Chapter 3.5 · Report

The income ladder

In the CES the highest household-income bracket's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote minus the lowest bracket's went from −9.1 points in 2008 to +5.7 in 2024.

Author: Vishal Singh
Affiliation: NYU Stern
Published: 30 September 2026

Every estimate of the chapter with its interval and every figure as a table, generated from the chapter's data files. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. The same report as Markdown: report.md.

Identification

Title

The income ladder

Chapter

3.5 (Part III, Participation and coalitions; Coalitions and political differences)

Question

How did the relationship between household income and the presidential vote change between 2008 and 2024?

Dek

In the CES the highest household-income bracket's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote minus the lowest bracket's went from −9.1 points in 2008 to +5.7 in 2024.

Grain

individuals

Status

draft

Published

30 September 2026

Updated

not revised

Data sources

Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative
State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976-2024, used only for the certified national two-party share; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts)

Canonical URL

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder

Markdown

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report.md

BibTeX

@misc{singh2026theincomeladder,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {The income ladder},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}

Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. Every fact is in the table of all estimates below.

Estimand	Population	Period	Value	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Fact id
Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	−9.1	95% CI −12.9 to −5.4	5,534	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	gap_2008
Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	+5.7	95% CI 1.1 to 10.3	12,281	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	gap_2024
change in the highest-minus-lowest gap (difference in differences), weighted, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	+14.8	95% CI 10.8 to 18.9	17,815	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	did_w
weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	62.4%	95% CI 60.5% to 64.4%	3,900	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	sh_b1_2008
weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	51.5%	95% CI 49.4% to 53.6%	7,449	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	sh_b1_2024
weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	53.3%	95% CI 50.4% to 56.1%	1,634	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	sh_b5_2008
weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	57.2%	95% CI 55.2% to 59.1%	4,832	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	sh_b5_2024
weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets	2024	−3.3	95% CI −9.3 to 2.7	7,437	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	gapn_2024
weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets	2024	+0.4	95% CI −5.2 to 6.0	4,844	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	gapd_2024
definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	$30,000			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study	floor_30
definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	$150,000			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study	floor_150
Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	+4.0	95% CI 1.7 to 6.3	33,761	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	pm_2024
Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	+9.7	95% CI 7.5 to 11.8	31,144	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	rm_2024
count of respondents	respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	188,145			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study	n_votes
count of respondents	two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	170,053			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study	n_income
definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	$60,000			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study	floor_60
definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024	$100,000			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study	floor_100

Findings

In the Cooperative Election Study (CES), the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the highest of five household-income brackets minus the share in the lowest was −9.1 (95% CI −12.9 to −5.4) points in 2008 and +5.7 (95% CI 1.1 to 10.3) in 2024. That is a change of +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) points, larger than sampling error. In 2008 the lowest bracket was the most Democratic of the five, and in 2024 the highest was. The Democratic share in the lowest bracket fell from 62.4% in 2008 to 51.5% in 2024, while the share in the highest bracket rose from 53.3% to 57.2%.

Within education groups the 2024 gap is −3.3 (95% CI −9.3 to 2.7) points among voters without a degree and +0.4 (95% CI −5.2 to 6.0) among degree holders, intervals that include zero (Table 4), so the reversal combines income and education.

The 2024 profile is U-shaped. The three brackets between the ends, which cover household incomes from $30,000 to $150,000, are less Democratic than either end when pooled. The lowest bracket's share minus that of the middle three is +4.0 (95% CI 1.7 to 6.3) points, and the same difference for the highest bracket is +9.7 (95% CI 7.5 to 11.8) points.

The CES is an online panel survey fielded by YouGov around each election. This chapter uses the presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024: 188,145 respondents who reported voting for one of the two major-party candidates, of whom 170,053 also reported household income.Except where a figure says otherwise, estimates use the cumulative-file survey weight, the one weight the file defines for all five elections. Intervals come from the Kish effective sample size [1] or from standard errors clustered by state, and each figure subtitle says which; the methods note in the appendix gives the rule. The file groups the twelve income bands of the questionnaire into five brackets in nominal dollars: under $30,000, $30,000 to $60,000, $60,000 to $100,000, $100,000 to $150,000, and $150,000 or more. High income means the highest bracket everywhere in this chapter. The Democratic share is the weighted share of these voters who reported a Democratic vote, and the gap is the Democratic share in one group minus that in another.

The most Democratic bracket went from lowest to highest

Table 1 compares the two elections bracket by bracket. In 2008 the Democratic share fell with income, from 62.4% (95% CI 60.5% to 64.4%) in the lowest bracket to 54.1%, 50.4% and 50.0% in the next three, and then rose to 53.3% in the highest. The rise at the top was small. The highest bracket was +1.3 (95% CI −1.7 to 4.3) points more Democratic than the three middle brackets pooled, and that interval includes zero.

Table 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highest

In 2024 the five shares, from the lowest bracket to the highest, were 51.5%, 46.9%, 46.9%, 49.3% and 57.2%. Between the two elections the Democratic share changed by −10.9 points in the lowest bracket and by −7.2, −3.5 and −0.7 in the next three, the last with an interval that includes zero. In the highest bracket it changed by +3.9 (95% CI 0.4 to 7.3) points, toward the Democratic candidate. Among all two-party voters in the survey, whether or not they reported income, the Democratic share changed by −4.9 (95% CI −6.0 to −3.9) points over the same years. The highest bracket therefore moved toward the Democratic candidate while the survey's voters as a whole moved away.

Work that covers a longer period found that Democratic candidates began winning a growing share of affluent voters in the 1990s, a trend concentrated among, but not limited to, college-educated voters and visible only in larger metropolitan areas [2]. The CES covers the recent end of that history. The next sections ask whether the recent change is a reversal of the income ladder or a different shape.

By 2024 both ends voted more Democratic than the middle

Table 2 breaks the change into two arms. The highest bracket's edge over the pooled middle three brackets rose from +1.3 points in 2008 to +8.2 in 2016 and +9.7 (95% CI 7.5 to 11.8) in 2024. The lowest bracket's edge over the same middle brackets fell from +10.4 to +4.0 (95% CI 1.7 to 6.3) and stayed above zero. The fourth bracket taken alone is not distinguishable from the lowest, with a difference of +2.2 (95% CI −0.5 to 5.0) points, so the U shape rests on the two pooled contrasts and not on every bracket. A ladder turned upside down would have the Democratic share rise steadily with income. In 2024 it does not, because the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three. The reversal applies only to the comparison of the two end brackets.

Table 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0

Dollar brackets are one way to describe income. A voter's rank in the year's income distribution gives a summary that does not depend on dollar cutoffs. The slope of the Democratic share on that rank, from the lowest rank to the highest, was −15.6 (95% CI −19.1 to −12.0) points in 2008 and +3.4 (95% CI −1.2 to 7.9) in 2024. The 2008 slope is clearly negative, and the 2024 slope has an interval that includes zero. A straight line summarizes a U poorly, so a single slope hides the shape that the brackets show.

The 2024 U shape within education groups

Degree holders make up a larger part of the highest bracket than of the lowest, and the difference has grown. In 2008 61.0% (95% CI 58.2% to 63.8%) of voters in the highest bracket held a four-year degree, against 12.0% (95% CI 10.7% to 13.4%) in the lowest bracket. In 2024 the shares were 74.5% (95% CI 72.8% to 76.2%) and 16.2% (95% CI 14.6% to 17.7%). Degree holders also vote more Democratic than other voters, by +4.2 (95% CI 2.7 to 5.8) points in 2008 and +12.6 (95% CI 11.0 to 14.1) in 2024 among all voters. A comparison of the highest and lowest brackets therefore mixes a difference in income with a difference in education.

