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The Public Mind

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    Introduction

    Party, belief and the political map

    Party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement moved closer together in the ANES, with a correlation of +0.32 in 1972 and +0.72 in 2024.

    DraftFigures and numbers may change as the analysis is rebuilt.what is still being checked

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    Between 1972 and 2024 the share of Democrats who called themselves conservative and the share of Republicans who called themselves liberal both shrank in the American National Election Studies (ANES), as Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology shows. Party identification and the ideological label people chose for themselves had drawn together, and that movement is where this book begins. A closer fit between two labels leaves open how closely either one fits a person's positions on issues, their feelings about the other party or the place where they live. The Public Mind asks how closely party, ideological label, positions on issues and the geography of the vote line up, and where they stay distinct.

    Party and ideological label drew together

    The link between the two labels can be put in one number, a correlationCorrelationA number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other., a number from minus one to plus one for how closely two answers move together. Among ANES respondents who answered both the party question and the liberal-conservative question, the weighted correlation was +0.32+0.32 correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placementInterval95% CI 0.27 to 0.36n1,545Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod1972SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1972 and +0.72+0.72 correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placementInterval95% CI 0.70 to 0.74n4,716Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. A higher positive value means that a more Republican identification goes more consistently with a more conservative placement.

    Figure 1 plots the correlation for three surveys. The General Social Survey (GSS) runs below the ANES in every year both ran, and the Cooperative Election Study (CES), which begins in 2006, starts above both and falls between 2008 and 2016. Each line ends higher than it starts. The rise shows that knowing someone's party tells more about their ideological label than it did. It does not establish that their views became more extreme, that their positions on issues became identical to their party's, or that party attachment caused their beliefs to change.

