Chapter 4.5 · Report

Perceptions of the economy

In the American National Election Studies from 2012 to 2024, the president's partisans were 34.0 points more likely than the other party's partisans to say the economy had gotten better over the past year.

Author: Vishal Singh
Affiliation: NYU Stern
Published: 30 September 2026

Every estimate of the chapter with its interval and every figure as a table, generated from the chapter's data files. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. The same report as Markdown: report.md.

Identification

Title

Perceptions of the economy

Chapter

4.5 (Part IV, Issues move on different schedules; Coalitions and political differences)

Question

How much do partisans' views of the national economy depend on which party holds the White House?

Dek

Grain

individuals

Status

draft

Published

30 September 2026

Updated

not revised

Data sources

ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, surveys from 1980 to 2024: retrospective economy (VCF0870), approval of the president's job (VCF0450), party identification (VCF0301), president in office; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode comparison
Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative common content 2006-2024: retrospective economy (economy_retro), 7-point party identification; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (year-specific)
Nationscape. Weekly waves July 2019 to January 2021: retrospective economy (economy_better_scale), 3-category party identification; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight (survey weight)

Canonical URL

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy

Markdown

https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md

BibTeX

@misc{singh2026perceptionsoftheeconomy,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Perceptions of the economy},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}

Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. Every fact is in the table of all estimates below.

Estimand	Population	Period	Value	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Fact id
mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)	34.0	95% CI 32.5 to 35.4	20,874	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File	prem_late
weighted share saying better	Democrats including leaners	2016	45.0%	95% CI 42.3% to 47.7%	1,934	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File	d_share_2016
weighted share saying better	Republicans including leaners	2016	11.2%	95% CI 9.6% to 13.1%	1,726	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File	r_share_2016
weighted share saying better	Democrats including leaners	2020	5.2%	95% CI 4.3% to 6.3%	3,829	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File	d_share_2020
weighted share saying better	Republicans including leaners	2020	36.2%	95% CI 34.1% to 38.4%	3,425	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File	r_share_2020
constant	cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys	1980 to 2024	10			none (constant)	ANES Cumulative Data File	low_cut
count	ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff	1980 to 2024	6			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File	n_low
count	ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item	1980 to 2024	18			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File	n_anes_years
count of respondents in the yearly premium cells	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1980 to 2024	42,864			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File	anes_n_resp
count of respondents in the yearly premium cells	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024	568,229			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study	ces_n_resp
count of respondents in the weekly party cells	Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item	July 2019 to January 2021	324,560			none (count)	Nationscape	ns_n_resp
count	Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans	July 2019 to January 2021	80			none (count)	Nationscape	n_ns_weeks

Findings

In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 2016, with a Democrat in the White House, 45.0% of Democrats and 11.2% of Republicans said the national economy had gotten better over the past year. In 2020, with a Republican in the White House, the shares were 5.2% and 36.2%. The president's party had the higher share in every ANES survey since 1980 and in every Cooperative Election Study (CES) survey since 2006. The difference between the parties, counted in points, averaged 34.0 in the ANES from 2012 to 2024. It was smaller than 10 points in 6 of the 18 ANES surveys.

The measure is one survey question about the past year, a judgment rather than a measured condition. The ANES asks whether, over the past year, the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse. The CES asks the same question with five answers, and this chapter counts somewhat better and much better as better. A respondent is a partisan if they name a party or say they lean toward one (leaners are included), and pure independents are left out. The in-party premium, called the premium below, is the share of the president's party who say better minus the share of the other party who say better, so it is signed toward the president's party. The gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, so it is signed by party. Because the gap changes sign with the presidency, the chapter follows the premium over time rather than the gap. The analysis uses 42,864 ANES partisans, 568,229 CES partisans and, for the weekly figure, 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves of the Nationscape survey.Every estimate is weighted with the survey weights of its survey. Each interval is a confidence interval that treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, using the Wilson formula [1] on the Kish effective sample size [2], and intervals that account for the sample design can be wider or narrower.

Each party says the economy improved under its own president

Table 1 plots the two parties' answers in each ANES survey since 1980. The line for the party in the White House is above the other line in every survey, and the two lines cross at every change of party. The gap between Democrats and Republicans was +33.8 (95% CI 30.5 to 37.0) points in 2016, −31.0 (95% CI −33.3 to −28.7) in 2020 and +31.8 (95% CI 28.8 to 34.8) in 2024, so it reversed sign at each of the last two changes of party.The gap changes sign at all 6 changes of party in the ANES and at all 3 in the CES. At 4 of the 6 ANES changes and 3 of the 3 CES changes, the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts. The two ANES exceptions are the change from 1980 to 1982, where the earlier gap was +1.4 (95% CI −0.6 to 3.4) points, and the change from 1992 to 1994, where the later gap was +4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3). Both intervals include zero. The difference between the lines has a 95% interval above zero in 15 of the 18 surveys. The exceptions are 1980, 1990 and 1994, where the interval includes zero, and this chapter comes back to them below. The intervals for 2002 (3.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 5.9) points) and 2008 (2.2 (95% CI 0.3 to 4.0) points) start close to zero. An interval that accounted for the sample design could be wider, and those two surveys would then join the exceptions.

Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House

The CES asks the item every year, so it shows how fast the reversal happens (Table 2). Between 2016 and 2017 the gap moved from +43.6 to −48.3 points. Between 2020 and 2021 it moved from −38.7 to +37.9, and between 2008 and 2009 from −1.3 to +19.2. The 95% interval of the premium is above zero in 19 of the 19 CES surveys. The 2008 gap is small because no more than 2.1% of either party said the economy got better in the autumn of 2008, a survey taken up again below.

Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House

The ANES premium is higher after 2012

The evidence for a rise is thin, because it rests on the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 and the four from 2012 to 2024. Table 3 plots the in-party premium in both surveys. In the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 the premium averaged 14.8 points, and in the four surveys from 2012 to 2024 it averaged 34.0, a difference of 19.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 33.7) points.Each average counts every survey once, so a survey with more respondents does not weigh more. The six earlier surveys are 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990, and the four later ones are 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024. The interval on the difference treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread (a Welch t interval). Sampling error alone gives 19.2 (95% CI 17.2 to 21.3) for the same difference, an interval that describes these ten surveys and not a typical survey of each period.

The earlier average includes 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better. Leaving those two surveys out, the average for 1982 to 1988 is 21.8 points, and the later average is 12.2 (95% CI −4.3 to 28.8) points higher, an interval that includes zero when each survey is one observation.

Most of the difference between the averages comes from the president's party. Its share saying better averaged 26.0% in the earlier surveys and 41.6% in the later ones, while the other party's share went from 11.2% to 7.7%.

Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points

The higher level from 2012 does not come from the web samples that the ANES added that year. The premium was already 32.5 (95% CI 27.0 to 38.0) points in 2004, when interviews were mainly face-to-face, and Table 4 shows that face-to-face interviews alone give 35.1 (95% CI 29.9 to 40.4) points in 2012, 38.4 (95% CI 32.3 to 44.5) in 2016 and 33.3 (95% CI 26.9 to 39.7) in 2024. The smallest of the three is 33.3 points, against an average of 14.8 from 1980 to 1990. The two interview modes do not give the same premium. Face-to-face minus web is −6.7 (95% CI −13.0 to −0.3) points in 2012, +6.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 13.5) in 2016 and +1.6 (95% CI −6.2 to 9.5) in 2024, so the difference reaches 6.7 points and changes sign between 2012 and 2016. Only the 2012 interval excludes zero.