Table 3 draws the profile inside each education group. Among degree holders in 2024 the lowest and highest brackets stand at 60.4% (95% CI 56.1% to 64.8%) and 60.8% (95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%), against 54.2% (95% CI 52.2% to 56.3%) in the third bracket. Among voters without a degree they stand at 49.7% (95% CI 47.4% to 52.1%) and 46.5% (95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%), against 41.2% (95% CI 39.1% to 43.4%) in the third. Against the pooled middle three brackets, the lowest bracket differs by +5.4 (95% CI 0.8 to 9.9) points and the highest by +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) among degree holders, and both intervals are above zero. Among voters without a degree the lowest bracket differs from the pooled middle by +7.7 (95% CI 5.0 to 10.4) points, an interval above zero, and the highest by +4.4 (95% CI 0.0 to 8.9), an interval that reaches zero. The two highest-bracket differences are close and their intervals overlap, so the data do not show that the right side of the U is weaker among voters without a degree. The shape appears inside each education group, so mixing two groups with different average votes does not produce it.

Table 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holders

The button labeled 2024, white voters in Table 3 restricts the sample to white voters. Among white voters without a degree the highest bracket voted 43.4% (95% CI 38.7% to 48.1%) Democratic in 2024, against 35.1% (95% CI 32.9% to 37.3%) in the third bracket, so income still separates these voters at the top of the range. In this view the highest bracket differs from the pooled middle brackets by +6.5 (95% CI 3.8 to 9.3) points among degree holders and +8.3 (95% CI 3.4 to 13.2) among the others, and both intervals are above zero. The lowest bracket differs by +4.4 (95% CI 1.4 to 7.5) points among white voters without a degree and by +3.5 (95% CI −2.0 to 9.1) among white degree holders, an interval that includes zero. The left side of the U is therefore clear in one white group and not in the other.

Net of education, the 2024 gap includes zero

Table 4 gives the highest-minus-lowest gap for all voters, within each education group, and net of education, which compares voters with the same education and comes from a linear probability model. The model uses four education levels, so its coefficient is not an average of the two within-group rows. Among voters without a degree the gap moved from −12.2 (95% CI −17.4 to −7.0) in 2008 to −3.3 (95% CI −9.3 to 2.7) in 2024, and among degree holders from −12.5 (95% CI −19.8 to −5.1) to +0.4 (95% CI −5.2 to 6.0). Both 2024 intervals include zero. That means the data cannot tell either within-group gap from zero, not that the gap is zero. Net of education the gap is −13.7 (95% CI −17.6 to −9.8) in 2008 and −4.5 (95% CI −9.1 to 0.1) in 2024, and net of education together with race and ethnicity the 2024 gap is −1.9 (95% CI −6.2 to 2.3).

Table 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zero

The gap still rises. The change is +8.9 (95% CI 2.2 to 15.6) points among voters without a degree, +12.9 (95% CI 3.9 to 21.8) among degree holders, +9.2 (95% CI 4.9 to 13.4) net of education and +7.8 (95% CI 3.7 to 11.9) net of education with race and ethnicity, against +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) for all voters. Holding education and race fixed removes part of the change in the gap and leaves the rest. The positive 2024 gap for all voters combines a difference in income with a difference in education. This is a description of shared variation and not a causal decomposition, since income, education and race are each tied to where people live, what work they do and whom they know.

A study of Western democracies from 1948 to 2020 found education and income separating: by the 2010s higher-educated voters voted for the left while high-income voters continued to vote for the right [3]. In the 2024 CES, net of education, the highest bracket is still more Democratic than the middle three brackets, by +4.1 (95% CI 1.6 to 6.6) points, against +8.6 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.6) for the lowest bracket. Net of education the profile remains U-shaped, with both end brackets above the middle. The comparison does not test the study's claims, which cover other countries, measures and years. A book-length account of the education divide in American politics is [4], and Chapter 3.4, The diploma divide takes up the issues on which graduates and non-graduates differ. Planned, Class, church and the two axes (planned) sets income and education against church attendance on the economic and cultural dimensions.

Among high-income voters, the education gap widened through 2020

The highest bracket is now a larger part of the electorate, so its composition matters. Table 5 splits it by education. Among voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree, the Democratic share was 55.7% (95% CI 52.6% to 58.8%) in 2008, 63.9% (95% CI 62.0% to 65.9%) in 2020 and 60.8% (95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%) in 2024, and it changed by −3.1 (95% CI −6.0 to −0.3) points from 2020 to 2024. Among voters in the highest bracket without a degree the shares were 49.4% (95% CI 43.9% to 54.9%), 46.4% (95% CI 42.4% to 50.3%) and 46.5% (95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%), with intervals that overlap. The gap between the two groups was +6.3 (95% CI 0.0 to 12.6) points in 2008, +17.6 (95% CI 13.2 to 22.0) in 2020 and +14.4 (95% CI 9.6 to 19.1) in 2024. It changed by +11.3 (95% CI 3.6 to 19.0) points from 2008 to 2020 and by −3.2 (95% CI −9.7 to 3.3) from 2020 to 2024, an interval that includes zero.

Table 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4%

The gap is lower in 2024 than in 2020 by an amount within sampling error. The share among degree holders was lower in 2024, and the share among voters without a degree changed by +0.1 (95% CI −5.7 to 5.9) points over the same years, so the decline among degree holders accounts for the difference in the point estimates. Voters without a degree in the highest bracket stayed within sampling error of their 2008 level in every later election, including 2024, when the change from 2008 was −3.0 (95% CI −9.9 to 4.0) points. One election cannot say whether the 2024 decline among degree holders lasts.

The timing of the crossing depends on the weight

The crossing of the highest-minus-lowest gap cannot be assigned to one election. The vote question is asked after the election, and the CES file carries several weights. The cumulative-file weight used in the rest of the chapter is defined for all five elections. A post-election weight, built for the respondents who completed the post-election interview, exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020, and a validated-vote weight, for respondents whose turnout was checked against voter records, exists for 2020 and 2024. Neither exists for 2008. Table 6 plots the gap by election under each weight, with intervals clustered by state.

With the cumulative-file weight the gap is −3.4 (95% CI −7.6 to 0.8) in 2012, +3.4 (95% CI −0.1 to 6.9) in 2016 and +2.6 (95% CI −1.0 to 6.2) in 2020, and each interval includes zero, so only 2008 and 2024 differ clearly from zero. With the post-election weight the gap is −6.9 (95% CI −10.9 to −3.0) in 2012, an interval below zero, and +2.0 (95% CI −1.7 to 5.6) in 2016 and +0.7 (95% CI −3.1 to 4.6) in 2020, whose intervals include zero. The 2024 gap is above zero under both weights defined for it, at +5.7 (95% CI 1.1 to 10.3) with the cumulative-file weight and +4.2 (95% CI 0.2 to 8.2) with the validated-vote weight.