    Figure 1

    The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys

    Weighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year

    Show data
    Data for The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys
    SurveyRespondents includedYearEstimateInterval lowInterval highRespondentsEffective n
    ANESAll interviews1972+0.32+0.27+0.361,5451,545
    ANESAll interviews1974+0.33+0.27+0.391,140857
    ANESAll interviews1976+0.38+0.33+0.421,4971,441
    ANESAll interviews1978+0.35+0.31+0.391,6581,658
    ANESAll interviews1980+0.39+0.33+0.441,0041,004
    ANESAll interviews1982+0.41+0.36+0.47891891
    ANESAll interviews1984+0.41+0.37+0.451,5461,546
    ANESAll interviews1986+0.36+0.32+0.411,6221,622
    ANESAll interviews1988+0.40+0.36+0.451,4191,419
    ANESAll interviews1990+0.34+0.29+0.391,3151,315
    ANESAll interviews1992+0.44+0.40+0.471,8191,812
    ANESAll interviews1994+0.51+0.46+0.551,3981,144
    ANESAll interviews1996+0.54+0.50+0.581,3261,070
    ANESAll interviews1998+0.44+0.39+0.491,012858
    ANESAll interviews2000+0.47+0.40+0.53669546
    ANESAll interviews2002+0.52+0.47+0.571,223828
    ANESAll interviews2004+0.58+0.53+0.63913766
    ANESAll interviews2008+0.61+0.57+0.651,6071,053
    ANESAll interviews2012+0.61+0.59+0.635,2882,970
    ANESAll interviews2016+0.70+0.68+0.723,2982,332
    ANESAll interviews2020+0.74+0.72+0.757,0413,929
    ANESAll interviews2024+0.72+0.70+0.744,7162,228
    GSSAll interviews1974+0.17+0.12+0.231,3451,122
    GSSAll interviews1975+0.23+0.18+0.291,3841,136
    GSSAll interviews1976+0.22+0.16+0.271,3931,137
    GSSAll interviews1977+0.22+0.16+0.271,4401,160
    GSSAll interviews1978+0.16+0.09+0.221,422885
    GSSAll interviews1980+0.14+0.08+0.211,418941
    GSSAll interviews1982+0.24+0.19+0.301,7231,032
    GSSAll interviews1983+0.28+0.20+0.36763482
    GSSAll interviews1984+0.26+0.20+0.321,386889
    GSSAll interviews1985+0.28+0.22+0.341,444919
    GSSAll interviews1986+0.31+0.26+0.361,3901,132
    GSSAll interviews1987+0.31+0.25+0.361,6661,126
    GSSAll interviews1988+0.30+0.24+0.351,4111,139
    GSSAll interviews1989+0.27+0.21+0.321,4291,127
    GSSAll interviews1990+0.29+0.23+0.351,3011,023
    GSSAll interviews1991+0.26+0.20+0.311,4431,105
    GSSAll interviews1993+0.34+0.28+0.381,5281,196
    GSSAll interviews1994+0.37+0.34+0.412,8062,204
    GSSAll interviews1996+0.38+0.35+0.422,7022,168
    GSSAll interviews1998+0.36+0.32+0.402,6222,033
    GSSAll interviews2000+0.34+0.30+0.382,5932,038
    GSSAll interviews2002+0.37+0.31+0.421,299944
    GSSAll interviews2004+0.43+0.38+0.481,289937
    GSSAll interviews2006+0.47+0.44+0.504,2532,952
    GSSAll interviews2008+0.48+0.44+0.521,8901,324
    GSSAll interviews2010+0.50+0.46+0.541,9141,231
    GSSAll interviews2012+0.47+0.42+0.511,8151,153
    GSSAll interviews2014+0.50+0.46+0.532,3681,734
    GSSAll interviews2016+0.50+0.46+0.532,6681,782
    GSSAll interviews2018+0.56+0.52+0.602,1491,285
    GSSAll interviews2021+0.64+0.62+0.673,8332,501
    GSSAll interviews2022+0.63+0.59+0.663,3031,304
    GSSAll interviews2024+0.63+0.60+0.663,0621,557
    CESAll interviews2006+0.66+0.65+0.6733,75526,295
    CESAll interviews2007+0.68+0.67+0.708,7874,593
    CESAll interviews2008+0.68+0.67+0.6829,93920,888
    CESAll interviews2009+0.66+0.64+0.6712,2299,223
    CESAll interviews2010+0.66+0.65+0.6651,57420,318
    CESAll interviews2011+0.60+0.58+0.6118,3298,715
    CESAll interviews2012+0.63+0.62+0.6448,97221,136
    CESAll interviews2013+0.60+0.58+0.6114,7127,302
    CESAll interviews2014+0.62+0.61+0.6349,87621,741
    CESAll interviews2015+0.63+0.61+0.6412,8076,907
    CESAll interviews2016+0.59+0.58+0.6058,78830,529
    CESAll interviews2017+0.63+0.62+0.6516,3567,800
    CESAll interviews2018+0.68+0.68+0.6954,06325,503
    CESAll interviews2019+0.69+0.68+0.7016,4789,481
    CESAll interviews2020+0.69+0.68+0.6955,39527,431
    CESAll interviews2021+0.69+0.68+0.7023,45013,577
    CESAll interviews2022+0.70+0.69+0.7054,96424,917
    CESAll interviews2023+0.65+0.64+0.6622,02912,323
    CESAll interviews2024+0.72+0.71+0.7355,83518,536
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1972+0.32+0.27+0.361,5451,545
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1974+0.33+0.27+0.391,140857
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1976+0.38+0.33+0.421,4971,441
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1978+0.35+0.31+0.391,6581,658
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1980+0.39+0.33+0.441,0041,004
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1982+0.41+0.36+0.47891891
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1984+0.41+0.37+0.451,5461,546
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1986+0.36+0.32+0.411,6221,622
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1988+0.40+0.36+0.451,4191,419
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1990+0.34+0.29+0.391,3151,315
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1992+0.44+0.40+0.471,8191,812
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1994+0.51+0.46+0.551,3981,144
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)1996+0.54+0.50+0.581,3261,070
