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    Companion 4.6a

    Racial attitudes and ideology

    Among white non-Hispanic respondents to the American National Election Studies, the correlation between racial resentment and conservative self-placement was +0.27 in 1986 and +0.66 in 2024.

    A companion to Chapter 4.6, Fifty years of racial attitudes

    Affiliation
    NYU Stern
    Published

    Four statements in the American National Election Studies (ANES) ask about Black Americans' effort, special favors and the lasting effects of slavery and discrimination, and the answers are combined into a racial resentment index.Democrats and Republicans include independents who say they lean toward a party, the leanersPartisan leanerA respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses., and white means white non-Hispanic, throughout the essay. Among white respondents, the correlation between that index and liberal-conservative self-placement was +0.27+0.27 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 0.19 to 0.34n664Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod1986SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1986 and +0.66+0.66 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 0.63 to 0.69n3,204Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. Most of the rise lies between the parties. White Democrats and white Republicans moved apart on the index, and among respondents who share a party label the link changed little.

    The correlation rose after 2012

    Racial resentmentRacial resentmentA survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. is measured with four ANES statements about Black Americans [1]: that Black people should work their way up without special favors, that they should try harder, that slavery and discrimination have made it difficult for Black people to rise, and that Black people have gotten less than they deserve. Each statement is recoded so that its most resentful answer scores one and its least resentful answer scores zero. The index averages the statements a respondent answered, at least two of the four, and multiplies by one hundred. Self-placement is the seven-point question that runs from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The link between the two is a correlationCorrelationA number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other., a number from minus one to plus one for how closely two answers move together along a straight line. Near zero, the index says nothing about where a respondent places themselves; near one, it nearly fixes the placement. What the index measures is contested, because two of the statements invite answers about government and individual responsibility as well as about race. The comparisons here are of answers to these statements, whatever their meaning.

    Figure 1 follows the correlation among white respondents in every survey year. The correlation rose slowly from 1986 to 2008 and was level from 2008 to 2012, the first Obama term, where the change is one the data cannot distinguish from zero. The rise came afterwards, from 2012 to 2020, and the 2024 reading held the 2020 level. The increase falls in the years around the 2016 election, and studies of that campaign report that views about race and identity were tied more closely to vote choice than in earlier elections [2].

    Figure 1

    Among white respondents the correlation between resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.66 in 2024

    Weighted correlation of the racial resentment index with seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement, by ANES survey year, white non-Hispanic respondents

    Show data
    Data for Among white respondents the correlation between resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.66 in 2024
    YearSampleCorrelationInterval lowInterval highRespondentsEffective n
    1986White non-Hispanic respondents+0.27+0.19+0.34664664
    1988White non-Hispanic respondents+0.22+0.16+0.271,0141,014
    1990White non-Hispanic respondents+0.31+0.23+0.38529529
    1992White non-Hispanic respondents+0.31+0.26+0.361,3451,340
    1994White non-Hispanic respondents+0.33+0.27+0.381,099914
    1998White non-Hispanic respondents+0.28+0.21+0.35789670
    2000White non-Hispanic respondents+0.39+0.30+0.47471389
    2004White non-Hispanic respondents+0.40+0.33+0.47619524
    2008White non-Hispanic respondents+0.43+0.37+0.49823660
    2012White non-Hispanic respondents+0.44+0.40+0.483,1111,984
    2016White non-Hispanic respondents+0.58+0.55+0.612,1911,562
    2020White non-Hispanic respondents+0.67+0.65+0.694,7992,785
    2024White non-Hispanic respondents+0.66+0.63+0.693,2041,502
    1986All respondents+0.22+0.16+0.29812812
    1988All respondents+0.26+0.21+0.311,2561,256
    1990All respondents+0.26+0.19+0.33657657
    1992All respondents+0.32+0.28+0.371,6521,646
    1994All respondents+0.30+0.25+0.361,3811,131
    1998All respondents+0.27+0.21+0.33999851
    2000All respondents+0.34+0.26+0.41577473
    2004All respondents+0.39+0.33+0.45824693
    2008All respondents+0.39+0.34+0.441,481980
    2012All respondents+0.41+0.38+0.444,9302,761
    2016All respondents+0.55+0.51+0.582,8742,017
    2020All respondents+0.64+0.62+0.656,3333,532
    2024All respondents+0.63+0.60+0.654,2632,005

    Follow the line: it climbs slowly to 2008, is level from 2008 to 2012, then rises to 2020 and holds in 2024. The 2008 to 2012 change is +0.01 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.08)+0.01 change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012Estimanddifference between two weighted correlations (delta-method interval)Interval95% CI −0.06 to 0.08n3,934Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod2008 to 2012SourceANES Cumulative Data File, an interval that includes zero. Each point is one ANES study's weighted correlation among white non-Hispanic respondents, and the band is its 95% interval. The toggle shows all respondents, whose line has the same shape at a lower level. Values in Table 1.

    Note: The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. The 1998 index has two statements, so that year is marked and is not strictly comparable with the years on either side.Note: ANES added web interviews in 2012, and the 2020 and 2024 studies also mix modes. The mode check later in the chapter compares the two modes.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size

    The statements were asked in most ANES study years from 1986 to 2024; none were asked in 1996 or 2002, and only two of the four in 1998. Across those years 20,65820,658 respondentsEstimandcount of respondents pooled across survey yearsWeightsnone (count)Populationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod1986-2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File white non-Hispanic respondents have both an index score and a self-placement. Each estimate is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that a study's sample matches the population on known traits, and every correlation is computed inside one study year. The qualification that matters is interview modeSurvey modeHow respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.. ANES added web interviews in 2012, and the 2020 and 2024 studies also mix modes, so a change in mode could raise or lower a correlation without any change in the public. A check with mode-specific weights finds the web and face-to-face correlations within 0.050.05 absolute difference in correlation coefficientsEstimandlargest absolute gap between the web and face-to-face correlations in a year with bothn7,773Weightsweight_ftf and weight_webPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod2012, 2016 and 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File of each other in each year that has both, and the face-to-face correlation in 2024 is above its 2008 value. The check covers 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, because the 2020 study has no mode weights, and in those years the rise appears in both modes. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.

    Holding party fixed removes most of the rise

    Party identification is tied to both answers, so a correlation across all white respondents mixes two things: how resentment and ideology line up among people who share a party, and how far apart the parties sit on both. Figure 2 separates them. Holding party fixed changes the comparison from whether more resentful white respondents are more conservative than other white respondents to whether they are more conservative than others with the same party label. Its net-of-party line is the slope of self-placement on the index in a regression that also gives each of the seven party-identification categories, from strong Democrat through independent to strong Republican, its own baseline. The regression is fitted separately in each year, so that respondents are compared only with others in the same category. Both variables are standardizedStandardized coefficientA regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared. first, rescaled inside each survey year so that each has an average of zero and a standard deviationStandard deviationA measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out., the typical distance of values from their average, of one. On that scale the slope without the party terms equals the correlation, so the two lines share one axis. With party held fixed the slope was +0.23+0.23 standardized slope (change in self-placement standard deviations per standard deviation of the index)Estimandstandardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categoriesInterval95% CI 0.16 to 0.31n662Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod1986SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1986 and +0.24+0.24 standardized slope (change in self-placement standard deviations per standard deviation of the index)Estimandstandardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categoriesInterval95% CI 0.19 to 0.29n3,200Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024, while the total correlation climbed over the same years.

    Depending on how party is held fixed, 72%72% percent of the per-decade rise in the total correlationEstimandone minus the ratio of the average of the two within-party per-decade changes (Democrats and Republicans, correlations standardized inside party and year) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negativeInterval95% CI 63% to 83%n20,614Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, Democrats and Republicans (leaners included)Period13 years between 1986 and 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File to 97%97% percent of the per-decade rise in the total correlationEstimandone minus the ratio of the per-decade change in the standardized slope net of party identification (year-specific party dummies) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negativeInterval95% CI 86% to 109%n20,614Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod13 years between 1986 and 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File of the per-decade rise in the correlation is removed. The measures differ because the spread of each variable inside a party changed as the parties sorted, and the data do not choose among them. Every measure places most of the rise between the parties. That is an accounting of the association; comparing respondents who share a party label does not test whether party changed anyone's answers.

