# The god gap in America: report

Chapter 3.8 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter.

## Identification

- Title: The god gap in America
- Chapter: 3.8 (Part III, Participation and coalitions; Coalitions and political differences)
- Question: How large is the political gap between frequent and infrequent worshippers, and how much of it runs through party?
- Dek: The Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders rose from 5.5 points in the ANES studies of 1972 to 1988 to 21.8 points in those of 2008 to 2020 and was 27.7 points in the 2024 CES.
- Grain: individuals
- Status: draft
- Published: 2026-09-30
- Updated: not revised
- Data sources:
  - ANES Cumulative Data File. Time Series Cumulative Data File, studies 1952 to 2020 (2024 religion and attendance codes excluded); years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z)
  - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, 2008 to 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative
  - General Social Survey. Cumulative file, 1972 to 2024, with interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use
  - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005 to 2023; ten EVS country labels restored; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries
  - European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11; attendance and left-right self-placement; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: weight (analysis weight) within each country
- Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america
- Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report
- Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md
- BibTeX key: singh2026thegodgapinamerica

```bibtex
@misc{singh2026thegodgapinamerica,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {The god gap in America},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}
```

## Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance.

| Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 5.5 | 95% CI 2.9 to 8.1 | 5,572 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dev_early |
| weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 21.8 | 95% CI 19.5 to 24.1 | 12,996 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dev_late |
| weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 27.7 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.3 | 39,057 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2024 |

## Findings

Among voters who reported a choice between the two major-party candidates in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES), those who attend religious services a few times a year or never voted Democratic at a rate 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) points above those who attend weekly or more. This chapter calls that difference between seldom and frequent attenders the god gap. In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 1972 to 1988 the same gap was 5.5 points, and in those of 2008 to 2020 it was 21.8 points. The pooled gap is not uniform across groups. It is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics, and part of it is the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else.

The chapter keeps three comparisons apart. The first is by attendance, the gap above. The second is by affiliation, the Democratic vote among Catholics against Protestants, which the attendance gap has exceeded since 1992. The third holds party identification fixed and asks how much of the rise in the tie between attendance and ideology, measured as a slope of ideology on attendance, remains in the General Social Survey (GSS). The chapter then compares the United States with Europe and the rest of the world.

Frequent attenders go to services weekly or nearly weekly, and seldom attenders go a few times a year or never. The ANES records attendance in three categories only, so the other surveys are cut to match as closely as their items allow. The CES has no nearly-weekly answer, so its frequent group is weekly or more. (Note: Attendance is self-reported, so each group is defined by how respondents answer and not by a count of visits. The cut is the same in the ANES and the GSS and one answer narrower in the CES, and the levels of the groups are compared across surveys only where the text says so.) A gap is the Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus the share among frequent attenders, in points, so a positive gap means that seldom attenders voted more Democratic. It describes who votes for whom and does not say why. A pooled estimate combines the respondents of several studies into one estimate. (Note: Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Shares use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out strata and clusters and can move an interval either way, and they describe sampling error within one survey and not differences between surveys. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its respondents chose to join; the same formula is used for it, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited.) Studies of American party politics through the 1990s described a widening division between religious traditionalists and seculars in party attachments [2]. A later account of American religion documented polarization between religious conservatives and secular liberals [3]. The sections below measure that division in several surveys.

### The ANES vote gap has been above zero since 1992

Table 1 plots the gap in every presidential year. In the ANES it was 10.3 (95% CI 5.3 to 15.3) points in 1972, 0.1 (95% CI −6.5 to 6.6) in 1980, an interval that includes zero, 11.3 (95% CI 6.2 to 16.5) in 1992 and 21.9 (95% CI 18.2 to 25.7) in 2020. The interval lies above zero in 8 of the 8 studies from 1992 on, and it includes zero in 3 studies, those of 1980, 1984 and 1988. Pooled over 1972 to 1988 the ANES gap is 5.5 (95% CI 2.9 to 8.1) points, and pooled over 1992 to 2004 it is 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points.

Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

The ANES and the CES agree in the gap pooled over 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, which is 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) points in the ANES and 23.4 (95% CI 22.7 to 24.2) points in the CES. (Note: In single years the two surveys differ in both directions. The CES gap was 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) points in 2012 against 20.5 (95% CI 16.2 to 24.8) in the ANES, with intervals that do not overlap, and the ANES gap was 23.8 (95% CI 18.9 to 28.7) points in 2016 against 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in the CES.)

The CES gap did not move in one direction after 2008. It was 25.5 (95% CI 23.9 to 27.1) points in 2008 and 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) in 2012, fell to 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in 2016, was 23.5 (95% CI 22.1 to 24.9) in 2020 and stood at 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) in 2024. The change from 2020 to 2024 came from the frequent end. The Democratic share among frequent attenders went from 36.5% (95% CI 35.3% to 37.7%) to 29.9% (95% CI 28.5% to 31.3%), while the share among seldom attenders went from 60.0% (95% CI 59.3% to 60.7%) to 57.6% (95% CI 56.7% to 58.5%).

#### The gap is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics

The gap for all voters mixes several groups, and the other two views of Table 1 separate some of them. Among white non-Hispanic voters the 2024 CES gap was 33.8 (95% CI 32.1 to 35.5) points, so leaving out Black, Hispanic and other voters raises it. Among Protestant and Catholic voters it was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024, down from 18.7 (95% CI 16.6 to 20.7) in 2008.

The voters left out of the Protestant and Catholic view include the unaffiliated. In the 2024 CES the unaffiliated attended seldom in 96% (95% CI 95% to 96%) of cases and voted 70.9% (95% CI 69.7% to 72.2%) Democratic. They made up 34.2% (95% CI 33.2% to 35.2%) of seldom-attending voters in 2008 and 44.8% (95% CI 43.9% to 45.7%) in 2024, so a growing part of the seldom group is made up of voters who voted Democratic at that rate. See Planned, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned) for the unaffiliated and Chapter 3.9, Religious tradition and race (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race) for white evangelicals, Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and other traditions.

### The attendance gap has exceeded the denominational gap since 1992

The ANES records denomination from 1952 and attendance from 1970, so the earliest religious line in the vote that can be measured runs between Catholics and Protestants. (Note: In the ANES the Catholic minus Protestant gap in the Democratic vote was 46.2 (95% CI 38.7 to 53.7) points in 1960, the year John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, was elected, and 20.6 (95% CI 17.4 to 23.7) points over the studies of 1952 to 1968 pooled. It was 8.5 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.3) points in 1972 to 1988.) The Catholic minus Protestant gap was 5.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 8.6) points in 1992 to 2004 and 8.3 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.1) in 2008 to 2020, and it was 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) in the 2024 CES (Table 2). The pooled attendance gap was 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points in 1992 to 2004 and 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) in 2008 to 2020, and its interval lies above the denominational interval in both windows. By study, the attendance gap was larger than the denominational gap in 8 of the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on, against 1 of 5 in 1972 to 1988. The two intervals are separate in 3 of the 8 studies from 1992 on (those of 2012, 2016 and 2020). In the CES the attendance interval lies wholly above the denominational interval in 5 of 5 presidential years. (Note: The ANES cumulative file cannot supply 2024 religion or attendance. It codes 835 respondents as Protestant in 2024 against 3,180 in 2020, and 49% of 2024 respondents have an attendance answer against 99% in 2020. Every ANES series here stops in 2020, and the CES supplies 2024.)

Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

The two gaps differ in who is compared. The attendance gap counts the unaffiliated in its seldom group, and the Catholic minus Protestant gap leaves them out. In the CES the unaffiliated voted 36.7 (95% CI 34.7 to 38.6) points more Democratic than Protestants in 2008 and 38.0 (95% CI 36.3 to 39.7) points more in 2024, against attendance gaps of 25.5 and 27.7 points. The unaffiliated-Protestant interval lies above both the attendance interval and the Catholic-Protestant interval in every presidential year. Among Protestant and Catholic voters alone, the two groups that the denominational gap compares, the attendance gap was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024 (the third view of Table 1) against 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) points for denomination, and the two intervals overlap. Across the 5 CES presidential years the attendance interval among these voters lies wholly above the denominational interval in 2 of them (2008 and 2012), and across the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on in 0. The comparison of the two gaps therefore depends on which voters are included.

The vote differs by attendance inside each tradition, by less than in the pooled comparison. In the 2024 CES seldom Protestants voted 12.5 (95% CI 10.1 to 14.8) points more Democratic than frequent Protestants, and seldom Catholics 10.4 (95% CI 6.6 to 14.2) points more than frequent Catholics, against 27.7 points among all voters. In 2008 the two gaps were 17.2 and 18.1 points. Denomination also separates voters at each level of attendance. In 2024 Catholics who attend often voted 10.2 (95% CI 6.6 to 13.8) points more Democratic than Protestants who attend often, and Catholics who attend seldom voted 8.1 (95% CI 5.4 to 10.9) points more than Protestants who attend seldom. Among the unaffiliated, those who attended weekly or more in 2020 voted 14.3 (95% CI 7.5 to 21.0) points less Democratic than the seldom attenders. The pooled attendance gap therefore combines a gap inside each tradition with the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else, and it is not a single gap that holds in every group.