The two surveys differ in level. The CES premium is higher than the ANES premium in every year in which both ask the item after 2008, by 11.2 (95% CI 8.1 to 14.4) points in 2012, 9.9 (95% CI 6.5 to 13.2) in 2016, 7.7 (95% CI 5.2 to 10.2) in 2020 and 15.7 (95% CI 12.5 to 19.0) in 2024. The questions differ in the number of answers, and the surveys differ in mode, sample and weighting. This chapter compares the shape of each series and does not treat the levels as interchangeable.

Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990

The CES cannot say whether the premium rose, because its series starts in 2006. Its premium runs from 1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.6) points in 2008 to 63.1 (95% CI 62.1 to 64.0) in 2006. By presidency the average premium runs between 29.3 and 42.5 points (Table 5), and within each presidency the highest and lowest yearly premiums differ by at least 26.7 points.The CES fields a large survey in each even year, when there is a national election, and a smaller one in each odd year. Its premium averages 39.7 points in the even-year surveys and 31.5 in the odd-year surveys, and the cumulative file gives no reason for the difference. A straight line fitted to the yearly premiums has a slope of 0.53 (95% CI −0.85 to 1.91) points per year over 2006 to 2024 in the CES, an interval that includes zero and the ANES slope of 0.49 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.97) points per year over 1980 to 2024. The ANES interval clears zero by a small margin, and without 1980 and 1990 the ANES slope is 0.37 (95% CI −0.16 to 0.89) points per year.

Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points

The premium shrinks when the president's party says worse

In 6 of the 18 ANES surveys (1980, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2002 and 2008) the premium is below 10 points, and it is at most 5.7. In the other 12 surveys it is 14.6 or more. In every low survey except 1994, no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better, against at least 22.8% in every one of the other surveys (Table 6). The premium cannot exceed the share of the president's own party who say better, so a survey in which even the president's partisans mostly say worse leaves little room for it.

Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better

In 1990, 72.3% of the president's party and 75.8% of the other party said the economy got worse, and in 2008 the shares were 87.6% and 93.9%. The parties still differed about the president in these years. The approval premium, the share of the president's party approving of the president's job minus the share of the other party, was at least 34.9 points in every ANES survey, including 1990 and 2008.

The 1994 survey does not fit that account. 37.2% of the president's party and 33.2% of the other party said the economy got better, and the premium of 4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3) points has an interval that includes zero. Approval of Clinton divided the parties as usual, by 55.0 (95% CI 50.3 to 59.7) points. The ANES interviewed its 1994 sample after the November election, but it did the same in 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1998, so timing does not separate 1994 from those surveys. These data cannot say whether the state of the economy or a feature of the sample made the premium small.In only 1 other ANES survey, 1998, was the other party's share saying better higher in the sample than in 1994, at 38.4% (95% CI 33.8% to 43.3%), and that interval overlaps the 1994 interval.

Weekly answers moved before the 2021 inauguration

The weekly Nationscape survey shows how quickly answers can change (Table 7). In late February 2020, 74.9% (95% CI 71.7% to 77.8%) of Republican identifiers said the economy got better, and by mid-April the share was 22.0% (95% CI 19.2% to 25.1%). The Democratic share went from 20.0% to 12.1% over the same weeks. A Republican was president, so the premium is the Republican share minus the Democratic share, and it went from 54.9 (95% CI 50.9 to 58.9) points to 10.0 (95% CI 6.2 to 13.7), close to the 10-point cutoff that marks the low-premium surveys above. The pandemic was declared in March, and the survey cannot separate a change in conditions from a change in what partisans say.

The levels differ from the other two surveys. In 2020 the share of Republicans saying better was 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, against 28.2% in Nationscape in the last full week before the election, and the Democratic shares were 5.2%, 5.7% and 10.3%. The surveys differ in mode, sample and timing, and Nationscape leaves out leaners, so this figure is read for its shape.

Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration

The change of president shows up before the inauguration. From the last full week before the election to mid-January the Democratic share rose from 10.3% to 18.2% and the Republican share fell from 28.2% to 18.6%, so the lines met before the new president took office. The Republican share in the election week itself, 33.6%, is above the share in the week before, but the intervals overlap. By the last week of January the shares were 23.6% and 13.3%. Several things changed between November and January, including the election result, and the survey cannot say which of them moved answers.

Belief and expression give two readings of the gap

The premium shows that partisans answer differently, not why. One reading is that partisans perceive different economies. Bartels found that Democrats and Republicans differ in their perceptions of events that have an objective answer [3]. A panel around the 2006 midterm election found that partisans' economic assessments moved apart after control of Congress changed, and the authors attribute the movement to different views of the parties' economic competence [4].

A second reading is that partisans give congenial answers when asked, even when they know or could infer less flattering facts. In two surveys with experiments, monetary payments and appeals for accuracy reduced the partisan gap in reports of economic conditions [5]. Small payments for correct answers also narrowed partisan gaps on other factual questions [6]. Behavior gives mixed evidence. One study found that consumption changed after a presidential election in line with a county's partisan makeup [7], and a later study of administrative spending data found that partisan shifts in expectations after the 2008 and 2016 elections had no effect on household spending [8].

Nothing in the ANES, CES or Nationscape items can separate these readings. Chapter 2.2, Feelings toward the other party covers how partisans feel about each other. Planned, Trust in government (planned) asks whether trust in the federal government also follows the party in the White House. Views about economic policy, such as trade and taxes, are a different subject from perceptions of how the economy performed, and Planned, Trade and economic populism (planned) takes them up. Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude dates when abortion, religion and racial resentment became partisan divides and finds no sort date for economic perceptions, whose gap follows the party of the president.

What these data cannot show

The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side. A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty. The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income. The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions.

The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions. The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions. The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation. The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since. Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment. A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view.

The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower. The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only. The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024. The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event. The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give.

