Chapter 2.1

Feelings toward the other party

Partisans' average rating of the other party fell from 48.0 to 20.6 on a 0 to 100 thermometer between 1978 and 2024, while their rating of their own party stayed near 70.5; 34.7% of the fall since 2008 goes with changes in survey mode.

Author: Vishal Singh
Affiliation: NYU Stern
Published: 30 September 2026

DraftFigures and numbers may change as the analysis is rebuilt.what is still being checked

Still to be done: intervals that use the ANES sampling design for years before 2024, the year-by-year distribution of the ratings, and decompositions by race, religion and age.

Among Democrats and Republicans, the average rating of the other party fell between 1978 and 2024 while the average rating of the own party ended near where it started. On the feeling thermometer the other party went from 48.0 in 1978 to 20.6 in 2024, and the own party from 71.0 to 70.5. The average difference between the two ratings, own party minus other party, rose from 23.0 points to 49.9.

The thermometer asks respondents to rate a party or a person from cold to warm on a scale from 0 to 100. The ratings here come from the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File: 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024 and 43,063 respondents who identify with a party or lean toward one (leaners included) and who rated both parties, so the own-party, other-party and gap averages in each year rest on the same people. Respondents who call themselves pure independents are left out because they have no own party. Averages use the ANES full-sample weight.Intervals come from the Kish effective sample size [1] and, for shares, the Wilson method [2], and they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. For 2024 the standard error of the all-interview other-party average is 0.36 points from the survey's strata and primary sampling units and 0.42 points from the effective sample size, so the printed interval for that average is the wider one. Each survey is analyzed as a separate cross-section, so the chapter describes how averages among partisans changed and says nothing about how any one person's feelings changed.

Researchers call the gap between how people feel about their own party and about the other party affective polarization [3] [4]. Work with these same ratings dates the rise of partisan animus to the 1980s and finds that it grew further in the decades that followed [5]. Published work with thermometer ratings describes contempt for the other party as now exceeding affection for one's own [6]. In the sample used here the gap rose from 23.0 in 1978 to 30.7 in 1988, and more of that rise comes from the own-party rating (71.0 to 76.3) than from the other-party rating (48.0 to 45.6). Whether the fall in warmth matters for voting and other behavior is the subject of Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship, and how far apart partisans are on issues is in Chapter 2.3, Affective and issue polarization (planned). This chapter describes the ratings and then asks how much of the change is a change in survey mode, how much is a change in the mix of partisans, and whether the change from 2020 to 2024 holds up.

Other-party ratings fell more than own-party ratings

Figure 1 plots the two averages. The rating of the other party was 48.0 (95% CI 47.1 to 48.9) in 1978 and 20.6 (95% CI 19.8 to 21.5) in 2024, a fall of 27.4 (95% CI 26.2 to 28.6) points. It was 46.8 in 1990, so most of the fall came after 1990. The gap between the two ratings peaked at 52.3 in 2020.

Figure 1

Partisans rated the other party 20.6 in 2024, down from 48.0 in 1978, and rated their own party 70.5

Mean feeling thermometer rating of the respondent's own party and of the other party, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100

Show data

Data for Partisans rated the other party 20.6 in 2024, down from 48.0 in 1978, and rated their own party 70.5
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	mode	n	series	year
48.87	47.12	48.00	All interviews	1,723	Other party	1978
47.72	45.43	46.57	All interviews	1,310	Other party	1980
45.43	43.12	44.27	All interviews	1,181	Other party	1982
46.86	44.92	45.89	All interviews	1,881	Other party	1984
47.25	45.25	46.25	All interviews	1,796	Other party	1986
46.60	44.52	45.56	All interviews	1,717	Other party	1988
47.83	45.74	46.78	All interviews	1,656	Other party	1990
42.74	40.95	41.84	All interviews	2,098	Other party	1992
43.63	41.40	42.51	All interviews	1,567	Other party	1994
42.35	39.99	41.17	All interviews	1,528	Other party	1996
42.34	39.59	40.96	All interviews	1,104	Other party	1998
42.78	40.43	41.60	All interviews	1,525	Other party	2000
41.05	38.08	39.57	All interviews	1,055	Other party	2004
35.88	33.50	34.69	All interviews	1,979	Other party	2008
28.65	27.07	27.86	All interviews	5,079	Other party	2012
26.90	25.17	26.04	All interviews	3,610	Other party	2016
19.91	18.58	19.24	All interviews	7,174	Other party	2020
21.46	19.80	20.63	All interviews	5,080	Other party	2024
71.84	70.19	71.01	All interviews	1,723	Own party	1978
73.46	71.48	72.47	All interviews	1,310	Own party	1980
75.23	73.31	74.27	All interviews	1,181	Own party	1982
75.61	74.02	74.81	All interviews	1,881	Own party	1984
75.27	73.66	74.46	All interviews	1,796	Own party	1986
77.12	75.42	76.27	All interviews	1,717	Own party	1988
72.07	70.30	71.19	All interviews	1,656	Own party	1990
70.75	69.20	69.98	All interviews	2,098	Own party	1992
71.12	69.25	70.19	All interviews	1,567	Own party	1994
72.76	70.78	71.77	All interviews	1,528	Own party	1996
71.63	69.22	70.42	All interviews	1,104	Own party	1998
73.62	71.58	72.60	All interviews	1,525	Own party	2000
74.80	72.50	73.65	All interviews	1,055	Own party	2004
71.73	69.69	70.71	All interviews	1,979	Own party	2008
70.50	69.05	69.78	All interviews	5,079	Own party	2012
67.98	66.27	67.13	All interviews	3,610	Own party	2016
72.17	70.89	71.53	All interviews	7,174	Own party	2020
71.34	69.70	70.52	All interviews	5,080	Own party	2024
35.88	33.50	34.69	Face-to-face	1,979	Other party	2008
34.16	31.45	32.81	Face-to-face	1,798	Other party	2012
32.22	29.01	30.61	Face-to-face	1,029	Other party	2016
27.35	23.68	25.52	Face-to-face	960	Other party	2024
71.73	69.69	70.71	Face-to-face	1,979	Own party	2008
71.06	68.62	69.84	Face-to-face	1,798	Own party	2012
66.53	63.35	64.94	Face-to-face	1,029	Own party	2016
70.32	66.94	68.63	Face-to-face	960	Own party	2024
26.02	24.12	25.07	Web	3,281	Other party	2012
25.34	23.32	24.33	Web	2,581	Other party	2016
19.19	16.73	17.96	Web	1,850	Other party	2024
70.64	68.84	69.74	Web	3,281	Own party	2012
68.96	66.94	67.95	Web	2,581	Own party	2016
72.72	70.18	71.45	Web	1,850	Own party	2024

The other-party line falls across the record, and the own-party line moves within a narrower range, so the shaded gap widens mostly because the other-party line falls. Each line is the weighted mean rating among Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, with a confidence band.Note: Bands are confidence intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024)

The own-party rating has a small negative slope. Figure 2 gives the slope of each average on survey year. Over the whole record the own-party rating changes by −0.7 (95% CI −1.4 to −0.1) points per decade, an interval that excludes zero. The 1978 and 2024 endpoints differ by −0.5 (95% CI −1.7 to 0.7) points, an interval that includes zero, while the line fitted through all 18 surveys changes by −3.3 (95% CI −6.3 to −0.4) points, because own-party ratings were high in the 1980s (76.3 in 1988) and low in 2016 (67.1).

The other-party rating changes by −6.9 (95% CI −7.9 to −5.9) points per decade, and the gap by +6.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 7.6). Standard errors are clustered on survey year, because respondents interviewed in one year share that year's events. Among face-to-face respondents alone, the own-party rating changed by −2.1 (95% CI −4.1 to −0.1) points between 2008 and 2024.