    Figure 2

    With party held fixed the slope is +0.23 in 1986 and +0.24 in 2024, against a total correlation of +0.27 and +0.66

    Standardized slope of seven-point self-placement on the racial resentment index, without and with the seven party-identification categories held fixed, and, in the second view, the correlation inside each party, white non-Hispanic respondents

    Standardized slope of self-placement on the index

    Show data
    Data for With party held fixed the slope is +0.23 in 1986 and +0.24 in 2024, against a total correlation of +0.27 and +0.66
    YearViewSeriesCorrelation or slopeInterval lowInterval highRespondentsEffective n
    1986netAll white respondents+0.27+0.19+0.34664664
    1988netAll white respondents+0.22+0.16+0.271,0141,014
    1990netAll white respondents+0.31+0.23+0.38529529
    1992netAll white respondents+0.31+0.26+0.361,3451,340
    1994netAll white respondents+0.33+0.27+0.381,099914
    1998netAll white respondents+0.28+0.21+0.35789670
    2000netAll white respondents+0.39+0.30+0.47471389
    2004netAll white respondents+0.40+0.33+0.47619524
    2008netAll white respondents+0.43+0.37+0.49823660
    2012netAll white respondents+0.44+0.40+0.483,1111,984
    2016netAll white respondents+0.58+0.55+0.612,1911,562
    2020netAll white respondents+0.67+0.65+0.694,7992,785
    2024netAll white respondents+0.66+0.63+0.693,2041,502
    1986netNet of party identification+0.23+0.16+0.31662662
    1988netNet of party identification+0.16+0.10+0.221,0111,011
    1990netNet of party identification+0.25+0.17+0.33529529
    1992netNet of party identification+0.21+0.16+0.261,3421,337
    1994netNet of party identification+0.21+0.15+0.261,097913
    1998netNet of party identification+0.18+0.11+0.25784666
    2000netNet of party identification+0.25+0.16+0.34470389
    2004netNet of party identification+0.21+0.14+0.29614520
    2008netNet of party identification+0.20+0.14+0.26817655
    2012netNet of party identification+0.19+0.15+0.223,1041,978
    2016netNet of party identification+0.22+0.18+0.262,1891,561
    2020netNet of party identification+0.24+0.20+0.274,7952,782
    2024netNet of party identification+0.24+0.19+0.293,2001,500
    1986withinAll white respondents+0.27+0.19+0.34664664
    1988withinAll white respondents+0.22+0.16+0.271,0141,014
    1990withinAll white respondents+0.31+0.23+0.38529529
    1992withinAll white respondents+0.31+0.26+0.361,3451,340
    1994withinAll white respondents+0.33+0.27+0.381,099914
    1998withinAll white respondents+0.28+0.21+0.35789670
    2000withinAll white respondents+0.39+0.30+0.47471389
    2004withinAll white respondents+0.40+0.33+0.47619524
    2008withinAll white respondents+0.43+0.37+0.49823660
    2012withinAll white respondents+0.44+0.40+0.483,1111,984
    2016withinAll white respondents+0.58+0.55+0.612,1911,562
    2020withinAll white respondents+0.67+0.65+0.694,7992,785
    2024withinAll white respondents+0.66+0.63+0.693,2041,502
    1986withinDemocrats+0.41+0.31+0.50292292
    1988withinDemocrats+0.37+0.28+0.45385385
    1990withinDemocrats+0.41+0.30+0.51245245
    1992withinDemocrats+0.39+0.32+0.46582580
    1994withinDemocrats+0.40+0.31+0.49429352
    1998withinDemocrats+0.39+0.29+0.48348299
    2000withinDemocrats+0.35+0.21+0.48204166
    2004withinDemocrats+0.51+0.40+0.60250210
    2008withinDemocrats+0.46+0.36+0.55335267
    2012withinDemocrats+0.39+0.33+0.451,229774
    2016withinDemocrats+0.47+0.40+0.53868609
    2020withinDemocrats+0.46+0.41+0.502,0361,147
    2024withinDemocrats+0.44+0.37+0.491,447673
    1986withinRepublicans+0.04−0.07+0.16298298
    1988withinRepublicans+0.06−0.02+0.14532532
    1990withinRepublicans+0.16+0.04+0.28246246
    1992withinRepublicans+0.03−0.05+0.11625623
    1994withinRepublicans+0.08−0.01+0.17579487
    1998withinRepublicans+0.05−0.06+0.16363307
    2000withinRepublicans+0.23+0.09+0.36221186
    2004withinRepublicans+0.05−0.07+0.17326279
    2008withinRepublicans+0.04−0.07+0.14404326
    2012withinRepublicans+0.13+0.07+0.191,473946
    2016withinRepublicans+0.16+0.09+0.231,116805
    2020withinRepublicans+0.26+0.21+0.312,3461,410
    2024withinRepublicans+0.26+0.20+0.331,631778