Tables

Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House

Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; ANES, 1980 to 2024

Survey year	Grouping	Group	President	Share saying better (%)	Interval low	Interval high	n
1980	party	Democrats	Carter	4.3	3.1	5.9	818
1980	party	Republicans	Carter	2.9	1.7	4.7	523
1980	role	President's party	Carter	4.3	3.1	5.9	818
1980	role	Other party	Carter	2.9	1.7	4.7	523
1982	party	Democrats	Reagan	6.6	5.0	8.6	758
1982	party	Republicans	Reagan	22.8	19.1	26.9	435
1982	role	President's party	Reagan	22.8	19.1	26.9	435
1982	role	Other party	Reagan	6.6	5.0	8.6	758
1984	party	Democrats	Reagan	25.9	23.3	28.6	1,013
1984	party	Republicans	Reagan	63.8	60.6	67.0	868
1984	role	President's party	Reagan	63.8	60.6	67.0	868
1984	role	Other party	Reagan	25.9	23.3	28.6	1,013
1986	party	Democrats	Reagan	17.7	15.5	20.2	1,043
1986	party	Republicans	Reagan	32.3	29.1	35.7	755
1986	role	President's party	Reagan	32.3	29.1	35.7	755
1986	role	Other party	Reagan	17.7	15.5	20.2	1,043
1988	party	Democrats	Reagan	10.8	8.9	12.9	920
1988	party	Republicans	Reagan	29.1	26.0	32.3	801
1988	role	President's party	Reagan	29.1	26.0	32.3	801
1988	role	Other party	Reagan	10.8	8.9	12.9	920
1990	party	Democrats	Bush	3.5	2.5	4.8	1,000
1990	party	Republicans	Bush	3.7	2.5	5.3	710
1990	role	President's party	Bush	3.7	2.5	5.3	710
1990	role	Other party	Bush	3.5	2.5	4.8	1,000
1992	party	Democrats	Bush	2.4	1.7	3.5	1,217
1992	party	Republicans	Bush	8.1	6.5	10.0	918
1992	role	President's party	Bush	8.1	6.5	10.0	918
1992	role	Other party	Bush	2.4	1.7	3.5	1,217
1994	party	Democrats	Clinton	37.2	33.6	41.0	819
1994	party	Republicans	Clinton	33.2	29.6	37.0	741
1994	role	President's party	Clinton	37.2	33.6	41.0	819
1994	role	Other party	Clinton	33.2	29.6	37.0	741
1996	party	Democrats	Clinton	48.6	44.9	52.3	887
1996	party	Republicans	Clinton	26.2	22.6	30.2	650
1996	role	President's party	Clinton	48.6	44.9	52.3	887
1996	role	Other party	Clinton	26.2	22.6	30.2	650
1998	party	Democrats	Clinton	53.7	49.5	57.8	647
1998	party	Republicans	Clinton	38.4	33.8	43.3	467
1998	role	President's party	Clinton	53.7	49.5	57.8	647
1998	role	Other party	Clinton	38.4	33.8	43.3	467
2000	party	Democrats	Clinton	49.6	45.9	53.3	879
2000	party	Republicans	Clinton	26.3	22.8	30.1	676
2000	role	President's party	Clinton	49.6	45.9	53.3	879
2000	role	Other party	Clinton	26.3	22.8	30.1	676
2002	party	Democrats	Bush	3.7	2.3	5.8	703
2002	party	Republicans	Bush	6.7	4.8	9.4	665
2002	role	President's party	Bush	6.7	4.8	9.4	665
2002	role	Other party	Bush	3.7	2.3	5.8	703
2004	party	Democrats	Bush	10.1	7.7	13.1	585
2004	party	Republicans	Bush	42.6	37.9	47.4	479
2004	role	President's party	Bush	42.6	37.9	47.4	479
2004	role	Other party	Bush	10.1	7.7	13.1	585
2008	party	Democrats	Bush	1.4	0.8	2.4	1,362
2008	party	Republicans	Bush	3.5	2.2	5.6	651
2008	role	President's party	Bush	3.5	2.2	5.6	651
2008	role	Other party	Bush	1.4	0.8	2.4	1,362
2012	party	Democrats	Obama	48.8	46.4	51.3	3,091
2012	party	Republicans	Obama	9.4	7.9	11.2	1,992
2012	role	President's party	Obama	48.8	46.4	51.3	3,091
2012	role	Other party	Obama	9.4	7.9	11.2	1,992
2016	party	Democrats	Obama	45.0	42.3	47.7	1,934
2016	party	Republicans	Obama	11.2	9.6	13.1	1,726
2016	role	President's party	Obama	45.0	42.3	47.7	1,934
2016	role	Other party	Obama	11.2	9.6	13.1	1,726
2020	party	Democrats	Trump	5.2	4.3	6.3	3,829
2020	party	Republicans	Trump	36.2	34.1	38.4	3,425
2020	role	President's party	Trump	36.2	34.1	38.4	3,425
2020	role	Other party	Trump	5.2	4.3	6.3	3,829
2024	party	Democrats	Biden	36.5	33.9	39.3	2,546
2024	party	Republicans	Biden	4.7	3.6	6.2	2,331
2024	role	President's party	Biden	36.5	33.9	39.3	2,546
2024	role	Other party	Biden	4.7	3.6	6.2	2,331

Views: Democrats and Republicans (basis = party); President's party and other party (basis = role).

Note: The ANES ran no survey in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 or 2022, so each line joins survey years.

Note: Interviews before 2012 were mainly face-to-face; web samples begin in 2012 (see the mode comparison later in the chapter).

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json

Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House

Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; CES, 2006 to 2024

Survey year	Party	President	Share saying better (%)	Interval low	Interval high	n
2006	Democrats	Bush	7.2	6.8	7.7	16,316
2006	Republicans	Bush	70.3	69.4	71.1	14,998
2007	Democrats	Bush	2.1	1.6	2.8	4,240
2007	Republicans	Bush	25.6	23.7	27.6	3,671
2008	Democrats	Bush	0.9	0.7	1.1	14,626
2008	Republicans	Bush	2.1	1.9	2.4	13,856
2009	Democrats	Obama	24.4	23.1	25.7	5,973
2009	Republicans	Obama	5.2	4.6	5.9	5,453
2010	Democrats	Obama	36.0	35.1	37.0	23,997
2010	Republicans	Obama	5.9	5.4	6.4	23,350
2011	Democrats	Obama	24.3	23.0	25.6	9,165
2011	Republicans	Obama	4.9	4.2	5.6	7,285
2012	Democrats	Obama	55.9	55.0	56.9	24,943
2012	Republicans	Obama	5.3	4.9	5.8	20,488
2013	Democrats	Obama	46.1	44.5	47.8	7,387
2013	Republicans	Obama	10.5	9.4	11.8	5,253
2014	Democrats	Obama	52.8	51.9	53.8	25,131
2014	Republicans	Obama	11.9	11.3	12.6	18,807
2015	Democrats	Obama	56.3	54.6	57.9	6,480
2015	Republicans	Obama	12.9	11.7	14.2	4,792
2016	Democrats	Obama	52.2	51.4	53.0	30,201
2016	Republicans	Obama	8.6	8.1	9.1	20,484
2017	Democrats	Trump	26.6	25.3	28.1	8,200
2017	Republicans	Trump	75.0	73.3	76.5	5,651
2018	Democrats	Trump	23.3	22.6	24.1	26,244
2018	Republicans	Trump	83.4	82.7	84.1	21,346
2019	Democrats	Trump	26.3	25.1	27.7	8,081
2019	Republicans	Trump	49.3	47.7	50.8	6,363
2020	Democrats	Trump	5.7	5.3	6.1	28,686
2020	Republicans	Trump	44.4	43.5	45.3	19,648
2021	Democrats	Biden	45.5	44.3	46.7	11,808
2021	Republicans	Biden	7.6	6.9	8.4	8,001
2022	Democrats	Biden	25.0	24.3	25.8	28,158
2022	Republicans	Biden	4.2	3.8	4.6	20,127
2023	Democrats	Biden	41.9	40.6	43.2	10,420
2023	Republicans	Biden	8.5	7.8	9.3	8,738
2024	Democrats	Biden	52.5	51.5	53.5	28,671
2024	Republicans	Biden	5.0	4.5	5.5	21,191

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json

Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points

In-party premium, percentage points; partisans including leaners; ANES 1980 to 2024 and CES 2006 to 2024