Table 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zero

The change in the gap since 2008 is above zero by 2016 under the cumulative-file weight, at +12.5 (95% CI 8.0 to 17.0) points, and under the post-election weight, at +11.1 (95% CI 6.4 to 15.8). By 2012 it is above zero only under the cumulative-file weight, at +5.7 (95% CI 1.0 to 10.4) points against +2.2 (95% CI −2.5 to 6.9) with the post-election weight. Under the validated-vote weight the change from 2008 to 2024 is +13.3 (95% CI 8.9 to 17.8) points. The data therefore do not place the start of the movement before 2016. The 2008 and 2024 gaps keep their signs under every weight available for them.

The change holds under five other definitions

The change in the highest-minus-lowest gap between 2008 and 2024, a difference in differences (the change in the gap between two elections), is +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) points, with a state-clustered standard error of 2.1 points. Without the survey weights it is +11.4 (95% CI 8.5 to 14.3). Dollar brackets raise a further question. The highest bracket held 6.7% (95% CI 6.3% to 7.1%) of the voters who reported income in 2008 and 13.3% (95% CI 12.8% to 13.9%) in 2024, so the highest bracket in 2024 is a broader group than the one in 2008.

Table 7 repeats the estimate under five other definitions, which its notes describe. All six intervals are above zero, and the change is largest, at +20.6 (95% CI 16.4 to 24.8) points, with both cutoffs held constant in real dollars, so nominal dollars do not account for it. The two real-dollar groups are not equal in size across years: the top group holds 19.8% of voters in 2008 and 13.3% in 2024, and the bottom group holds 10.8% and 17.8%.

Table 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groups

The highest bracket made up 6.6% (95% CI 6.0% to 7.2%) of Democratic voters in 2008 and 15.4% (95% CI 14.6% to 16.2%) in 2024, and 6.9% (95% CI 6.3% to 7.4%) and 11.3% (95% CI 10.6% to 12.0%) of Republican voters, so the increase is larger among Democratic voters. Part of the increase comes from the growth of the bracket among all voters, so the comparison of the two parties is more informative than either series alone. Chapter 3.2, The two coalitions breaks each party's voters down by education, income, race, religion, age and gender, and Chapter 3.3, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (planned) follows the vote of three racial and ethnic groups.

Table 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3%

What these data cannot show

The CES interviews different respondents in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not people. It cannot say whether any voter changed their vote as income or education changed, or how much of the change comes from migration, aging and the entry of new voters. The vote is self-reported, and an online survey could lean toward one party by an amount that varies with income. The check available here is coarse. Table 9 compares the CES national Democratic share with the certified count in each election. The largest difference is 1.1 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.8) points, in 2012 with the survey above the count, and in that election the certified share lies outside the survey interval. The difference is −0.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 0.5) points in 2024. With the post-election weight the 2012 difference is +0.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 1.1) points, so the 2012 discrepancy depends on the weight. A lean of constant size would leave the differences between brackets intact, but agreement at the national level cannot show that the survey is accurate inside income brackets.

Table 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result

Income is household income in bands and is missing for 6.3% of two-party voters in 2008 and 11.2% in 2012, and for 8.2% in 2024. The Democratic share among voters who skipped the income question minus the share among those who answered was −6.5 (95% CI −9.3 to −3.6) points in 2024, so the ladder leaves out a group whose vote differs. Brackets are nominal dollars for households of any size. The chapter has no data on wealth, occupation or individual earnings.

The design cannot separate income from the things that go with it. Education and race are the only two adjustments, and place of residence, occupation, homeownership and age are not held fixed. The chapter describes where the Democratic share is higher and how that changed, and it says nothing about why, since the file holds no measures of candidates, campaigns or policy positions. Five elections are a short series, and the 2024 result for degree holders in the highest bracket is one observation.

Income relates to the vote differently in different places. An analysis of survey and state data found that the association between income and Republican voting was stronger in poorer states than in richer ones [5], and this chapter pools voters across states without estimating the ladder for each. A pattern across places also need not match a pattern across households, which is the problem of ecological inference. Planned, Income and the county vote (planned) compares counties with different incomes once education is held constant, and Companion 8.1b, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote looks at wage and capital income in ZIP codes.

Tables

Table 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highest

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket, 2008 and 2024 (the buttons show other elections); two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Later election	Income bracket	Share 2008 (%)	95% CI low 2008	95% CI high 2008	n 2008	Share later (%)	95% CI low later	95% CI high later	n later	Change (points)	95% CI low change	95% CI high change
2024	$150k or more	53.3	50.4	56.1	1,634	57.2	55.2	59.1	4,832	+3.9	0.4	7.3
2024	$100k to $150k	50.0	48.0	51.9	3,244	49.3	47.5	51.0	6,416	−0.7	−3.3	2.0
2024	$60k to $100k	50.4	49.0	51.8	6,261	46.9	45.4	48.4	9,646	−3.5	−5.6	−1.4
2024	$30k to $60k	54.1	52.7	55.4	7,172	46.9	45.3	48.4	10,250	−7.2	−9.3	−5.1
2024	Under $30k	62.4	60.5	64.4	3,900	51.5	49.4	53.6	7,449	−10.9	−13.8	−8.1
2020	$150k or more	53.3	50.4	56.1	1,634	59.3	57.5	61.0	3,908	+6.0	2.6	9.4
2020	$100k to $150k	50.0	48.0	51.9	3,244	53.7	52.2	55.2	6,062	+3.8	1.3	6.2
2020	$60k to $100k	50.4	49.0	51.8	6,261	50.3	49.1	51.5	10,534	−0.1	−2.0	1.7
2020	$30k to $60k	54.1	52.7	55.4	7,172	51.6	50.4	52.9	11,283	−2.4	−4.3	−0.6
2020	Under $30k	62.4	60.5	64.4	3,900	56.6	55.0	58.2	7,867	−5.8	−8.3	−3.3
2016	$150k or more	53.3	50.4	56.1	1,634	58.4	56.2	60.7	2,739	+5.1	1.5	8.8
2016	$100k to $150k	50.0	48.0	51.9	3,244	52.8	51.2	54.5	5,428	+2.9	0.3	5.5
2016	$60k to $100k	50.4	49.0	51.8	6,261	50.4	49.1	51.6	10,089	−0.1	−2.0	1.8
2016	$30k to $60k	54.1	52.7	55.4	7,172	49.1	47.9	50.4	11,291	−4.9	−6.8	−3.1
2016	Under $30k	62.4	60.5	64.4	3,900	55.1	53.4	56.8	7,025	−7.4	−10.0	−4.8
2012	$150k or more	53.3	50.4	56.1	1,634	56.2	53.1	59.3	2,206	+2.9	−1.3	7.1
2012	$100k to $150k	50.0	48.0	51.9	3,244	52.0	49.8	54.2	4,300	+2.0	−0.9	5.0
2012	$60k to $100k	50.4	49.0	51.8	6,261	50.7	49.1	52.2	8,686	+0.2	−1.9	2.3
2012	$30k to $60k	54.1	52.7	55.4	7,172	53.8	52.4	55.2	10,959	−0.3	−2.3	1.7
2012	Under $30k	62.4	60.5	64.4	3,900	59.6	57.9	61.4	6,872	−2.8	−5.4	−0.2

Views: 2008 and 2024 (comparison = 2024); 2008 and 2020 (comparison = 2020); 2008 and 2016 (comparison = 2016); 2008 and 2012 (comparison = 2012).

Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years.

Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json

Table 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0

Difference in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote between an end bracket and the pooled middle three brackets, percentage points, by presidential election; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Contrast	Election	Difference (points)	95% CI low (Kish)	95% CI high (Kish)	95% CI low (clustered by state)	95% CI high (clustered by state)	n voters
Highest bracket minus the middle three	2008	+1.3	−1.7	4.3	−1.3	3.9	18,311
Highest bracket minus the middle three	2012	+3.8	0.6	7.0	0.2	7.4	26,151
Highest bracket minus the middle three	2016	+8.2	5.8	10.5	5.6	10.7	29,547
Highest bracket minus the middle three	2020	+7.7	5.7	9.6	5.2	10.2	31,787
Highest bracket minus the middle three	2024	+9.7	7.5	11.8	6.9	12.4	31,144
Lowest bracket minus the middle three	2008	+10.4	8.3	12.6	8.4	12.5	20,577
Lowest bracket minus the middle three	2012	+7.2	5.2	9.2	4.7	9.7	30,817
Lowest bracket minus the middle three	2016	+4.8	2.9	6.7	2.6	6.9	33,833
Lowest bracket minus the middle three	2020	+5.1	3.3	6.8	3.1	7.1	35,746
Lowest bracket minus the middle three	2024	+4.0	1.7	6.3	0.9	7.0	33,761

Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years.

Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design.

Note: The bands use the Kish effective sample size. The last two columns of the table give intervals from standard errors clustered by state, which are wider.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_contrasts.json

Table 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holders

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket and education, 2024 by default; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Sample	Election	Education	Income bracket	Democratic share (%)	95% CI low	95% CI high	n voters
All voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	60.8	58.7	62.9	3,569
All voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	54.8	52.7	57.0	3,769
All voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	54.2	52.2	56.3	4,160
All voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	56.8	54.1	59.5	2,755
All voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	60.4	56.1	64.8	1,275
All voters	2024	No four-year degree	$150k or more	46.5	42.2	50.7	1,263
All voters	2024	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	40.9	38.0	43.9	2,647
All voters	2024	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	41.2	39.1	43.4	5,486
All voters	2024	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	43.1	41.2	45.0	7,495
All voters	2024	No four-year degree	Under $30k	49.7	47.4	52.1	6,174
All voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	63.9	62.0	65.9	2,965
All voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	61.1	59.3	62.9	3,883
All voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	61.6	60.0	63.1	5,066
All voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	63.0	61.0	65.0	3,567
All voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	67.7	64.8	70.5	1,526
All voters	2020	No four-year degree	$150k or more	46.4	42.4	50.3	943
All voters	2020	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	42.6	40.0	45.2	2,179
All voters	2020	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	41.2	39.5	42.9	5,468
All voters	2020	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	47.1	45.6	48.6	7,716
All voters	2020	No four-year degree	Under $30k	54.5	52.7	56.4	6,341
All voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	62.4	60.0	64.8	2,003
All voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	59.5	57.5	61.4	3,342
All voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	60.6	59.0	62.3	4,723
All voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	60.6	58.6	62.5	3,378
All voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	62.6	59.4	65.9	1,313
All voters	2016	No four-year degree	$150k or more	51.0	46.4	55.6	736
All voters	2016	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	45.4	42.6	48.1	2,086
All voters	2016	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	44.1	42.3	45.8	5,366
All voters	2016	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	46.0	44.5	47.5	7,913
All voters	2016	No four-year degree	Under $30k	54.1	52.2	55.9	5,712
All voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	59.8	56.4	63.3	1,607
All voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	56.1	53.3	59.0	2,663
All voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	55.3	53.1	57.6	4,054
All voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	59.3	56.8	61.8	3,359
All voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	63.7	59.8	67.5	1,401
All voters	2012	No four-year degree	$150k or more	49.7	43.7	55.7	599
All voters	2012	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	47.3	43.9	50.7	1,637
All voters	2012	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	47.9	45.8	50.0	4,632
All voters	2012	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	52.1	50.4	53.7	7,600
All voters	2012	No four-year degree	Under $30k	58.9	57.0	60.8	5,471
All voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	55.7	52.6	58.8	1,094
All voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	54.0	51.5	56.5	1,709
All voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	56.6	54.5	58.7	2,425
All voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	58.0	55.5	60.4	1,768
All voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	68.2	64.2	72.2	595
All voters	2008	No four-year degree	$150k or more	49.4	43.9	54.9	540
All voters	2008	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	46.1	43.1	49.1	1,535
All voters	2008	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	46.9	45.1	48.8	3,836
All voters	2008	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	52.9	51.3	54.6	5,404
All voters	2008	No four-year degree	Under $30k	61.6	59.5	63.8	3,305
White voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	58.1	55.8	60.5	2,774
White voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	51.3	48.9	53.7	2,979
White voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	51.0	48.7	53.3	3,143
White voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	53.1	50.0	56.2	1,985
White voters	2024	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	55.1	49.8	60.5	854
White voters	2024	No four-year degree	$150k or more	43.4	38.7	48.1	1,004
White voters	2024	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	35.4	32.4	38.4	2,134
White voters	2024	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	35.1	32.9	37.3	4,345
White voters	2024	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	34.9	33.0	36.9	5,709
White voters	2024	No four-year degree	Under $30k	39.5	36.7	42.3	4,344
White voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	61.3	59.2	63.5	2,291
White voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	58.0	56.0	60.0	2,975
White voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	57.7	55.9	59.5	3,790
White voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	57.3	55.1	59.6	2,570
White voters	2020	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	63.4	60.0	66.7	1,057
White voters	2020	No four-year degree	$150k or more	39.6	35.4	43.7	727
White voters	2020	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	36.5	33.8	39.1	1,724
White voters	2020	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	33.0	31.3	34.6	4,293
White voters	2020	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	35.0	33.5	36.5	5,780
White voters	2020	No four-year degree	Under $30k	38.9	37.0	40.8	4,432
White voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	59.7	56.9	62.5	1,466
White voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	56.7	54.6	58.9	2,524
White voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	57.1	55.2	59.0	3,463
White voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	56.2	53.9	58.4	2,402
White voters	2016	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	58.1	54.2	62.0	867
White voters	2016	No four-year degree	$150k or more	45.6	40.5	50.8	569
White voters	2016	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	38.0	35.1	41.0	1,625
White voters	2016	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	37.3	35.4	39.1	4,236
White voters	2016	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	36.6	35.0	38.1	6,080
White voters	2016	No four-year degree	Under $30k	39.7	37.7	41.8	4,128
White voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	57.1	53.4	60.9	1,357
White voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	53.4	50.2	56.5	2,172
White voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	52.3	49.8	54.8	3,310
White voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	54.7	51.8	57.6	2,625
White voters	2012	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	60.6	56.1	65.1	1,061
White voters	2012	No four-year degree	$150k or more	47.0	40.2	53.8	492
White voters	2012	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	42.7	38.9	46.4	1,354
White voters	2012	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	41.6	39.4	43.8	3,854
White voters	2012	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	44.5	42.7	46.3	6,074
White voters	2012	No four-year degree	Under $30k	47.9	45.6	50.1	4,077
White voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$150k or more	53.2	50.0	56.5	978
White voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$100k to $150k	50.4	47.8	53.0	1,514
White voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$60k to $100k	52.9	50.7	55.1	2,116
White voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	$30k to $60k	52.9	50.3	55.5	1,504
White voters	2008	Four-year degree or more	Under $30k	64.5	60.2	68.9	514
White voters	2008	No four-year degree	$150k or more	43.9	38.1	49.8	462
White voters	2008	No four-year degree	$100k to $150k	39.6	36.4	42.8	1,307
White voters	2008	No four-year degree	$60k to $100k	40.3	38.3	42.2	3,242
White voters	2008	No four-year degree	$30k to $60k	42.5	40.8	44.2	4,446
White voters	2008	No four-year degree	Under $30k	50.3	47.9	52.7	2,643

Views: 2024, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2024); 2016, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2016); 2008, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2008); 2024, white voters (population = White voters, year = 2024); 2008, white voters (population = White voters, year = 2008).

Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years.

Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design.

Note: Cells with fewer than 100 respondents or a Kish effective sample below 100 are not shown; none met that condition.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/profile_by_degree.json

Table 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zero

Democratic share in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, 2008 and 2024, for all voters, within education groups, and net of education and race and ethnicity; 95% intervals clustered by state

Comparison	Gap 2008 (points)	95% CI low 2008	95% CI high 2008	n 2008	Gap 2024 (points)	95% CI low 2024	95% CI high 2024	n 2024
All voters	−9.1	−12.9	−5.4	5,534	+5.7	1.1	10.3	12,281
No degree	−12.2	−17.4	−7.0	3,845	−3.3	−9.3	2.7	7,437
Degree	−12.5	−19.8	−5.1	1,689	+0.4	−5.2	6.0	4,844
Net of education	−13.7	−17.6	−9.8	5,534	−4.5	−9.1	0.1	12,281
Net of education and race	−9.7	−13.2	−6.2	5,534	−1.9	−6.2	2.3	12,281

Note: Model rows use only the highest and lowest brackets. Education has four levels: high school or less, some college, a four-year degree, and postgraduate study.

Note: Intervals use standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia) and a normal approximation; they are model based.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_net_of_education.json

Table 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4%

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among voters in the highest household-income bracket, by education, 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Education	Election	Democratic share (%)	95% CI low	95% CI high	Gap, degree minus no degree (points)	Gap 95% CI low	Gap 95% CI high	n voters
Degree	2008	55.7	52.6	58.8	+6.3	0.0	12.6	1,094
No degree	2008	49.4	43.9	54.9	+6.3	0.0	12.6	540
Degree	2012	59.8	56.4	63.3	+10.2	3.2	17.1	1,607
No degree	2012	49.7	43.7	55.7	+10.2	3.2	17.1	599
Degree	2016	62.4	60.0	64.8	+11.3	6.1	16.5	2,003
No degree	2016	51.0	46.4	55.6	+11.3	6.1	16.5	736
Degree	2020	63.9	62.0	65.9	+17.6	13.2	22.0	2,965
No degree	2020	46.4	42.4	50.3	+17.6	13.2	22.0	943
Degree	2024	60.8	58.7	62.9	+14.4	9.6	19.1	3,569
No degree	2024	46.5	42.2	50.7	+14.4	9.6	19.1	1,263

Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years.

Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/high_income_by_degree.json

Table 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zero

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, by election and survey weight; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state

Election	Weight	Gap (points)	95% CI low (clustered by state)	95% CI high (clustered by state)	95% CI low (Kish)	95% CI high (Kish)	n voters
2008	Cumulative-file weight	−9.1	−12.9	−5.4	−12.6	−5.7	5,534
2012	Cumulative-file weight	−3.4	−7.6	0.8	−7.0	0.1	9,078
2016	Cumulative-file weight	+3.4	−0.1	6.9	0.5	6.2	9,764
2020	Cumulative-file weight	+2.6	−1.0	6.2	0.2	5.0	11,775
2024	Cumulative-file weight	+5.7	1.1	10.3	2.8	8.5	12,281
2012	Post-election weight	−6.9	−10.9	−3.0	−10.5	−3.4	9,078
2016	Post-election weight	+2.0	−1.7	5.6	−1.1	5.1	9,764
2020	Post-election weight	+0.7	−3.1	4.6	−1.9	3.4	11,775
2020	Validated-vote weight	+2.8	−1.0	6.7	0.2	5.4	9,585
2024	Validated-vote weight	+4.2	0.2	8.2	1.3	7.1	9,405

Note: The post-election weight is not available for 2008 or 2024, and the validated-vote weight only for 2020 and 2024. Intervals use standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia) and a normal approximation; they are model based.

Note: The table also gives the interval from the Kish effective sample size, which is narrower; under the cumulative-file weight it is above zero for both 2016 and 2020.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative, weight_post or vvweight, as labelled); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_by_weight.json

Table 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groups

Change from 2008 to 2024 in the Democratic share of the higher-income group minus that of the lower-income group, percentage points; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state

Estimate	Change (points)	95% CI low	95% CI high	n observations
Main: highest vs lowest	+14.8	10.8	18.9	17,815
Unweighted	+11.4	8.5	14.3	17,815
Top 2 vs bottom 2	+10.2	7.9	12.4	44,897
Top group, fixed share	+16.3	12.6	20.0	19,225
Real-dollar cutoffs	+20.6	16.4	24.8	18,933
Rank slope (other scale)	+18.9	15.3	22.6	60,804

Note: Each row is a difference in differences, the change in the gap between two elections, estimated by weighted least squares with standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia).

Note: Unweighted: the same estimate without the survey weights. Top 2 vs bottom 2: each group is two brackets.

Note: Top group, fixed share: in each election the top group's income cutoff is set so that the group holds about the same share of voters as the highest bracket does in 2024; the comparison group is the lowest bracket.

Note: Real-dollar cutoffs: both cutoffs are held constant in real dollars with the consumer price index, at the income band edges nearest the 2024 cutoffs deflated to each election.

Note: Rank slope: the vote is regressed on each voter's income rank within the election, so no dollar cutoffs are used. The estimate is the change in the difference between the lowest and the highest rank, and it does not compare two groups of voters.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_definitions.json

Table 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3%

Share of each party's two-party presidential voters who live in a household in the highest income bracket, percent, 2008 and 2024; voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Party's voters	Share 2008 (%)	95% CI low 2008	95% CI high 2008	n 2008	Share 2024 (%)	95% CI low 2024	95% CI high 2024	n 2024
Democratic voters	6.6	6.0	7.2	10,942	15.4	14.6	16.2	21,814
Republican voters	6.9	6.3	7.4	11,269	11.3	10.6	12.0	16,779

Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years.

Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/top_bracket_by_party.json

Table 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, CES respondents minus the certified national count, percentage points, by election; two-party voters whether or not they reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

Election	CES (%)	Certified (%)	Difference (points)	95% CI low	95% CI high	n voters
2008	53.9	53.8	+0.1	−0.7	+0.9	23,585
2012	53.1	52.0	+1.1	+0.3	+1.8	37,789
2016	51.0	51.2	−0.2	−0.8	+0.5	40,891
2020	52.5	52.3	+0.3	−0.4	+0.9	43,872
2024	49.0	49.2	−0.3	−1.0	+0.5	42,008

Note: The certified share is a full count and has no sampling interval; the interval shown is the survey's.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative). MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, 1976-2024; full counts (unweighted)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/survey_vs_certified.json

All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (116), sorted by id. The same values as JSON: facts.json.

Fact id	Value	Unit	Estimand	Population	Period	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Note
bench_diff_2024	−0.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	CES weighted Democratic share minus the certified national two-party share	all two-party presidential voters	2024	95% CI −1.0 to 0.5	42,008	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
bench_max	1.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	largest absolute difference between the CES weighted Democratic share and the certified national two-party share in the five elections	all two-party presidential voters	2012	95% CI 0.3 to 1.8	37,789	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	The largest difference is in 2012.
bench_post_2012	+0.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	CES Democratic share with the post-election weight minus the certified national two-party share	all two-party presidential voters	2012	95% CI −0.4 to 1.1	37,789	weight_post	Cooperative Election Study
chg_b1	−10.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI −13.8 to −8.1		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_b2	−7.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI −9.3 to −5.1		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_b3	−3.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI −5.6 to −1.4		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_b4	−0.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI −3.3 to 2.0		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_b5	+3.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 0.4 to 7.3		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_deg	+12.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap among voters with a four-year degree or more; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 3.9 to 21.8	6,533	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_edu	+9.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap net of education; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 4.9 to 13.4	17,815	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_er	+7.8	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap net of education and of race and ethnicity; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 3.7 to 11.9	17,815	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
chg_nodeg	+8.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap among voters without a four-year degree; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 2.2 to 15.6	11,282	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
degree_gap_2008	+4.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined	two-party presidential voters who reported household income, degree holders minus others	2008	95% CI 2.7 to 5.8		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
degree_gap_2024	+12.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined	two-party presidential voters who reported household income, degree holders minus others	2024	95% CI 11.0 to 14.1		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
dem_b5_2008	6.6%	percent of Democratic voters	weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket	Democratic presidential voters who reported income	2008	95% CI 6.0% to 7.2%	10,942	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
dem_b5_2024	15.4%	percent of Democratic voters	weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket	Democratic presidential voters who reported income	2024	95% CI 14.6% to 16.2%	21,814	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_2012	+5.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008, weighted, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2012	95% CI 1.0 to 10.4	14,612	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_2016	+12.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008, weighted, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2016	95% CI 8.0 to 17.0	15,298	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_post_2012	+2.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2012 with weight_post), state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2012	95% CI −2.5 to 6.9	14,612	weight_cumulative for 2008, weight_post for 2012	Cooperative Election Study
did_post_2016	+11.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2016 with weight_post), state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2016	95% CI 6.4 to 15.8	15,298	weight_cumulative for 2008, weight_post for 2016	Cooperative Election Study
did_rank	+18.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the slope of Democratic share on income rank, state-clustered standard errors	slope on within-year income rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 15.3 to 22.6	60,804	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_real	+20.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the gap between a top group and a bottom group whose cutoffs are the band edges nearest the 2024 cutoffs deflated with the CPI-U, state-clustered standard errors	top and bottom groups with income cutoffs held constant in real dollars, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 16.4 to 24.8	18,933	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study	Cutoffs: $100,000 and $20,000 in 2008; $150,000 and $30,000 in 2024. Deflator: BLS CPI-U annual averages, series CUUR0000SA0.
did_se	2.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	state-clustered standard error of the change in the gap	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024			weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_u	+11.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the gap, unweighted, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 8.5 to 14.3	17,815	none (unweighted)	Cooperative Election Study
did_vv_2024	+13.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2024 with vvweight), state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 8.9 to 17.8	17,815	weight_cumulative for 2008, vvweight for 2024	Cooperative Election Study
did_w	+14.8	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the highest-minus-lowest gap (difference in differences), weighted, state-clustered standard errors	highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 10.8 to 18.9	17,815	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
did_wide	+10.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the gap between the two highest and the two lowest brackets, state-clustered standard errors	top two brackets against bottom two, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008 to 2024	95% CI 7.9 to 12.4	44,897	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
floor_100	$100,000	dollars of annual household income	definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study
floor_150	$150,000	dollars of annual household income	definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study
floor_30	$30,000	dollars of annual household income	definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study
floor_60	$60,000	dollars of annual household income	definition of a bracket edge	edge of an income bracket	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (definition)	Cooperative Election Study
gap_2008	−9.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI −12.9 to −5.4	5,534	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_2012	−3.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2012	95% CI −7.6 to 0.8	9,078	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_2016	+3.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2016	95% CI −0.1 to 6.9	9,764	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_2020	+2.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2020	95% CI −1.0 to 6.2	11,775	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_2024	+5.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 1.1 to 10.3	12,281	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_edu_2008	−13.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI −17.6 to −9.8	5,534	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_edu_2024	−4.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI −9.1 to 0.1	12,281	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_er_2024	−1.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education and of race and ethnicity; state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI −6.2 to 2.3	12,281	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gap_post_2012	−6.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2012	95% CI −10.9 to −3.0	9,078	weight_post	Cooperative Election Study
gap_post_2016	+2.0	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2016	95% CI −1.7 to 5.6	9,764	weight_post	Cooperative Election Study
gap_post_2020	+0.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2020	95% CI −3.1 to 4.6	11,775	weight_post	Cooperative Election Study
gap_vv_2020	+2.8	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the validated-vote weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2020	95% CI −1.0 to 6.7	9,585	vvweight	Cooperative Election Study
gap_vv_2024	+4.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the validated-vote weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 0.2 to 8.2	9,405	vvweight	Cooperative Election Study
gapd_2008	−12.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets	2008	95% CI −19.8 to −5.1	1,689	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gapd_2024	+0.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets	2024	95% CI −5.2 to 6.0	4,844	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gapn_2008	−12.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets	2008	95% CI −17.4 to −7.0	3,845	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
gapn_2024	−3.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors	highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets	2024	95% CI −9.3 to 2.7	7,437	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_deg_2008	55.7%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more	2008	95% CI 52.6% to 58.8%	1,094	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_deg_2020	63.9%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more	2020	95% CI 62.0% to 65.9%	2,965	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_deg_2024	60.8%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%	3,569	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_deg_chg	−3.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2020; independent cycles, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more	2020 to 2024	95% CI −6.0 to −0.3	6,534	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_gap_2008	+6.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others	2008	95% CI 0.0 to 12.6	1,634	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_gap_2020	+17.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others	2020	95% CI 13.2 to 22.0	3,908	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_gap_2024	+14.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others	2024	95% CI 9.6 to 19.1	4,832	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_gap_chg_2020	+11.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the difference between the Democratic shares of degree holders and others; independent cycles, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others	2008 to 2020	95% CI 3.6 to 19.0	5,542	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_gap_chg_2024	−3.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	change in the difference between the Democratic shares of degree holders and others; independent cycles, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others	2020 to 2024	95% CI −9.7 to 3.3	8,740	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_nod_2008	49.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree	2008	95% CI 43.9% to 54.9%	540	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_nod_2020	46.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree	2020	95% CI 42.4% to 50.3%	943	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_nod_2024	46.5%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%	1,263	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_nod_chg	+0.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2020; independent cycles, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree	2020 to 2024	95% CI −5.7 to 5.9	2,206	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
hi_nod_chg_0824	−3.0	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined	voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree	2008 to 2024	95% CI −9.9 to 4.0	1,803	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
mix_b1_2008	12.0%	percent of voters in the bracket	weighted share holding a four-year degree or more	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 10.7% to 13.4%	3,900	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
mix_b1_2024	16.2%	percent of voters in the bracket	weighted share holding a four-year degree or more	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 14.6% to 17.7%	7,449	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
mix_b5_2008	61.0%	percent of voters in the bracket	weighted share holding a four-year degree or more	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 58.2% to 63.8%	1,634	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
mix_b5_2024	74.5%	percent of voters in the bracket	weighted share holding a four-year degree or more	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 72.8% to 76.2%	4,832	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
n_income	170,053	respondents	count of respondents	two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_votes	188,145	respondents	count of respondents	respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote	2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
nat_swing	−4.9	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	CES weighted Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2008	all two-party presidential voters (income reported or not)	2008 to 2024	95% CI −6.0 to −3.9		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
net_pm_2024	+8.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted linear probability model coefficient for the lowest bracket against the three middle brackets, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors	lowest bracket against the pooled middle three brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 5.6 to 11.6	38,593	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
net_rm_2024	+4.1	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the three middle brackets, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors	highest bracket against the pooled middle three brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 1.6 to 6.6	38,593	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
nonrep_gap_2024	−6.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share among voters who did not report income minus that among voters who did; independent groups, standard errors combined	all two-party presidential voters	2024	95% CI −9.3 to −3.6		weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
nonresp_2008	6.3%	percent of two-party voters	weighted share who did not report household income	all two-party presidential voters	2008	95% CI 6.0% to 6.7%	23,585	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
nonresp_2012	11.2%	percent of two-party voters	weighted share who did not report household income	all two-party presidential voters	2012	95% CI 10.7% to 11.6%	37,789	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
nonresp_2024	8.2%	percent of two-party voters	weighted share who did not report household income	all two-party presidential voters	2024	95% CI 7.8% to 8.6%	42,008	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
p4_2024	+2.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the lowest bracket minus that in the fourth; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000), two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI −0.5 to 5.0	13,865	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_deg_b1	60.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000), voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 56.1% to 64.8%	1,275	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_deg_b3	54.2%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 52.2% to 56.3%	4,160	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_deg_b5	60.8%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%	3,569	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_hm_deg	+5.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 3.3 to 8.2	14,253	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_hm_nod	+4.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 0.0 to 8.9	16,891	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_hm_wdeg	+6.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 3.8 to 9.3	10,881	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_hm_wnod	+8.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 3.4 to 13.2	13,192	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_lm_deg	+5.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI 0.8 to 9.9	11,959	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_lm_nod	+7.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 5.0 to 10.4	21,802	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_lm_wdeg	+3.5	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters with a four-year degree or more	2024	95% CI −2.0 to 9.1	8,961	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_lm_wnod	+4.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 1.4 to 7.5	16,532	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_nod_b1	49.7%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000), voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 47.4% to 52.1%	6,174	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_nod_b3	41.2%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 39.1% to 43.4%	5,486	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_nod_b5	46.5%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%	1,263	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_white_nod_b3	35.1%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), white voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 32.9% to 37.3%	4,345	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pf_white_nod_b5	43.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), white voters without a four-year degree	2024	95% CI 38.7% to 48.1%	1,004	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pm_2008	+10.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 8.3 to 12.6	20,577	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
pm_2024	+4.0	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 1.7 to 6.3	33,761	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rank_2008	−15.6	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted least squares slope on the income rank (0 to 1) with state-clustered standard errors	slope of Democratic share on within-year income rank, from lowest to highest rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI −19.1 to −12.0	22,211	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rank_2024	+3.4	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	weighted least squares slope on the income rank (0 to 1) with state-clustered standard errors	slope of Democratic share on within-year income rank, from lowest to highest rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI −1.2 to 7.9	38,593	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
real_bot_2008	10.8%	percent of voters	weighted share of two-party voters who reported income	voters with income under $20,000	2008			weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
real_bot_2024	17.8%	percent of voters	weighted share of two-party voters who reported income	voters with income under $30,000	2024			weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
real_top_2008	19.8%	percent of voters	weighted share of two-party voters who reported income	voters with income of $100,000 or more	2008			weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_b5_2008	6.9%	percent of Republican voters	weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket	Republican presidential voters who reported income	2008	95% CI 6.3% to 7.4%	11,269	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rep_b5_2024	11.3%	percent of Republican voters	weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket	Republican presidential voters who reported income	2024	95% CI 10.6% to 12.0%	16,779	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rm_2008	+1.3	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI −1.7 to 4.3	18,311	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rm_2016	+8.2	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2016	95% CI 5.8 to 10.5	29,547	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
rm_2024	+9.7	percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share	Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined	highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 7.5 to 11.8	31,144	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b1_2008	62.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 60.5% to 64.4%	3,900	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b1_2024	51.5%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 49.4% to 53.6%	7,449	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b2_2008	54.1%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 52.7% to 55.4%	7,172	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b2_2024	46.9%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 45.3% to 48.4%	10,250	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b3_2008	50.4%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 49.0% to 51.8%	6,261	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b3_2024	46.9%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 45.4% to 48.4%	9,646	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b4_2008	50.0%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 48.0% to 51.9%	3,244	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b4_2024	49.3%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 47.5% to 51.0%	6,416	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b5_2008	53.3%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 50.4% to 56.1%	1,634	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
sh_b5_2024	57.2%	percent of the two-party presidential vote	weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote	the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 55.2% to 59.1%	4,832	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
topshare_2008	6.7%	percent of voters	weighted share of voters in the highest bracket, nominal dollars	two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2008	95% CI 6.3% to 7.1%	22,211	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study
topshare_2024	13.3%	percent of voters	weighted share of voters in the highest bracket, nominal dollars	two-party presidential voters who reported household income	2024	95% CI 12.8% to 13.9%	38,593	weight_cumulative	Cooperative Election Study