    Follow the colored line: it stays near its 1986 level throughout, while the grey line, the total correlation from the first figure, rises slowly away from it to 2008 and climbs after 2012. Both lines are standardized slopes of self-placement on the index among white non-Hispanic respondents, the colored one with the seven party categories held fixed in each year; the band is the 95% interval. The second view shows the correlation inside each party. Values in Table 4.

    Note: Independents who do not lean to either party are in the total and net-of-party lines and in neither party line.Note: The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. The 1998 index has two statements, so that year is marked and is not strictly comparable with the years on either side.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; net-of-party slopes with HC3 intervals

    Inside each party the link is present and changed less. The correlation among Republicans rose, the gain per decade among Democrats has an interval that includes zero, and the gain inside each party is small next to the total gain. The difference between the two parties' gains also has an interval that includes zero, so these data do not separate the parties.

    The parties moved apart on resentment

    Among white respondents the correlation between the resentment index and seven-point party identification was +0.06 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12)+0.06 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point party identification (1 strong Democrat, 7 strong Republican)Interval95% CI −0.01 to 0.12n838Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod1986SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1986, an interval that includes zero, and +0.62+0.62 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point party identification (1 strong Democrat, 7 strong Republican)Interval95% CI 0.59 to 0.65n3,540Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. The correlation between party identification and self-placement rose as well, and Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology covers that second link. Figure 3 shows where the first change came from. White Democrats averaged 5757.0 points on the 0 to 100 resentment indexEstimandweighted mean of the racial resentment indexInterval95% CI 54.4 to 59.6n375Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod1986SourceANES Cumulative Data File on the index in 1986 and white Republicans 6161.2 points on the 0 to 100 resentment indexEstimandweighted mean of the racial resentment indexInterval95% CI 59.1 to 63.4n356Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod1986SourceANES Cumulative Data File, and in 2024 the two averages were 3029.6 points on the 0 to 100 resentment indexEstimandweighted mean of the racial resentment indexInterval95% CI 27.8 to 31.4n1,547Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File and 6767.1 points on the 0 to 100 resentment indexEstimandweighted mean of the racial resentment indexInterval95% CI 65.7 to 68.6n1,803Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File. The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened in two stages. Through 2012 Republicans' average rose while Democrats' stayed level. After 2012 both averages fell, Democrats' by 2626.0 points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (2012 minus 2024)Estimanddifference between two weighted meansInterval95% CI 23.5 to 28.4n2,842Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod2012 to 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File index points and Republicans' by 88.1 points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (2012 minus 2024)Estimanddifference between two weighted meansInterval95% CI 6.2 to 10.0n3,327Weightsweight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where statedPopulationwhite non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index scorePeriod2012 to 2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File. That is party sortingParty sortingThe alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. on this index, and Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude dates when resentment became a partisan divide. Within a party, more resentful respondents still place themselves further to the right on average, and the difference across all white respondents is larger because the parties differ on both scores.

    Figure 3

    The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened from 4.2 index points in 1986 to 37.6 in 2024

    Weighted mean of the racial resentment index (0 least resentful, 100 most resentful) by party identification, leaners included, and, in the second view, weighted correlations, white non-Hispanic respondents

    Show data
    Data for The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened from 4.2 index points in 1986 to 37.6 in 2024
    YearViewSeriesMean or correlationInterval lowInterval highRespondentsEffective n
    1986meansDemocrats56.9954.4259.56375375
    1988meansDemocrats60.7058.7462.65538538
    1990meansDemocrats55.6853.0258.34338338
    1992meansDemocrats57.2555.4459.06765762
    1994meansDemocrats59.9357.8462.03555454
    2000meansDemocrats58.2755.9660.59516413
    2004meansDemocrats56.2053.0359.37308252
    2008meansDemocrats56.2053.6458.75443353
    2012meansDemocrats55.5253.8157.231,295823
    2016meansDemocrats41.3739.3243.421,037729
    2020meansDemocrats27.1025.7028.502,2241,251
    2024meansDemocrats29.5727.7731.371,547727
    1986meansRepublicans61.2359.1063.36356356
    1988meansRepublicans64.8763.3066.44657657
    1990meansRepublicans59.4057.0261.79317317
    1992meansRepublicans65.2363.7766.69747744
    1994meansRepublicans68.2766.6969.85651546
    2000meansRepublicans68.9967.1170.87529445
    2004meansRepublicans69.5867.4371.73377319
    2008meansRepublicans72.6070.6674.53464377
    2012meansRepublicans75.2774.0676.491,524982
    2016meansRepublicans70.6069.2271.981,270904
    2020meansRepublicans67.5966.4768.712,6031,530
    2024meansRepublicans67.1365.6868.581,803852
    1986meansAll white respondents59.5758.0261.11844844
    1988meansAll white respondents63.6262.4664.791,3551,355
    1990meansAll white respondents58.1956.5059.88742742
    1992meansAll white respondents61.6060.5062.691,7231,716
    1994meansAll white respondents64.8263.5866.051,3541,120
    2000meansAll white respondents64.1262.6965.551,197977
    2004meansAll white respondents63.7661.9365.59757628
    2008meansAll white respondents64.7763.1966.341,040834
    2012meansAll white respondents66.7165.7067.723,2792,102
    2016meansAll white respondents58.2756.9859.552,6261,847
    2020meansAll white respondents51.0249.9452.105,3743,068
    2024meansAll white respondents51.5250.1152.933,5521,668
    1986corrResentment and ideology0.270.190.34664664
    1988corrResentment and ideology0.220.160.271,0141,014
    1990corrResentment and ideology0.310.230.38529529
    1992corrResentment and ideology0.310.260.361,3451,340
    1994corrResentment and ideology0.330.270.381,099914
    1998corrResentment and ideology0.280.210.35789670
    2000corrResentment and ideology0.390.300.47471389
    2004corrResentment and ideology0.400.330.47619524
    2008corrResentment and ideology0.430.370.49823660
    2012corrResentment and ideology0.440.400.483,1111,984
    2016corrResentment and ideology0.580.550.612,1911,562
    2020corrResentment and ideology0.670.650.694,7992,785
    2024corrResentment and ideology0.660.630.693,2041,502
    1986corrResentment and party0.06−0.010.12838838
    1988corrResentment and party0.080.030.131,3511,351
    1990corrResentment and party0.080.010.15740740
    1992corrResentment and party0.150.110.201,7141,707
    1994corrResentment and party0.190.140.251,3471,114
    1998corrResentment and party0.170.100.23936795
    2000corrResentment and party0.210.150.271,189971
    2004corrResentment and party0.270.200.34748620
    2008corrResentment and party0.330.270.391,029825
    2012corrResentment and party0.400.360.433,2692,094
    2016corrResentment and party0.490.450.522,6181,849
    2020corrResentment and party0.620.600.645,3673,065
    2024corrResentment and party0.620.590.653,5401,662
    1986corrParty and ideology0.370.320.421,3161,316
    1988corrParty and ideology0.450.400.501,1311,131
    1990corrParty and ideology0.400.350.451,0401,040
    1992corrParty and ideology0.470.430.511,4621,457
    1994corrParty and ideology0.530.480.581,111924
    1998corrParty and ideology0.480.420.54793673
    2000corrParty and ideology0.510.440.58532436
    2004corrParty and ideology0.630.580.68675571
    2008corrParty and ideology0.670.630.71884705
    2012corrParty and ideology0.680.650.703,3262,123
    2016corrParty and ideology0.750.730.772,4901,788
    2020corrParty and ideology0.790.780.805,2903,085
    2024corrParty and ideology0.790.770.813,5281,655