    ANESLeft out: telephone or mixed-mode study1998n/an/an/an/an/a
    ANESLeft out: telephone or mixed-mode study2000n/an/an/an/an/a
    ANESLeft out: telephone or mixed-mode study2002n/an/an/an/an/a
    ANESAll respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)2004+0.58+0.53+0.63913766
    ANESFace-to-face respondents2008+0.61+0.57+0.651,6071,053
    ANESFace-to-face respondents2012+0.63+0.59+0.671,454794
    ANESFace-to-face respondents2016+0.67+0.62+0.71903598
    ANESFace-to-face respondents2024+0.72+0.68+0.77868442
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1974+0.17+0.12+0.231,3451,122
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1975+0.23+0.18+0.291,3841,136
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1976+0.22+0.16+0.271,3931,137
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1977+0.22+0.16+0.271,4401,160
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1978+0.16+0.09+0.221,422885
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1980+0.14+0.08+0.211,418941
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1982+0.24+0.19+0.301,7231,032
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1983+0.28+0.20+0.36763482
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1984+0.26+0.20+0.321,386889
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1985+0.28+0.22+0.341,444919
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1986+0.31+0.26+0.361,3901,132
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1987+0.31+0.25+0.361,6661,126
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1988+0.30+0.24+0.351,4111,139
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1989+0.27+0.21+0.321,4291,127
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1990+0.29+0.23+0.351,3011,023
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1991+0.26+0.20+0.311,4431,105
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1993+0.34+0.28+0.381,5281,196
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1994+0.37+0.34+0.412,8062,204
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1996+0.38+0.35+0.422,7022,168
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)1998+0.36+0.32+0.402,6222,033
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)2000+0.34+0.30+0.382,5932,038
    GSSAll respondents (no mode variable before 2004)2002+0.37+0.31+0.421,299944
    GSSIn-person respondents2004+0.44+0.38+0.501,025761
    GSSIn-person respondents2006+0.47+0.44+0.493,9722,812
    GSSIn-person respondents2008+0.46+0.42+0.511,6671,180
    GSSIn-person respondents2010+0.49+0.45+0.541,7061,100
    GSSIn-person respondents2012+0.47+0.42+0.521,5791,016
    GSSIn-person respondents2014+0.48+0.44+0.522,0541,503
    GSSIn-person respondents2016+0.51+0.47+0.542,4871,651
    GSSIn-person respondents2018+0.55+0.51+0.591,9201,177
    GSSIn-person respondents2022+0.59+0.53+0.641,424566
    GSSIn-person respondents2024+0.56+0.50+0.611,029536
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1974+0.15+0.07+0.242,485n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1976+0.16+0.09+0.232,890n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1978+0.19+0.12+0.273,080n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1980+0.24+0.16+0.332,422n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1982+0.17+0.09+0.252,614n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1984+0.15+0.07+0.222,932n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1986+0.05−0.01+0.123,012n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1988+0.11+0.04+0.182,830n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1990+0.05−0.02+0.122,616n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1994+0.13+0.08+0.194,204n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1996+0.16+0.10+0.214,028n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys1998+0.08+0.01+0.153,634n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2000+0.12+0.05+0.203,262n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2002+0.15+0.07+0.222,522n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2004+0.15+0.08+0.222,202n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2008+0.13+0.07+0.193,497n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2012+0.14+0.09+0.197,103n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2016+0.20+0.16+0.245,966n/a
    ANES minus GSSAll interviews in both surveys2024+0.09+0.06+0.137,778n/a
    ANES minus GSSANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents2008+0.15+0.09+0.213,274n/a
    ANES minus GSSANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents2012+0.16+0.10+0.223,033n/a
    ANES minus GSSANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents2016+0.16+0.10+0.223,390n/a
    ANES minus GSSANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents2024+0.16+0.09+0.241,897n/a
    ANES minus CESAll interviews in both surveys2008−0.06−0.10−0.0331,546n/a
    ANES minus CESAll interviews in both surveys2012−0.02−0.04+0.0154,260n/a
    ANES minus CESAll interviews in both surveys2016+0.11+0.09+0.1362,086n/a
    ANES minus CESAll interviews in both surveys2020+0.05+0.04+0.0762,436n/a
    ANES minus CESAll interviews in both surveys20240.00−0.02+0.0260,551n/a

    The colored ANES line rises from the lower part of the axis in the 1970s to the upper part in the 2020s. The grey lines are the GSS, below the ANES in every year both ran, and the CES, which begins in 2006 above both. Each point is one survey year, the band is the 95% interval, and the shaded windows are the two that the chapter Party and ideology compares. Values in Table 1.

    Note: The in-person view keeps all respondents in the years before the file records interview mode; the methods note of the chapter Party and ideology gives its rules.Note: In the all-interviews view, rings mark ANES 2000 and GSS 1983, 2002 and 2004. The label is the share of respondents with a party answer who placed themselves on the ideology scale, fewer than in the years around them, so each ringed point rests on fewer respondents.Note: A year is drawn only when it has at least 150 respondents who answered both questions and passes a second size condition given in the methods note of the chapter Party and ideology. A difference needs both surveys to pass.Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z; weight_ftf for the in-person view); GSS, 1974-2024 (weight_use); CES cumulative file, 2006-2024 (weight); all estimates weighted

    The two ANES correlations describe respondents who answered both seven-point questions, 1,5451,545 respondentsEstimandcount of respondents who answered both questionsWeightsunweighted count of respondentsPopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod1972SourceANES Cumulative Data File of them in 1972 and 4,7164,716 respondentsEstimandcount of respondents who answered both questionsWeightsunweighted count of respondentsPopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. Each estimate is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that the sample matches the population on known traits, and people who decline to place themselves are left out. The intervals describe sampling uncertainty only and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.Each interval uses the Fisher z transformation [1] with the Kish effective sample size [2]. In the figure's in-person view, which removes web interviews, the GSS reading for 2024 is level with the one for 2018. The other numbers in this essay come from the chapters named beside them. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.

    Alignment has several meanings and several schedules

    Party identification is a person's attachment to a party. Ideological self-placement is the label a person chooses for their views. A policy preference is an answer to a more specific question, such as what government should provide. The three often move together and describe different things. Partisan sortingParty sortingThe alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. means that political characteristics become more consistently associated with party. It can occur when people change parties while keeping their opinions, when their opinions change, or when the composition of the groups changes. Repeated surveys of different people describe the resulting alignment without identifying which process produced it.

    Issue polarization concerns the distance between positions on policy. Affective polarizationAffective polarizationThe gap between how warmly people feel toward their own party and how coldly they feel toward the other party. It measures feeling, not disagreement on issues. concerns the difference between feelings toward one's own party and the other party; a person can dislike the opposing party while holding some views in common with its supporters. The correlation between the book's economic and cultural conservatism indices rose from +0.10+0.10 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval)Interval95% CI 0.05 to 0.15n1,508Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationadults with at least two of three items answered on each indexPeriod1984SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1984 to +0.51+0.51 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval)Interval95% CI 0.48 to 0.55n4,387Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationadults with at least two of three items answered on each indexPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 and is still below one after correction for measurement error. Ratings of the other party fell from 48.048.0 points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometerEstimandweighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 47.1 to 48.9n1,723Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationpartisans, leaners included, with a rating of both partiesPeriod1978SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1978 to 20.620.6 points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometerEstimandweighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 19.8 to 21.5n5,080Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationpartisans, leaners included, with a rating of both partiesPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 on the ANES feeling thermometerFeeling thermometerA 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way., while the average own-party rating ends near its starting level. The recent movement depends on which interview modes are compared.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 1.2, Economic and cultural dimensions and Chapter 2.2, Feelings toward the other party.

    The timing differs by subject. On abortion, the gap between the Democratic and Republican shares who say it should always be allowed as a matter of choice widened in the ANES from 3.53.5 percentage pointsEstimandweighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice'Interval95% CI −1.8 to 8.8n1,313Weightsweight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted)PopulationDemocratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion questionPeriod1980SourceANES Cumulative Data File pointsPercentage pointThe unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. in 1980 to 52.352.3 percentage pointsEstimandweighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice'Interval95% CI 48.8 to 55.9n4,666Weightsweight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted)PopulationDemocratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion questionPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. On the economy, partisans are more likely to say it got better over the past year when their own party holds the presidency, and the gap reverses at each change of party there. A persistent difference and a difference that changes sign with control of government are different patterns.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort, Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude and Chapter 4.5, Perceptions of the economy.

    Left and right hold different combinations of beliefs

    The American pairing of label and belief is one observed combination among many. Across countries, left-right placement follows economic attitudes most closely in some, the importance of God in others and moral attitudes in others, and in the remaining countries no one attitude leads clearly. Within post-communist Europe, conservation values, the importance people give to conformity, tradition and security, can relate to the left in one country and the right in another, so the regional average conceals opposite signs. A label can line up more closely with party in one country and still carry different beliefs from the same label in another, and the first volume reads the American labels against that variation.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 1.3, Left and right across countries and Companion 1.3a, Basic values and left-right.

    Election maps describe distributions of votes

    The third volume begins with county election returns. A county's marginCounty two-party marginThe Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. describes its result in one election, and its swingSwingThe change in a place's two-party margin between two elections. In this book a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. describes the change between elections. Counties can swing by similar amounts while remaining far apart in their levels of support. Chapter 6.1, Nationalization of the county vote measures the spread of those changes around the national swingNational swingThe change between two elections in the Democratic minus Republican margin for the country as a whole. A county's own swing is compared with it to show whether the county moved with the nation or against it., and Chapter 6.2, Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024 measures distance from the national result within an election. Figure 2 shows the first of them for every pair of presidential elections from 1868 to 2024.

    Figure 2

    The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024

    Change in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections

    Loading county values

    County swing minus national swing (points)

    More RepublicanMore Democratic

    Values outside −40 to +40 take the end colors.

    No data (3,143 counties)

    Select a class to show only those places.

    Hover or tap a county for its value, or search by name. Zoom with the buttons on the map, then drag to move it.

    • Alaska draws as no data. Its election returns are reported by election district, and the district codes cannot be matched to boroughs and census areas.

    Compare the frame for 1972 to 1976 with the frame for 2020 to 2024. In 1972 to 1976 the South is mostly blue: 93.5%93.5% percent of counties in the Census South regionEstimandshare of counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Democrats than the nationWeightsnone (full counts)Populationcounties in the Census South regionPeriod1972 to 1976SourceCounty election returns of its counties swung 55 percentage points of the two-party marginEstimanddefinition of 'near the national swing'Weightsnone (full counts)Populationhalf-width of the band around the national swingPeriod1868-2024SourceCounty election returns or more points more toward the Democrats than the nation did. In 2020 to 2024 most of the map is in the palest class, counties within 55 percentage points of the two-party marginEstimanddefinition of 'near the national swing'Weightsnone (full counts)Populationhalf-width of the band around the national swingPeriod1868-2024SourceCounty election returns points of the national swing. The share of counties in that class was 21.2%21.2% percent of matched countiesEstimandshare of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swingWeightsnone (full counts)Populationcounties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excludedPeriod1972 to 1976SourceCounty election returns in the first pair and 75.6%75.6% percent of matched countiesEstimandshare of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swingWeightsnone (full counts)Populationcounties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excludedPeriod2020 to 2024SourceCounty election returns in the second. Each county is colored by its own change in two-party margin minus the national change. Values in Table 2.

    Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval.Note: Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and matched across elections on FIPS code. A county with no return in one of the two elections, or whose code is absent from the 2020 map, draws as no data. Values are rounded to one decimal place, except that a county within 5 points of the national swing is never rounded to the edge of the palest class, so that class holds the counties counted in the chapter Nationalization of the county vote.Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated

    Below the county line, Chapter 6.3, Precincts within counties compares counties that finished near a tie but had different distributions of reporting-unit margins. A close county result does not say whether most units were close or whether one-sided results balanced each other. Donors are a selected group, and their scores are inferred from giving rather than chosen as survey labels. Chapter 7.1, The ideology of the donor pool follows who is active on a scale that gives each donor a fixed score, and Chapter 7.2, Counties where donors and voters diverge compares county donor pools with one election. Neither measures how an individual donor voted.

    People and places answer different questions

    A relationship across places can differ from a relationship among the people who live in them, so the book ends its map chapters by returning to survey respondents. Chapter 8.3, Party and place compares Democrats and Republicans living in the same kind of county, then members of the same party across strongly Democratic and strongly Republican counties. On every issue it examines, the party gap is larger than the within-party place gap, averaging 43.143.1 points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale)Estimandaverage over the issues of the party gap: Democratic minus Republican share taking the Democratic side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue countiesInterval95% CI 41.8 to 44.5n118,638Weightsweight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or morePeriodCES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was askedSourceCooperative Election Study and 5.65.6 points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale)Estimandaverage over the issues of the place gap: deep-blue minus deep-red county share taking the Democratic side, averaged over Democrats and RepublicansInterval95% CI 4.7 to 6.6n118,638Weightsweight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or morePeriodCES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was askedSourceCooperative Election Study points. The place differences remain observable, and their size depends on the issue and the adjustment.

    Figure 3

    On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties

    Gap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021

    • Place gap
    • Party gap
    Show data
    Data for On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties
    IssueDemocratic side of the questionSurvey yearsParty gapParty gap, lowParty gap, highPlace gapPlace gap, lowPlace gap, highRatioSmallest group, n
    Assault weapons banSupport an assault weapons ban2013 to 202141.940.343.87.56.19.05.616,440
    Background checksSupport universal background checks for gun buyers2013 to 2021, not 202013.312.014.92.10.93.16.513,375
    Concealed carryOppose easier concealed carry2013 to 202138.837.140.74.83.46.48.116,452
    Border securityOppose more spending on border security2013 to 2021, not 201840.238.642.05.33.76.77.613,428
    Path to legal statusSupport a path to legal status for undocumented immigrants2013 to 2021, not 201838.736.940.34.12.65.89.613,422
    Border wallOppose spending on a border wall2017 to 2021, not 201964.162.565.84.12.95.315.58,257
    Gay marriageSupport legal gay marriage2013 to 201636.433.639.310.26.613.73.67,161
    Repeal the ACAOppose repealing the Affordable Care Act2013 to 202157.255.858.84.22.85.413.716,459
    EPA regulates CO2Support letting the EPA regulate carbon dioxide2014 to 202144.442.346.55.23.56.98.615,459
    Abortion legalSupport always allowing abortion as a matter of choice2014 to 202146.544.748.712.09.214.63.915,818
    Medicare for AllSupport Medicare for All2018 to 202151.349.353.64.21.76.412.18,385
    Cut immigrationOppose cutting legal immigration by half2018 to 202044.242.645.74.12.55.910.87,157

    In every row the solid dot, the party gap, sits far to the right of the open dot, the place gap, and the two intervals do not touch. Rows are sorted by the size of the party gap, and the number at the right of each row is the party gap minus the place gap. Whiskers are 95% intervals. Both gaps are in the share taking the Democratic side, among Democrats and Republicans in deep-red and deep-blue counties, CES survey years 2013 to 2021. Values in Table 3.

    Note: A deep county is one where the two-party presidential margin is at or beyond the cutoff stated in the chapter Party and place. The share is measured on the side of each issue that Democrats take more often, which the data table names for each question.Note: The issues were asked in different survey years, listed in the data table, so the averages combine periods. The number in a tooltip is the smallest of the four party by county-type groups behind the row.Note: Ratios are computed from unrounded gaps, so a ratio can differ in its last digit from the quotient of the gaps as printed.Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel.Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative)

    That comparison does not establish what moving to another county would do to someone's views. People select where they live, party attachments go with other characteristics, and the measured county margin captures only one aspect of local context. Separating influence from selection needs different evidence.

    What to ask of each comparison

    The chapters that follow each answer the book's question for one comparison, and their answers differ. Reading them together means asking of each result how closely two characteristics line up, when that alignment changed and whether it moved in one direction, which population is counted, and whether the unit is a person, a place or a country. The planned conclusion sets the answers side by side.

    What these chapters cannot show

    The chapters describe relationships more often than they identify causes. They cannot by themselves determine whether party leaders changed voters' views, whether voters selected leaders who matched them, or whether both responded to other changes. Survey weights match the sample to specified population characteristics, and confidence intervalsConfidence intervalA range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. leave out errors from wording, nonresponse or selection into an online panel. Election returns count recorded votes under the rules of their period, and the sources cannot be treated as equivalent samples of the public. The chapters this essay summarizes are drafts, and a planned chapter is a question still to be investigated.


    Go deeper

    • The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
    • Tables: every figure of the report as a table.

    Data sources

    • ANES Cumulative Data FileANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024: seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative scale, respondents who answered bothYears: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: weight (VCF0009z) · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.
    • General Social SurveyGeneral Social Survey, 1974-2024: partyid and polviews, in the reused party-ideology figure onlyYears: 1972-2024 (35 study years) · Weights: weight_use · License: See the provider's terms of use.
    • Cooperative Election StudyCooperative Election Study: the cumulative file, 2006-2024, in the party-ideology figure; the cumulative common content, 2013-2021, in the party gap and place gap figureYears: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years) · Weights: weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled waves) · License: See the provider's terms of use.
    • County election returnsCounty presidential returns, 1868-2024, in the county swing map; 2004-2020, with the CES, in the party gap and place gap figureYears: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024 · Weights: none (full counts) · License: The Heideman file is CC BY 4.0 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22976553), but the state records behind it keep their own terms, and the sites of Florida, Indiana, Colorado and Wisconsin restrict reuse.

    All data sources

    References

    1. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32.
    2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.

    How to cite

    @misc{singh2026partybeliefandthepoliticalmap,
      author = {Singh, Vishal},
      title = {Party, belief and the political map},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map},
      note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
    }