### The Republican share among frequent attenders rose in the GSS

Table 3 plots the Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers by attendance. In the GSS the share among frequent attenders was 37.4% (95% CI 35.5% to 39.2%) in 1972 to 1978 and 53.2% (95% CI 50.9% to 55.5%) in 2010 to 2018, the last in-person surveys, a change of 15.9 (95% CI 12.9 to 18.8) points. Among seldom attenders it went from 32.1% (95% CI 30.5% to 33.7%) to 37.8% (95% CI 36.2% to 39.5%), a change of 5.7 (95% CI 3.4 to 8.0) points. The gap between the two groups went from 5.3 (95% CI 2.9 to 7.7) to 15.4 (95% CI 12.6 to 18.2) points, so the Republican share rose in both groups and rose more among frequent attenders. The GSS has included web interviews since 2021, and the surveys from 2021 on are called the web era below. The surveys of 2018 to 2024, which include web interviews, give a larger gap of 19.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 22.8) points. In 2022 and 2024 the gap was 18.0 (95% CI 10.3 to 25.8) points among in-person respondents and 23.7 (95% CI 16.8 to 30.5) among web respondents, so part of the larger gap in that window is not separable from the interview mode. (Note: In the surveys of 2018 to 2024 the Republican share was 59.7% (95% CI 57.0% to 62.5%) among frequent attenders and 40.2% (95% CI 38.5% to 41.9%) among seldom attenders, changes from 1972 to 1978 of 22.4 (95% CI 19.1 to 25.7) and 8.1 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.4) points.)

Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

The CES begins in 2008 and shows a different pattern. Its gap was 26.5 (95% CI 25.0 to 28.0) points in 2008 and 27.4 (95% CI 25.7 to 29.1) points in 2024. Frequent attenders were 61.5% (95% CI 60.3% to 62.7%) Republican in 2008 and 68.1% (95% CI 66.7% to 69.5%) in 2024, and seldom attenders 35.0% (95% CI 34.1% to 35.9%) and 40.7% (95% CI 39.8% to 41.6%), so the Republican share rose by similar amounts in the two groups. The CES gap of 2008 already exceeds the GSS gap of 15.4 points in 2010 to 2018 and of 19.5 points in 2018 to 2024. The two surveys differ in sample, mode and party items, so their levels are not comparable. The CES cannot say what happened before 2008.

### Party identification accounts for part of the rise in the slope

In the GSS, party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise in the slope of ideology on attendance between the in-person surveys of 1974 to 1978 and those of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope was 0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.20) in 1974, 0.26 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.31) in 2008, 0.25 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.31) in 2018 and 0.32 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.37) in 2024 (Table 4). Each slope is the standardized slope of self-placed ideology on attendance in one survey year, with both variables standardized once on all respondents in the sample. It counts the standard deviations of ideology that go with one standard deviation more attendance.

Net of party identification, with leaners counted with their party and the fit made on the same respondents, the slope was 0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) in 1974, 0.19 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.24) in 2018 and 0.20 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.25) in 2024. The 2024 point falls in the web era of the GSS. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.30) and web respondents give 0.37 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.42), a difference of 0.13 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.22), so the 2024 slope differs by mode of interview.

The CES, which is online throughout, does not show a steady rise. Its slope was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.36) in 2008 and fell to 0.25 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.26) in 2010, and it was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.37) in 2024. Pooled, it was 0.26 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.27) over 2010 to 2017 and 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.35) over 2018 to 2024. The step between 2017 and 2018 coincides with a rise in the spread of the five-point ideology item, whose standard deviation was 1.00 in 2010 to 2017 and 1.21 in 2018 to 2024. The slope is standardized on all years together, so part of the step is a change in that spread and not in the tie with attendance. The correlation of attendance with ideology, which does not depend on the spread, was +0.29 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.29) over 2010 to 2017 and +0.32 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.32) over 2018 to 2024.

Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise

To ask how much of the rise is accounted for by party, the chapter fits each slope on one set of respondents, once raw and once with party identification added, and compares an early and a late window. The main comparison pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope rose by 0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.15) between the two windows and the slope net of party by 0.06 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.10), so party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise. (Note: The share is one minus the ratio of the two rises. Its interval comes from a bootstrap over respondents, which recomputes both rises on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement and reads the interval from the spread of the results.) Four other specifications give shares from 50% to 64% (Table 5). Every specification puts the rise net of party below the raw rise, and the single-year comparisons have intervals wide enough to include the whole rise.

Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications

The share is an accounting of the slope. Party identification and ideology are answered by the same respondents in the same interview, and the tie between them tightened over these years (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology)), so a party control can be expected to remove more of the slope in later years. In the GSS it removes 8% (95% CI 0% to 18%) of the raw slope in 1974 and 38% (95% CI 29% to 48%) in 2024, and in the CES 47% (95% CI 45% to 50%) in 2008 and 53% (95% CI 50% to 55%) in 2024. Panel studies find that religious behavior and identity respond to politics. Partisan identity that forms early can shape how often people attend and whether they identify with a religion [4], and religious and secular orientations respond to political orientations [5]. Cross-sections cannot separate the two directions, so the share is not an estimate of how much of the slope party causes or how much religion does.

### Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic attitudes

The GSS asks questions on sexual morality and abortion (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, a pornography law and abortion for any reason) and on economic policy (help for the poor, help for the sick and government action on income differences). Averaging each set gives a cultural index and an economic index. The economic items are asked from 1975, so the comparison starts there. Over 1975 to 2024 the correlation of attendance with the cultural index is +0.44 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.45), with the economic index +0.11 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12) and with self-placed ideology +0.22 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.23). All three use the same survey years. The cultural and economic correlations use the same respondents, and the ideology correlation uses every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The cultural correlation was +0.37 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.40) in 1975 to 1984 and +0.46 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.49) in 2021 to 2024, and the economic correlation went from +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.11) to +0.18 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.22) (Table 6). The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items.

Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown

The two indices have similar internal consistency, meaning that their items agree with one another to a similar degree (standardized alpha of 0.70 for the cultural items and 0.69 for the economic ones). That similarity limits how far unequal measurement error can account for the difference in correlations. The cultural items ask about sexual morality and abortion, topics on which many religious traditions take positions, so part of the tie sits close to the content of religious teaching. For the abortion item by party see Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort), for whether the cultural items form one dimension see Planned, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned), and for the economic and cultural dimensions across the whole ideology scale see Chapter 1.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions).

### The United States sits above the European and world averages

The World Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS) ask how important God is in a respondent's life and ask for a left-right self-placement. Inside each country the two answers have a correlation, and in the United States it is +0.28 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.31). The mean across the 104 countries and territories with a usable estimate, counting each once, is +0.10 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12). It is +0.13 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.16) across 42 European countries and +0.08 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.10) across 61 countries outside Europe and the United States. 4 countries have a higher point estimate than the United States (Croatia, Greece, Slovenia and Spain), and in 2 of them (Croatia and Spain) the interval lies wholly above the United States interval (Table 7). (Note: The cleaned WVS/EVS file holds 118 countries and territories, and 112 were surveyed in 2005 or later. It leaves the country name blank for ten EVS countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. This chapter restores them from the country code, and 9 have a usable estimate. Without them the mean across 95 countries and territories is +0.10 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.12).)

Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages

The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS, where every country answered the same question. Attendance gives the same contrast on other surveys. The correlation of attendance with self-placed ideology in the GSS from 2006 to 2024 is +0.25 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.26) in the United States, and the mean across 36 European countries in the European Social Survey (ESS) is +0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.14). The two projects also order countries alike. Across the 36 countries that both surveyed, the attendance correlations in the WVS/EVS and the ESS correlate at +0.81 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.90), with a mean absolute difference of 0.04.

#### In the GSS the correlation is higher in 2024 than in 2002

A rising correlation would make the United States a place where the tie between religiosity and the right is still growing, and the data do not settle it. In the GSS the correlation of attendance with ideology was +0.18 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.24) in 2002 and +0.30 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.34) in 2024. The 2024 value falls in the web era. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the correlation was +0.22 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) among in-person respondents and +0.33 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.37) among web respondents. The in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval, so the separation between 2002 and 2024 rests on the web-era point. In the CES the correlation was +0.34 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.35) in 2008, +0.27 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.28) in 2010 and +0.33 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.34) in 2024. In a fixed panel of 15 European countries present in every ESS round, the mean correlation was +0.17 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.20) in 2002 and +0.15 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.21) in 2023, a paired change of −0.02 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.03) (Table 8). (Note: The panel mean hides movements in both directions. The correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9, with the largest rise in Poland, from +0.20 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.25) to +0.38 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.43), and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) to −0.04 (95% CI −0.10 to 0.02).) The direction of the United States series therefore depends on the survey and on the years compared. For attendance in Europe see Planned, Secularization in Europe (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/secularization-in-europe; planned).

Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change

### What these data cannot show

Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers. The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one. The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation. The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate.

The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation. The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode. The CES is an opt-in online panel. The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys.

The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs. The GSS design variables allow two checks. Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one. A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents. The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way. Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race. The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is. The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country.