    Watch the shaded gap between the Republican and Democratic averages widen in two stages: the Republican line rises through 2012 while the Democratic line stays level, and after 2012 both fall. Points are weighted means of the index among white non-Hispanic respondents, bands are 95% intervals, and 1998 is left out of the party lines. The averages are not adjusted for interview mode, and web respondents score higher than face-to-face respondents in the same year. The second view plots the correlations with party identification. Values in Table 2.

    Note: Independents who do not lean to either party are left out of the two party lines and included in the all-respondents line.Note: The 1998 study asked only two of the four statements, so the level of its index is not comparable with the years on either side and 1998 is left out of the means; the lines join 1994 and 2000. The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002.Note: Web respondents score higher than face-to-face respondents in the same year, and these means are not adjusted for mode; the next figure gives the two modes separately.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from the Kish effective sample size (Fisher z for the correlations)

    The index is contested

    The scale has a long history of dispute, and this chapter does not settle it. Sniderman and Tetlock [3] argued that reading prejudice from answers to such statements attributes a motive that principled conservatism can also explain. Feldman and Huddy [4] found that the scale means different things to white liberals and white conservatives. Two of the statements, about special favors and about trying harder, invite an answer based on views about government and individual responsibility, and those views are themselves related to self-placement. A correlation between the index and ideology is therefore partly a correlation between two related political attitudes. Two checks bear on the measure without resolving the dispute. The index is related to the feeling thermometerFeeling thermometerA 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. toward Black Americans, with more resentful respondents rating Black Americans colder, without being the same thing. The rise appears in all four statements, so it does not come from the two with the most policy content alone.

    What these cross-sections cannot tell you

    The ANES interviews different people in each study, so a change from one year to the next mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed parties, and the replacement of older cohorts by younger ones, which the chapter cannot separate. The direction of influence is not identified. Resentment and party identification are measured in the same interview, and holding party fixed does not show that party is a cause or an outcome of resentment. Engelhardt [5] reports from panel studies that white respondents aligned their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, so a change in resentment scores can follow party as well as precede it. The share of the rise that sits between the parties depends on how the association is measured, and the intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the ANES sampling design.

    Go deeper

    • The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
    • Tables: every figure of the report as a table.
    • Issues: the explorer for this part.

    Reading paths that include this chapter:

    Data sources

    • ANES Cumulative Data FileCumulative Data File 1948-2024; racial resentment statements VCF9039 to VCF9042 (asked 1986-2024), self-placement VCF0803, party identification VCF0301, policy items VCF0806, VCF0839 and VCF0843Years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode comparison · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.

    All data sources

    References

    1. Kinder, Donald R.; Sanders, Lynn M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. University of Chicago Press.
    2. Sides, John; Tesler, Michael; Vavreck, Lynn (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press. press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691174198/identity-crisis
    3. Sniderman, Paul M.; Tetlock, Philip E. (1986). Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis. Journal of Social Issues 42(2): 129-150. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1986.tb00229.x
    4. Feldman, Stanley; Huddy, Leonie (2005). Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?. American Journal of Political Science 49(1): 168-183. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00117.x
    5. Engelhardt, Andrew M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1062-1079. doi:10.1017/S0007123419000437

    How to cite

    @misc{singh2026racialattitudesandideology,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Racial attitudes and ideology},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}