Survey year	Survey	President	Premium (points)	Interval low	Interval high	n
1980	ANES	Carter	1.4	−0.6	3.4	1,341
1982	ANES	Reagan	16.2	11.8	20.5	1,193
1984	ANES	Reagan	38.0	33.8	42.1	1,881
1986	ANES	Reagan	14.6	10.5	18.6	1,798
1988	ANES	Reagan	18.3	14.6	22.1	1,721
1990	ANES	Bush	0.2	−1.6	2.0	1,710
1992	ANES	Bush	5.7	3.7	7.6	2,135
1994	ANES	Clinton	4.0	−1.2	9.3	1,560
1996	ANES	Clinton	22.3	17.1	27.6	1,537
1998	ANES	Clinton	15.3	8.9	21.6	1,114
2000	ANES	Clinton	23.3	18.1	28.5	1,555
2002	ANES	Bush	3.0	0.2	5.9	1,368
2004	ANES	Bush	32.5	27.0	38.0	1,064
2008	ANES	Bush	2.2	0.3	4.0	2,013
2012	ANES	Obama	39.4	36.4	42.4	5,083
2016	ANES	Obama	33.8	30.5	37.0	3,660
2020	ANES	Trump	31.0	28.7	33.3	7,254
2024	ANES	Biden	31.8	28.8	34.8	4,877
2006	CES	Bush	63.1	62.1	64.0	31,314
2007	CES	Bush	23.5	21.5	25.6	7,911
2008	CES	Bush	1.3	0.9	1.6	28,482
2009	CES	Obama	19.2	17.7	20.7	11,426
2010	CES	Obama	30.1	29.1	31.2	47,347
2011	CES	Obama	19.4	18.0	20.9	16,450
2012	CES	Obama	50.6	49.5	51.7	45,431
2013	CES	Obama	35.6	33.6	37.6	12,640
2014	CES	Obama	40.9	39.8	42.1	43,938
2015	CES	Obama	43.4	41.3	45.4	11,272
2016	CES	Obama	43.6	42.7	44.6	50,685
2017	CES	Trump	48.3	46.2	50.4	13,851
2018	CES	Trump	60.1	59.0	61.1	47,590
2019	CES	Trump	22.9	20.9	24.9	14,444
2020	CES	Trump	38.7	37.7	39.7	48,334
2021	CES	Biden	37.9	36.4	39.3	19,809
2022	CES	Biden	20.8	20.0	21.7	48,285
2023	CES	Biden	33.4	31.9	34.9	19,158
2024	CES	Biden	47.5	46.4	48.7	49,862
1980	ANES average	n/a	14.8	n/a	n/a	9,644
1990	ANES average	n/a	14.8	n/a	n/a	9,644
2001	ANES average	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2012	ANES average	n/a	34.0	n/a	n/a	20,874
2024	ANES average	n/a	34.0	n/a	n/a	20,874

Note: The ANES adds web interviews in 2012; the CES is an online panel throughout. Mode comparisons follow in the chapter.

Note: The averages count each survey once and carry no band here: the interval of an average covers sampling error within each survey only, and the yearly premiums vary by more than that.

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z for the ANES, year-specific weight for the CES)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json

Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990

In-party premium, percentage points, by survey and interview mode; partisans including leaners; 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024

Year	Survey and mode	Premium (points)	Interval low	Interval high	n
2012	ANES all modes	39.4	36.4	42.4	5,083
2012	ANES face-to-face	35.1	29.9	40.4	1,805
2012	ANES web	41.8	38.2	45.4	3,278
2012	CES online panel	50.6	49.5	51.7	45,431
2016	ANES all modes	33.8	30.5	37.0	3,660
2016	ANES face-to-face	38.4	32.3	44.5	1,042
2016	ANES web	32.1	28.3	35.9	2,618
2016	CES online panel	43.6	42.7	44.6	50,685
2020	ANES all modes	31.0	28.7	33.3	7,254
2020	CES online panel	38.7	37.7	39.7	48,334
2024	ANES all modes	31.8	28.8	34.8	4,877
2024	ANES face-to-face	33.3	26.9	39.7	966
2024	ANES web	31.7	27.2	36.2	1,855
2024	CES online panel	47.5	46.4	48.7	49,862

Note: The ANES has no mode weights in 2020, so that year shows the all-mode estimate only.

Note: The ANES all-mode estimate for 2024 also includes panel and paper respondents, who have no mode weight.

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json

Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points

Average, lowest and highest yearly in-party premium in each presidency, percentage points; partisans including leaners; CES, 2006 to 2024

Presidency	Years	Average premium (points)	Lowest yearly premium	Highest yearly premium
Bush	2006 to 2008	29.3	1.3	63.1
Obama	2009 to 2016	35.4	19.2	50.6
Trump	2017 to 2020	42.5	22.9	60.1
Biden	2021 to 2024	34.9	20.8	47.5

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json

Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better

In-party premium against the share of the president's party saying the economy got better, one point per ANES survey, 1980 to 2024; percent and percentage points

Survey year	President's party saying better (%)	Premium (points)	Interval low	Interval high	n
1980	4.3	1.4	−0.6	3.4	1,341
1982	22.8	16.2	11.8	20.5	1,193
1984	63.8	38.0	33.8	42.1	1,881
1986	32.3	14.6	10.5	18.6	1,798
1988	29.1	18.3	14.6	22.1	1,721
1990	3.7	0.2	−1.6	2.0	1,710
1992	8.1	5.7	3.7	7.6	2,135
1994	37.2	4.0	−1.2	9.3	1,560
1996	48.6	22.3	17.1	27.6	1,537
1998	53.7	15.3	8.9	21.6	1,114
2000	49.6	23.3	18.1	28.5	1,555
2002	6.7	3.0	0.2	5.9	1,368
2004	42.6	32.5	27.0	38.0	1,064
2008	3.5	2.2	0.3	4.0	2,013
2012	48.8	39.4	36.4	42.4	5,083
2016	45.0	33.8	30.5	37.0	3,660
2020	36.2	31.0	28.7	33.3	7,254
2024	36.5	31.8	28.8	34.8	4,877

Note: The chart shows each survey's estimate without its interval; the data table gives the interval of each premium.

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json

Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration

Share of Democratic and Republican identifiers saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by interview week; Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021