## Tables

### Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES), reported voters, percentage points, 95% intervals; ANES 1972 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024

| Sample | Survey | Year | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Seldom, Democratic share (%) | Frequent, Democratic share (%) | Seldom voters | Frequent voters |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| All voters | ANES | 1972 | 10.3 | 5.3 | 15.3 | 40.6 | 30.3 | 705 | 684 |
| All voters | ANES | 1976 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 13.5 | 53.5 | 46.0 | 536 | 578 |
| All voters | ANES | 1980 | 0.1 | −6.5 | 6.6 | 38.8 | 38.7 | 441 | 408 |
| All voters | ANES | 1984 | 5.2 | −0.3 | 10.8 | 43.0 | 37.8 | 621 | 580 |
| All voters | ANES | 1988 | 2.1 | −4.1 | 8.2 | 47.1 | 45.1 | 522 | 497 |
| All voters | ANES | 1992 | 11.3 | 6.2 | 16.5 | 53.4 | 42.0 | 745 | 684 |
| All voters | ANES | 1996 | 14.6 | 7.7 | 21.5 | 61.3 | 46.7 | 459 | 496 |
| All voters | ANES | 2000 | 14.9 | 7.9 | 21.9 | 58.4 | 43.5 | 453 | 481 |
| All voters | ANES | 2004 | 12.6 | 4.5 | 20.7 | 55.9 | 43.3 | 371 | 316 |
| All voters | ANES | 2008 | 21.1 | 14.4 | 27.8 | 62.2 | 41.2 | 666 | 600 |
| All voters | ANES | 2012 | 20.5 | 16.2 | 24.8 | 61.2 | 40.8 | 2,198 | 1,543 |
| All voters | ANES | 2016 | 23.8 | 18.9 | 28.7 | 62.0 | 38.2 | 1,432 | 884 |
| All voters | ANES | 2020 | 21.9 | 18.2 | 25.7 | 62.3 | 40.4 | 3,950 | 1,723 |
| All voters | CES | 2008 | 25.5 | 23.9 | 27.1 | 63.4 | 37.9 | 13,147 | 8,021 |
| All voters | CES | 2012 | 27.3 | 25.7 | 28.9 | 62.3 | 35.0 | 22,397 | 11,984 |
| All voters | CES | 2016 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 56.9 | 37.9 | 26,471 | 10,902 |
| All voters | CES | 2020 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 60.0 | 36.5 | 30,080 | 10,434 |
| All voters | CES | 2024 | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.3 | 57.6 | 29.9 | 29,642 | 9,415 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1972 | 6.3 | 1.1 | 11.5 | 36.4 | 30.1 | 604 | 677 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1976 | 4.5 | −1.8 | 10.8 | 50.6 | 46.1 | 450 | 570 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1980 | 0.6 | −6.5 | 7.7 | 39.4 | 38.8 | 340 | 402 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1984 | 2.1 | −3.8 | 8.0 | 39.5 | 37.3 | 484 | 568 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1988 | −1.7 | −8.2 | 4.8 | 43.0 | 44.7 | 407 | 492 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1992 | 8.3 | 2.5 | 14.2 | 49.8 | 41.5 | 488 | 643 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1996 | 15.7 | 7.9 | 23.5 | 61.2 | 45.5 | 301 | 469 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2000 | 9.4 | 1.3 | 17.6 | 53.5 | 44.0 | 289 | 458 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2004 | 11.0 | 1.4 | 20.6 | 55.1 | 44.1 | 211 | 292 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2008 | 16.4 | 8.5 | 24.3 | 57.3 | 40.9 | 394 | 568 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2012 | 14.7 | 9.5 | 19.9 | 55.4 | 40.7 | 1,207 | 1,348 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2016 | 15.3 | 9.5 | 21.2 | 52.9 | 37.5 | 759 | 797 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2020 | 11.8 | 7.2 | 16.3 | 52.6 | 40.9 | 1,938 | 1,403 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2008 | 18.7 | 16.6 | 20.7 | 51.9 | 33.3 | 6,415 | 5,786 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2012 | 15.3 | 13.5 | 17.2 | 50.6 | 35.3 | 11,833 | 10,669 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2016 | 9.0 | 7.3 | 10.8 | 45.3 | 36.3 | 12,636 | 9,457 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2020 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 12.7 | 45.7 | 34.8 | 12,431 | 8,674 |
| Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2024 | 13.2 | 11.2 | 15.2 | 42.2 | 29.0 | 12,221 | 7,759 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1972 | 9.9 | 4.8 | 15.0 | 35.8 | 25.9 | 640 | 622 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1976 | 8.3 | 2.1 | 14.6 | 49.6 | 41.2 | 486 | 523 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1980 | 3.5 | −3.2 | 10.3 | 33.6 | 30.1 | 384 | 346 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1984 | 9.0 | 3.2 | 14.8 | 39.4 | 30.4 | 545 | 483 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1988 | 6.5 | −0.1 | 13.1 | 42.5 | 36.0 | 447 | 400 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1992 | 17.9 | 12.3 | 23.4 | 50.1 | 32.2 | 640 | 542 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1996 | 22.5 | 15.0 | 29.9 | 57.3 | 34.8 | 397 | 386 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2000 | 18.8 | 11.1 | 26.4 | 54.9 | 36.1 | 377 | 383 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2004 | 18.9 | 9.7 | 28.0 | 51.5 | 32.7 | 283 | 230 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2008 | 28.8 | 20.9 | 36.7 | 55.4 | 26.6 | 410 | 284 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2012 | 29.3 | 24.4 | 34.1 | 53.9 | 24.7 | 1,460 | 874 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2016 | 27.8 | 22.6 | 33.1 | 53.5 | 25.7 | 1,107 | 652 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2020 | 29.9 | 26.0 | 33.9 | 55.4 | 25.4 | 3,035 | 1,292 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2008 | 32.1 | 30.5 | 33.7 | 58.2 | 26.2 | 11,293 | 6,653 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2012 | 33.0 | 31.3 | 34.7 | 57.9 | 24.9 | 18,416 | 9,387 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2016 | 25.4 | 23.9 | 26.9 | 51.1 | 25.7 | 20,561 | 7,745 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2020 | 31.0 | 29.6 | 32.3 | 54.2 | 23.2 | 23,149 | 7,406 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2024 | 33.8 | 32.1 | 35.5 | 53.7 | 19.9 | 22,958 | 6,803 |

Views: All voters (sample = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (sample = White non-Hispanic voters); Protestant and Catholic voters (sample = Protestant and Catholic voters).

Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion and attendance codes cannot be used, so the ANES line ends in 2020.

Note: Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item: frequent is weekly or almost weekly, seldom is a few times a year or never. The CES has no almost-weekly answer, so its frequent group is the top two answers, once a week and more than once a week.

Note: A study enters only when each attendance group has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json

### Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among reported voters; gaps in percentage points and shares in percent; ANES 1952 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals

| View | Tradition or sample | Series | Year | Estimate | Lower | Upper | Voters |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1972 | 10.3 | 5.3 | 15.3 | 1,389 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1976 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 13.5 | 1,114 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1980 | 0.1 | −6.5 | 6.6 | 849 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1984 | 5.2 | −0.3 | 10.8 | 1,201 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1988 | 2.1 | −4.1 | 8.2 | 1,019 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1992 | 11.3 | 6.2 | 16.5 | 1,429 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1996 | 14.6 | 7.7 | 21.5 | 955 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2000 | 14.9 | 7.9 | 21.9 | 934 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2004 | 12.6 | 4.5 | 20.7 | 687 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2008 | 21.1 | 14.4 | 27.8 | 1,266 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2012 | 20.5 | 16.2 | 24.8 | 3,741 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2016 | 23.8 | 18.9 | 28.7 | 2,316 |
| gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2020 | 21.9 | 18.2 | 25.7 | 5,673 |
| gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2008 | 25.5 | 23.9 | 27.1 | 21,168 |
| gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2012 | 27.3 | 25.7 | 28.9 | 34,381 |
| gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2016 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 37,373 |
| gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2020 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 40,514 |
| gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2024 | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.3 | 39,057 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1952 | 15.3 | 8.7 | 22.0 | 1,104 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1956 | 9.9 | 3.4 | 16.4 | 1,181 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1960 | 46.2 | 38.7 | 53.7 | 847 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1964 | 16.2 | 10.2 | 22.1 | 1,035 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1968 | 21.8 | 14.6 | 29.0 | 963 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1972 | 8.2 | 2.7 | 13.7 | 1,469 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1976 | 11.5 | 5.1 | 17.8 | 1,219 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1980 | 1.3 | −6.3 | 8.9 | 839 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1984 | 8.7 | 2.7 | 14.7 | 1,212 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1988 | 10.5 | 3.9 | 17.1 | 1,070 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1992 | 5.9 | 0.1 | 11.7 | 1,342 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1996 | 6.6 | −1.0 | 14.1 | 912 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2000 | 1.4 | −6.1 | 9.0 | 911 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2004 | 5.0 | −4.2 | 14.3 | 610 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2008 | 9.2 | 1.2 | 17.1 | 1,195 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2012 | 9.5 | 4.4 | 14.7 | 2,927 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2016 | 8.6 | 2.8 | 14.4 | 1,799 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2020 | 7.3 | 2.8 | 11.8 | 3,745 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2008 | 10.1 | 8.1 | 12.2 | 13,915 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2012 | 7.9 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 25,252 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2016 | 10.8 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 24,840 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2020 | 10.7 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 23,634 |
| gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2024 | 10.4 | 8.3 | 12.4 | 22,174 |
| gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2008 | 36.7 | 34.7 | 38.6 | 13,283 |
| gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2012 | 32.3 | 30.5 | 34.1 | 25,423 |
| gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2016 | 30.1 | 28.5 | 31.6 | 27,239 |
| gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2020 | 35.4 | 34.0 | 36.8 | 29,897 |
| gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2024 | 38.0 | 36.3 | 39.7 | 28,512 |
| within | Catholic | Frequent | 2008 | 38.7 | 36.0 | 41.3 | 1,809 |
| within | Catholic | Frequent | 2012 | 37.5 | 35.0 | 39.9 | 3,002 |
| within | Catholic | Frequent | 2016 | 42.9 | 40.4 | 45.4 | 2,901 |
| within | Catholic | Frequent | 2020 | 42.3 | 39.7 | 44.9 | 2,434 |
| within | Catholic | Frequent | 2024 | 36.7 | 33.5 | 39.8 | 2,146 |
| within | Catholic | Seldom | 2008 | 56.8 | 54.5 | 59.1 | 2,705 |
| within | Catholic | Seldom | 2012 | 56.0 | 53.9 | 58.1 | 4,421 |
| within | Catholic | Seldom | 2016 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 53.2 | 5,220 |
| within | Catholic | Seldom | 2020 | 51.6 | 49.7 | 53.5 | 5,232 |
| within | Catholic | Seldom | 2024 | 47.1 | 44.9 | 49.2 | 5,074 |
| within | Protestant | Frequent | 2008 | 30.8 | 29.1 | 32.4 | 3,977 |
| within | Protestant | Frequent | 2012 | 34.5 | 32.9 | 36.1 | 7,667 |
| within | Protestant | Frequent | 2016 | 33.6 | 32.0 | 35.1 | 6,556 |
| within | Protestant | Frequent | 2020 | 32.3 | 30.8 | 33.7 | 6,240 |
| within | Protestant | Frequent | 2024 | 26.5 | 24.8 | 28.1 | 5,613 |
| within | Protestant | Seldom | 2008 | 48.0 | 46.1 | 49.9 | 3,710 |
| within | Protestant | Seldom | 2012 | 47.2 | 45.6 | 48.8 | 7,412 |
| within | Protestant | Seldom | 2016 | 41.4 | 39.9 | 43.0 | 7,416 |
| within | Protestant | Seldom | 2020 | 41.8 | 40.4 | 43.3 | 7,199 |
| within | Protestant | Seldom | 2024 | 38.9 | 37.2 | 40.6 | 7,147 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2012 | 54.5 | 46.0 | 62.9 | 266 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2016 | 53.5 | 46.8 | 60.3 | 386 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2020 | 59.5 | 52.9 | 66.2 | 369 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2008 | 76.6 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,351 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2012 | 74.7 | 73.2 | 76.2 | 7,904 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2016 | 69.3 | 68.1 | 70.4 | 10,803 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2020 | 73.8 | 72.9 | 74.8 | 14,096 |
| within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2024 | 72.1 | 70.9 | 73.4 | 13,762 |

