted)	respondents in the ANES cumulative file	2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_dev_early	5.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled	95% CI 2.9 to 8.1	5,572	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_dev_late	21.8	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled	95% CI 19.5 to 24.1	12,996	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_dev_mid	13.0	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled	95% CI 9.7 to 16.2	4,005	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_1972	10.3	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	1972	95% CI 5.3 to 15.3	1,389	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_1980	0.1	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	1980	95% CI −6.5 to 6.6	849	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_1992	11.3	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	1992	95% CI 6.2 to 16.5	1,429	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2012	20.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2012	95% CI 16.2 to 24.8	3,741	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2016	23.8	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2016	95% CI 18.9 to 28.7	2,316	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2020	21.9	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2020	95% CI 18.2 to 25.7	5,673	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prot_2020	3,180	count	count of respondents (unweighted)	respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant	2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prot_2024	835	count	count of respondents (unweighted)	respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant	2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
be_2002	+0.14	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of left-right with attendance	respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer	ESS round 1 (2002)	95% CI 0.08 to 0.19	1,627	weight (analysis weight) within the country	European Social Survey
be_2023	−0.04	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of left-right with attendance	respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer	ESS round 11 (2023)	95% CI −0.10 to 0.02	1,513	weight (analysis weight) within the country	European Social Survey
boot_reps	2,000	count	suppression floor or setting used in the build	bootstrap replicates	all years			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
bridge_mad	0.04	absolute difference between two correlation coefficients (no sign)	mean absolute difference between the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations	countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys	2005 or later			weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS
bridge_r	+0.81	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations (Fisher z interval on the number of countries)	countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys	2005 or later	95% CI 0.66 to 0.90	36	weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS
ces_c_2008	+0.34	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology	2008	95% CI 0.32 to 0.35	29,793	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_c_2010	+0.27	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology	2010	95% CI 0.26 to 0.28	51,265	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_c_2018	+0.33	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology	2018	95% CI 0.32 to 0.34	53,579	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_c_2024	+0.33	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology	2024	95% CI 0.32 to 0.34	55,195	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_cwin_early	+0.29	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2010 to 2017, pooled	95% CI 0.28 to 0.29	269,105	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_cwin_late	+0.32	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2018 to 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.31 to 0.32	278,831	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_dev_pool	23.4	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	CES 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled	95% CI 22.7 to 24.2	133,436	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_freq_2020	36.5%	percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic	weighted share voting Democratic	reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more	2020	95% CI 35.3% to 37.7%	10,434	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_freq_2024	29.9%	percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic	weighted share voting Democratic	reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more	2024	95% CI 28.5% to 31.3%	9,415	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2008	25.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2008	95% CI 23.9 to 27.1	21,168	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2012	27.3	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2012	95% CI 25.7 to 28.9	34,381	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2016	18.9	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2016	95% CI 17.4 to 20.4	37,373	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2020	23.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2020	95% CI 22.1 to 24.9	40,514	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2024	27.7	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2024	95% CI 26.0 to 29.3	39,057	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_christian_2008	18.7	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate	2008	95% CI 16.6 to 20.7	12,201	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_christian_2024	13.2	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate	2024	95% CI 11.2 to 15.2	19,980	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_white_2024	33.8	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders	white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate	2024	95% CI 32.1 to 35.5	29,761	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_net_2008	0.18	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2008	95% CI 0.17 to 0.20	29,793	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_net_2024	0.17	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 0.16 to 0.18	55,195	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_raw_2008	0.35	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2008	95% CI 0.34 to 0.36	29,793	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_raw_2010	0.25	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2010	95% CI 0.24 to 0.26	51,265	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_raw_2016	0.26	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2016	95% CI 0.25 to 0.27	58,315	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_raw_2018	0.36	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2018	95% CI 0.35 to 0.38	53,579	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_raw_2024	0.35	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 0.34 to 0.37	55,195	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_sd_early	1.00	standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative)	weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2010 to 2017, pooled		269,105	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_sd_late	1.21	standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative)	weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2018 to 2024, pooled		278,831	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_sel_2020	60.0%	percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic	weighted share voting Democratic	reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never	2020	95% CI 59.3% to 60.7%	30,080	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_sel_2024	57.6%	percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic	weighted share voting Democratic	reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never	2024	95% CI 56.7% to 58.5%	29,642	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
ces_slope_early	0.26	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2010 to 2017, pooled	95% CI 0.26 to 0.27	269,105	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
ces_slope_late	0.35	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	CES 2018 to 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.34 to 0.35	278,831	weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year	Cooperative Election Study