Week starts	Week ends	Party	Share saying better (%)	Interval low	Interval high	n
2019-07-18	2019-07-21	Democrats	16.3	13.5	19.7	1,741
2019-07-18	2019-07-21	Republicans	70.2	66.0	74.1	1,445
2019-07-22	2019-07-28	Democrats	14.8	12.3	17.7	2,252
2019-07-22	2019-07-28	Republicans	66.4	62.3	70.2	1,750
2019-07-29	2019-08-04	Democrats	14.9	12.5	17.7	2,346
2019-07-29	2019-08-04	Republicans	66.1	62.2	69.7	1,814
2019-08-05	2019-08-11	Democrats	14.3	11.8	17.2	1,959
2019-08-05	2019-08-11	Republicans	64.0	60.1	67.7	1,654
2019-08-12	2019-08-18	Democrats	12.3	9.9	15.1	1,970
2019-08-12	2019-08-18	Republicans	64.6	60.4	68.6	1,565
2019-08-19	2019-08-25	Democrats	12.5	10.4	14.9	2,707
2019-08-19	2019-08-25	Republicans	66.9	63.5	70.2	2,152
2019-08-26	2019-09-01	Democrats	11.0	8.9	13.6	1,993
2019-08-26	2019-09-01	Republicans	64.4	60.4	68.2	1,571
2019-09-02	2019-09-08	Democrats	11.4	9.3	14.0	2,119
2019-09-02	2019-09-08	Republicans	62.2	58.4	65.9	1,685
2019-09-09	2019-09-15	Democrats	11.5	9.2	14.3	2,002
2019-09-09	2019-09-15	Republicans	64.7	60.6	68.6	1,632
2019-09-16	2019-09-22	Democrats	12.8	10.4	15.7	2,171
2019-09-16	2019-09-22	Republicans	66.0	61.9	69.9	1,709
2019-09-23	2019-09-29	Democrats	11.4	9.2	14.2	2,044
2019-09-23	2019-09-29	Republicans	64.5	60.5	68.4	1,741
2019-09-30	2019-10-06	Democrats	12.8	10.9	15.1	3,266
2019-09-30	2019-10-06	Republicans	62.7	59.3	66.0	2,579
2019-10-07	2019-10-13	Democrats	13.6	11.0	16.8	1,732
2019-10-07	2019-10-13	Republicans	62.1	57.6	66.3	1,377
2019-10-14	2019-10-20	Democrats	15.7	12.6	19.3	1,397
2019-10-14	2019-10-20	Republicans	68.4	63.9	72.7	1,251
2019-10-21	2019-10-27	Democrats	13.1	10.8	15.9	2,337
2019-10-21	2019-10-27	Republicans	66.1	62.2	69.8	1,911
2019-10-28	2019-11-03	Democrats	16.4	13.8	19.4	2,427
2019-10-28	2019-11-03	Republicans	68.4	64.7	71.9	2,030
2019-11-04	2019-11-10	Democrats	14.7	12.2	17.6	1,936
2019-11-04	2019-11-10	Republicans	69.7	66.1	73.1	1,769
2019-11-11	2019-11-17	Democrats	12.9	10.9	15.3	2,565
2019-11-11	2019-11-17	Republicans	68.1	64.8	71.2	2,181
2019-11-18	2019-11-24	Democrats	17.1	13.7	21.3	1,156
2019-11-18	2019-11-24	Republicans	69.8	65.2	74.1	1,158
2019-11-25	2019-12-01	Democrats	14.7	12.4	17.3	2,604
2019-11-25	2019-12-01	Republicans	69.8	66.5	72.9	2,303
2019-12-02	2019-12-08	Democrats	13.6	11.0	16.8	1,566
2019-12-02	2019-12-08	Republicans	68.9	64.8	72.7	1,490
2019-12-09	2019-12-15	Democrats	14.0	11.9	16.4	2,706
2019-12-09	2019-12-15	Republicans	69.7	66.4	72.8	2,316
2019-12-16	2019-12-22	Democrats	18.9	16.4	21.7	2,289
2019-12-16	2019-12-22	Republicans	70.0	66.7	73.2	1,996
2019-12-23	2019-12-29	Democrats	22.4	19.6	25.5	1,913
2019-12-23	2019-12-29	Republicans	73.4	69.8	76.6	1,526
2019-12-30	2020-01-05	Democrats	17.8	15.7	20.0	3,131
2019-12-30	2020-01-05	Republicans	73.1	70.5	75.5	2,804
2020-01-06	2020-01-12	Democrats	19.3	16.3	22.7	1,572
2020-01-06	2020-01-12	Republicans	73.7	69.9	77.2	1,401
2020-01-13	2020-01-19	Democrats	21.7	18.9	24.7	2,195
2020-01-13	2020-01-19	Republicans	70.1	66.6	73.4	1,845
2020-01-20	2020-01-26	Democrats	15.9	13.6	18.5	2,370
2020-01-20	2020-01-26	Republicans	70.8	67.5	73.8	1,972
2020-01-27	2020-02-02	Democrats	17.8	14.9	21.0	1,714
2020-01-27	2020-02-02	Republicans	73.1	69.2	76.6	1,417
2020-02-03	2020-02-09	Democrats	15.3	12.8	18.1	2,143
2020-02-03	2020-02-09	Republicans	73.2	69.6	76.4	1,897
2020-02-10	2020-02-16	Democrats	20.7	17.9	23.9	1,935
2020-02-10	2020-02-16	Republicans	73.2	69.7	76.5	1,823
2020-02-17	2020-02-23	Democrats	20.0	17.4	22.7	2,366
2020-02-17	2020-02-23	Republicans	74.9	71.7	77.8	1,967
2020-02-24	2020-03-01	Democrats	19.0	16.3	22.1	1,778
2020-02-24	2020-03-01	Republicans	68.9	65.3	72.3	1,682
2020-03-02	2020-03-08	Democrats	16.4	14.0	19.2	2,264
2020-03-02	2020-03-08	Republicans	66.0	62.2	69.5	1,767
2020-03-09	2020-03-15	Democrats	14.0	11.7	16.6	2,054
2020-03-09	2020-03-15	Republicans	58.9	55.2	62.5	1,803
2020-03-16	2020-03-22	Democrats	8.9	7.2	11.0	2,313
2020-03-16	2020-03-22	Republicans	44.5	40.9	48.1	1,837
2020-03-23	2020-03-29	Democrats	10.3	8.5	12.6	2,097
2020-03-23	2020-03-29	Republicans	37.0	33.8	40.4	1,918
2020-03-30	2020-04-05	Democrats	9.9	8.5	11.5	3,657
2020-03-30	2020-04-05	Republicans	31.1	28.7	33.6	3,108
2020-04-06	2020-04-12	Democrats	7.2	6.1	8.5	4,597
2020-04-06	2020-04-12	Republicans	28.1	26.0	30.2	3,908
2020-04-13	2020-04-19	Democrats	12.1	10.0	14.5	1,857
2020-04-13	2020-04-19	Republicans	22.0	19.2	25.1	1,654
2020-04-20	2020-04-26	Democrats	7.4	5.8	9.4	1,846
2020-04-20	2020-04-26	Republicans	21.5	18.6	24.6	1,566
2020-04-27	2020-05-03	Democrats	6.9	5.3	9.0	1,784
2020-04-27	2020-05-03	Republicans	24.2	21.3	27.4	1,684
2020-05-04	2020-05-10	Democrats	6.6	5.2	8.3	2,556
2020-05-04	2020-05-10	Republicans	21.4	18.9	24.2	2,138
2020-05-11	2020-05-17	Democrats	10.4	8.4	12.9	1,735
2020-05-11	2020-05-17	Republicans	18.1	15.4	21.1	1,583
2020-05-18	2020-05-24	Democrats	9.5	8.0	11.3	2,806
2020-05-18	2020-05-24	Republicans	23.3	20.9	25.8	2,503
2020-05-25	2020-05-31	Democrats	7.6	6.0	9.7	1,799
2020-05-25	2020-05-31	Republicans	21.1	18.4	24.1	1,587
2020-06-01	2020-06-07	Democrats	6.3	4.9	8.1	2,035
2020-06-01	2020-06-07	Republicans	20.1	17.5	23.0	1,757
2020-06-08	2020-06-14	Democrats	6.4	4.9	8.1	2,197
2020-06-08	2020-06-14	Republicans	22.4	19.8	25.2	2,000
2020-06-15	2020-06-21	Democrats	5.9	4.6	7.6	2,214
2020-06-15	2020-06-21	Republicans	18.7	16.3	21.4	1,898
2020-06-22	2020-06-28	Democrats	6.5	5.1	8.3	2,337
2020-06-22	2020-06-28	Republicans	17.2	15.0	19.8	1,991
2020-06-29	2020-07-05	Democrats	5.6	4.2	7.4	1,961
2020-06-29	2020-07-05	Republicans	21.2	18.5	24.2	1,785
2020-07-06	2020-07-12	Democrats	4.8	3.4	6.7	1,666
2020-07-06	2020-07-12	Republicans	20.7	17.6	24.2	1,458
2020-07-13	2020-07-19	Democrats	9.0	7.7	10.5	4,172
2020-07-13	2020-07-19	Republicans	22.4	20.3	24.7	3,373
2020-07-20	2020-07-26	Democrats	6.0	4.8	7.3	3,562
2020-07-20	2020-07-26	Republicans	21.0	19.0	23.2	3,379
2020-07-27	2020-08-02	Democrats	7.3	5.9	9.0	2,640
2020-07-27	2020-08-02	Republicans	14.6	12.6	16.8	2,423
2020-08-03	2020-08-09	Democrats	5.3	3.9	7.2	1,739
2020-08-03	2020-08-09	Republicans	19.8	17.0	22.9	1,504
2020-08-10	2020-08-16	Democrats	6.6	5.0	8.6	1,849
2020-08-10	2020-08-16	Republicans	22.1	19.3	25.3	1,659
2020-08-17	2020-08-23	Democrats	5.6	4.3	7.4	2,320
2020-08-17	2020-08-23	Republicans	21.3	18.8	24.1	2,237
2020-08-24	2020-08-30	Democrats	6.9	5.2	9.1	1,865
2020-08-24	2020-08-30	Republicans	26.6	23.1	30.4	1,506
2020-08-31	2020-09-06	Democrats	7.6	5.8	9.8	1,875
2020-08-31	2020-09-06	Republicans	23.3	20.4	26.5	1,898
2020-09-07	2020-09-13	Democrats	8.3	6.5	10.5	1,966
2020-09-07	2020-09-13	Republicans	24.3	21.2	27.7	1,669
2020-09-14	2020-09-20	Democrats	9.7	7.9	11.9	2,430
2020-09-14	2020-09-20	Republicans	28.4	25.4	31.6	2,069
2020-09-21	2020-09-27	Democrats	8.5	6.5	11.1	1,809
2020-09-21	2020-09-27	Republicans	24.0	20.7	27.6	1,629
2020-09-28	2020-10-04	Democrats	8.3	6.3	10.9	1,665
2020-09-28	2020-10-04	Republicans	27.1	23.7	30.9	1,673
2020-10-05	2020-10-11	Democrats	6.4	4.9	8.4	2,205
2020-10-05	2020-10-11	Republicans	20.4	17.6	23.5	2,058
2020-10-12	2020-10-18	Democrats	9.0	7.2	11.3	2,127
2020-10-12	2020-10-18	Republicans	26.9	23.7	30.4	1,871
2020-10-19	2020-10-25	Democrats	9.9	7.8	12.6	1,897
2020-10-19	2020-10-25	Republicans	28.0	24.4	31.9	1,669
2020-10-26	2020-11-01	Democrats	10.3	8.5	12.5	2,424
2020-10-26	2020-11-01	Republicans	28.2	25.2	31.4	2,383
2020-11-02	2020-11-08	Democrats	9.9	8.0	12.2	2,050
2020-11-02	2020-11-08	Republicans	33.6	30.2	37.1	1,808
2020-11-09	2020-11-15	Democrats	14.1	11.9	16.6	2,165
2020-11-09	2020-11-15	Republicans	30.8	27.5	34.2	1,790
2020-11-16	2020-11-22	Democrats	14.3	11.8	17.1	1,931
2020-11-16	2020-11-22	Republicans	25.6	22.2	29.3	1,496
2020-11-23	2020-11-29	Democrats	11.9	10.0	14.1	2,520
2020-11-23	2020-11-29	Republicans	27.3	24.4	30.5	2,079
2020-11-30	2020-12-06	Democrats	15.3	13.2	17.8	2,639
2020-11-30	2020-12-06	Republicans	21.3	18.7	24.3	2,209
2020-12-07	2020-12-13	Democrats	18.1	15.2	21.5	1,630
2020-12-07	2020-12-13	Republicans	24.1	20.2	28.3	1,131
2020-12-14	2020-12-20	Democrats	13.6	11.6	15.8	2,713
2020-12-14	2020-12-20	Republicans	21.4	18.8	24.2	2,125
2020-12-21	2020-12-27	Democrats	14.2	12.1	16.5	2,387
2020-12-21	2020-12-27	Republicans	21.0	18.4	23.8	1,975
2020-12-28	2020-12-30	Democrats	10.2	7.9	13.1	1,334
2020-12-28	2020-12-30	Republicans	18.6	15.2	22.6	924
2021-01-12	2021-01-16	Democrats	18.2	15.2	21.7	1,647
2021-01-12	2021-01-16	Republicans	18.6	15.2	22.5	1,222
2021-01-21	2021-01-24	Democrats	18.3	15.7	21.2	1,788
2021-01-21	2021-01-24	Republicans	13.8	11.3	16.7	1,404
2021-01-25	2021-01-31	Democrats	23.6	20.3	27.2	1,358
2021-01-25	2021-01-31	Republicans	13.3	10.6	16.5	1,155

Note: Party is the file's three-category party identification, so leaners are not counted with a party. Nationscape recruits online respondents who chose to take part, and the intervals treat it as a probability sample.

Note: The levels differ from the other two surveys: in 2020 the Republican share saying better is 28.2% in the last full week before the election, against 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, so this figure is read for its shape.

Note: The Republican share in the election week (33.6%) is above the share in the week before (28.2%), and its 95% interval overlaps the intervals of the weeks on either side.

Note: No wave was fielded between the end of December 2020 and the middle of January 2021, and the line is not drawn across that gap.

Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021; weighted (survey weight)

Data: vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json

All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (104), sorted by id. The same values as JSON: facts.json.

Fact id	Value	Unit	Estimand	Population	Period	Interval	n	Weights	Source	Note
anes_gap_1980	+1.4	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1980	95% CI −0.6 to 3.4	1,341	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_1994	+4.0	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1994	95% CI −1.2 to 9.3	1,560	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2016	+33.8	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2016	95% CI 30.5 to 37.0	3,660	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2020	−31.0	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2020	95% CI −33.3 to −28.7	7,254	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_gap_2024	+31.8	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2024	95% CI 28.8 to 34.8	4,877	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_n_resp	42,864	respondents	count of respondents in the yearly premium cells	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_1984	38.0	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1984	95% CI 33.8 to 42.1	1,881	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_1990	0.2	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1990	95% CI −1.6 to 2.0	1,710	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_1994	4.0	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1994	95% CI −1.2 to 9.3	1,560	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_2002	3.0	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2002	95% CI 0.2 to 5.9	1,368	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_2004	32.5	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2004	95% CI 27.0 to 38.0	1,064	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_prem_2008	2.2	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2008	95% CI 0.3 to 4.0	2,013	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_slope	0.49	percentage points per year	least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1980 to 2024	95% CI 0.01 to 0.97	42,864	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
anes_slope_ex	0.37	percentage points per year	least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1982 to 2024, without 1980 and 1990	95% CI −0.16 to 0.89	39,813	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
appr_prem_1994	55.0	percentage points	in-party share approving of the president's job minus out-party share, weighted	ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer	1994	95% CI 50.3 to 59.7	1,509	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
appr_prem_min	34.9	percentage points	smallest yearly premium in approval of the president's job	ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer	1980 to 2024			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
ces_d_share_2020	5.7%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Democrats including leaners	2020	95% CI 5.3% to 6.1%	28,686	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_even_mean	39.7	percentage points	mean of the yearly premiums in the even-year surveys, each survey counted once	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006, 2008 and every second year to 2024		441,268	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study	No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 10 yearly premiums.
ces_gap_2008	−1.3	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2008	95% CI −1.6 to −0.9	28,482	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2009	+19.2	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2009	95% CI 17.7 to 20.7	11,426	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2016	+43.6	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2016	95% CI 42.7 to 44.6	50,685	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2017	−48.3	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2017	95% CI −50.4 to −46.2	13,851	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2020	−38.7	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2020	95% CI −39.7 to −37.7	48,334	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_gap_2021	+37.9	percentage points, Democratic minus Republican	Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2021	95% CI 36.4 to 39.3	19,809	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_mean_high	42.5	percentage points	largest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024, by presidency			weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study	No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys.
ces_mean_low	29.3	percentage points	smallest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums (Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024), each survey counted once	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024, by presidency			weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study	No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys.
ces_n_resp	568,229	respondents	count of respondents in the yearly premium cells	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_odd_mean	31.5	percentage points	mean of the yearly premiums in the odd-year surveys, each survey counted once	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2007, 2009 and every second year to 2023		126,961	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study	No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 9 yearly premiums.
ces_prem_2006	63.1	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006	95% CI 62.1 to 64.0	31,314	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_prem_2008	1.3	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2008	95% CI 0.9 to 1.6	28,482	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_r_share_2020	44.4%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Republicans including leaners	2020	95% CI 43.5% to 45.3%	19,648	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_range_min	26.7	percentage points	smallest, across the four presidencies, of the largest minus the smallest yearly premium within the presidency	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024, by presidency			weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_share_max_2008	2.1%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	larger of the two party shares	partisans of either party	2008			weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
ces_slope	0.53	percentage points per year	least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval	CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2006 to 2024	95% CI −0.85 to 1.91	568,229	weight (year-specific)	Cooperative Election Study
d_share_2016	45.0%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Democrats including leaners	2016	95% CI 42.3% to 47.7%	1,934	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
d_share_2020	5.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Democrats including leaners	2020	95% CI 4.3% to 6.3%	3,829	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
ftf_min	33.3	percentage points	smallest of the three face-to-face premiums	ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2012, 2016 and 2024			weight_ftf	ANES Cumulative Data File
ftf_prem_2012	35.1	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2012	95% CI 29.9 to 40.4	1,805	weight_ftf	ANES Cumulative Data File
ftf_prem_2016	38.4	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2016	95% CI 32.3 to 44.5	1,042	weight_ftf	ANES Cumulative Data File
ftf_prem_2024	33.3	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2024	95% CI 26.9 to 39.7	966	weight_ftf	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_share_1994	37.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	partisans of the president's party	1994	95% CI 33.6% to 41.0%	819	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_share_early	26.0%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once	partisans of the president's party	1980 to 1990 (six surveys)	95% CI 24.8% to 27.2%	9,644	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_share_late	41.6%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once	partisans of the president's party	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)	95% CI 40.4% to 42.9%	20,874	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_share_max_low5	8.1%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	largest in-party share among those surveys	partisans of the president's party	the five low-premium surveys other than 1994			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_share_min_high	22.8%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	smallest in-party share among those surveys	partisans of the president's party	the surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_worse_1990	72.3%	percent of partisans who said the economy got worse	weighted share saying worse	partisans of the president's party	1990	95% CI 68.8% to 75.4%	710	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
in_worse_2008	87.6%	percent of partisans who said the economy got worse	weighted share saying worse	partisans of the president's party	2008	95% CI 84.3% to 90.2%	651	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
low_cut	10	percentage points	constant	cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys	1980 to 2024			none (constant)	ANES Cumulative Data File
low_share_max_8090	4.3%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	largest of the four shares (both parties, both surveys)	partisans of either party	1980 and 1990			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
max_low	5.7	percentage points	largest premium among the surveys below the cutoff	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	the low-premium surveys			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
min_high	14.6	percentage points	smallest premium among the surveys at or above the cutoff	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	the other surveys			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
mode_diff_2012	−6.7	percentage points, face-to-face minus web	face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2012	95% CI −13.0 to −0.3		weight_ftf and weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
mode_diff_2016	+6.3	percentage points, face-to-face minus web	face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2016	95% CI −0.9 to 13.5		weight_ftf and weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
mode_diff_2024	+1.6	percentage points, face-to-face minus web	face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2024	95% CI −6.2 to 9.5		weight_ftf and weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
mode_diff_max	6.7	percentage points	largest absolute difference between the face-to-face and web premiums	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2012, 2016 and 2024			weight_ftf and weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_both_ci	4	changes of party in the White House	count	transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_ci_pos	15	ANES survey years	count	ANES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_transfers	6	changes of party in the White House	count	changes of the president's party between two surveys	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_anes_years	18	ANES survey years	count	ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_ces_both_ci	3	changes of party in the White House	count	transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts	2006 to 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_ces_ci_pos	19	CES survey years	count	CES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero	2006 to 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_ces_transfers	3	changes of party in the White House	count	changes of the president's party between two surveys	2006 to 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_ces_years	19	CES survey years	count	CES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item	2006 to 2024			none (count)	Cooperative Election Study
n_high	12	ANES survey years	count	ANES surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_low	6	ANES survey years	count	ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
n_ns_weeks	80	weekly waves	count	Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans	July 2019 to January 2021			none (count)	Nationscape
n_out_above_1994	1	ANES survey years	count	ANES surveys in which the share of the other party saying better exceeds the 1994 share	1980 to 2024			none (count)	ANES Cumulative Data File
ns_d_apr	12.1%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Democrats among Nationscape respondents	2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19	95% CI 10.0% to 14.5%	1,857	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_d_end	23.6%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Democrats among Nationscape respondents	2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31	95% CI 20.3% to 27.2%	1,358	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_d_feb	20.0%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Democrats among Nationscape respondents	2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23	95% CI 17.4% to 22.7%	2,366	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_d_jan	18.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Democrats among Nationscape respondents	2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16	95% CI 15.2% to 21.7%	1,647	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_d_oct	10.3%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Democrats among Nationscape respondents	2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01	95% CI 8.5% to 12.5%	2,424	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_n_resp	324,560	respondent-weeks	count of respondents in the weekly party cells	Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item	July 2019 to January 2021			none (count)	Nationscape
ns_prem_apr	10.0	percentage points	Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature	Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item	2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19	95% CI 6.2 to 13.7		weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_prem_feb	54.9	percentage points	Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature	Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item	2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23	95% CI 50.9 to 58.9		weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_apr	22.0%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19	95% CI 19.2% to 25.1%	1,654	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_end	13.3%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31	95% CI 10.6% to 16.5%	1,155	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_feb	74.9%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23	95% CI 71.7% to 77.8%	1,967	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_jan	18.6%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16	95% CI 15.2% to 22.5%	1,222	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_nov	33.6%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2020-11-02 to 2020-11-08	95% CI 30.2% to 37.1%	1,808	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
ns_r_oct	28.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better in one weekly wave	Republicans among Nationscape respondents	2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01	95% CI 25.2% to 31.4%	2,383	weight (Nationscape survey weight)	Nationscape
offset_2012	11.2	percentage points, CES minus ANES	CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	partisans with an answer in both surveys	2012	95% CI 8.1 to 14.4		weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z)	Cooperative Election Study
offset_2016	9.9	percentage points, CES minus ANES	CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	partisans with an answer in both surveys	2016	95% CI 6.5 to 13.2		weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z)	Cooperative Election Study
offset_2020	7.7	percentage points, CES minus ANES	CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	partisans with an answer in both surveys	2020	95% CI 5.2 to 10.2		weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z)	Cooperative Election Study
offset_2024	15.7	percentage points, CES minus ANES	CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature	partisans with an answer in both surveys	2024	95% CI 12.5 to 19.0		weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z)	Cooperative Election Study
out_share_1994	33.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	partisans of the other party	1994	95% CI 29.6% to 37.0%	741	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
out_share_1998	38.4%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	partisans of the other party	1998	95% CI 33.8% to 43.3%	467	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
out_share_early	11.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once	partisans of the other party	1980 to 1990 (six surveys)	95% CI 10.4% to 12.0%	9,644	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
out_share_late	7.7%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once	partisans of the other party	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)	95% CI 6.9% to 8.4%	20,874	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
out_worse_1990	75.8%	percent of partisans who said the economy got worse	weighted share saying worse	partisans of the other party	1990	95% CI 73.0% to 78.4%	1,000	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
out_worse_2008	93.9%	percent of partisans who said the economy got worse	weighted share saying worse	partisans of the other party	2008	95% CI 92.0% to 95.3%	1,362	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_change	19.2	percentage points	difference between the two era means, standard errors combined in quadrature; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990	95% CI 17.2 to 21.3		weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_change_ex_svy	12.2	percentage points	difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (4 and 4 surveys)	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 minus 1982 to 1988	95% CI −4.3 to 28.8		weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_change_svy	19.2	percentage points	difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (6 and 4 surveys)	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990	95% CI 4.8 to 33.7		weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_early	14.8	percentage points	mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1980 to 1990 (six surveys)	95% CI 13.3 to 16.2	9,644	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_early_ex	21.8	percentage points	mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	1982 to 1988 (four surveys)	95% CI 19.7 to 23.8	6,593	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_late	34.0	percentage points	mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)	95% CI 32.5 to 35.4	20,874	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_late_max	39.4	percentage points	largest of the yearly premiums	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
prem_late_min	31.0	percentage points	smallest of the yearly premiums	ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item	2012 to 2024 (four surveys)			weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
r_share_2016	11.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Republicans including leaners	2016	95% CI 9.6% to 13.1%	1,726	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
r_share_2020	36.2%	percent of partisans who said the economy got better	weighted share saying better	Republicans including leaners	2020	95% CI 34.1% to 38.4%	3,425	weight (VCF0009z)	ANES Cumulative Data File
web_prem_2012	41.8	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2012	95% CI 38.2 to 45.4	3,278	weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
web_prem_2016	32.1	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2016	95% CI 28.3 to 35.9	2,618	weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File
web_prem_2024	31.7	percentage points	in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight	ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party	2024	95% CI 27.2 to 36.2	1,855	weight_web	ANES Cumulative Data File

Definitions

Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.

Methods

Sample: ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 18 surveys from 1980 to 2024 that ask whether the national economy got better, stayed about the same or got worse over the past year (VCF0870), who identify with or lean toward a party (7-point party identification, 1 to 3 Democratic and 5 to 7 Republican; pure independents are left out) and carry a positive weight: 42,864 respondents. CES cumulative common content respondents in the 19 surveys from 2006 to 2024 (item economy_retro, recoded so that somewhat better and much better count as better and 'not sure' is missing; party by the 7-point scale with leaners): 568,229 respondents. Nationscape weekly waves from July 2019 to January 2021 (economy_better_scale, 3 = better), Democratic and Republican identifiers only because the file's 3-category party identification has no leaners: 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves. Estimand: for each survey year, the weighted share of partisans who say the economy got better, by party and by relation to the president; the in-party premium is the share among partisans of the president's party minus the share among partisans of the other party, in percentage points. The president's party is the party of the president in office at the time of interview (the ANES cumulative file's president variable; for the CES, which is fielded each autumn, the president in office that autumn: Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024). Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the interview-mode comparison in 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was face-to-face only and 2020 has no mode weights); CES year-specific weight; Nationscape survey weight. Intervals: 95% intervals; a share uses the Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size; a premium or gap combines the two normal standard errors in quadrature; an average of yearly estimates counts each survey once and combines the yearly standard errors in quadrature, so its interval covers sampling error within each survey only and not the spread between surveys (the CES presidency averages carry no interval and are shown with their lowest and highest yearly values); the difference between two periods is also given with a Welch t interval on the yearly premiums, which treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread; the difference between the face-to-face and web premiums combines the two standard errors in quadrature; a slope is the least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year with a t interval on the number of surveys minus two. The intervals for shares, premiums, gaps, era averages and mode differences are model based (a weighted simple random sample) and ignore clustering and stratification; the Welch and slope intervals take the yearly premiums as the observations. Suppression: a party-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, a survey needs at least 150 respondents on the item, and a Nationscape party-week cell needs at least 500 respondents; no ANES or CES cell fell below a floor (the smallest cell holds 435 respondents), and 80 weekly Nationscape waves meet the weekly floor while the thin waves after January 2021 do not. Item differences: the ANES item has three answers and the CES item five, so levels differ across the two surveys. Timing: the ANES surveys of 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 have post-election interviews only (no respondent has a pre-election interview in the cumulative file).

What these data cannot show

The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side.
A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty.
The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income.
The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions.
The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions.
The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions.
The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation.
The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since.
Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment.
A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view.
The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower.
The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only.
The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024.
The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event.
The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give.

References

Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. doi:10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953
Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
Bartels, Larry M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. Political Behavior 24(2): 117-150. doi:10.1023/A:1021226224601
Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2010). Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments. American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 153-173. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00424.x
Prior, Markus; Sood, Gaurav; Khanna, Kabir (2015). You Cannot Be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 489-518. doi:10.1561/100.00014127
Bullock, John G.; Gerber, Alan S.; Hill, Seth J.; Huber, Gregory A. (2015). Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 519-578. nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-14074
Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2009). Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?. American Political Science Review 103(3): 407-426.
Mian, Atif R.; Sufi, Amir; Khoshkhou, Nasim (2023). Partisan Bias, Economic Expectations, and Household Spending. Review of Economics and Statistics 105(3): 493-510. direct.mit.edu/rest/article/105/3/493/100979/Partisan-Bias-Economic-Expectations-and-Household

Provenance

Pipeline version: 1.0.0
Build script: book3/chapters/perceptions-of-the-economy/build.py (sha256 31dd75a70dfb637a8087213a1c84a702642bb1730768b90f8b04eccba431c84e)
Built on: 2026-09-30
Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs

File	Size (bytes)	SHA-256, first 1 MB	SHA-256, last 1 MB
data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet	15,640,720	b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643	04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583
data/cces/cces_clean.parquet	53,454,868	9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806	f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405
data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet	43,528,088	6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4	8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44

Outputs

File	SHA-256
facts.json	3ddb57bf606953b125471134b2ef26b947ac3f9e064599163a7b50263a886d2c
figures/ces_by_presidency.json	b4cbe5d9d9d3714c2e8e21ac404973509e45b08e874ef40b14289c86b3214262
figures/instrument_and_mode.json	d68eb8a8498a8d7137bb2e48eedf008d7e2af0a28161d449084f525074b18699
figures/nationscape_weeks.json	c0b7ce9444314a20e47ca205b3e3c2ea1534d836f7126573effda8e728bb6a8e
figures/premium_trend.json	b2dc403d3d645d00bfd8ad2ecc6d88074e68c0db0ff5af4799b9b817f49e9a7e
figures/premium_vs_in_share.json	018b86ef761b9bf2473d912c38007035515641ea3fa66c77d84d3c7cc35737ca
figures/share_better_anes.json	6645d8fdb9aa72192defe51b6ef308685eace9fb51bdf6ff146ebd2c4076c5ae
figures/share_better_ces.json	ca074729eb21c5dfb80820b996ee35c5d4b3d6739f4f4c68d4f9d61fec3afd73
meta.json	34455f80583917bcb9d11685cc1f0f22486b2398486d9ee05a27247949f0fb03
refs.json	b813078a3d0da0dd71a4046ec8a7517d1135fae9a69c11b70c66c0985ee81e30

Machine formats

Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md
Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/facts.json
Table 1, figure "share_better_anes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json
Table 2, figure "share_better_ces" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json
Table 3, figure "premium_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json
Table 4, figure "instrument_and_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json
Table 5, figure "ces_by_presidency" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json
Table 6, figure "premium_vs_in_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json
Table 7, figure "nationscape_weeks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json
Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt