Political violence and democratic norms

Asked between August and Election Day in November 2024 how much it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country, 17%17.2% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5)Interval95% CI 15.6% to 18.9%n5,192WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationadult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series of adult citizens said at least a little and 5%4.6% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5)Interval95% CI 3.7% to 5.4%n5,192WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationadult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series said a lot or a great deal. The question, from the American National Election Studies (ANES), has a five-step scale from not at all to a great deal. "At least a little" counts every answer above not at all, and most adult citizens said not at all. The broad share includes the answer "a little," whose meaning the wording leaves most open, and the strong share does not. These are answers from one survey in one year, so they describe 2024 and cannot show whether approval rose or fell. They are also answers about approval, not about action. The ANES records no violent act, threat or harassment by a respondent, and an answer of "a little" says nothing about what the respondent has done or would do.

The party gap on violence is not distinguishable from zero

Party here means party identification, with leanersPartisan leanerA respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses., people who first call themselves independent and then say they lean toward a party, counted with that party. Among Democrats, 17.3%17.3% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5)Interval95% CI 14.9% to 19.7%n2,532WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series said violence is justified at least a little; among Republicans, 15.0%15.0% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5)Interval95% CI 13.0% to 17.1%n2,290WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationRepublicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series did. The Democratic share minus the Republican share is 2.2 (95% CI −0.9 to 5.3)2.2 percentage pointsEstimandDemocratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units createInterval95% CI −0.9 to 5.3n4,822WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series pointsPercentage pointThe unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused., and the interval includes zero. The intervals at the other two cut points include zero as well. When leaners are counted as independents instead, the sign of the gap changes and zero stays inside the interval. The highest share in Figure 1 is among adults who name neither party and do not lean, 31%30.5% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5)Interval95% CI 23.4% to 37.7%n346WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationadults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series of whom said violence is justified at least a little.

Figure 1

Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero

Share of adult citizens saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at three cut points of the five-point answer scale, by party identification; pre-election 2024

With leanersWithout leaners

At least a little justified

A moderate amount or more

A lot or a great deal

Share of the group (%)

Show data

Data for Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero

Grouping	Cut point	Group	Share (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
with leaners	At least a little justified	All adult citizens	17.2	15.6	18.9	5,192
with leaners	At least a little justified	Democrats	17.3	14.9	19.7	2,532
with leaners	At least a little justified	Neither party	30.5	23.4	37.7	346
with leaners	At least a little justified	Republicans	15.0	13.0	17.1	2,290
with leaners	A moderate amount or more	All adult citizens	10.8	9.5	12.1	5,192
with leaners	A moderate amount or more	Democrats	10.0	8.4	11.6	2,532
with leaners	A moderate amount or more	Neither party	21.7	14.8	28.7	346
with leaners	A moderate amount or more	Republicans	9.9	8.0	11.9	2,290
with leaners	A lot or a great deal	All adult citizens	4.6	3.7	5.4	5,192
with leaners	A lot or a great deal	Democrats	4.1	3.0	5.3	2,532
with leaners	A lot or a great deal	Neither party	6.3	2.5	10.1	346
with leaners	A lot or a great deal	Republicans	4.8	3.5	6.2	2,290
without leaners	At least a little justified	All adult citizens	17.2	15.6	18.9	5,192
without leaners	At least a little justified	Democrats	14.8	12.5	17.2	1,848
without leaners	At least a little justified	Independents and leaners	21.3	18.0	24.6	1,695
without leaners	At least a little justified	Republicans	15.1	12.4	17.8	1,625
without leaners	A moderate amount or more	All adult citizens	10.8	9.5	12.1	5,192
without leaners	A moderate amount or more	Democrats	8.9	7.0	10.8	1,848
without leaners	A moderate amount or more	Independents and leaners	13.1	10.7	15.6	1,695
without leaners	A moderate amount or more	Republicans	10.2	7.8	12.5	1,625
without leaners	A lot or a great deal	All adult citizens	4.6	3.7	5.4	5,192
without leaners	A lot or a great deal	Democrats	4.1	2.8	5.3	1,848
without leaners	A lot or a great deal	Independents and leaners	4.8	3.4	6.2	1,695
without leaners	A lot or a great deal	Republicans	4.9	3.3	6.4	1,625

The gaps that the data do separate from zero run along other lines. Approval at the first cut point is higher among younger adults than among older ones, and higher among adults with a high school education or less than among adults with a bachelor's degree or more. Both differences have intervals that lie above the upper end of the party gap. Within every age group and every education group, the Democratic and Republican intervals overlap. Adults who follow government and politics less often than always or most of the time also said violence is justified more often. The neither-party group is the least likely of the three to follow politics that often. Age, education and attention overlap with one another, and the chapter does not separate them.

Who was asked, and what the question leaves open

The 2024 ANES interviewed adult citizens at residential addresses in person and on the web, before the election and again after it, through February 2025.The file combines a fresh sample interviewed mainly in person, a fresh sample interviewed mainly on the web and a panel also interviewed in 2016 and 2020. Approval of violence at the first cut point is lower in the panel than in the fresh web sample. Each share is weightedSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. so that the sample matches the population on known traits. Each interval is a 95% confidence intervalConfidence intervalA range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. computed from the survey's strata and sampling units rather than by treating respondents as independent draws. Respondents who refused a question, and paper respondents who were not asked it, are left out of its share, and 5,1925,192 respondentsEstimandrespondents with a usable answer to V241579 (violence justified)Weightsnone (unweighted count of respondents)Populationpre-election respondents asked the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series respondents gave a usable answer to the violence question. The qualification that changes the reading is the wording. The violence question names no target, no goal and no act, so the shares cannot be sorted into approval of attacks on officials, on the other party or on no one in particular. Westwood and co-authors report from four survey experiments that questions of this kind are biased upward by disengaged respondents and by wording open to more than one reading [1]. The attention pattern above fits that finding and also fits other differences between the groups. The report gives every estimate with its interval and sample size.

Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often

The questions about elections divide the parties where the violence question does not. Before the election, 35%35.1% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2)Interval95% CI 32.3% to 37.9%n2,444WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationRepublicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Republicans expected the November votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately, against 8%8.2% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2)Interval95% CI 6.7% to 9.7%n2,638WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Democrats. Little or no trust in local election officials was 33.0% (95% CI 30.2% to 35.8%)33.0% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2)Interval95% CI 30.2% to 35.8%n2,323WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationRepublicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series among Republicans and 11.9% (95% CI 10.0% to 13.8%)11.9% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2)Interval95% CI 10.0% to 13.8%n2,551WeightsV240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024SourceANES 2024 Time Series among Democrats. After the election, 56%55.5% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1)Interval95% CI 52.6% to 58.5%n2,009WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationRepublicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Republicans said Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, against 5%4.5% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1)Interval95% CI 3.3% to 5.7%n2,297WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Democrats. Republicans also chose the account in which FBI agents posing as protesters planned and carried out the events of January 2021 more often than Democrats did. Each of these paired statements offers two answers, so a respondent who is unsure still picks one.

The 2024 question points the other way. Among Democrats, 15%14.7% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2)Interval95% CI 12.4% to 16.9%n2,283WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationDemocrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series said Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the election that Trump won, against 2%2.3% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2)Interval95% CI 1.2% to 3.4%n2,042WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationRepublicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Republicans. The gap on the 2024 question is smaller in absolute value than the gap on the 2020 question. A second count question, asked after the election, concerns how often votes are counted fairly in this country's elections in general, and its party gap is smaller. The two targets differ, one election whose result was not yet known against elections in general, so the smaller post-election gap is not a measured change. Figure 2 shows all six measures by party.

Figure 2

Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often

Share giving the doubting answer on six measures, by party identification; two measures from the pre-election interview and four from the post-election interview, 2024

With leanersWithout leaners

Expected count inaccurate (before the election)

Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)

Little or no trust in local election officials (before)

Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)

FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)

Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)

Share of the group (%)

Show data

Data for Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often

Grouping	Measure	Group	Share (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
with leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	All adult citizens	21.8	20.2	23.4	5,478
with leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Democrats	8.2	6.7	9.7	2,638
with leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Neither party	29.9	23.1	36.7	373
with leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Republicans	35.1	32.3	37.9	2,444
with leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	All adult citizens	27.7	26.0	29.4	4,926
with leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Democrats	19.9	17.5	22.2	2,407
with leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Neither party	44.8	36.4	53.1	320
with leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Republicans	33.2	30.5	35.8	2,177
with leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	All adult citizens	22.5	20.9	24.2	5,243
with leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Democrats	11.9	10.0	13.8	2,551
with leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Neither party	30.9	23.3	38.4	349
with leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Republicans	33.0	30.2	35.8	2,323
with leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	All adult citizens	29.2	27.3	31.0	4,612
with leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Democrats	4.5	3.3	5.7	2,297
with leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Neither party	32.5	24.5	40.5	289
with leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Republicans	55.5	52.6	58.5	2,009
with leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	All adult citizens	24.5	22.6	26.4	4,551
with leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Democrats	4.7	3.5	6.0	2,291
with leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Neither party	28.1	20.1	36.0	284
with leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Republicans	46.4	43.0	49.7	1,965
with leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	All adult citizens	9.3	8.0	10.6	4,633
with leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Democrats	14.7	12.4	16.9	2,283
with leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Neither party	16.4	9.5	23.2	293
with leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Republicans	2.3	1.2	3.4	2,042
without leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	All adult citizens	21.8	20.2	23.4	5,478
without leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Democrats	7.2	5.4	9.0	1,926
without leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Independents and leaners	24.0	20.8	27.1	1,795
without leaners	Expected count inaccurate (before the election)	Republicans	35.7	32.5	38.8	1,734
without leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	All adult citizens	27.7	26.0	29.4	4,926
without leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Democrats	18.7	15.9	21.5	1,765
without leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Independents and leaners	31.0	27.2	34.7	1,597
without leaners	Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after)	Republicans	33.9	30.4	37.3	1,542
without leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	All adult citizens	22.5	20.9	24.2	5,243
without leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Democrats	9.9	7.7	12.1	1,863
without leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Independents and leaners	26.5	23.1	29.8	1,715
without leaners	Little or no trust in local election officials (before)	Republicans	32.7	29.4	36.1	1,645
without leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	All adult citizens	29.2	27.3	31.0	4,612
without leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Democrats	3.9	2.5	5.3	1,684
without leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Independents and leaners	27.4	23.7	31.0	1,487
without leaners	Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after)	Republicans	59.9	56.2	63.6	1,424
without leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	All adult citizens	24.5	22.6	26.4	4,551
without leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Democrats	5.0	3.3	6.6	1,681
without leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Independents and leaners	25.8	22.2	29.5	1,459
without leaners	FBI account of the January 2021 events (after)	Republicans	46.1	42.3	50.0	1,400
without leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	All adult citizens	9.3	8.0	10.6	4,633
without leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Democrats	15.6	13.0	18.2	1,675
without leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Independents and leaners	8.8	6.7	10.9	1,497
without leaners	Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after)	Republicans	2.5	1.1	3.8	1,446

Losing voters disputed the 2020 result more often

A voter's view of an election goes with whether the voter's candidate won, a pattern described as a winner effect in voter confidence [2] and, across countries, as losers' consent [3]. Figure 3 puts the two elections on the same footing by showing the share of voters who said the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner. In 2020, 61%60.6% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1)Interval95% CI 57.4% to 63.9%n1,495WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationTrump voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series of respondents who recalled voting for Trump said Trump was the legitimate winner. In 2024, 13%12.7% percent of the groupEstimandweighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2)Interval95% CI 10.3% to 15.0%n1,976WeightsV240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107cPopulationHarris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the itemPeriod2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025SourceANES 2024 Time Series of Harris voters said Harris was the legitimate winner. In each election the losing side's voters gave that answer more often than the winning side's voters did. The comparison does not isolate a difference between the parties. The 2020 question was asked years after that election and the 2024 question in the months after it, and the survey does not measure what candidates and officials said about either result in between. Nor does winning remove all doubt about counts. After the 2024 election, Trump voters doubted how often votes are counted fairly more often than Harris voters did. Cold feelings toward the other party, measured on the feeling thermometerFeeling thermometerA 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. in the same pre-election interview, go with doubt about the count among Republicans. For approval of violence the Republican interval includes zero, and among Democrats each step colder goes with fewer saying violence is justified, an association whose interval includes zero after adjustment for age, education and other traits. An association measured at one time does not say which came first, and Chapter 2.2, Feelings toward the other party follows those ratings over time.

Figure 3

Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%)

Share saying the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner, by the voter's choice in each election; post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025

Show data

Data for Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%)

Election and voters	Share (%)	Lower	Upper	Respondents
2020 election: Trump voters	60.6	57.4	63.9	1,495
2020 election: Biden voters	4.2	3.0	5.4	2,135
2024 election: Harris voters	12.7	10.3	15.0	1,976
2024 election: Trump voters	1.4	0.4	2.4	1,547

What these answers cannot tell you

One cross-section cannot show change, and no earlier ANES study on disk asks about political violence, accurate counts or the legitimacy of an election. Whether approval or doubt rose or fell needs surveys that repeat the questions over time. The file records no action, so approval in the abstract is not evidence that a respondent would act, and a count of how many have acted would need records the survey cannot supply. The violence question does not say who would be hurt, for what goal or by what act, and the answer "a little" is the one whose meaning the wording leaves most open. The party, age and education gaps are not adjusted for one another. The intervals describe sampling variation only and do not include the differences among the three sample groups in the file or the effect of question wording.

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Go deeper

• The report: every estimate with its interval and sample size.
• Tables: every figure of the report as a table.

Reading paths that include this chapter:

• Trust and democracy
• Party feeling and its consequences

Data sources

• ANES 2024 Time Series2024 Time Series full release (May 19, 2026): political violence, vote counts, election legitimacy, the events of January 2021 and democratic norms, with party identification, age, education, race, sex and party thermometersYears: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews) · Weights: V240107a (pre-election) and V240107b (post-election) with PSU V240107c and stratum V240107d; sample-group weights V240101, V240102 and V240106 · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.

All data sources

References

1. Westwood, Sean J.; Grimmer, Justin; Tyler, Matthew; Nall, Clayton (2022). Current research overstates American support for political violence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(12): e2116870119. doi:10.1073/pnas.2116870119
2. Sinclair, Betsy; Smith, Steven S.; Tucker, Patrick D. (2018). "It's Largely a Rigged System": Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016. Political Research Quarterly 71(4): 854-868. doi:10.1177/1065912918768006
3. Anderson, Christopher J.; Blais, Andre; Bowler, Shaun; Donovan, Todd; Listhaug, Ola (2005). Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199276382.001.0001

How to cite

@misc{singh2026politicalviolenceanddemocraticnorms,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Political violence and democratic norms},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}