den_1960	46.2	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	1960	95% CI 38.7 to 53.7	847	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
den_ces_2024	10.4	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	2024	95% CI 8.3 to 12.4	22,174	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
den_early	8.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled	95% CI 5.6 to 11.3	5,809	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
den_fix_frequent_2024	10.2	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group	Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend weekly or more	2024	95% CI 6.6 to 13.8	7,759	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
den_fix_seldom_2024	8.1	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group	Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never	2024	95% CI 5.4 to 10.9	12,221	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
den_late	8.3	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled	95% CI 5.6 to 11.1	9,666	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
den_mid	5.0	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled	95% CI 1.3 to 8.6	3,775	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
den_old	20.6	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants	ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic	ANES studies of 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968, pooled	95% CI 17.4 to 23.7	5,130	weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year	ANES Cumulative Data File
design_ratio_max	1.15	ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope	largest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available)	GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years			weight_use	General Social Survey
design_ratio_med	1.01	ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope	median across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available)	GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years			weight_use	General Social Survey
design_ratio_min	0.92	ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope	smallest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available)	GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years			weight_use	General Social Survey
ess_2002	+0.17	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries)	15 European countries in every ESS round	ESS round 1 (2002)	95% CI 0.14 to 0.20	26,103	weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries	European Social Survey
ess_2023	+0.15	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries)	15 European countries in every ESS round	ESS round 11 (2023)	95% CI 0.10 to 0.21	22,401	weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries	European Social Survey
ess_europe_mean	+0.11	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries)	European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more	ESS rounds 3 to 11 (2006-2023)	95% CI 0.08 to 0.14	36	weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries	European Social Survey
ess_panel_change	−0.02	change in the correlation coefficient between ESS round 1 and round 11	mean across the countries of the round 11 correlation minus the round 1 correlation (percentile bootstrap over countries)	15 European countries in every ESS round	ESS rounds 1 (2002) and 11 (2023)	95% CI −0.06 to 0.03	48,504	weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries	European Social Survey	n is the number of respondents in rounds 1 and 11 together; the interval comes from a bootstrap over the 15 countries.
floor_cell	100	count	suppression floor or setting used in the build	respondents (and effective respondents) needed in each attendance group of a survey year	all years			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
floor_country	300	count	suppression floor or setting used in the build	effective respondents needed for a country correlation	all years			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
floor_reg	200	count	suppression floor or setting used in the build	respondents needed for a year-by-year regression	all years			none (count)	General Social Survey
gss_c_2002	+0.18	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2002	95% CI 0.11 to 0.24	1,325	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_c_2008	+0.26	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2008	95% CI 0.21 to 0.31	1,926	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_c_2018	+0.24	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2018	95% CI 0.19 to 0.29	2,235	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_c_2021	+0.25	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2021	95% CI 0.21 to 0.28	3,916	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_c_2024	+0.30	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2024	95% CI 0.25 to 0.34	3,137	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_c_ftf	+0.22	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	in-person GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.16 to 0.27	2,512	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
gss_c_web	+0.33	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	web GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.28 to 0.37	3,331	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
gss_net_1974	0.14	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974	95% CI 0.08 to 0.19	1,344	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_net_2018	0.19	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2018	95% CI 0.14 to 0.24	2,139	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_net_2024	0.20	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 0.15 to 0.25	3,039	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_raw_1974	0.15	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974	95% CI 0.09 to 0.20	1,344	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_raw_2008	0.26	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2008	95% CI 0.21 to 0.31	1,884	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_raw_2018	0.25	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2018	95% CI 0.20 to 0.31	2,139	weight_use	General Social Survey
gss_raw_2024	0.32	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 0.26 to 0.37	3,039	weight_use	General Social Survey
item_r_cult	+0.32	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean pairwise weighted correlation among the five cultural items	GSS respondents	1972-2024			weight_use	General Social Survey
item_r_econ	+0.42	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean pairwise weighted correlation among the three economic items	GSS respondents	1972-2024			weight_use	General Social Survey
level_ces_2008	47%	percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2008	95% CI 45% to 50%	29,793	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
level_ces_2024	53%	percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents	CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 50% to 55%	55,195	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
level_gss_1974	8%	percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974	95% CI 0% to 18%	1,344	weight_use	General Social Survey
level_gss_2024	38%	percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2024	95% CI 29% to 48%	3,039	weight_use	General Social Survey
mode_diff_raw	0.13	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	web slope minus in-person slope (independent samples, standard errors combined)	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.05 to 0.22	5,650	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
mode_ftf_raw	0.23	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	in-person GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.17 to 0.30	2,423	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
mode_web_raw	0.37	standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope)	weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance	web GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 0.31 to 0.42	3,227	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