Views: Three gaps compared (view = gaps); Attendance within each tradition (view = within).

Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion codes cannot be used: Protestants number 3,180 in 2020 and 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, so the ANES lines end in 2020. The CES gives a Catholic-Protestant gap of 10.4 points in 2024. The ANES religion item cannot separate the unaffiliated from other faiths, so the unaffiliated line is CES only.

Note: A group needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size in a study. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json

### Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS

Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) among frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by year, percent, 95% intervals

| Survey | Attendance | Year | Republican share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| CES | Frequent | 2008 | 61.5 | 60.3 | 62.7 | 9,264 |
| CES | Frequent | 2009 | 62.6 | 60.7 | 64.5 | 3,447 |
| CES | Frequent | 2010 | 61.7 | 60.5 | 63.0 | 15,341 |
| CES | Frequent | 2011 | 58.2 | 56.2 | 60.2 | 4,711 |
| CES | Frequent | 2012 | 59.6 | 58.3 | 60.8 | 13,849 |
| CES | Frequent | 2013 | 57.2 | 54.8 | 59.6 | 3,336 |
| CES | Frequent | 2014 | 61.4 | 60.1 | 62.7 | 12,466 |
| CES | Frequent | 2015 | 57.0 | 54.6 | 59.4 | 3,019 |
| CES | Frequent | 2016 | 56.5 | 55.4 | 57.7 | 13,736 |
| CES | Frequent | 2017 | 59.3 | 57.0 | 61.6 | 3,608 |
| CES | Frequent | 2018 | 65.1 | 63.9 | 66.3 | 12,055 |
| CES | Frequent | 2019 | 63.9 | 61.9 | 65.9 | 3,690 |
| CES | Frequent | 2020 | 63.8 | 62.6 | 65.0 | 11,385 |
| CES | Frequent | 2021 | 63.5 | 61.7 | 65.3 | 4,609 |
| CES | Frequent | 2022 | 64.5 | 63.2 | 65.8 | 11,125 |
| CES | Frequent | 2023 | 58.2 | 56.4 | 60.0 | 5,168 |
| CES | Frequent | 2024 | 68.1 | 66.7 | 69.5 | 10,949 |
| CES | Seldom | 2008 | 35.0 | 34.1 | 35.9 | 15,164 |
| CES | Seldom | 2009 | 37.6 | 36.3 | 39.0 | 6,317 |
| CES | Seldom | 2010 | 40.8 | 39.8 | 41.7 | 26,251 |
| CES | Seldom | 2011 | 38.8 | 37.4 | 40.2 | 9,845 |
| CES | Seldom | 2012 | 33.8 | 32.9 | 34.7 | 25,858 |
| CES | Seldom | 2013 | 37.2 | 35.7 | 38.8 | 7,801 |
| CES | Seldom | 2014 | 40.1 | 39.2 | 40.9 | 26,501 |
| CES | Seldom | 2015 | 39.9 | 38.3 | 41.4 | 7,057 |
| CES | Seldom | 2016 | 39.1 | 38.4 | 39.9 | 31,636 |
| CES | Seldom | 2017 | 39.2 | 37.7 | 40.7 | 8,894 |
| CES | Seldom | 2018 | 38.7 | 38.0 | 39.5 | 31,182 |
| CES | Seldom | 2019 | 37.6 | 36.3 | 38.9 | 9,363 |
| CES | Seldom | 2020 | 40.3 | 39.6 | 41.1 | 32,768 |
| CES | Seldom | 2021 | 38.4 | 37.3 | 39.5 | 13,718 |
| CES | Seldom | 2022 | 40.0 | 39.2 | 40.7 | 32,774 |
| CES | Seldom | 2023 | 40.1 | 39.0 | 41.2 | 12,096 |
| CES | Seldom | 2024 | 40.7 | 39.8 | 41.6 | 34,618 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1972 | 33.7 | 29.5 | 37.9 | 575 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1973 | 43.0 | 38.1 | 47.8 | 468 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1974 | 36.9 | 32.1 | 41.8 | 473 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1975 | 38.9 | 34.0 | 43.9 | 467 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1976 | 33.3 | 28.5 | 38.0 | 452 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1977 | 35.3 | 30.5 | 40.0 | 482 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1978 | 41.4 | 35.7 | 47.1 | 458 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1980 | 38.6 | 33.1 | 44.2 | 438 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1982 | 39.7 | 34.3 | 45.0 | 579 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1983 | 39.9 | 34.3 | 45.4 | 513 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1984 | 47.8 | 42.2 | 53.5 | 489 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1985 | 45.4 | 39.8 | 50.9 | 507 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1986 | 47.1 | 42.1 | 52.1 | 466 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1987 | 46.3 | 41.1 | 51.5 | 549 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1988 | 51.6 | 46.5 | 56.7 | 444 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1989 | 50.1 | 45.0 | 55.2 | 476 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1990 | 52.8 | 47.5 | 58.1 | 429 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1991 | 50.9 | 45.7 | 56.0 | 458 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1993 | 53.5 | 48.5 | 58.6 | 487 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1994 | 51.1 | 47.2 | 55.0 | 810 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1996 | 50.0 | 46.0 | 53.9 | 748 |
| GSS | Frequent | 1998 | 51.2 | 47.3 | 55.2 | 763 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2000 | 53.9 | 49.8 | 58.1 | 688 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2002 | 54.1 | 49.9 | 58.4 | 705 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2004 | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 786 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2006 | 55.3 | 51.9 | 58.6 | 1,165 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2008 | 53.0 | 47.9 | 58.1 | 527 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2010 | 50.7 | 45.2 | 56.2 | 507 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2012 | 50.8 | 45.2 | 56.3 | 496 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2014 | 54.6 | 50.0 | 59.3 | 587 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2016 | 52.2 | 47.7 | 56.7 | 681 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2018 | 57.9 | 52.1 | 63.6 | 489 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2021 | 54.6 | 50.3 | 59.0 | 813 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2022 | 60.7 | 54.2 | 67.3 | 606 |
| GSS | Frequent | 2024 | 66.2 | 60.9 | 71.5 | 623 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1972 | 31.4 | 27.2 | 35.6 | 579 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1973 | 34.3 | 30.3 | 38.4 | 625 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1974 | 29.4 | 25.3 | 33.4 | 571 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1975 | 30.7 | 26.6 | 34.7 | 587 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1976 | 30.8 | 26.8 | 34.9 | 620 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1977 | 32.8 | 28.7 | 36.9 | 631 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1978 | 34.7 | 30.0 | 39.4 | 625 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1980 | 33.2 | 28.5 | 37.9 | 587 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1982 | 38.1 | 33.7 | 42.5 | 753 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1983 | 37.9 | 33.2 | 42.7 | 639 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1984 | 40.5 | 35.4 | 45.6 | 576 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1985 | 44.4 | 39.7 | 49.1 | 650 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1986 | 43.1 | 38.5 | 47.6 | 560 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1987 | 43.5 | 39.1 | 47.9 | 706 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1988 | 40.2 | 35.8 | 44.6 | 612 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1989 | 46.3 | 42.0 | 50.7 | 643 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1990 | 44.7 | 39.9 | 49.5 | 528 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1991 | 49.5 | 45.1 | 54.0 | 596 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1993 | 43.4 | 39.1 | 47.8 | 630 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1994 | 41.8 | 38.8 | 44.9 | 1,250 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1996 | 44.9 | 41.8 | 48.1 | 1,187 |
| GSS | Seldom | 1998 | 41.0 | 37.8 | 44.3 | 1,108 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2000 | 40.4 | 37.2 | 43.7 | 1,110 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2002 | 40.9 | 37.5 | 44.4 | 1,083 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2004 | 42.7 | 39.3 | 46.0 | 1,140 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2006 | 39.3 | 36.6 | 42.0 | 1,733 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2008 | 35.3 | 31.5 | 39.1 | 857 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2010 | 37.1 | 33.0 | 41.1 | 842 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2012 | 36.3 | 32.2 | 40.5 | 788 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2014 | 37.1 | 33.7 | 40.5 | 1,069 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2016 | 36.2 | 32.9 | 39.5 | 1,240 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2018 | 42.3 | 38.4 | 46.1 | 1,055 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2021 | 35.0 | 32.4 | 37.6 | 1,977 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2022 | 43.6 | 39.9 | 47.3 | 1,690 |
| GSS | Seldom | 2024 | 42.0 | 38.5 | 45.5 | 1,452 |

Views: GSS, 1972 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES).