Definitions

Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other.
Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors.
Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them.

Methods

Sample: respondents in the Cooperative Election Study cumulative file for the five presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate (188,145 respondents), of whom 170,053 also reported household income. Outcome: the Democratic share of the two-party vote as reported by the respondent in the post-election interview; third-party and other votes are excluded. Weights: weight_cumulative, the cumulative-file weight for pooled years, in every estimate except the row marked unweighted and the weight sensitivity figure. Within each election it is a constant multiple of the single-wave weight, and it is the only weight defined for all five elections. A post-election weight (weight_post), built for the respondents who completed the post-election interview, exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020, and a validated-vote weight (vvweight), for respondents whose turnout was checked against voter records, exists for 2020 and 2024; neither exists for 2008. The weight sensitivity figure re-estimates the highest-minus-lowest gap with each of them and gives state-clustered intervals, and the chapter quotes the change in the gap under them where a conclusion depends on the weight. Income: the file's five brackets, built from twelve reported income bands, in nominal dollars (under $30,000; $30,000 to $60,000; $60,000 to $100,000; $100,000 to $150,000; $150,000 or more). High income means the highest bracket everywhere in the chapter. Education: a four-year degree or more against all other levels. Estimators: a share is a weighted mean of the 0/1 Democratic vote; a gap is the difference of two weighted means; a change in a gap between two elections is a difference in differences (the change in the gap between two elections) fitted by weighted least squares; the net-of-education rows, which compare voters with the same education, are coefficients from a weighted linear probability model on the two end brackets, and the contrasts against the middle three brackets use the same model on all five brackets. Intervals: 95%. Shares, contrasts between groups within one election (the differences against the pooled middle three brackets, the education differences among voters in the highest bracket and the contrasts inside education groups) and changes in one share between two elections use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, and combine the standard errors of independent groups in quadrature. The highest-minus-lowest gap in each election, a change in a gap between two elections and every regression coefficient use standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters, the states and the District of Columbia) with normal critical values; a t critical value with 50 degrees of freedom (2.01 in place of 1.96) would widen each clustered interval by about 2.5% and would not move zero in or out of any of the 84 clustered intervals in the chapter. State-clustered intervals for the 25 bracket-by-election shares are 1.3 to 3.0 times as wide as the Kish intervals (median 2.1), because between-state differences in the vote count as sampling error, so the Kish intervals on levels leave out that variation. The tables under the figure of the two contrasts against the middle three and under the figure of the gap by weight give the state-clustered interval beside the Kish interval for every one-election estimate they show. All intervals are model based: the CES is an opt-in panel, so an interval treats the weighted sample as a random sample and ignores how respondents came to be in the panel. Suppression: a cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100, and no cell was suppressed. Rounding: displays round half up from the unrounded estimate, and differences are computed before rounding, so a printed difference can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed shares. Income rank: the weighted midpoint percentile of the respondent's income band among all respondents who reported income in that election. Top group held near a constant share: in each election the income cutoff among the twelve bands whose group share of voters is closest to the 2024 share of the highest bracket (income of $120,000 or more in 2008); the comparison group is the lowest bracket. Constant real dollars: the 2024 cutoffs ($150,000 and $30,000) deflated to each election with the BLS CPI-U annual average (series CUUR0000SA0; the 2024 price level is 1.457 times the 2008 level) and moved to the nearest band edge ($100,000 and $20,000 in 2008); the top group is the bands at or above the top edge and the bottom group the bands at or below the bottom edge. Benchmark: the certified national two-party share from the state presidential returns of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, full counts. Survey mode: the CES is an online panel in every year, so there is no mode break in the series.

What these data cannot show

The CES interviews different respondents in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not people.
It cannot say whether any voter changed their vote as income or education changed, or how much of the change comes from migration, aging and the entry of new voters.
The vote is self-reported, and an online survey could lean toward one party by an amount that varies with income.
The check available here is coarse.
Table 9 compares the CES national Democratic share with the certified count in each election.
The largest difference is 1.1 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.8) points, in 2012 with the survey above the count, and in that election the certified share lies outside the survey interval.
The difference is −0.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 0.5) points in 2024.
With the post-election weight the 2012 difference is +0.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 1.1) points, so the 2012 discrepancy depends on the weight.
A lean of constant size would leave the differences between brackets intact, but agreement at the national level cannot show that the survey is accurate inside income brackets.
Table 9.
In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result
Income is household income in bands and is missing for 6.3% of two-party voters in 2008 and 11.2% in 2012, and for 8.2% in 2024.
The Democratic share among voters who skipped the income question minus the share among those who answered was −6.5 (95% CI −9.3 to −3.6) points in 2024, so the ladder leaves out a group whose vote differs.
Brackets are nominal dollars for households of any size.
The chapter has no data on wealth, occupation or individual earnings.
The design cannot separate income from the things that go with it.
Education and race are the only two adjustments, and place of residence, occupation, homeownership and age are not held fixed.
The chapter describes where the Democratic share is higher and how that changed, and it says nothing about why, since the file holds no measures of candidates, campaigns or policy positions.
Five elections are a short series, and the 2024 result for degree holders in the highest bracket is one observation.
Income relates to the vote differently in different places.
An analysis of survey and state data found that the association between income and Republican voting was stronger in poorer states than in richer ones [5], and this chapter pools voters across states without estimating the ladder for each.
A pattern across places also need not match a pattern across households, which is the problem of ecological inference.
Planned, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) compares counties with different incomes once education is held constant, and Companion 8.1b, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) looks at wage and capital income in ZIP codes.

References

Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
Zacher, Sam (2024). Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution. Perspectives on Politics 22(2): 338-356. doi:10.1017/S1537592722003310
Gethin, Amory; Martínez-Toledano, Clara; Piketty, Thomas (2022). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1): 1-48. doi:10.1093/qje/qjab036
Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Gelman, Andrew; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Park, David (2008). Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What's the Matter with Connecticut?. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(4): 345-367. doi:10.1561/100.00006026

Provenance

Pipeline version: 1.0.0
Build script: book3/chapters/the-income-ladder/build.py (sha256 f9b1d4414cde9f5d3f157f9e8290e8d48a805771b17da5cb520fb5440d34f3d0)
Built on: 2026-09-30
Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs

File	Size (bytes)	SHA-256, first 1 MB	SHA-256, last 1 MB
data/cces/cces_clean.parquet	53,454,868	9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806	f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405
data/dime/cpi_u_annual.csv	930	8e420e70de42064ef8822e4d86435b238afb69b3b92ad8364c933e48fc5fb6d7	8e420e70de42064ef8822e4d86435b238afb69b3b92ad8364c933e48fc5fb6d7
data/state/1976-2024-president.csv	514,108	9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7	9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7

Outputs

File	SHA-256
facts.json	94b439d32d17779b39b3c43a576350de23cb090efde900a2f824a170506c9a37
figures/gap_by_weight.json	b54496864d50383cbf9e82757bf7fa4cfa71135115b00a2752d7645a8e88a63f
figures/gap_contrasts.json	c36c7efab21f3733475e3f0b29b71df6b0bc144810c1531dfd58d71a00162637
figures/gap_definitions.json	a1339efa436331d1c774c915095ff5312c96815d2c82746635e04c5d29b33191
figures/gap_net_of_education.json	95b6c2699aaf5f47e7097770020b23e284a4fa774f642e471b658b048418bd70
figures/high_income_by_degree.json	311669b69d2e24ec5dd1c0d998f56060f83404474be1820c21badefc13cfb49d
figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json	9ce725424f49201523d74aacfb77f56526c5b3e2d6a94d25ea13b15eb1b5c2b1
figures/profile_by_degree.json	f68ef9793d2e854442d5a8d0960ec6747995f2181a2550e987dcf214fbb63187
figures/survey_vs_certified.json	51a97dee9f77407efc0ce56e75d04873ed7077c73de5dfadc016cfe24a4733bd
figures/top_bracket_by_party.json	1a5545ad970bc9fa43ad65f5308dbe15aead6935eafe2ba2e2206bc38dab1a10
meta.json	6fdeb172d26fd2689c0db1c4e2f05937d3c3e17c5b6ca10ea768235a7988fb7c
refs.json	9cc7a1224e62f4d93a79a67301f21d1c59a0912f56a96b769fb48efa5c39eb40

Machine formats

Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report.md
Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/facts.json
Table 1, figure "ladder_2008_vs_later" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json
Table 2, figure "gap_contrasts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_contrasts.json
Table 3, figure "profile_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/profile_by_degree.json
Table 4, figure "gap_net_of_education" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_net_of_education.json
Table 5, figure "high_income_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/high_income_by_degree.json
Table 6, figure "gap_by_weight" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_by_weight.json
Table 7, figure "gap_definitions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_definitions.json
Table 8, figure "top_bracket_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/top_bracket_by_party.json
Table 9, figure "survey_vs_certified" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/survey_vs_certified.json
Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt

Identification

Principal estimates

Findings

The most Democratic bracket went from lowest to highest

By 2024 both ends voted more Democratic than the middle

The 2024 U shape within education groups

Net of education, the 2024 gap includes zero

Among high-income voters, the education gap widened through 2020

The timing of the crossing depends on the weight

The change holds under five other definitions

The highest bracket's share of each party's voters

What these data cannot show

Tables

Table 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highest

Table 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0

Table 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holders

Table 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zero

Table 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4%

Table 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zero

Table 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groups

Table 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3%

Table 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result

All estimates

Definitions

Methods

What these data cannot show

References

Provenance

Machine formats