n_anes_above_zero	8	count	count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies above zero	ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020	1992-2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_since_1992	8	count	count of studies	ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020	1992-2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_zero	3	count	count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap includes zero	ANES presidential-year studies from 1980 to 1988	1980-1988			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_before_1992	5	count	count of studies	ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988	1972-1988			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_bridge	36	count	count of countries	countries with a usable correlation in both the WVS/EVS and the ESS	2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_ces_chr_dev_gt_den	2	count	count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap	CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024, Protestant and Catholic voters only	2008-2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_ces_dev_gt_den	5	count	count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap	CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024	2008-2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_ces_years	5	count	count of years	CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024	2008-2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_chr_apart_den_anes	0	count	count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap	ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020, Protestant and Catholic voters only	1992-2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_clearly_steeper	2	count	count of countries whose 95% interval lies entirely above the United States interval	countries and territories with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_dev_apart_den	3	count	count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap	ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020	1992-2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_dev_gt_den	8	count	count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap	ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020	1992-2020			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_dev_gt_den_early	1	count	count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap	ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988	1972-1988			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_ess	36	count	count of countries	European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more	ESS rounds 3 to 11			none (count)	European Social Survey
n_europe_wvs	42	count	count of countries	European countries and territories with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_panel	15	count	count of countries	European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11	ESS rounds 1 to 11			none (count)	European Social Survey
n_panel_down	9	count	count of countries whose correlation is lower in round 11 than in round 1	European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11	ESS rounds 1 to 11			none (count)	European Social Survey
n_panel_up	6	count	count of countries whose correlation is higher in round 11 than in round 1	European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11	ESS rounds 1 to 11			none (count)	European Social Survey
n_publics	104	count	count of countries and territories	countries and territories with a left-right answer and an effective sample of 300 or more	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_publics_2005	112	count	count of countries and territories	countries and territories surveyed in 2005 or later	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_publics_file	118	count	count of countries and territories (ten EVS labels restored from the country code)	countries and territories in the cleaned WVS/EVS file	1981-2023			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_publics_old	95	count	count of countries and territories	countries and territories with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_rest_wvs	61	count	count of countries	countries outside Europe and the United States with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_restored	9	count	count of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal)	restored EVS countries with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
n_steeper	4	count	count of countries whose correlation is larger than the United States value	countries and territories with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later			none (count)	World Values Survey and EVS
pl_2002	+0.20	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of left-right with attendance	respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer	ESS round 1 (2002)	95% CI 0.16 to 0.25	1,750	weight (analysis weight) within the country	European Social Survey
pl_2023	+0.38	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of left-right with attendance	respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer	ESS round 11 (2023)	95% CI 0.33 to 0.43	1,282	weight (analysis weight) within the country	European Social Survey
r_cult_1975	+0.37	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	1975-1984	95% CI 0.34 to 0.40	4,196	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_cult_2021	+0.46	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	2021-2024	95% CI 0.44 to 0.49	6,846	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_cult_all	+0.44	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	1975-2024	95% CI 0.43 to 0.45	38,327	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_econ_1975	+0.07	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	1975-1984	95% CI 0.04 to 0.11	4,196	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_econ_2021	+0.18	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	2021-2024	95% CI 0.15 to 0.22	6,846	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_econ_all	+0.11	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism	GSS respondents with attendance and both indices	1975-2024	95% CI 0.09 to 0.12	38,327	weight_use	General Social Survey
r_ideo_all	+0.22	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with the self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology, in the survey years in which both indices were measured	1975-2024	95% CI 0.21 to 0.23	55,035	weight_use	General Social Survey
rep_ces_freq_2008	61.5%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more	2008	95% CI 60.3% to 62.7%	9,264	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_ces_freq_2024	68.1%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more	2024	95% CI 66.7% to 69.5%	10,949	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_ces_gap_2008	26.5	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	2008	95% CI 25.0 to 28.0	24,428	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_ces_gap_2024	27.4	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	2024	95% CI 25.7 to 29.1	45,567	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_ces_sel_2008	35.0%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	2008	95% CI 34.1% to 35.9%	15,164	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_ces_sel_2024	40.7%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	2024	95% CI 39.8% to 41.6%	34,618	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_freq_change	15.9	percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers	late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined)	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly	1972-1978 to 2010-2018	95% CI 12.9 to 18.8	15,367	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_freq_change24	22.4	percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers	late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined)	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly	1972-1978 to 2018-2024	95% CI 19.1 to 25.7	16,318	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_freq_early	37.4%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly	GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled	95% CI 35.5% to 39.2%	3,375	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_freq_late	53.2%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly	GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys)	95% CI 50.9% to 55.5%	2,760	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_freq_late24	59.7%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly	GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	95% CI 57.0% to 62.5%	2,531	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_gap_early	5.3	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled	95% CI 2.9 to 7.7	7,613	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_gap_ftf	18.0	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	in-person GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 10.3 to 25.8	1,723	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_gap_late	15.4	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys)	95% CI 12.6 to 18.2	7,754	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_gap_late24	19.5	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	95% CI 16.3 to 22.8	8,705	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_gap_web	23.7	percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders	weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders	web GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently	2022 and 2024, pooled	95% CI 16.8 to 30.5	2,175	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_sel_change	5.7	percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers	late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined)	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	1972-1978 to 2010-2018	95% CI 3.4 to 8.0	15,367	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_sel_change24	8.1	percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers	late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined)	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	1972-1978 to 2018-2024	95% CI 5.8 to 10.4	16,318	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_sel_early	32.1%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled	95% CI 30.5% to 33.7%	4,238	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_sel_late	37.8%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys)	95% CI 36.2% to 39.5%	4,994	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rep_sel_late24	40.2%	percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican	weighted share Republican	GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never	GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	95% CI 38.5% to 41.9%	6,174	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rise_net_in	0.06	change in the standardized slope	rise in the standardized slope net of party; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	95% CI 0.03 to 0.10	17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
rise_raw_in	0.11	change in the standardized slope	rise in the raw standardized slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	95% CI 0.08 to 0.15	17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_1974_2018	50%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode)	95% CI 20% to 163%	3,483	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_1974_2024	64%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews)	95% CI 41% to 112%	4,383	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in	46%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	95% CI 33% to 67%	17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in7	52%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories	95% CI 37% to 74%	17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in_hi	67%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled		17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in_lo	33%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled		17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in_psu	46%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units (respondents in 1974 stand alone, since the design variables start in 1975)	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled	95% CI 33% to 66%	17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in_psu_hi	66%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units	same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled		17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_in_psu_lo	33%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units	same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled		17,849	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
share_web	63%	percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for	one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents	GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification	1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews)	95% CI 49% to 82%	19,215	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
unaff_dem_2024	70.9%	percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic	weighted share voting Democratic	unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate	2024	95% CI 69.7% to 72.2%	14,311	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
unaff_in_seldom_2008	34.2%	percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated	weighted share unaffiliated	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never	2008	95% CI 33.2% to 35.2%	13,123	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
unaff_in_seldom_2024	44.8%	percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated	weighted share unaffiliated	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never	2024	95% CI 43.9% to 45.7%	29,631	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
unaff_prot_2008	36.7	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant	2008	95% CI 34.7 to 38.6	13,283	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
unaff_prot_2024	38.0	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants	CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant	2024	95% CI 36.3 to 39.7	28,512	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
unaff_seldom_share	96%	percent of unaffiliated voters who attend a few times a year or never	weighted share attending seldom	unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and answered the attendance question	2024	95% CI 95% to 96%	14,224	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
us_gss	+0.25	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology	GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology	2006-2024	95% CI 0.23 to 0.26	27,953	weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year	General Social Survey
us_wvs	+0.28	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	weighted correlation of left-right self-placement with the importance of God	WVS/EVS respondents in the United States with a left-right answer	fieldwork 2006, 2011 and 2017	95% CI 0.25 to 0.31	5,858	weight (S017) within the country	World Values Survey and EVS
within_cath_2008	18.1	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition	Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2008	95% CI 14.7 to 21.6	4,514	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
within_cath_2024	10.4	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition	Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2024	95% CI 6.6 to 14.2	7,220	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
within_none_2020	14.3	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, among the unaffiliated	unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2020	95% CI 7.5 to 21.0	14,465	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	n counts the seldom and the frequent group together. The frequent group is the limiting cell, with 369 respondents and an effective sample of 208.
within_prot_2008	17.2	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition	Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2008	95% CI 14.7 to 19.7	7,687	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
within_prot_2024	12.5	percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders	weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition	Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently	2024	95% CI 10.1 to 14.8	12,760	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
wvs_all_mean	+0.10	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries)	countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later	95% CI 0.09 to 0.12	104	weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS
wvs_all_mean_old	+0.10	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries)	countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries	fieldwork 2005 or later	95% CI 0.08 to 0.12	95	weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS
wvs_europe_mean	+0.13	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries)	European countries in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later	95% CI 0.10 to 0.16	42	weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS
wvs_rest_mean	+0.08	correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1	mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries)	countries outside Europe and the United States in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation	fieldwork 2005 or later	95% CI 0.06 to 0.10	61	weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries	World Values Survey and EVS

Definitions

Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
Standardized coefficient: A regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared.
Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out.
Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.
Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other.
Left-right self-placement: A survey question that asks people to place themselves on a scale from left to right. The scale is the same for everyone, but the meaning attached to left and right differs across people, countries and years.

Methods

Sample. Reported two-party presidential voters in the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (studies from 1952 to 2020; attendance is asked from 1970) and in the Cooperative Election Study (presidential years 2008 to 2024, weight_cumulative); General Social Survey respondents 1972 to 2024 (weight_use, with the interview mode joined from the raw file); World Values Survey and European Values Study respondents with fieldwork in 2005 or later; European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11. The cumulative ANES file's 2024 religion and attendance codes are unusable (the count of Protestants falls from 3,180 in 2020 to 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, and 49% of 2024 respondents have a valid attendance answer against 99% in 2020), so every ANES series ends in 2020 and 2024 comes from the CES. Groups. Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item and are cut as closely as each source allows: frequent is weekly or nearly weekly (ANES Often, GSS attend 6 to 8), which in the CES is weekly or more (5 and 6 on the six-point item) because the CES has no nearly-weekly answer; occasional is monthly; seldom is a few times a year or never. Party identification includes leaners (GSS partyid 0 to 2 Democratic, 3 independent, 4 to 6 Republican; CES pid7 1 to 3, 4 and 5 to 7); pure independents are left out of the Republican share and are a category in the party control. The CES party and ideology series use every CES year from 2008 to 2024, and the vote series the presidential years. Estimands. The attendance gap is the weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus that among frequent attenders; the denominational gap is Catholics minus Protestants, and the CES contrast for the unaffiliated is the unaffiliated minus Protestants. The slope is the weighted least squares coefficient of ideology (GSS polviews 1 to 7; CES five-point ideology with not sure missing) on attendance (GSS 0 to 8; CES 1 to 6), both standardized once on the whole common sample of respondents with attendance, ideology and party (GSS 1974 to 2024; CES 2008 to 2024), fitted year by year raw and with the party control on the same respondents (two indicators for Republican and independent, or six indicators for seven categories). A rise is the late slope minus the early slope; the share accounted for by party is one minus the ratio of the rise net of party to the raw rise. Windows of several survey years rescale each year's weights to average one. The cultural index averages the weighted z-scores of five GSS items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason) and the economic index those of three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences), each with at least two answers; the economic items are asked from 1975, so both indices and their correlations start there, the first period holds the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984 only, and the correlation with self-placed ideology uses the same survey years. Cross-national correlations are weighted Pearson correlations of left-right self-placement with the importance of God (WVS/EVS), or with attendance (ESS rounds 3 to 11 pooled; the GSS for the United States, 2006 to 2024). Intervals. Weighted shares and means use the Kish effective sample size and a normal interval, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores stratification and clustering, which can raise or lower the variance; the same formula is used for the CES, an opt-in panel, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited; gaps combine the two standard errors; correlations use Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size; year-by-year slopes use HC3 robust errors; rises and the shares of a rise or of a slope that party accounts for use a percentile bootstrap over respondents (the estimate is recomputed on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement, each window resampled separately, seed 12345, and the interval is read from the percentiles of the results); means across countries count each country once and use the same bootstrap over countries; the correlation between the WVS/EVS and ESS country values uses Fisher z on the number of countries. The GSS design variables are used for two checks: cluster-robust errors on the primary sampling unit change the standard errors of the yearly slopes by a median ratio of 1.01 against the HC3 errors (range 0.92 to 1.15), and a bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the main share as 46% (95% interval 33% to 66%) against 46% (33% to 67%) from the bootstrap over respondents. The shares and correlations of the ANES, CES, WVS/EVS and ESS are not checked this way. Suppression. A subgroup-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size; a yearly regression needs 200 respondents; a country correlation needs an effective sample of 300; no published cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents. Countries. The cleaned WVS/EVS file has a blank country label for ten EVS countries; they are restored from the country code and 9 of them have a usable correlation. Europe in the WVS/EVS is the region Europe and Central Asia without Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The European time series uses the 15 countries in every ESS round and places each round at the year fieldwork began. Mode. GSS interviews were in person, with some by telephone, through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and a mix of in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024; the CES is online throughout. Estimates from 2021 on are reported with a mode split or a mode note: the split covers the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation in 2022 and 2024, and the party comparison of the text uses the in-person surveys of 2010 to 2018 with the 2018 to 2024 window as a second comparison. The ANES mixes in-person and web interviews from 2012 and has no mode weights in 2020, and its vote gap is not split by mode.

What these data cannot show

Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers.
The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one.
The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation.
The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate.
The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation.
The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode.
The CES is an opt-in online panel.
The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys.
The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs.
The GSS design variables allow two checks.
Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one.
A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents.
The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way.
Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race.
The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is.
The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country.

References

Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
Layman, Geoffrey C. (2001). The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. Columbia University Press.
Putnam, Robert D.; Campbell, David E. (2010). American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. Simon and Schuster.
Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press.
Campbell, David E.; Layman, Geoffrey C.; Green, John C.; Sumaktoyo, Nathanael G. (2018). Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations. American Journal of Political Science 62(3): 551-565. doi:10.1111/ajps.12365

Provenance

Pipeline version: 1.0.0
Build script: book3/chapters/the-god-gap-in-america/build.py (sha256 1efbd4d08327c8f4db0440ba4e914725365d37fecbd1562fa4c64e45f1770290)
Built on: 2026-09-30
Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs

File	Size (bytes)	SHA-256, first 1 MB	SHA-256, last 1 MB
data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet	15,640,720	b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643	04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583
data/cces/cces_clean.parquet	53,454,868	9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806	f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405
data/ess/ess_clean.parquet	45,592,290	9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529	6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338
data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet	35,044,704	6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538	5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b
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data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet	71,974,374	cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b	59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061
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Outputs

File	SHA-256
facts.json	cd368dc38fad0e09bcd47e966d70d4e1ef4242d8fa2892da9f7f2f8cbe496034
figures/absorbed_share.json	6aec4900cf7cfa3a0adb86e75d1ed5e44673530364a2db63d1f1812ea2f74273
figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json	4bef0e4879a66a4df65d44cea6e06efa4d357a9a1f9cb39e3f14bc3380a956fc
figures/culture_economics.json	7e554a4e4c1057034e32db8fbd320bfc3948f5939dc6860e632eb128d963b0fb
figures/denomination_attendance.json	09fceedb34ff1c11f9815acd3c490a4a0a578c492d275a804e17f6801d2ad49d
figures/europe_time.json	b12002b0a858197205a6e95959546f63b6fc97291a23a7d33e00f904cc660159
figures/party_by_attendance.json	3ecaf73993edb276e71f13e8e6466790752370c4359515c17ad5571c7da6275f
figures/vote_gap.json	7383489921647668c3e8ba5b8bbc62a464ff7a969a5aab02d55a8c5b85b7aa7a
figures/world_correlations.json	1d9e907148092b6f0f46f4b913df2dc4d4f9810a0876ec3ad2addf0bedf90515
meta.json	7c8b722ca7a0de3dee8e67ef0a09eac7e3351b8e93051ee71e1b2b4a4209e310
refs.json	718f8ea732d967f435517adf7b53597b252e6925bf32ef8a8d0e0fca857c8f69

Machine formats

Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md
Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/facts.json
Table 1, figure "vote_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json
Table 2, figure "denomination_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json
Table 3, figure "party_by_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json
Table 4, figure "attendance_ideology_slope" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json
Table 5, figure "absorbed_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json
Table 6, figure "culture_economics" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json
Table 7, figure "world_correlations" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json
Table 8, figure "europe_time" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json
Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt

Identification

Principal estimates

Findings

The ANES vote gap has been above zero since 1992

The gap is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics

The attendance gap has exceeded the denominational gap since 1992

The Republican share among frequent attenders rose in the GSS

Party identification accounts for part of the rise in the slope

Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic attitudes

The United States sits above the European and world averages

In the GSS the correlation is higher in 2024 than in 2002

What these data cannot show

Tables

Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise

Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications

Table 5.1. Share accounted for

Table 5.2. Rises in the slope

Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown

Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages

Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change

All estimates

Definitions

Methods

What these data cannot show

References

Provenance

Machine formats