Note: Pure independents are left out. GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, so the 2018 to 2024 window is not comparable with the in-person window of 2010 to 2018. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the frequent-minus-seldom gap was 18.0 points among in-person respondents and 23.7 points among web respondents.

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json

### Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise

Standardized slope of ideology on church attendance, by year, raw and net of party identification; 95% intervals

| Survey | Series | Year | Slope | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| CES | Net of party | 2008 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 29,793 |
| CES | Net of party | 2009 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 12,123 |
| CES | Net of party | 2010 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 51,265 |
| CES | Net of party | 2011 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 18,198 |
| CES | Net of party | 2012 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 48,517 |
| CES | Net of party | 2013 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 14,509 |
| CES | Net of party | 2014 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 49,407 |
| CES | Net of party | 2015 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 12,719 |
| CES | Net of party | 2016 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 58,315 |
| CES | Net of party | 2017 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 16,175 |
| CES | Net of party | 2018 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 53,579 |
| CES | Net of party | 2019 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 16,287 |
| CES | Net of party | 2020 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 54,697 |
| CES | Net of party | 2021 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 23,134 |
| CES | Net of party | 2022 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 54,246 |
| CES | Net of party | 2023 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 21,693 |
| CES | Net of party | 2024 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 55,195 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2008 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 29,793 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2009 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 12,123 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2010 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 51,265 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2011 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 18,198 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2012 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 48,517 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2013 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 14,509 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2014 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 49,407 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2015 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 12,719 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2016 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 58,315 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2017 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 16,175 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2018 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.38 | 53,579 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2019 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 16,287 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2020 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 54,697 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2021 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 23,134 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2022 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 54,246 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2023 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 21,693 |
| CES | Raw slope | 2024 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 55,195 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1974 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,344 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1975 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,382 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1976 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,387 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1977 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 1,435 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1978 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,420 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1980 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 1,414 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1982 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,718 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1983 | −0.02 | −0.10 | 0.06 | 761 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1984 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.23 | 1,380 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1985 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 1,443 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1986 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,387 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1987 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,658 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1988 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 1,408 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1989 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 1,428 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1990 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,267 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1991 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,421 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1993 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 1,496 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1994 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 2,765 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1996 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 2,630 |
| GSS | Net of party | 1998 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,585 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2000 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 2,527 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2002 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,294 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2004 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 1,287 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2006 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 4,244 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2008 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 1,884 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2010 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,911 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2012 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 1,809 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2014 | 0.21 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 2,360 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2016 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,662 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2018 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 2,139 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2021 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 3,793 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2022 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 3,276 |
| GSS | Net of party | 2024 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 3,039 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1974 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 1,344 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1975 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,382 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1976 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,387 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1977 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 1,435 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1978 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,420 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1980 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.19 | 1,414 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1982 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,718 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1983 | −0.02 | −0.11 | 0.06 | 761 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1984 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 1,380 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1985 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 1,443 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1986 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,387 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1987 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,658 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1988 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,408 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1989 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,428 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1990 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,267 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1991 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.22 | 1,421 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1993 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 1,496 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1994 | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 2,765 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1996 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 2,630 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 1998 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 2,585 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2000 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 2,527 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 1,294 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2004 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 1,287 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2006 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 4,244 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2008 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 1,884 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2010 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 1,911 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2012 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 1,809 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2014 | 0.27 | 0.23 | 0.32 | 2,360 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2016 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.30 | 2,662 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2018 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.31 | 2,139 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2021 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 3,793 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2022 | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.35 | 3,276 |
| GSS | Raw slope | 2024 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 3,039 |

Views: GSS, 1974 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES).

Note: Ideology is the seven-point liberal-conservative scale in the GSS and a five-point scale in the CES.

Note: GSS interviews were in person, with some telephone interviews, through 2018; 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 and web respondents 0.37.

Note: The GSS 1983 survey asked the ideology item of a subsample only, and that year's slope, marked on the chart, rests on fewer respondents. Years with fewer than 200 respondents are left out. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Regression intervals use HC3 robust errors.

Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json

### Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications

Early and late GSS periods compared on one common sample of respondents, by specification; 95% bootstrap intervals

#### Table 5.1. Share accounted for

The share of the rise that party identification accounts for runs from 46% in the main specification to 64% when 1974 is compared with 2024

Share of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, in percent

| Specification | Periods compared | Share accounted for by party (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Pooled in-person windows | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 46 | 33 | 67 | 17,849 |
| Seven party categories | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 52 | 37 | 74 | 17,849 |
| 1974 and 2018 alone | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 50 | 20 | 163 | 3,483 |
| 1974 and 2024 alone | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 64 | 41 | 112 | 4,383 |
| Late window with web | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 63 | 49 | 82 | 19,215 |

#### Table 5.2. Rises in the slope

The rise in the slope net of party is smaller than the rise in the raw slope in every specification

Rise in the standardized slope of ideology on attendance, raw and net of party identification

| Specification | Periods compared | Raw rise | Lower | Upper | Rise net of party | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Pooled in-person windows | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 17,849 |
| Seven party categories | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 17,849 |
| 1974 and 2018 alone | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.19 | 0.05 | −0.02 | 0.13 | 3,483 |
| 1974 and 2024 alone | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.14 | 4,383 |
| Late window with web | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 19,215 |

Note: The main specification pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, and the seven-category row repeats that comparison with a finer party control. The single-year rows compare 1974 with 2018, the last survey before the web mode, and with 2024. The late window with web pools 2018 to 2024 against 1974 to 1978.

Note: The percentile bootstrap resamples respondents within each period 2,000 times and refits both slopes each time. The party control is two indicators (Republican, independent) unless the row says seven categories.

Note: The web mode began in 2021. Rows that end in 2018 or use the survey years 2010 to 2018 contain no web interviews.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json

### Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown

Weighted correlation of church attendance (never to more than weekly) with cultural conservatism, economic conservatism and self-placed ideology, by period, GSS respondents, 95% intervals

| Outcome | Period | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cultural conservatism | 1975 to 1984 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 4,196 |
| Cultural conservatism | 1985 to 1994 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 9,643 |
| Cultural conservatism | 1995 to 2004 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 6,963 |
| Cultural conservatism | 2005 to 2014 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.47 | 7,362 |
| Cultural conservatism | 2015 to 2018 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 3,317 |
| Cultural conservatism | 2021 to 2024 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.49 | 6,846 |
| Economic conservatism | 1975 to 1984 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 4,196 |
| Economic conservatism | 1985 to 1994 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 9,643 |
| Economic conservatism | 1995 to 2004 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 6,963 |
| Economic conservatism | 2005 to 2014 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 7,362 |
| Economic conservatism | 2015 to 2018 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 3,317 |
| Economic conservatism | 2021 to 2024 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 6,846 |
| Self-placed ideology | 1975 to 1984 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.17 | 3,565 |
| Self-placed ideology | 1985 to 1994 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 12,990 |
| Self-placed ideology | 1995 to 2004 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 10,527 |
| Self-placed ideology | 2005 to 2014 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 12,522 |
| Self-placed ideology | 2015 to 2018 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 4,983 |
| Self-placed ideology | 2021 to 2024 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 10,448 |

Note: The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items. All three outcomes use the survey years in which both indices were measured; the ideology points include every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The periods are 1975 to 1984, 1985 to 1994, 1995 to 2004, 2005 to 2014, 2015 to 2018 and 2021 to 2024.

Note: Cultural conservatism averages five standardized items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason); economic conservatism averages three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences). Each index needs at least two answers. The mean correlation among the cultural items is +0.32 and among the economic items +0.42.

Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, and 2015 to 2018 is the last period before them. Correlations use the Kish effective sample size for the interval.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json

### Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages

Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement and the importance of God or attendance, inside each country; the United States on two measures and equal-country means for Europe and the rest of the world; 95% intervals

| View | Row | Drawn in the chart | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents | Countries |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| summary | US, GSS attendance | yes | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 27,953 | n/a |
| summary | Europe, ESS attendance (36 countries) | yes | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.14 | n/a | 36 |
| summary | US, WVS/EVS importance of God | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 5,858 | n/a |
| summary | Europe, WVS/EVS importance of God (42 countries) | yes | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | n/a | 42 |
| summary | Rest of the world, WVS/EVS importance of God (61 countries) | yes | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.10 | n/a | 61 |
| summary | All WVS/EVS countries, importance of God (104 countries) | yes | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.12 | n/a | 104 |
| countries | Albania | no | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 2,209 | n/a |
| countries | Algeria | no | −0.02 | −0.11 | 0.06 | 536 | n/a |
| countries | Andorra | yes | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 1,813 | n/a |
| countries | Argentina | yes | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 2,326 | n/a |
| countries | Armenia | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 3,758 | n/a |
| countries | Australia | no | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 4,456 | n/a |
| countries | Austria | no | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 2,710 | n/a |
| countries | Azerbaijan | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 2,152 | n/a |
| countries | Bangladesh | no | 0.01 | −0.05 | 0.06 | 1,200 | n/a |
| countries | Belarus | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,186 | n/a |
| countries | Belgium | no | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.17 | 1,421 | n/a |
| countries | Bolivia | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 1,803 | n/a |
| countries | Bosnia Herzegovina | no | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,269 | n/a |
| countries | Brazil | no | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 3,673 | n/a |
| countries | Bulgaria | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 2,670 | n/a |
| countries | Burkina Faso | no | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.02 | 1,109 | n/a |
| countries | Canada | yes | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 5,628 | n/a |
| countries | Chile | no | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 2,085 | n/a |
| countries | Colombia | no | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 5,005 | n/a |
| countries | Croatia | yes | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 2,354 | n/a |
| countries | Cyprus | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,279 | n/a |
| countries | Czechia | no | 0.01 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,856 | n/a |
| countries | Denmark | no | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 4,678 | n/a |
| countries | Ecuador | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 2,243 | n/a |
| countries | Egypt | no | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.04 | 2,721 | n/a |
| countries | Estonia | yes | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | n/a |
| countries | Ethiopia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,914 | n/a |
| countries | Finland | no | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,897 | n/a |
| countries | France | no | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 3,845 | n/a |
| countries | Georgia | no | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 4,283 | n/a |
| countries | Germany | no | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 8,654 | n/a |
| countries | Ghana | no | 0.03 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 2,330 | n/a |
| countries | Greece | yes | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 2,118 | n/a |
| countries | Guatemala | no | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 1,211 | n/a |
| countries | Haiti | no | 0.01 | −0.03 | 0.05 | 1,929 | n/a |
| countries | Hong Kong SAR | no | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 3,801 | n/a |
| countries | Hungary | no | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 3,432 | n/a |
| countries | Iceland | no | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 2,299 | n/a |
| countries | India | no | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 5,785 | n/a |
| countries | Indonesia | no | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 4,082 | n/a |
| countries | Iraq | no | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 978 | n/a |
| countries | Ireland | yes | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 682 | n/a |
| countries | Italy | no | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 3,515 | n/a |
| countries | Japan | no | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 3,386 | n/a |
| countries | Kazakhstan | no | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 1,500 | n/a |
| countries | Kenya | no | −0.04 | −0.10 | 0.02 | 1,160 | n/a |
| countries | Kosovo | yes | −0.06 | −0.13 | 0.02 | 650 | n/a |
| countries | Kyrgyzstan | no | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 1,458 | n/a |
| countries | Latvia | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 2,033 | n/a |
| countries | Lebanon | no | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.17 | 834 | n/a |
| countries | Libya | no | 0.03 | −0.02 | 0.08 | 2,594 | n/a |
| countries | Lithuania | no | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,812 | n/a |
| countries | Luxembourg | yes | 0.27 | 0.21 | 0.33 | 1,261 | n/a |
| countries | Macau SAR | no | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.12 | 996 | n/a |
| countries | Malaysia | no | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 2,613 | n/a |
| countries | Maldives | no | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 1,023 | n/a |
| countries | Mali | no | 0.01 | −0.04 | 0.07 | 1,140 | n/a |
| countries | Malta | no | 0.07 | −0.01 | 0.15 | 770 | n/a |
| countries | Mexico | no | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 4,781 | n/a |
| countries | Moldova | no | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 1,657 | n/a |
| countries | Mongolia | no | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 1,611 | n/a |
| countries | Montenegro | no | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,218 | n/a |
| countries | Morocco | no | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.08 | 1,914 | n/a |
| countries | Netherlands | no | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 7,785 | n/a |
| countries | New Zealand | no | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 1,361 | n/a |
| countries | Nicaragua | no | 0.02 | −0.05 | 0.08 | 871 | n/a |
| countries | Nigeria | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 2,929 | n/a |
| countries | North Macedonia | no | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 1,729 | n/a |
| countries | Northern Ireland | no | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 763 | n/a |
| countries | Norway | no | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 3,144 | n/a |
| countries | Pakistan | no | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.22 | 1,200 | n/a |
| countries | Palestine | no | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.16 | 728 | n/a |
| countries | Peru | no | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,339 | n/a |
| countries | Philippines | no | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 2,388 | n/a |
| countries | Poland | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 3,703 | n/a |
| countries | Portugal | no | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 1,954 | n/a |
| countries | Puerto Rico | no | 0.03 | −0.03 | 0.09 | 1,042 | n/a |
| countries | Romania | no | 0.01 | −0.02 | 0.04 | 4,728 | n/a |
| countries | Russia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 4,411 | n/a |
| countries | Rwanda | no | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.04 | 2,554 | n/a |
| countries | Serbia | no | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 3,715 | n/a |
| countries | Singapore | no | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 1,740 | n/a |
| countries | Slovakia | no | −0.01 | −0.05 | 0.03 | 3,257 | n/a |
| countries | Slovenia | yes | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.36 | 3,098 | n/a |
| countries | South Africa | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 5,568 | n/a |
| countries | South Korea | no | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 3,631 | n/a |
| countries | Spain | yes | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 4,244 | n/a |
| countries | Sweden | no | 0.03 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 4,155 | n/a |
| countries | Switzerland | no | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 5,138 | n/a |
| countries | Taiwan ROC | no | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,561 | n/a |
| countries | Tajikistan | yes | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 1,200 | n/a |
| countries | Thailand | no | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,656 | n/a |
| countries | Trinidad and Tobago | no | 0.02 | −0.04 | 0.08 | 1,210 | n/a |
| countries | Tunisia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,681 | n/a |
| countries | Turkey | no | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 6,438 | n/a |
| countries | Ukraine | no | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 4,601 | n/a |
| countries | United Kingdom | no | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 6,155 | n/a |
| countries | United States | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 5,858 | n/a |
| countries | Uruguay | no | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 2,586 | n/a |
| countries | Uzbekistan | no | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.27 | 615 | n/a |
| countries | Venezuela | no | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.02 | 1,190 | n/a |
| countries | Vietnam | no | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 1,373 | n/a |
| countries | Zambia | no | −0.02 | −0.08 | 0.04 | 946 | n/a |
| countries | Zimbabwe | yes | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,627 | n/a |

Views: Averages (view = summary); Country ranking (plotted = yes, view = countries).

Note: The WVS/EVS file holds ten EVS countries with no country label; they are restored from the country code, and 9 of them enter here. Without them the world mean is +0.10.

Note: Europe in the WVS/EVS excludes Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. A country needs an effective sample of 300 or more. Northern Ireland is a separate WVS/EVS entry.

Note: The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS rows, where every country answered the same question.

Source: General Social Survey, 2006-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 3-11 (2006-2023); World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted, with equal weight for each country in averages

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json

### Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change

Weighted correlation between church attendance and left-right or ideological self-placement, by survey year; the United States in the GSS and CES and a fixed panel of European countries in the ESS; 95% intervals

| Series | Year | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Europe, ESS | 2002 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 26,103 |
| Europe, ESS | 2004 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.20 | 25,153 |
| Europe, ESS | 2006 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 25,528 |
| Europe, ESS | 2008 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.20 | 25,843 |
| Europe, ESS | 2010 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 25,234 |
| Europe, ESS | 2012 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 26,600 |
| Europe, ESS | 2014 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 25,084 |
| Europe, ESS | 2016 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 24,898 |
| Europe, ESS | 2018 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 23,263 |
| Europe, ESS | 2020 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 29,750 |
| Europe, ESS | 2023 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 22,401 |
| US, CES | 2008 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 29,793 |
| US, CES | 2009 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 12,123 |
| US, CES | 2010 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 51,265 |
| US, CES | 2011 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 18,198 |
| US, CES | 2012 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 48,517 |
| US, CES | 2013 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 14,509 |
| US, CES | 2014 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.31 | 49,407 |
| US, CES | 2015 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 12,719 |
| US, CES | 2016 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 58,315 |
| US, CES | 2017 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 16,175 |
| US, CES | 2018 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 53,579 |
| US, CES | 2019 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 16,287 |
| US, CES | 2020 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 54,697 |
| US, CES | 2021 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 23,134 |
| US, CES | 2022 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 54,246 |
| US, CES | 2023 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 21,693 |
| US, CES | 2024 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 55,195 |
| US, GSS | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 1,325 |
| US, GSS | 2004 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,305 |
| US, GSS | 2006 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 4,322 |
| US, GSS | 2008 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 1,926 |
| US, GSS | 2010 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 1,968 |
| US, GSS | 2012 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 1,868 |
| US, GSS | 2014 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 2,438 |
| US, GSS | 2016 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.28 | 2,748 |
| US, GSS | 2018 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 2,235 |
| US, GSS | 2021 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 3,916 |
| US, GSS | 2022 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 3,395 |
| US, GSS | 2024 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 3,137 |

Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews: 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. The 2024 point falls in that period, and the in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval. The three surveys use different attendance and ideology items, so levels are compared less safely than trends.

Note: ESS rounds are placed at the year fieldwork began; round 10 ran from 2020 to 2022 and round 11 began in 2023. The panel is the 15 countries present in every round: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia.

Note: The panel mean hides opposite movements: the correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9. The largest rise is in Poland, from +0.20 in 2002 to +0.38 in 2023, and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 to −0.04.

Source: General Social Survey, 2002-2024; Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 1-11 (2002-2023); weighted

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json

## All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (175), sorted by id.

| Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| alpha_cult | 0.70 | coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha) | standardized alpha of the five cultural items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| alpha_econ | 0.69 | coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha) | standardized alpha of the three economic items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| anes_att_valid_2020 | 99% | percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer | share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file | 2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_att_valid_2024 | 49% | percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer | share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file | 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_dev_early | 5.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 95% CI 2.9 to 8.1 | 5,572 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_dev_late | 21.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 19.5 to 24.1 | 12,996 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_dev_mid | 13.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled | 95% CI 9.7 to 16.2 | 4,005 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_1972 | 10.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1972 | 95% CI 5.3 to 15.3 | 1,389 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_1980 | 0.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1980 | 95% CI −6.5 to 6.6 | 849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_1992 | 11.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1992 | 95% CI 6.2 to 16.5 | 1,429 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2012 | 20.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2012 | 95% CI 16.2 to 24.8 | 3,741 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2016 | 23.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2016 | 95% CI 18.9 to 28.7 | 2,316 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2020 | 21.9 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 18.2 to 25.7 | 5,673 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prot_2020 | 3,180 | count | count of respondents (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant | 2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prot_2024 | 835 | count | count of respondents (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant | 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| be_2002 | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.19 | 1,627 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey |   |
| be_2023 | −0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI −0.10 to 0.02 | 1,513 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey |   |
| boot_reps | 2,000 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | bootstrap replicates | all years |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| bridge_mad | 0.04 | absolute difference between two correlation coefficients (no sign) | mean absolute difference between the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations | countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys | 2005 or later |   |   | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| bridge_r | +0.81 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys | 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.90 | 36 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| ces_c_2008 | +0.34 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2008 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.35 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_c_2010 | +0.27 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2010 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.28 | 51,265 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_c_2018 | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2018 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.34 | 53,579 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_c_2024 | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2024 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.34 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_cwin_early | +0.29 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.29 | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_cwin_late | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.32 | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_dev_pool | 23.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | CES 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 22.7 to 24.2 | 133,436 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_freq_2020 | 36.5% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more | 2020 | 95% CI 35.3% to 37.7% | 10,434 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_freq_2024 | 29.9% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 28.5% to 31.3% | 9,415 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2008 | 25.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 23.9 to 27.1 | 21,168 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2012 | 27.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2012 | 95% CI 25.7 to 28.9 | 34,381 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2016 | 18.9 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2016 | 95% CI 17.4 to 20.4 | 37,373 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2020 | 23.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 22.1 to 24.9 | 40,514 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2024 | 27.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.3 | 39,057 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_christian_2008 | 18.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 16.6 to 20.7 | 12,201 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_christian_2024 | 13.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 11.2 to 15.2 | 19,980 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_white_2024 | 33.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 32.1 to 35.5 | 29,761 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_net_2008 | 0.18 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.20 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_net_2024 | 0.17 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.18 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_raw_2008 | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.36 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_raw_2010 | 0.25 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2010 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.26 | 51,265 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_raw_2016 | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2016 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.27 | 58,315 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_raw_2018 | 0.36 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.38 | 53,579 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_raw_2024 | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.37 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_sd_early | 1.00 | standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative) | weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled |   | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_sd_late | 1.21 | standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative) | weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled |   | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_sel_2020 | 60.0% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2020 | 95% CI 59.3% to 60.7% | 30,080 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_sel_2024 | 57.6% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 56.7% to 58.5% | 29,642 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_slope_early | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.27 | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_slope_late | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.35 | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| den_1960 | 46.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | 1960 | 95% CI 38.7 to 53.7 | 847 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| den_ces_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | 2024 | 95% CI 8.3 to 12.4 | 22,174 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| den_early | 8.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.3 | 5,809 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| den_fix_frequent_2024 | 10.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 6.6 to 13.8 | 7,759 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| den_fix_seldom_2024 | 8.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 5.4 to 10.9 | 12,221 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| den_late | 8.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.1 | 9,666 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| den_mid | 5.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled | 95% CI 1.3 to 8.6 | 3,775 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| den_old | 20.6 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968, pooled | 95% CI 17.4 to 23.7 | 5,130 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| design_ratio_max | 1.15 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | largest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| design_ratio_med | 1.01 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | median across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| design_ratio_min | 0.92 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | smallest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| ess_2002 | +0.17 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.14 to 0.20 | 26,103 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey |   |
| ess_2023 | +0.15 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.21 | 22,401 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey |   |
| ess_europe_mean | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 11 (2006-2023) | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.14 | 36 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey |   |
| ess_panel_change | −0.02 | change in the correlation coefficient between ESS round 1 and round 11 | mean across the countries of the round 11 correlation minus the round 1 correlation (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS rounds 1 (2002) and 11 (2023) | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.03 | 48,504 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | n is the number of respondents in rounds 1 and 11 together; the interval comes from a bootstrap over the 15 countries. |
| floor_cell | 100 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | respondents (and effective respondents) needed in each attendance group of a survey year | all years |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| floor_country | 300 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | effective respondents needed for a country correlation | all years |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| floor_reg | 200 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | respondents needed for a year-by-year regression | all years |   |   | none (count) | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_2002 | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2002 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.24 | 1,325 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_2008 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2008 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.31 | 1,926 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_2018 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2018 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.29 | 2,235 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_2021 | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2021 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.28 | 3,916 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_2024 | +0.30 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2024 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.34 | 3,137 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_ftf | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | in-person GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.27 | 2,512 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_c_web | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | web GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.37 | 3,331 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_net_1974 | 0.14 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.19 | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_net_2018 | 0.19 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.14 to 0.24 | 2,139 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_net_2024 | 0.20 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.25 | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_raw_1974 | 0.15 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.20 | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_raw_2008 | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.31 | 1,884 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_raw_2018 | 0.25 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.31 | 2,139 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_raw_2024 | 0.32 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.37 | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| item_r_cult | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean pairwise weighted correlation among the five cultural items | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| item_r_econ | +0.42 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean pairwise weighted correlation among the three economic items | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| level_ces_2008 | 47% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 45% to 50% | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| level_ces_2024 | 53% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 50% to 55% | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| level_gss_1974 | 8% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0% to 18% | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| level_gss_2024 | 38% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 29% to 48% | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| mode_diff_raw | 0.13 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | web slope minus in-person slope (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.22 | 5,650 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| mode_ftf_raw | 0.23 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | in-person GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.30 | 2,423 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| mode_web_raw | 0.37 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | web GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.42 | 3,227 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| n_anes_above_zero | 8 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies above zero | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_since_1992 | 8 | count | count of studies | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_zero | 3 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap includes zero | ANES presidential-year studies from 1980 to 1988 | 1980-1988 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_before_1992 | 5 | count | count of studies | ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988 | 1972-1988 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_bridge | 36 | count | count of countries | countries with a usable correlation in both the WVS/EVS and the ESS | 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_ces_chr_dev_gt_den | 2 | count | count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024, Protestant and Catholic voters only | 2008-2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_ces_dev_gt_den | 5 | count | count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024 | 2008-2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_ces_years | 5 | count | count of years | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024 | 2008-2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_chr_apart_den_anes | 0 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020, Protestant and Catholic voters only | 1992-2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_clearly_steeper | 2 | count | count of countries whose 95% interval lies entirely above the United States interval | countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_dev_apart_den | 3 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_dev_gt_den | 8 | count | count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_dev_gt_den_early | 1 | count | count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988 | 1972-1988 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_ess | 36 | count | count of countries | European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 11 |   |   | none (count) | European Social Survey |   |
| n_europe_wvs | 42 | count | count of countries | European countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_panel | 15 | count | count of countries | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 |   |   | none (count) | European Social Survey |   |
| n_panel_down | 9 | count | count of countries whose correlation is lower in round 11 than in round 1 | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 |   |   | none (count) | European Social Survey |   |
| n_panel_up | 6 | count | count of countries whose correlation is higher in round 11 than in round 1 | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 |   |   | none (count) | European Social Survey |   |
| n_publics | 104 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories with a left-right answer and an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_publics_2005 | 112 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories surveyed in 2005 or later | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_publics_file | 118 | count | count of countries and territories (ten EVS labels restored from the country code) | countries and territories in the cleaned WVS/EVS file | 1981-2023 |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_publics_old | 95 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_rest_wvs | 61 | count | count of countries | countries outside Europe and the United States with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_restored | 9 | count | count of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal) | restored EVS countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| n_steeper | 4 | count | count of countries whose correlation is larger than the United States value | countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later |   |   | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| pl_2002 | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.25 | 1,750 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey |   |
| pl_2023 | +0.38 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.43 | 1,282 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey |   |
| r_cult_1975 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-1984 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.40 | 4,196 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_cult_2021 | +0.46 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 2021-2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.49 | 6,846 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_cult_all | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.45 | 38,327 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_econ_1975 | +0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-1984 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.11 | 4,196 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_econ_2021 | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 2021-2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.22 | 6,846 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_econ_all | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.12 | 38,327 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| r_ideo_all | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology, in the survey years in which both indices were measured | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.23 | 55,035 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_ces_freq_2008 | 61.5% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more | 2008 | 95% CI 60.3% to 62.7% | 9,264 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_ces_freq_2024 | 68.1% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 66.7% to 69.5% | 10,949 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_ces_gap_2008 | 26.5 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 25.0 to 28.0 | 24,428 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_ces_gap_2024 | 27.4 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 25.7 to 29.1 | 45,567 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_ces_sel_2008 | 35.0% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 2008 | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.9% | 15,164 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_ces_sel_2024 | 40.7% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 39.8% to 41.6% | 34,618 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| rep_freq_change | 15.9 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | 1972-1978 to 2010-2018 | 95% CI 12.9 to 18.8 | 15,367 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_freq_change24 | 22.4 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | 1972-1978 to 2018-2024 | 95% CI 19.1 to 25.7 | 16,318 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_freq_early | 37.4% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 35.5% to 39.2% | 3,375 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_freq_late | 53.2% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 50.9% to 55.5% | 2,760 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_freq_late24 | 59.7% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 57.0% to 62.5% | 2,531 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_gap_early | 5.3 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 2.9 to 7.7 | 7,613 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_gap_ftf | 18.0 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | in-person GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 10.3 to 25.8 | 1,723 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_gap_late | 15.4 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 12.6 to 18.2 | 7,754 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_gap_late24 | 19.5 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 16.3 to 22.8 | 8,705 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_gap_web | 23.7 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | web GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 16.8 to 30.5 | 2,175 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_sel_change | 5.7 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 1972-1978 to 2010-2018 | 95% CI 3.4 to 8.0 | 15,367 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_sel_change24 | 8.1 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 1972-1978 to 2018-2024 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.4 | 16,318 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_sel_early | 32.1% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 30.5% to 33.7% | 4,238 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_sel_late | 37.8% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 36.2% to 39.5% | 4,994 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_sel_late24 | 40.2% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 38.5% to 41.9% | 6,174 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rise_net_in | 0.06 | change in the standardized slope | rise in the standardized slope net of party; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.10 | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| rise_raw_in | 0.11 | change in the standardized slope | rise in the raw standardized slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.15 | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_1974_2018 | 50% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 95% CI 20% to 163% | 3,483 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_1974_2024 | 64% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 95% CI 41% to 112% | 4,383 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in | 46% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 33% to 67% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in7 | 52% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 95% CI 37% to 74% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in_hi | 67% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled |   | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in_lo | 33% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled |   | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in_psu | 46% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units (respondents in 1974 stand alone, since the design variables start in 1975) | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 33% to 66% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in_psu_hi | 66% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled |   | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_in_psu_lo | 33% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled |   | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| share_web | 63% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 49% to 82% | 19,215 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| unaff_dem_2024 | 70.9% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 69.7% to 72.2% | 14,311 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| unaff_in_seldom_2008 | 34.2% | percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated | weighted share unaffiliated | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2008 | 95% CI 33.2% to 35.2% | 13,123 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| unaff_in_seldom_2024 | 44.8% | percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated | weighted share unaffiliated | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 43.9% to 45.7% | 29,631 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| unaff_prot_2008 | 36.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant | 2008 | 95% CI 34.7 to 38.6 | 13,283 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| unaff_prot_2024 | 38.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant | 2024 | 95% CI 36.3 to 39.7 | 28,512 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| unaff_seldom_share | 96% | percent of unaffiliated voters who attend a few times a year or never | weighted share attending seldom | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and answered the attendance question | 2024 | 95% CI 95% to 96% | 14,224 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| us_gss | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2006-2024 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.26 | 27,953 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey |   |
| us_wvs | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right self-placement with the importance of God | WVS/EVS respondents in the United States with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2011 and 2017 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 5,858 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| within_cath_2008 | 18.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 14.7 to 21.6 | 4,514 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| within_cath_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 6.6 to 14.2 | 7,220 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| within_none_2020 | 14.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, among the unaffiliated | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 7.5 to 21.0 | 14,465 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the seldom and the frequent group together. The frequent group is the limiting cell, with 369 respondents and an effective sample of 208. |
| within_prot_2008 | 17.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 14.7 to 19.7 | 7,687 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| within_prot_2024 | 12.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 10.1 to 14.8 | 12,760 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| wvs_all_mean | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.12 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| wvs_all_mean_old | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | 95 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| wvs_europe_mean | +0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | European countries in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.16 | 42 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |
| wvs_rest_mean | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries outside Europe and the United States in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.10 | 61 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS |   |

## Definitions

- Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
- Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
- Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
- Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
- Standardized coefficient: A regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared.
- Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out.
- Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
- Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.
- Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other.
- Left-right self-placement: A survey question that asks people to place themselves on a scale from left to right. The scale is the same for everyone, but the meaning attached to left and right differs across people, countries and years.

## Methods

Sample. Reported two-party presidential voters in the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (studies from 1952 to 2020; attendance is asked from 1970) and in the Cooperative Election Study (presidential years 2008 to 2024, weight_cumulative); General Social Survey respondents 1972 to 2024 (weight_use, with the interview mode joined from the raw file); World Values Survey and European Values Study respondents with fieldwork in 2005 or later; European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11. The cumulative ANES file's 2024 religion and attendance codes are unusable (the count of Protestants falls from 3,180 in 2020 to 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, and 49% of 2024 respondents have a valid attendance answer against 99% in 2020), so every ANES series ends in 2020 and 2024 comes from the CES. Groups. Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item and are cut as closely as each source allows: frequent is weekly or nearly weekly (ANES Often, GSS attend 6 to 8), which in the CES is weekly or more (5 and 6 on the six-point item) because the CES has no nearly-weekly answer; occasional is monthly; seldom is a few times a year or never. Party identification includes leaners (GSS partyid 0 to 2 Democratic, 3 independent, 4 to 6 Republican; CES pid7 1 to 3, 4 and 5 to 7); pure independents are left out of the Republican share and are a category in the party control. The CES party and ideology series use every CES year from 2008 to 2024, and the vote series the presidential years. Estimands. The attendance gap is the weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus that among frequent attenders; the denominational gap is Catholics minus Protestants, and the CES contrast for the unaffiliated is the unaffiliated minus Protestants. The slope is the weighted least squares coefficient of ideology (GSS polviews 1 to 7; CES five-point ideology with not sure missing) on attendance (GSS 0 to 8; CES 1 to 6), both standardized once on the whole common sample of respondents with attendance, ideology and party (GSS 1974 to 2024; CES 2008 to 2024), fitted year by year raw and with the party control on the same respondents (two indicators for Republican and independent, or six indicators for seven categories). A rise is the late slope minus the early slope; the share accounted for by party is one minus the ratio of the rise net of party to the raw rise. Windows of several survey years rescale each year's weights to average one. The cultural index averages the weighted z-scores of five GSS items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason) and the economic index those of three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences), each with at least two answers; the economic items are asked from 1975, so both indices and their correlations start there, the first period holds the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984 only, and the correlation with self-placed ideology uses the same survey years. Cross-national correlations are weighted Pearson correlations of left-right self-placement with the importance of God (WVS/EVS), or with attendance (ESS rounds 3 to 11 pooled; the GSS for the United States, 2006 to 2024). Intervals. Weighted shares and means use the Kish effective sample size and a normal interval, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores stratification and clustering, which can raise or lower the variance; the same formula is used for the CES, an opt-in panel, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited; gaps combine the two standard errors; correlations use Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size; year-by-year slopes use HC3 robust errors; rises and the shares of a rise or of a slope that party accounts for use a percentile bootstrap over respondents (the estimate is recomputed on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement, each window resampled separately, seed 12345, and the interval is read from the percentiles of the results); means across countries count each country once and use the same bootstrap over countries; the correlation between the WVS/EVS and ESS country values uses Fisher z on the number of countries. The GSS design variables are used for two checks: cluster-robust errors on the primary sampling unit change the standard errors of the yearly slopes by a median ratio of 1.01 against the HC3 errors (range 0.92 to 1.15), and a bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the main share as 46% (95% interval 33% to 66%) against 46% (33% to 67%) from the bootstrap over respondents. The shares and correlations of the ANES, CES, WVS/EVS and ESS are not checked this way. Suppression. A subgroup-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size; a yearly regression needs 200 respondents; a country correlation needs an effective sample of 300; no published cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents. Countries. The cleaned WVS/EVS file has a blank country label for ten EVS countries; they are restored from the country code and 9 of them have a usable correlation. Europe in the WVS/EVS is the region Europe and Central Asia without Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The European time series uses the 15 countries in every ESS round and places each round at the year fieldwork began. Mode. GSS interviews were in person, with some by telephone, through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and a mix of in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024; the CES is online throughout. Estimates from 2021 on are reported with a mode split or a mode note: the split covers the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation in 2022 and 2024, and the party comparison of the text uses the in-person surveys of 2010 to 2018 with the 2018 to 2024 window as a second comparison. The ANES mixes in-person and web interviews from 2012 and has no mode weights in 2020, and its vote gap is not split by mode.

## What these data cannot show

- Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers.
- The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one.
- The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation.
- The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate.
- The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation.
- The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode.
- The CES is an opt-in online panel.
- The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys.
- The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs.
- The GSS design variables allow two checks.
- Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one.
- A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents.
- The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way.
- Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race.
- The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is.
- The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country.

## References

1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
2. Layman, Geoffrey C. (2001). The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. Columbia University Press.
3. Putnam, Robert D.; Campbell, David E. (2010). American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. Simon and Schuster.
4. Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press.
5. Campbell, David E.; Layman, Geoffrey C.; Green, John C.; Sumaktoyo, Nathanael G. (2018). Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations. American Journal of Political Science 62(3): 551-565. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12365

## Provenance

- Pipeline version: 1.0.0
- Build script: book3/chapters/the-god-gap-in-america/build.py (sha256 1efbd4d08327c8f4db0440ba4e914725365d37fecbd1562fa4c64e45f1770290)
- Built on: 2026-09-30
- Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs:

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## Machine formats

- Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report
- Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md
- Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/facts.json
- Table 1, figure "vote_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json
- Table 2, figure "denomination_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json
- Table 3, figure "party_by_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json
- Table 4, figure "attendance_ideology_slope" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json
- Table 5, figure "absorbed_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json
- Table 6, figure "culture_economics" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json
- Table 7, figure "world_correlations" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json
- Table 8, figure "europe_time" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json
- Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt