Volume 1Labels, sorting and partisan feeling

Party identification and ideological labels drew closer together in American surveys. The volume asks what the labels contain, in the United States and about 100 countries, how the alignment changed across birth cohorts, and how it differs from partisans' feelings toward the other party.

Volume 2Coalitions and political differences

Participation, group coalitions, issues and attitudes toward institutions and democracy, 1948 to 2024. Party gaps on these measures differ in size and timing, and some reverse with control of the presidency, so no single trend describes them.

Volume 3Votes, giving and places

Election returns, donor records and county data count different populations at different scales. The volume follows the vote from counties to precincts and down the ballot, compares donors with voters, and returns from places to the people who live in them.

Reading path

A tour of the book, one chapter per part

8 chapters in reading order. A path is a way through the book that follows one question; every chapter also stands alone.

1
Party and ideology
Chapter 1.1 in Part I, Labels and beliefs
Among ANES respondents, the correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement rose from +0.32 in 1972 to +0.72 in 2024.
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2
Feelings toward the other party
Chapter 2.2 in Part II, Change and partisan feeling
Among ANES partisans, the average rating of the other party on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer fell from 48.0 in 1978 to 20.6 in 2024.
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3
The income ladder
Chapter 3.5 in Part III, Participation and coalitions
In the CES the highest household-income bracket's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote minus the lowest bracket's went from −9.1 points in 2008 to +5.7 in 2024.
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4
The abortion sort
Chapter 4.1 in Part IV, Issues move on different schedules
In the American National Election Studies, the share saying abortion should always be allowed was 3.5 points higher among Democrats than Republicans in 1980 and 52.3 points higher in 2024.
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5
Confidence in thirteen institutions
Chapter 5.1 in Part V, Institutions and democratic attitudes
Among respondents interviewed in person, the average size of the gap between Democrats and Republicans in confidence across thirteen institutions was 4.8 points in 1973-1980 and 9.4 points in 2022-2024.
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6
Nationalization of the county vote
Chapter 6.1 in Part VI, Election results at different scales
Counties moved more nearly in step in 2020 to 2024 than in any other pair of presidential elections since 1868, with a vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings of 4.5 points against 5.0 in 2008 to 2012, the next lowest.
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7
Counties where donors and voters diverge
Chapter 7.2 in Part VII, Giving
In 570 of 2,839 counties, or 20.1%, the reliable donors of 1980 to 2024 lean opposite to the county's 2020 presidential vote, a count that depends on the definition of divergence.
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8
Party and place
Chapter 8.3 in Part VIII, Places and the people in them
Across 12 policy issues in 2013 to 2021, Democrats and Republicans in the same kind of county differ by 43.1 points, and one party's members in deep-blue and deep-red counties differ by 5.6 points.
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All chapters