Figure 2

The other-party rating changed by −6.9 points per decade and the own-party rating by −0.7

Slope of the mean thermometer rating on survey year, points per decade, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024

Show data

Data for The other-party rating changed by −6.9 points per decade and the own-party rating by −0.7
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	n	period	waves	window
−0.085	−1.37	−0.728	43,063	Own party	18	Whole record
−5.90	−7.94	−6.92	43,063	Other party	18	Whole record
7.57	4.82	6.20	43,063	Gap, own minus other	18	Whole record
7.14	−3.98	1.58	11,264	Own party, 1978 to 1990	7	Split at 1990
0.466	−0.830	−0.182	33,455	Own party, 1990 to 2024	12	Split at 1990
1.73	−3.34	−0.803	11,264	Other party, 1978 to 1990	7	Split at 1990
−6.78	−9.66	−8.22	33,455	Other party, 1990 to 2024	12	Split at 1990

The other-party slope is more negative than the own-party slope, and both intervals lie below zero. Each dot is the slope of a line fitted to respondents' ratings on survey year, with each respondent counted by survey weight, and a confidence interval from standard errors clustered on survey year.Note: Intervals come from a t distribution, which is wider than the normal curve when there are few surveys, with one fewer degree of freedom than the number of surveys.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z)

Splitting the record at 1990 gives two windows (the second view of Figure 2). Before 1990 the other-party slope is −0.8 (95% CI −3.3 to 1.7), an interval that includes zero, and from 1990 it is −8.2 (95% CI −9.7 to −6.8). The pre-1990 result depends on where the record is split: for 1978 to 1988 the slope is −1.8 (95% CI −4.0 to 0.5), and for 1978 to 1996 it is −3.2 (95% CI −4.5 to −1.9), an interval that excludes zero. The own-party intervals in both windows include zero, so they cannot separate a lower level after 1990 from a steady drift.

More partisans rate the other party at zero

The average hides a change in how people answer. In 1978, 5.4% (95% CI 4.4% to 6.6%) of partisans rated the other party at zero, the coldest answer the scale allows. The share peaked at 40.0% in 2020 and was 33.2% (95% CI 31.4% to 35.1%) in 2024 (Figure 3). The share rating the other party above the neutral midpoint moved the other way, from 31.2% in 1978 to 6.5% in 2024.

Figure 3

The share of partisans rating the other party at zero rose from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024

Percent of partisans including leaners who rate the other party at the coldest possible answer of zero, 1978 to 2024

Share rating the other party at zero (percent of partisans)

Show data

Data for The share of partisans rating the other party at zero rose from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	mode	n	series	year
6.57	4.43	5.40	All interviews	1,723	Other party	1978
8.37	5.62	6.87	All interviews	1,310	Other party	1980
8.81	5.86	7.20	All interviews	1,181	Other party	1982
9.23	6.78	7.92	All interviews	1,881	Other party	1984
9.13	6.64	7.80	All interviews	1,796	Other party	1986
9.54	6.95	8.15	All interviews	1,717	Other party	1988
8.92	6.37	7.55	All interviews	1,656	Other party	1990
9.57	7.20	8.31	All interviews	2,098	Other party	1992
8.24	5.49	6.74	All interviews	1,567	Other party	1994
10.44	7.26	8.72	All interviews	1,528	Other party	1996
11.50	7.75	9.46	All interviews	1,104	Other party	1998
10.00	6.91	8.32	All interviews	1,525	Other party	2000
14.69	10.33	12.35	All interviews	1,055	Other party	2004
16.82	12.90	14.75	All interviews	1,979	Other party	2008
24.36	21.25	22.77	All interviews	5,079	Other party	2012
23.90	20.64	22.23	All interviews	3,610	Other party	2016
41.57	38.51	40.03	All interviews	7,174	Other party	2020
35.12	31.36	33.22	All interviews	5,080	Other party	2024
16.82	12.90	14.75	Face-to-face	1,979	Other party	2008
19.86	15.02	17.31	Face-to-face	1,798	Other party	2012
20.19	14.51	17.16	Face-to-face	1,029	Other party	2016
26.28	18.90	22.38	Face-to-face	960	Other party	2024
27.89	23.91	25.85	Web	3,281	Other party	2012
26.13	22.20	24.11	Web	2,581	Other party	2016
41.76	35.88	38.78	Web	1,850	Other party	2024

The share at zero rises from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024, with a peak of 40.0% in 2020. The line is a weighted share with a Wilson confidence band, an interval for a share that stays inside its possible range. The buttons restrict the sample to one interview mode.Note: Bands are Wilson intervals on the Kish effective sample size.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024)

The share at zero is lower in face-to-face interviews than on the web in every year with both modes. In 2024 it was 22.4% (95% CI 18.9% to 26.3%) among face-to-face respondents and 38.8% (95% CI 35.9% to 41.8%) among web respondents, so the pooled 33.2% depends on the mix of modes. Inside face-to-face interviews the share still rose, from 14.8% in 2008.

Part of the fall after 2008 goes with survey mode

The ANES changed how it interviews during this record. Through 2008 interviewing was mainly in person. In 2012 the study added a separate web sample, in 2020 it interviewed no one in person [7], and in 2024 it combined a new face-to-face sample, a new web sample and respondents from an earlier panel [8].The 2024 analysis sample has 960 partisans from the new face-to-face sample, 1,850 from the new web sample and 2,270 who belong to neither: respondents re-interviewed from the 2016 and 2020 panel, and paper questionnaires. Their weights are not mode-specific, so they enter only the all-interview estimates. In the all-interview weights of 2024 the face-to-face sample carries 35.1% of the total, the web sample 31.3% and the group in neither 33.7%. The group in neither rates the other party at 17.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 18.6), close to the web value of 18.0. The file carries mode-specific weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, which allow each mode to be estimated by itself.

Web respondents rate the other party lower than face-to-face respondents in every year with both: by 7.7 (95% CI 6.1 to 9.4) points in 2012, 6.3 (95% CI 4.4 to 8.2) in 2016 and 7.6 (95% CI 5.3 to 9.8) in 2024. The ANES web and face-to-face samples are separate samples, so the gap combines how people answer with who answers.

Figure 4

Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 4.9 points warmer than the all-interview average in 2024, and web respondents colder

Rating of the other party by interview mode and the split of the all-interview fall, partisans including leaners, 2008 to 2024, 0 to 100

Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 25.5 in 2024, web respondents 18.0 and all interviews 20.6

Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party, partisans including leaners, by interview mode, 2008 to 2024, 0 to 100

Mean rating of the other party (0 to 100)

The face-to-face line lies above the all-interview line and the web line lies below it in 2012, 2016 and 2024, so the blended fall is larger than the fall within face-to-face interviews. The lines are weighted means with confidence bands, using the mode weights. The 2020 study has no mode weights, so only the all-interview line has a 2020 point and the other two lines join 2016 to 2024 across the shaded band.

Show data

Data for Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 4.9 points warmer than the all-interview average in 2024, and web respondents colder, Rating by mode
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	mode	n	series	year
35.88	33.50	34.69	All interviews	1,979	All interviews	2008
28.65	27.07	27.86	All interviews	5,079	All interviews	2012
26.90	25.17	26.04	All interviews	3,610	All interviews	2016
19.91	18.58	19.24	All interviews	7,174	All interviews	2020
21.46	19.80	20.63	All interviews	5,080	All interviews	2024
35.88	33.50	34.69	Face-to-face	1,979	Face-to-face	2008
34.16	31.45	32.81	Face-to-face	1,798	Face-to-face	2012
32.22	29.01	30.61	Face-to-face	1,029	Face-to-face	2016
27.35	23.68	25.52	Face-to-face	960	Face-to-face	2024
26.02	24.12	25.07	Web	3,281	Web	2012
25.34	23.32	24.33	Web	2,581	Web	2016
19.19	16.73	17.96	Web	1,850	Web	2024

The 2024 all-interview average lies below the face-to-face average and above the web average. The first tab plots the rating by interview mode and the second splits the all-interview fall since 2008.Note: The 2008 study was interviewed in person only, so its face-to-face and all-interview estimates coincide and there is no web estimate. The 2024 all-interview sample also contains re-interviewed panel and paper respondents who belong to neither mode group. The steps of the second tab add to the total within rounding.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2008-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y)

Because the blended sample includes web respondents from 2012 and panel and paper respondents in 2024, the all-interview average falls faster than the face-to-face average. The all-interview rating fell by 14.1 (95% CI 12.6 to 15.5) points between 2008, a year with face-to-face interviews only, and 2024, and the face-to-face rating by 9.2 (95% CI 6.9 to 11.4). The remaining 4.9 (95% CI 3.5 to 6.3) points, 34.7% (95% CI 23.8% to 46.6%) of the all-interview fall, are the distance between the 2024 all-interview average and the 2024 face-to-face average, and the second tab of Figure 4 splits them between web respondents and panel and paper respondents.

The gap first appears in 2012, when web respondents entered and the sample had only face-to-face and web respondents: between 2008 and 2012 the all-interview rating fell by 6.8 (95% CI 5.4 to 8.3) points and the face-to-face rating by 1.9 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.7). The fall continues inside each mode. From 2012 to 2024 the face-to-face rating fell by 7.3 (95% CI 5.0 to 9.6) points and the web rating by 7.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 8.7).

The face-to-face and web views of Figure 1 and Figure 3 repeat the trend for each mode. The 2020 study has no mode weights, so the fall from 26.0 in 2016 to 19.2 in 2020 cannot be split by mode and is reported as it stands. The direction of the trend holds inside each mode, and its size depends on which interviews are counted.

The fall happened inside every group

A change in who counts as a strong or weak partisan could lower the average without any group changing. Strong partisans rate the other party lowest, and their share of partisans rose from 27.2% (95% CI 25.1% to 29.3%) in 1978 to 46.2% (95% CI 44.2% to 48.2%) in 2024. A shift-share decomposition [9] splits the change in the average into three terms: the change within groups, computed at the 1978 mix of groups; the change in the mix, computed at the 1978 group averages; and an interaction of the two. The three add to the total.

Figure 5

Change within groups accounts for 24.5 of the 27.4 points the other-party rating fell

Decomposition of the change in the mean rating between 1978 and 2024 over strength-of-attachment groups, partisans including leaners, points on the 0 to 100 thermometer

Mean rating of the other party (0 to 100)

Show data

Data for Change within groups accounts for 24.5 of the 27.4 points the other-party rating fell
conf_high	conf_low	decomposition	kind	n	step	value
48.87	47.12	oth_strength	start	1,723	1978 mean	48.00
−23.24	−25.78	oth_strength	delta	6,803	Within groups	−24.54
−1.27	−2.31	oth_strength	delta	6,803	Group mix	−1.77
−0.461	−1.65	oth_strength	delta	6,803	Interaction	−1.05
21.46	19.80	oth_strength	end	5,080	2024 mean	20.63
48.87	47.12	oth_strength_ftf	start	1,723	1978 mean	48.00
−18.01	−22.46	oth_strength_ftf	delta	2,683	Within groups	−20.25
−0.512	−1.63	oth_strength_ftf	delta	2,683	Group mix	−1.05
−0.204	−2.19	oth_strength_ftf	delta	2,683	Interaction	−1.18
27.35	23.68	oth_strength_ftf	end	960	2024 mean, face-to-face	25.52
48.90	47.15	oth_education	start	1,718	1978 mean	48.03
−25.43	−28.18	oth_education	delta	6,753	Within groups	−26.83
0.030	−0.904	oth_education	delta	6,753	Group mix	−0.442
0.618	−0.797	oth_education	delta	6,753	Interaction	−0.072
21.51	19.85	oth_education	end	5,035	2024 mean	20.68
71.84	70.19	own_strength	start	1,723	1978 mean	71.01
−2.49	−4.61	own_strength	delta	6,803	Within groups	−3.57
2.76	1.57	own_strength	delta	6,803	Group mix	2.16
1.42	0.412	own_strength	delta	6,803	Interaction	0.915
71.34	69.70	own_strength	end	5,080	2024 mean	70.52

The bar for change within groups carries almost all of the fall; the bars for group mix and the interaction are small. Group mix is the change in each group's share of partisans, and the interaction is the part that comes from the shares and the group averages changing together.Note: The decomposition holds the 1978 mix of strong partisans, weak partisans and leaners fixed and lets each group's mean change, then adds the change in the mix and the term for both together, so the three steps add to the total. Intervals on the three steps come from redrawing the respondents of each year with replacement many times and taking the 95% interval of the redrawn estimates; the start and end bars use the Kish interval, so the totals differ slightly from the normal-curve intervals used elsewhere in the chapter.Note: Groups: strong (party identification 1 or 7), weak (2 or 6) and leaner (3 or 5) on the seven-point scale. The education view uses three groups and leaves out respondents with no education answer, so its total fall is 27.3 against 27.4 in the strength views.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978 and 2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf for the face-to-face view)

For strength groups (strong partisans, weak partisans and leaners) the total fall of 27.4 (95% CI 26.2 to 28.5) points splits into 24.5 (95% CI 23.2 to 25.8) from change within groups (89.7% (95% CI 87.8% to 91.7%) of the total), 1.8 (95% CI 1.3 to 2.3) from the change in the mix and 1.1 (95% CI 0.5 to 1.7) from the interaction. The face-to-face and education tabs give the same result: change within groups accounts for most of the fall in each.

The own-party rating shows different arithmetic (the last tab of Figure 5). Its total change of −0.5 (95% CI −1.6 to 0.6) points combines −3.6 (95% CI −4.6 to −2.5) from change within groups with +2.2 (95% CI 1.6 to 2.8) from the larger share of strong partisans, who rate their own party higher, and +0.9 (95% CI 0.4 to 1.4) from the interaction.

The 1978 base is low for strong partisans, whose own-party rating was 81.5 in 1978, 84.3 in 1980, 84.5 in 1988 and 80.6 in 2024, so the change within that group depends on the base year. The steadiness of the overall own-party average is a balance between lower ratings inside the weaker groups and a larger share of the strongest group.

The same fall shows up group by group. Figure 6 plots the other-party average within each strength, party, education and birth cohort group, and each tab gives the start and end of its lines. All 12 groups have a lower average at the end of their record than at the start, and the interval for the change excludes zero in all of them. Leaners in 2024 rate the other party lower than strong partisans did in 1978.

Figure 6

The other-party rating fell in all 12 groups of partisans

Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party within groups of partisans including leaners, by strength of attachment, party, education and birth cohort, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100

Mean rating of the other party (0 to 100)

Show data

Data for The other-party rating fell in all 12 groups of partisans
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	lens	n	series	year
49.34	46.92	48.13	Birth cohort	1,022	Born 1942 or earlier	1978
48.73	45.48	47.10	Birth cohort	763	Born 1942 or earlier	1980
46.03	42.82	44.43	Birth cohort	651	Born 1942 or earlier	1982
48.18	45.24	46.71	Birth cohort	892	Born 1942 or earlier	1984
47.50	44.25	45.87	Birth cohort	792	Born 1942 or earlier	1986
48.29	44.85	46.57	Birth cohort	730	Born 1942 or earlier	1988
48.45	44.79	46.62	Birth cohort	648	Born 1942 or earlier	1990
43.10	40.01	41.55	Birth cohort	786	Born 1942 or earlier	1992
46.69	42.87	44.78	Birth cohort	563	Born 1942 or earlier	1994
44.09	39.98	42.03	Birth cohort	534	Born 1942 or earlier	1996
43.95	38.48	41.21	Birth cohort	304	Born 1942 or earlier	1998
42.80	38.08	40.44	Birth cohort	401	Born 1942 or earlier	2000
41.22	34.56	37.89	Birth cohort	237	Born 1942 or earlier	2004
40.14	34.16	37.15	Birth cohort	331	Born 1942 or earlier	2008
30.89	26.47	28.68	Birth cohort	615	Born 1942 or earlier	2012
27.31	21.36	24.34	Birth cohort	332	Born 1942 or earlier	2016
22.75	17.58	20.16	Birth cohort	471	Born 1942 or earlier	2020
26.16	17.88	22.02	Birth cohort	243	Born 1942 or earlier	2024
49.05	46.52	47.78	Birth cohort	651	Born 1943 to 1958	1978
47.66	44.27	45.97	Birth cohort	459	Born 1943 to 1958	1980
45.62	41.88	43.75	Birth cohort	420	Born 1943 to 1958	1982
46.58	43.51	45.05	Birth cohort	689	Born 1943 to 1958	1984
48.28	45.26	46.77	Birth cohort	680	Born 1943 to 1958	1986
45.33	42.11	43.72	Birth cohort	622	Born 1943 to 1958	1988
47.46	43.96	45.71	Birth cohort	533	Born 1943 to 1958	1990
41.47	38.53	40.00	Birth cohort	691	Born 1943 to 1958	1992
42.37	38.53	40.45	Birth cohort	482	Born 1943 to 1958	1994
41.68	37.55	39.61	Birth cohort	477	Born 1943 to 1958	1996
39.59	34.86	37.22	Birth cohort	356	Born 1943 to 1958	1998
42.06	37.99	40.03	Birth cohort	485	Born 1943 to 1958	2000
41.74	36.03	38.89	Birth cohort	316	Born 1943 to 1958	2004
35.02	30.51	32.77	Birth cohort	546	Born 1943 to 1958	2008
27.45	24.73	26.09	Birth cohort	1,658	Born 1943 to 1958	2012
24.68	21.60	23.14	Birth cohort	999	Born 1943 to 1958	2016
17.31	14.94	16.12	Birth cohort	1,966	Born 1943 to 1958	2020
18.77	15.80	17.28	Birth cohort	1,336	Born 1943 to 1958	2024
48.89	41.75	45.32	Birth cohort	109	Born 1959 to 1974	1982
47.86	43.03	45.44	Birth cohort	280	Born 1959 to 1974	1984
48.43	43.98	46.21	Birth cohort	321	Born 1959 to 1974	1986
48.74	44.54	46.64	Birth cohort	364	Born 1959 to 1974	1988
49.99	46.40	48.20	Birth cohort	475	Born 1959 to 1974	1990
45.85	42.62	44.23	Birth cohort	612	Born 1959 to 1974	1992
43.86	39.82	41.84	Birth cohort	478	Born 1959 to 1974	1994
43.72	39.71	41.72	Birth cohort	468	Born 1959 to 1974	1996
46.05	41.11	43.58	Birth cohort	320	Born 1959 to 1974	1998
44.83	40.88	42.86	Birth cohort	499	Born 1959 to 1974	2000
43.96	38.83	41.39	Birth cohort	293	Born 1959 to 1974	2004
37.08	32.69	34.89	Birth cohort	581	Born 1959 to 1974	2008
30.25	27.24	28.74	Birth cohort	1,395	Born 1959 to 1974	2012
28.07	24.76	26.42	Birth cohort	931	Born 1959 to 1974	2016
20.40	17.94	19.17	Birth cohort	1,838	Born 1959 to 1974	2020
21.90	18.75	20.33	Birth cohort	1,316	Born 1959 to 1974	2024
47.94	40.27	44.11	Birth cohort	133	Born 1975 or later	2000
42.83	36.33	39.58	Birth cohort	209	Born 1975 or later	2004
37.36	32.70	35.03	Birth cohort	486	Born 1975 or later	2008
29.77	26.72	28.25	Birth cohort	1,363	Born 1975 or later	2012
29.51	26.53	28.02	Birth cohort	1,260	Born 1975 or later	2016
21.96	19.69	20.83	Birth cohort	2,646	Born 1975 or later	2020
23.36	20.80	22.08	Birth cohort	2,057	Born 1975 or later	2024
48.39	44.87	46.63	Education	317	College degree or more	1978
44.77	40.21	42.49	Education	235	College degree or more	1980
44.21	39.76	41.98	Education	231	College degree or more	1982
44.03	39.87	41.95	Education	339	College degree or more	1984
46.76	43.16	44.96	Education	391	College degree or more	1986
45.29	41.22	43.26	Education	365	College degree or more	1988
45.00	40.91	42.96	Education	358	College degree or more	1990
38.14	34.85	36.49	Education	517	College degree or more	1992
38.01	34.25	36.13	Education	409	College degree or more	1994
40.08	36.41	38.25	Education	441	College degree or more	1996
40.11	35.54	37.82	Education	323	College degree or more	1998
42.04	38.46	40.25	Education	504	College degree or more	2000
37.54	32.68	35.11	Education	339	College degree or more	2004
33.06	28.62	30.84	Education	460	College degree or more	2008
26.61	24.13	25.37	Education	1,621	College degree or more	2012
25.45	23.19	24.32	Education	1,479	College degree or more	2016
18.44	16.83	17.64	Education	3,299	College degree or more	2020
21.29	19.01	20.15	Education	2,353	College degree or more	2024
49.81	47.41	48.61	Education	1,041	High school or less	1978
49.71	46.56	48.14	Education	777	High school or less	1980
47.11	43.73	45.42	Education	649	High school or less	1982
48.27	45.56	46.92	Education	1,038	High school or less	1984
48.46	45.48	46.97	Education	952	High school or less	1986
48.38	45.37	46.88	Education	916	High school or less	1988
49.27	46.28	47.77	Education	920	High school or less	1990
45.58	42.96	44.27	Education	1,036	High school or less	1992
47.78	44.40	46.09	Education	710	High school or less	1994
45.11	41.35	43.23	Education	661	High school or less	1996
44.95	40.56	42.76	Education	454	High school or less	1998
44.56	40.34	42.45	Education	543	High school or less	2000
45.02	39.85	42.43	Education	376	High school or less	2004
38.06	34.26	36.16	Education	890	High school or less	2008
30.55	27.64	29.10	Education	1,707	High school or less	2012
29.76	25.94	27.85	Education	852	High school or less	2016
23.24	20.08	21.66	Education	1,397	High school or less	2020
23.70	20.24	21.97	Education	1,102	High school or less	2024
49.26	45.87	47.57	Education	360	Some college	1978
48.20	43.77	45.99	Education	294	Some college	1980
45.66	41.47	43.57	Education	297	Some college	1982
48.28	44.66	46.47	Education	496	Some college	1984
47.65	43.90	45.77	Education	436	Some college	1986
46.49	42.46	44.48	Education	406	Some college	1988
50.57	46.56	48.57	Education	351	Some college	1990
43.55	40.00	41.78	Education	492	Some college	1992
42.65	38.48	40.57	Education	414	Some college	1994
42.11	37.69	39.90	Education	423	Some college	1996
43.21	38.16	40.68	Education	323	Some college	1998
43.35	39.53	41.44	Education	476	Some college	2000
42.03	37.16	39.60	Education	340	Some college	2004
38.65	34.60	36.62	Education	617	Some college	2008
30.38	27.61	28.99	Education	1,687	Some college	2012
27.31	24.55	25.93	Education	1,254	Some college	2016
19.65	17.42	18.54	Education	2,384	Some college	2020
21.35	18.43	19.89	Education	1,580	Some college	2024
49.49	47.18	48.34	Party	1,088	Democrats	1978
49.50	46.52	48.01	Party	797	Democrats	1980
45.15	42.03	43.59	Party	750	Democrats	1982
46.06	43.20	44.63	Party	1,028	Democrats	1984
47.18	44.37	45.78	Party	1,049	Democrats	1986
47.20	44.20	45.70	Party	921	Democrats	1988
47.01	44.10	45.56	Party	976	Democrats	1990
42.08	39.64	40.86	Party	1,196	Democrats	1992
47.98	44.88	46.43	Party	822	Democrats	1994
43.38	40.29	41.84	Party	879	Democrats	1996
40.72	36.97	38.84	Party	643	Democrats	1998
44.01	40.77	42.39	Party	862	Democrats	2000
40.55	36.27	38.41	Party	579	Democrats	2004
34.56	31.48	33.02	Party	1,336	Democrats	2008
27.74	25.59	26.66	Party	3,093	Democrats	2012
28.05	25.64	26.84	Party	1,903	Democrats	2016
21.52	19.64	20.58	Party	3,780	Democrats	2020
22.21	19.95	21.08	Party	2,631	Democrats	2024
48.72	46.09	47.41	Party	635	Republicans	1978
46.12	42.57	44.34	Party	513	Republicans	1980
47.08	43.84	45.46	Party	431	Republicans	1982
48.68	46.15	47.41	Party	853	Republicans	1984
48.29	45.54	46.91	Party	747	Republicans	1986
46.81	43.98	45.40	Party	796	Republicans	1988
49.98	47.09	48.54	Party	680	Republicans	1990
44.45	41.85	43.15	Party	902	Republicans	1992
39.64	36.59	38.12	Party	745	Republicans	1994
42.09	38.44	40.27	Party	649	Republicans	1996
45.86	41.92	43.89	Party	461	Republicans	1998
42.22	38.86	40.54	Party	663	Republicans	2000
42.98	38.96	40.97	Party	476	Republicans	2004
38.82	35.14	36.98	Party	643	Republicans	2008
30.44	28.11	29.27	Party	1,986	Republicans	2012
26.33	23.88	25.10	Party	1,707	Republicans	2016
18.70	16.84	17.77	Party	3,394	Republicans	2020
21.36	18.94	20.15	Party	2,449	Republicans	2024
51.81	49.19	50.50	Strength of attachment	500	Leaners	1978
51.30	47.33	49.32	Strength of attachment	332	Leaners	1980
49.52	45.04	47.28	Strength of attachment	258	Leaners	1982
50.26	46.91	48.59	Strength of attachment	502	Leaners	1984
51.38	47.93	49.66	Strength of attachment	450	Leaners	1986
51.26	47.72	49.49	Strength of attachment	489	Leaners	1988
51.69	48.21	49.95	Strength of attachment	455	Leaners	1990
45.59	42.57	44.08	Strength of attachment	639	Leaners	1992
48.21	44.44	46.33	Strength of attachment	433	Leaners	1994
46.64	42.45	44.55	Strength of attachment	411	Leaners	1996
46.45	41.54	44.00	Strength of attachment	308	Leaners	1998
47.08	43.01	45.04	Strength of attachment	484	Leaners	2000
47.15	42.50	44.83	Strength of attachment	340	Leaners	2004
42.81	38.89	40.85	Strength of attachment	603	Leaners	2008
34.22	31.34	32.78	Strength of attachment	1,345	Leaners	2012
31.84	28.64	30.24	Strength of attachment	971	Leaners	2016
24.00	21.40	22.70	Strength of attachment	1,828	Leaners	2020
28.29	24.92	26.60	Strength of attachment	1,418	Leaners	2024
43.29	39.17	41.23	Strength of attachment	468	Strong partisans	1978
44.23	39.40	41.81	Strength of attachment	405	Strong partisans	1980
38.70	34.44	36.57	Strength of attachment	410	Strong partisans	1982
40.49	36.72	38.60	Strength of attachment	630	Strong partisans	1984
39.93	36.20	38.07	Strength of attachment	597	Strong partisans	1986
40.28	36.72	38.50	Strength of attachment	619	Strong partisans	1988
43.10	38.97	41.04	Strength of attachment	562	Strong partisans	1990
37.01	33.72	35.37	Strength of attachment	705	Strong partisans	1992
36.58	32.66	34.62	Strength of attachment	549	Strong partisans	1994
35.81	31.57	33.69	Strength of attachment	539	Strong partisans	1996
36.14	31.09	33.61	Strength of attachment	369	Strong partisans	1998
37.70	33.80	35.75	Strength of attachment	568	Strong partisans	2000
32.19	27.10	29.64	Strength of attachment	390	Strong partisans	2004
27.74	24.04	25.89	Strength of attachment	799	Strong partisans	2008
20.63	18.36	19.50	Strength of attachment	2,244	Strong partisans	2012
19.85	17.47	18.66	Strength of attachment	1,594	Strong partisans	2016
13.89	12.28	13.08	Strength of attachment	3,638	Strong partisans	2020
13.99	12.07	13.03	Strength of attachment	2,472	Strong partisans	2024
51.72	49.35	50.53	Strength of attachment	755	Weak partisans	1978
49.92	46.78	48.35	Strength of attachment	573	Weak partisans	1980
50.45	47.38	48.92	Strength of attachment	513	Weak partisans	1982
51.57	48.87	50.22	Strength of attachment	749	Weak partisans	1984
52.16	49.29	50.73	Strength of attachment	749	Weak partisans	1986
51.24	47.92	49.58	Strength of attachment	609	Weak partisans	1988
51.08	48.08	49.58	Strength of attachment	639	Weak partisans	1990
47.39	44.66	46.02	Strength of attachment	754	Weak partisans	1992
48.54	45.15	46.85	Strength of attachment	585	Weak partisans	1994
46.93	43.49	45.21	Strength of attachment	578	Weak partisans	1996
47.17	43.15	45.16	Strength of attachment	427	Weak partisans	1998
46.85	42.95	44.90	Strength of attachment	473	Weak partisans	2000
48.19	43.57	45.88	Strength of attachment	325	Weak partisans	2004
40.55	36.38	38.47	Strength of attachment	577	Weak partisans	2008
35.44	32.67	34.06	Strength of attachment	1,490	Weak partisans	2012
34.94	31.78	33.36	Strength of attachment	1,045	Weak partisans	2016
29.63	26.69	28.16	Strength of attachment	1,708	Weak partisans	2020
29.53	26.15	27.84	Strength of attachment	1,190	Weak partisans	2024

Every line slopes down, and strong partisans sit lowest in every year: their average went from 41.2 in 1978 to 13.0 in 2024, weak partisans' from 50.5 to 27.8 and leaners' from 50.5 to 26.6. Each line is the weighted mean within one group with a confidence band; cells with fewer than 100 respondents are not drawn.Note: A group appears only where its yearly cell has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size, and only if it has estimates in four or more years.Note: All interview modes are pooled, so the fall after 2008 includes the mode composition effect shown in the mode figure.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z); all interview modes

The 2020 to 2024 change depends on the 2024 sample

Across all 2024 interviews the other-party average changed by +1.4 (95% CI 0.3 to 2.4) points from 2020, from 19.2 to 20.6. The 2020 study was interviewed online, by video and by telephone [7], so 2024 web respondents are the closest match to it, and among them the change is −1.3 (95% CI −2.7 to 0.1) points, an interval that includes zero. Among 2024 face-to-face respondents the change is +6.3 (95% CI 4.3 to 8.2) points, but the 2020 baseline has no face-to-face interviews.

In 2024 face-to-face respondents rated the other party 7.6 (95% CI 5.3 to 9.8) points higher than web respondents, close to the change of +6.3 from 2020, so the face-to-face change cannot be read as a rise since 2020. The 2024 respondents in neither mode group, who carry 33.7% of the all-interview weight, rated the other party at 17.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 18.6), against 19.2 in 2020, so the face-to-face sample is the only one of the three 2024 groups above the 2020 average.

Figure 7 repeats the comparison for all partisans, Democrats and Republicans, and its second view adds subgroups by strength of attachment and interest in the campaign.The 2024 all-interview sample includes respondents who were also interviewed in 2020. The intervals treat the 2020 and 2024 samples as independent, which makes the intervals of the all-interview comparison wider than they need to be. The web and face-to-face comparisons use fresh 2024 samples. Among web respondents the only subgroup change with an interval that excludes zero is negative: Democrats at −2.3 (95% CI −4.1 to −0.4). Among face-to-face respondents all 8 subgroups shown have an interval above zero. Across all 2024 interviews 3 of the 9 changes have an interval that excludes zero (all partisans, Republicans and leaners), and the other subgroups have intervals that include zero, so the data cannot separate their changes from no change.

Figure 7

Compared with 2020, the other-party rating differs by −1.3 points among 2024 web respondents and +6.3 among 2024 face-to-face respondents

Change in the mean thermometer rating of the other party from the 2020 all-interview mean to the 2024 mean, points, partisans including leaners, by 2024 sample

2024 all interviews

2024 web respondents only

2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)

Change in the mean rating, 2020 to 2024 (points)

Show data

Data for Compared with 2020, the other-party rating differs by −1.3 points among 2024 web respondents and +6.3 among 2024 face-to-face respondents
conf_high	conf_low	core	estimate	kind_of_group	level_2020	level_2024	n	sample	subgroup
2.45	0.328	yes	1.39	All partisans	19.24	20.63	5,080	2024 all interviews	All partisans
1.97	−0.968	yes	0.501	Party	20.58	21.08	2,631	2024 all interviews	Democrats
3.90	0.847	yes	2.37	Party	17.77	20.15	2,449	2024 all interviews	Republicans
1.20	−1.30	no	−0.048	Strength of attachment	13.08	13.03	2,472	2024 all interviews	Strong partisans
1.92	−2.56	no	−0.319	Strength of attachment	28.16	27.84	1,190	2024 all interviews	Weak partisans
6.03	1.78	no	3.90	Strength of attachment	22.70	26.60	1,418	2024 all interviews	Leaners
2.04	−0.584	no	0.730	Interest in the campaign	14.92	15.65	2,550	2024 all interviews	Very interested in the campaign
3.33	−0.371	no	1.48	Interest in the campaign	23.67	25.15	1,768	2024 all interviews	Somewhat interested
5.76	−1.14	no	2.31	Interest in the campaign	24.55	26.86	547	2024 all interviews	Not much interested
0.113	−2.68	yes	−1.28	All partisans	19.24	17.96	1,850	2024 web respondents only	All partisans
−0.363	−4.14	yes	−2.25	Party	20.58	18.32	966	2024 web respondents only	Democrats
1.85	−2.28	yes	−0.219	Party	17.77	17.55	884	2024 web respondents only	Republicans
0.070	−3.25	no	−1.59	Strength of attachment	13.08	11.49	900	2024 web respondents only	Strong partisans
0.964	−4.99	no	−2.01	Strength of attachment	28.16	26.14	454	2024 web respondents only	Weak partisans
3.31	−2.33	no	0.489	Strength of attachment	22.70	23.19	496	2024 web respondents only	Leaners
0.300	−3.28	no	−1.49	Interest in the campaign	14.92	13.43	886	2024 web respondents only	Very interested in the campaign
0.390	−4.32	no	−1.96	Interest in the campaign	23.67	21.70	734	2024 web respondents only	Somewhat interested
2.13	−6.33	no	−2.10	Interest in the campaign	24.55	22.45	230	2024 web respondents only	Not much interested
8.22	4.32	yes	6.27	All partisans	19.24	25.52	960	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	All partisans
8.63	3.12	yes	5.87	Party	20.58	26.45	522	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Democrats
9.44	3.94	yes	6.69	Party	17.77	24.46	438	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Republicans
5.58	0.766	no	3.17	Strength of attachment	13.08	16.26	407	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Strong partisans
9.14	1.23	no	5.19	Strength of attachment	28.16	33.34	223	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Weak partisans
10.83	3.89	no	7.36	Strength of attachment	22.70	30.06	330	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Leaners
6.65	1.92	no	4.29	Interest in the campaign	14.92	19.21	492	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Very interested in the campaign
9.59	2.92	no	6.25	Interest in the campaign	23.67	29.92	333	2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews)	Somewhat interested

The 2024 web sample is the closest match to the online, video and telephone interviews of 2020: the point estimates for all partisans, Democrats and Republicans are below zero there, and only the interval for Democrats excludes zero. Among 2024 face-to-face respondents every interval lies above zero, but 2020 had no face-to-face interviews, and the 2020 comparison is always the all-interview mean. Each dot is the 2024 mean minus the 2020 mean with a confidence interval.Note: n is the smaller of the 2020 and 2024 cell sizes. Subgroups with fewer than 100 respondents or an effective sample below that in either year are not shown.Note: The intervals treat the 2020 and 2024 samples as independent. The all-interview 2024 sample includes respondents who were also interviewed in 2020, so its intervals are wider than needed; the web and face-to-face comparisons use fresh 2024 samples.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2020 and 2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_web and weight_ftf for the 2024 mode samples)

The change from 2020 is not the same in the two 2024 samples. Two readings fit the numbers. Warmth may have risen among people reachable face to face and held or fallen among people reachable online. Or the two 2024 samples may differ in who they reach and how they answer for reasons unrelated to 2020, which the 2024 gap between them allows. The files used here cannot separate the two, because 2020 has no face-to-face interviews to compare with. The subgroup changes were not tested against each other, so the figure does not show that any subgroup moved more than another.

Since 2012 the other party's nominee is rated below the party

The other party's presidential nominee was rated below the party in 9 of the 12 elections from 1980 to 2024, with an interval for the difference that excludes zero, and in every election from 2012 on (the second view of Figure 8). The party average minus the nominee average was 1.6 (95% CI 0.4 to 2.8) points in 2012 and 7.3 (95% CI 6.1 to 8.5) in 2024.The nominee and party averages come from two overlapping samples: partisans who rated both nominees and partisans who rated both parties. The intervals treat the two samples as independent, so they are wider than needed.

In 2008 the nominee was rated 3.4 (95% CI 1.6 to 5.1) points above the party. The difference is among Democrats, who rated John McCain 5.7 (95% CI 3.5 to 7.9) points above the Republican Party; Republicans rated Barack Obama 0.3 (95% CI −2.6 to 3.1) points above the Democratic Party, an interval that includes zero. The intervals for 1996 and 2000 include zero.

Figure 8

The other party's nominee was rated 13.3 in 2024, below the 20.6 for the party, while the own party's nominee was rated 75.2

Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party, the other party's presidential nominee (other nominee) and the own party's nominee (own nominee), partisans including leaners, 1968 to 2024, 0 to 100

Show data

Data for The other party's nominee was rated 13.3 in 2024, below the 20.6 for the party, while the own party's nominee was rated 75.2
conf_high	conf_low	estimate	measure	n	series	year
55.63	52.91	54.27	Mean rating	1,157	Other nominee	1968
47.78	45.35	46.57	Mean rating	2,203	Other nominee	1972
51.02	48.71	49.87	Mean rating	1,811	Other nominee	1976
45.39	42.63	44.01	Mean rating	1,301	Other nominee	1980
43.89	41.62	42.75	Mean rating	1,903	Other nominee	1984
44.65	42.31	43.48	Mean rating	1,721	Other nominee	1988
40.89	38.88	39.88	Mean rating	2,110	Other nominee	1992
41.60	38.90	40.25	Mean rating	1,524	Other nominee	1996
44.28	41.71	42.99	Mean rating	1,527	Other nominee	2000
36.06	32.70	34.38	Mean rating	1,063	Other nominee	2004
39.36	36.80	38.08	Mean rating	1,990	Other nominee	2008
27.16	25.38	26.27	Mean rating	5,075	Other nominee	2012
16.37	14.54	15.45	Mean rating	3,622	Other nominee	2016
15.36	13.95	14.65	Mean rating	7,026	Other nominee	2020
14.16	12.47	13.32	Mean rating	5,087	Other nominee	2024
48.87	47.12	48.00	Mean rating	1,723	Other party	1978
47.72	45.43	46.57	Mean rating	1,310	Other party	1980
45.43	43.12	44.27	Mean rating	1,181	Other party	1982
46.86	44.92	45.89	Mean rating	1,881	Other party	1984
47.25	45.25	46.25	Mean rating	1,796	Other party	1986
46.60	44.52	45.56	Mean rating	1,717	Other party	1988
47.83	45.74	46.78	Mean rating	1,656	Other party	1990
42.74	40.95	41.84	Mean rating	2,098	Other party	1992
43.63	41.40	42.51	Mean rating	1,567	Other party	1994
42.35	39.99	41.17	Mean rating	1,528	Other party	1996
42.34	39.59	40.96	Mean rating	1,104	Other party	1998
42.78	40.43	41.60	Mean rating	1,525	Other party	2000
41.05	38.08	39.57	Mean rating	1,055	Other party	2004
35.88	33.50	34.69	Mean rating	1,979	Other party	2008
28.65	27.07	27.86	Mean rating	5,079	Other party	2012
26.90	25.17	26.04	Mean rating	3,610	Other party	2016
19.91	18.58	19.24	Mean rating	7,174	Other party	2020
21.46	19.80	20.63	Mean rating	5,080	Other party	2024
76.23	73.57	74.90	Mean rating	1,157	Own nominee	1968
69.66	67.43	68.54	Mean rating	2,203	Own nominee	1972
74.89	73.03	73.96	Mean rating	1,811	Own nominee	1976
70.63	68.32	69.47	Mean rating	1,301	Own nominee	1980
76.68	74.91	75.80	Mean rating	1,903	Own nominee	1984
75.16	73.19	74.18	Mean rating	1,721	Own nominee	1988
70.36	68.73	69.55	Mean rating	2,110	Own nominee	1992
73.07	70.84	71.96	Mean rating	1,524	Own nominee	1996
72.49	70.32	71.40	Mean rating	1,527	Own nominee	2000
75.92	73.20	74.56	Mean rating	1,063	Own nominee	2004
72.79	70.50	71.64	Mean rating	1,990	Own nominee	2008
76.52	74.97	75.74	Mean rating	5,075	Own nominee	2012
65.79	63.65	64.72	Mean rating	3,622	Own nominee	2016
76.48	74.95	75.72	Mean rating	7,026	Own nominee	2020
76.16	74.27	75.22	Mean rating	5,087	Own nominee	2024
−0.775	−4.36	−2.57	Nominee minus party	1,301	Other nominee minus other party	1980
−1.64	−4.63	−3.14	Nominee minus party	1,881	Other nominee minus other party	1984
−0.513	−3.64	−2.08	Nominee minus party	1,717	Other nominee minus other party	1988
−0.619	−3.31	−1.96	Nominee minus party	2,098	Other nominee minus other party	1992
0.878	−2.71	−0.918	Nominee minus party	1,524	Other nominee minus other party	1996
3.13	−0.345	1.39	Nominee minus party	1,525	Other nominee minus other party	2000
−2.95	−7.43	−5.19	Nominee minus party	1,055	Other nominee minus other party	2004
5.14	1.64	3.39	Nominee minus party	1,979	Other nominee minus other party	2008
−0.397	−2.78	−1.59	Nominee minus party	5,075	Other nominee minus other party	2012
−9.33	−11.83	−10.58	Nominee minus party	3,610	Other nominee minus other party	2016
−3.62	−5.56	−4.59	Nominee minus party	7,026	Other nominee minus other party	2020
−6.13	−8.50	−7.31	Nominee minus party	5,080	Other nominee minus other party	2024
6.71	4.13	5.27	Share at zero	1,157	Other nominee	1968
16.44	13.46	14.89	Share at zero	2,203	Other nominee	1972
9.59	7.01	8.21	Share at zero	1,811	Other nominee	1976
14.28	10.70	12.38	Share at zero	1,301	Other nominee	1980
14.51	11.49	12.93	Share at zero	1,903	Other nominee	1984
13.77	10.68	12.14	Share at zero	1,721	Other nominee	1988
13.59	10.80	12.12	Share at zero	2,110	Other nominee	1992
14.06	10.38	12.10	Share at zero	1,524	Other nominee	1996
9.92	6.84	8.25	Share at zero	1,527	Other nominee	2000
23.32	18.00	20.53	Share at zero	1,063	Other nominee	2004
14.21	10.59	12.28	Share at zero	1,990	Other nominee	2008
31.51	28.12	29.79	Share at zero	5,075	Other nominee	2012
50.65	46.75	48.70	Share at zero	3,622	Other nominee	2016
59.31	56.19	57.76	Share at zero	7,026	Other nominee	2020
61.65	57.74	59.71	Share at zero	5,087	Other nominee	2024
6.57	4.43	5.40	Share at zero	1,723	Other party	1978
8.37	5.62	6.87	Share at zero	1,310	Other party	1980
8.81	5.86	7.20	Share at zero	1,181	Other party	1982
9.23	6.78	7.92	Share at zero	1,881	Other party	1984
9.13	6.64	7.80	Share at zero	1,796	Other party	1986
9.54	6.95	8.15	Share at zero	1,717	Other party	1988
8.92	6.37	7.55	Share at zero	1,656	Other party	1990
9.57	7.20	8.31	Share at zero	2,098	Other party	1992
8.24	5.49	6.74	Share at zero	1,567	Other party	1994
10.44	7.26	8.72	Share at zero	1,528	Other party	1996
11.50	7.75	9.46	Share at zero	1,104	Other party	1998
10.00	6.91	8.32	Share at zero	1,525	Other party	2000
14.69	10.33	12.35	Share at zero	1,055	Other party	2004
16.82	12.90	14.75	Share at zero	1,979	Other party	2008
24.36	21.25	22.77	Share at zero	5,079	Other party	2012
23.90	20.64	22.23	Share at zero	3,610	Other party	2016
41.57	38.51	40.03	Share at zero	7,174	Other party	2020
35.12	31.36	33.22	Share at zero	5,080	Other party	2024

The other-nominee line lies below the other-party line in every election from 2012 on, and the own-nominee line dips in 2016 and recovers. Lines are weighted means with confidence bands: the party series starts in 1978 and the nominee series in 1968. The dashed line is the other party's nominee.Note: Nominees are the major-party presidential candidates of each election, so the same person can appear in several years (Trump in 2016, 2020 and 2024) while the other party's nominee for Republican respondents is Clinton in 2016, Biden in 2020 and Harris in 2024. In the second view n is the smaller of the party and nominee sample sizes, and the interval treats those two overlapping samples as independent, so it is wider than needed.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1968-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024)

The nominee is also rated below the party in 2024 within each interview mode: 16.7 (95% CI 14.7 to 18.7) against 25.5 among face-to-face respondents and 11.6 (95% CI 10.4 to 12.9) against 18.0 among web respondents. The share rating the other party's nominee at zero was 5.3% (95% CI 4.1% to 6.7%) in 1968, 57.8% in 2020 and 59.7% (95% CI 57.7% to 61.7%) in 2024, against 33.2% for the party in 2024 (the third view of Figure 8).

Between 2020 and 2024 the party average changed by +1.4 points while the nominee average changed by −1.3 (95% CI −2.4 to −0.2) points, an interval below zero. The fall in the nominee average is among Republicans, who rated Joe Biden in 2020 and Kamala Harris in 2024, a change of −4.0 (95% CI −5.7 to −2.4) points.Republicans rated Biden at 20.2 in 2020 and Harris at 16.2 (95% CI 14.9 to 17.5) in 2024. Democrats rated Donald Trump in both years, at 9.6 in 2020 and 10.6 (95% CI 9.5 to 11.8) in 2024. Democrats rated Donald Trump in both years, a change of +1.1 (95% CI −0.4 to 2.5) points, an interval that includes zero.

Ratings of the own party's nominee did not move in step. They were 64.7 (95% CI 63.7 to 65.8) in 2016, the lowest in the record, and 75.2 (95% CI 74.3 to 76.2) in 2024, near the 75.8 of 1984 and the 75.7 of 2020.

What these data cannot show

The ratings come from repeated cross-sections, so they cannot show that any partisan grew colder. The decomposition shows that the fall is not accounted for by a shift among strength or education groups. It does not rule out that older cohorts leave the samples while younger ones enter, or that people who change party move between groups. The cohort lines cannot separate age, cohort and period. A panel that re-interviews the same people is needed to describe change within persons. The ANES 2016, 2020 and 2024 panel exists but is not in the files used here.

The mode results rest on mode weights that exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. The gap between the all-interview and face-to-face averages combines how people answer in each mode with who answers in each mode, and it is a decomposition of the record and not an estimate of a mode effect. The 2024 gap also includes the panel and paper respondents, who belong to neither mode group. Interviews before 2008 are not split by mode. The 2016 to 2020 change and the 2020 to 2024 change cannot be split by mode at all.

A thermometer rating of a party may reflect feelings about party elites more than about fellow citizens who support it [10], and a rating of zero is the coldest answer and not a measure of behavior. What the ratings go with in voting, in willingness to live near or work with the other side and in support for political violence belongs to Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship and Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms. Feelings toward social groups are in Chapter 2.4, Party and feelings toward social groups (planned). Accounts that start from partisanship as a social identity [11], from the alignment of party with other traits (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology) or from negative partisanship [12] are candidate explanations, and the ratings alone cannot tell them apart.

The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES sampling design. The check against the design variables in the note on intervals covers 2024 only, so the intervals for other years are not compared with design-based intervals. The split year 1990 was chosen after looking at the series, and the pre-1990 slope changes with the split year. Each sample in the 2020 to 2024 comparison reports up to nine changes without adjustment for multiple comparisons, so an interval that excludes zero in one sample is weaker evidence than it looks.

The nominee series rates people, and the same Republican nominee appears in 2016, 2020 and 2024, so it mixes feelings about a party with feelings about a person. The Democratic nominee differs in each of those years, so a change in Republicans' ratings of the other nominee between elections compares different people. The decompositions cover strength of attachment and education and leave out race, religion and age, so the mix of each party by those traits is not decomposed here. The year-by-year distribution of the ratings is not shown beyond the shares at zero and above the midpoint.

Data sources

ANES Cumulative Data FileCumulative Data File 1948-2024: party thermometers 1978-2024, presidential nominee thermometers 1968-2024Years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x, VCF0009y) for mode-specific estimates in 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.
ANES 2024 Time Series2024 Time Series: party thermometers V241166 and V241167, party identification V241227x, variance strata V240107d and primary sampling units V240107c, used for one design-based check of the 2024 all-interview other-party meanYears: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews) · Weights: pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a), equal to the Cumulative File weight · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.

All data sources

Methods

Sample: respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series, from the Cumulative Data File, who identify as Democrats or Republicans on the seven-point party identification scale with leaners included (codes 1 to 3 and 5 to 7) and who gave a valid rating of both parties (the paired sample): 43,063 respondents in 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024. Series for presidential nominees use partisans with a valid rating of both major-party nominees, 39,120 respondents in the elections of 1968 to 2024. Pure independents are excluded because they have no own party. Each survey year is a separate cross-section of people, so every change is a change in a group average and not a change within persons. Measure: the feeling thermometer, from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest); own party is the party the respondent identifies with or leans toward. The gap is the respondent's own-party rating minus the other-party rating, averaged. Weights: the full-sample weight VCF0009z. Mode: weight_ftf (VCF0009x) on the fresh face-to-face sample and weight_web (VCF0009y) on the fresh web sample in 2008 (face-to-face only), 2012, 2016 and 2024; 2020 has no mode weights, and the 2024 re-interviewed panel and paper respondents belong to neither mode group and enter the all-interview estimate only. Estimators: weighted means and weighted shares by year with intervals on the Kish effective sample size (normal for means, Wilson for shares); they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Changes between two years or two samples combine the two standard errors in quadrature, which treats the samples as independent. Slopes: weighted least squares of the rating on year (in decades) over respondents, standard errors clustered on survey year, t interval with the number of surveys minus one degrees of freedom. Shift-share: with s the weighted share of a group and m its weighted mean, within = sum s0 (m1 - m0), composition = sum (s1 - s0) m0 and interaction = sum (s1 - s0)(m1 - m0), base 1978, end 2024, so the three terms add to the total change; intervals are percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples respondents within each year (2000 replicates, seed 12345), as are the intervals for the mode-composition terms. Strength groups: strong (party identification 1 or 7), weak (2 or 6), leaner (3 or 5). Education and birth cohort are recodes of the file's categories. Suppression: yearly cells need at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (timeline floor); subgroup-year cells need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; a group needs estimates in four or more surveys. Interviews before 2008 are not split by mode. Mode terms for 2024: with s a group's share of the all-interview weight, m its mean and F the weight_ftf mean, the gap between the face-to-face and all-interview means is s_web (F - m_web) + s_other (F - m_other) plus a remainder for weighting the face-to-face respondents two ways; the bootstrap is the one used for the other mode terms. Design check (2024 only): the standard error of the 2024 all-interview other-party mean was recomputed from the variance strata (V240107d) and primary sampling units (V240107c) of the 2024 Time Series file, with the pre-election full-sample weight V240107a, by Taylor linearization with replacement within strata and the partisans with both ratings as a domain of the full sample; the sample and the mean equal the Cumulative File's. The Cumulative File used here has no strata or primary sampling units, so no other year is checked. The difference between a nominee average and the party average in an election treats two overlapping samples as independent.

References

Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. doi:10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953
Iyengar, Shanto; Sood, Gaurav; Lelkes, Yphtach (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly 76(3): 405-431. academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/76/3/405/1894274
Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science 22: 129-146. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034
Iyengar, Shanto; Krupenkin, Masha (2018). The Strengthening of Partisan Affect. Political Psychology 39(S1): 201-218. doi:10.1111/pops.12487
Finkel, Eli J.; Bail, Christopher A.; Cikara, Mina; Ditto, Peter H.; Iyengar, Shanto; Klar, Samara; Mason, Lilliana; McGrath, Mary C.; Nyhan, Brendan; Rand, David G.; Skitka, Linda J.; Tucker, Joshua A.; Van Bavel, Jay J.; Wang, Cynthia S.; Druckman, James N. (2020). Political Sectarianism in America. Science 370(6516): 533-536. doi:10.1126/science.abe1715
American National Election Studies (2022). Methodology Report for the ANES 2020 Time Series Study. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/anes_timeseries_2020_methodology_report.pdf
American National Election Studies (2025). ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/anes_timeseries_2024_userguidecodebook_20250808.pdf
Kitagawa, Evelyn M. (1955). Components of a Difference Between Two Rates. Journal of the American Statistical Association 50(272): 1168-1194. doi:10.1080/01621459.1955.10501299
Druckman, James N.; Levendusky, Matthew S. (2019). What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?. Public Opinion Quarterly 83(1): 114-122. academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/83/1/114/5486527
Mason, Lilliana (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press. press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html
Abramowitz, Alan I.; Webster, Steven W. (2016). The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century. Electoral Studies 41: 12-22. www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379415001857

How to cite

@misc{singh2026feelingstowardtheotherparty,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Feelings toward the other party},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}

Other-party ratings fell more than own-party ratings

More partisans rate the other party at zero

Part of the fall after 2008 goes with survey mode

The fall happened inside every group

The 2020 to 2024 change depends on the 2024 sample

Since 2012 the other party's nominee is rated below the party

What these data cannot show

Data sources

Methods

References

How to cite

Reading paths