# Perceptions of the economy: report

Chapter 4.5 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter.

## Identification

- Title: Perceptions of the economy
- Chapter: 4.5 (Part IV, Issues move on different schedules; Coalitions and political differences)
- Question: How much do partisans' views of the national economy depend on which party holds the White House?
- Dek: In the American National Election Studies from 2012 to 2024, the president's partisans were 34.0 points more likely than the other party's partisans to say the economy had gotten better over the past year.
- Grain: individuals
- Status: draft
- Published: 2026-09-30
- Updated: not revised
- Data sources:
  - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, surveys from 1980 to 2024: retrospective economy (VCF0870), approval of the president's job (VCF0450), party identification (VCF0301), president in office; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode comparison
  - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative common content 2006-2024: retrospective economy (economy_retro), 7-point party identification; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (year-specific)
  - Nationscape. Weekly waves July 2019 to January 2021: retrospective economy (economy_better_scale), 3-category party identification; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight (survey weight)
- Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy
- Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report
- Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md
- BibTeX key: singh2026perceptionsoftheeconomy

```bibtex
@misc{singh2026perceptionsoftheeconomy,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Perceptions of the economy},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.}
}
```

## Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance.

| Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 34.0 | 95% CI 32.5 to 35.4 | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | prem_late |
| weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2016 | 45.0% | 95% CI 42.3% to 47.7% | 1,934 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | d_share_2016 |
| weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2016 | 11.2% | 95% CI 9.6% to 13.1% | 1,726 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_share_2016 |
| weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 5.2% | 95% CI 4.3% to 6.3% | 3,829 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | d_share_2020 |
| weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 36.2% | 95% CI 34.1% to 38.4% | 3,425 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_share_2020 |
| constant | cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys | 1980 to 2024 | 10 |   |   | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | low_cut |
| count | ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 | 6 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_low |
| count | ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 1980 to 2024 | 18 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_years |
| count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 | 42,864 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_n_resp |
| count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 | 568,229 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | ces_n_resp |
| count of respondents in the weekly party cells | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | July 2019 to January 2021 | 324,560 |   |   | none (count) | Nationscape | ns_n_resp |
| count | Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans | July 2019 to January 2021 | 80 |   |   | none (count) | Nationscape | n_ns_weeks |

## Findings

In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 2016, with a Democrat in the White House, 45.0% of Democrats and 11.2% of Republicans said the national economy had gotten better over the past year. In 2020, with a Republican in the White House, the shares were 5.2% and 36.2%. The president's party had the higher share in every ANES survey since 1980 and in every Cooperative Election Study (CES) survey since 2006. The difference between the parties, counted in points, averaged 34.0 in the ANES from 2012 to 2024. It was smaller than 10 points in 6 of the 18 ANES surveys.

The measure is one survey question about the past year, a judgment rather than a measured condition. The ANES asks whether, over the past year, the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse. The CES asks the same question with five answers, and this chapter counts somewhat better and much better as better. A respondent is a partisan if they name a party or say they lean toward one (leaners are included), and pure independents are left out. The in-party premium, called the premium below, is the share of the president's party who say better minus the share of the other party who say better, so it is signed toward the president's party. The gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, so it is signed by party. Because the gap changes sign with the presidency, the chapter follows the premium over time rather than the gap. The analysis uses 42,864 ANES partisans, 568,229 CES partisans and, for the weekly figure, 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves of the Nationscape survey. (Note: Every estimate is weighted with the survey weights of its survey. Each interval is a confidence interval that treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, using the Wilson formula [1] on the Kish effective sample size [2], and intervals that account for the sample design can be wider or narrower.)

### Each party says the economy improved under its own president

Table 1 plots the two parties' answers in each ANES survey since 1980. The line for the party in the White House is above the other line in every survey, and the two lines cross at every change of party. The gap between Democrats and Republicans was +33.8 (95% CI 30.5 to 37.0) points in 2016, −31.0 (95% CI −33.3 to −28.7) in 2020 and +31.8 (95% CI 28.8 to 34.8) in 2024, so it reversed sign at each of the last two changes of party. (Note: The gap changes sign at all 6 changes of party in the ANES and at all 3 in the CES. At 4 of the 6 ANES changes and 3 of the 3 CES changes, the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts. The two ANES exceptions are the change from 1980 to 1982, where the earlier gap was +1.4 (95% CI −0.6 to 3.4) points, and the change from 1992 to 1994, where the later gap was +4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3). Both intervals include zero.) The difference between the lines has a 95% interval above zero in 15 of the 18 surveys. The exceptions are 1980, 1990 and 1994, where the interval includes zero, and this chapter comes back to them below. The intervals for 2002 (3.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 5.9) points) and 2008 (2.2 (95% CI 0.3 to 4.0) points) start close to zero. An interval that accounted for the sample design could be wider, and those two surveys would then join the exceptions.

Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House

The CES asks the item every year, so it shows how fast the reversal happens (Table 2). Between 2016 and 2017 the gap moved from +43.6 to −48.3 points. Between 2020 and 2021 it moved from −38.7 to +37.9, and between 2008 and 2009 from −1.3 to +19.2. The 95% interval of the premium is above zero in 19 of the 19 CES surveys. The 2008 gap is small because no more than 2.1% of either party said the economy got better in the autumn of 2008, a survey taken up again below.

Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House

### The ANES premium is higher after 2012

The evidence for a rise is thin, because it rests on the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 and the four from 2012 to 2024. Table 3 plots the in-party premium in both surveys. In the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 the premium averaged 14.8 points, and in the four surveys from 2012 to 2024 it averaged 34.0, a difference of 19.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 33.7) points. (Note: Each average counts every survey once, so a survey with more respondents does not weigh more. The six earlier surveys are 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990, and the four later ones are 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024. The interval on the difference treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread (a Welch t interval). Sampling error alone gives 19.2 (95% CI 17.2 to 21.3) for the same difference, an interval that describes these ten surveys and not a typical survey of each period.)

The earlier average includes 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better. Leaving those two surveys out, the average for 1982 to 1988 is 21.8 points, and the later average is 12.2 (95% CI −4.3 to 28.8) points higher, an interval that includes zero when each survey is one observation.

Most of the difference between the averages comes from the president's party. Its share saying better averaged 26.0% in the earlier surveys and 41.6% in the later ones, while the other party's share went from 11.2% to 7.7%.

Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points

The higher level from 2012 does not come from the web samples that the ANES added that year. The premium was already 32.5 (95% CI 27.0 to 38.0) points in 2004, when interviews were mainly face-to-face, and Table 4 shows that face-to-face interviews alone give 35.1 (95% CI 29.9 to 40.4) points in 2012, 38.4 (95% CI 32.3 to 44.5) in 2016 and 33.3 (95% CI 26.9 to 39.7) in 2024. The smallest of the three is 33.3 points, against an average of 14.8 from 1980 to 1990. The two interview modes do not give the same premium. Face-to-face minus web is −6.7 (95% CI −13.0 to −0.3) points in 2012, +6.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 13.5) in 2016 and +1.6 (95% CI −6.2 to 9.5) in 2024, so the difference reaches 6.7 points and changes sign between 2012 and 2016. Only the 2012 interval excludes zero.

The two surveys differ in level. The CES premium is higher than the ANES premium in every year in which both ask the item after 2008, by 11.2 (95% CI 8.1 to 14.4) points in 2012, 9.9 (95% CI 6.5 to 13.2) in 2016, 7.7 (95% CI 5.2 to 10.2) in 2020 and 15.7 (95% CI 12.5 to 19.0) in 2024. The questions differ in the number of answers, and the surveys differ in mode, sample and weighting. This chapter compares the shape of each series and does not treat the levels as interchangeable.

Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990

The CES cannot say whether the premium rose, because its series starts in 2006. Its premium runs from 1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.6) points in 2008 to 63.1 (95% CI 62.1 to 64.0) in 2006. By presidency the average premium runs between 29.3 and 42.5 points (Table 5), and within each presidency the highest and lowest yearly premiums differ by at least 26.7 points. (Note: The CES fields a large survey in each even year, when there is a national election, and a smaller one in each odd year. Its premium averages 39.7 points in the even-year surveys and 31.5 in the odd-year surveys, and the cumulative file gives no reason for the difference. A straight line fitted to the yearly premiums has a slope of 0.53 (95% CI −0.85 to 1.91) points per year over 2006 to 2024 in the CES, an interval that includes zero and the ANES slope of 0.49 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.97) points per year over 1980 to 2024. The ANES interval clears zero by a small margin, and without 1980 and 1990 the ANES slope is 0.37 (95% CI −0.16 to 0.89) points per year.)

Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points

### The premium shrinks when the president's party says worse

In 6 of the 18 ANES surveys (1980, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2002 and 2008) the premium is below 10 points, and it is at most 5.7. In the other 12 surveys it is 14.6 or more. In every low survey except 1994, no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better, against at least 22.8% in every one of the other surveys (Table 6). The premium cannot exceed the share of the president's own party who say better, so a survey in which even the president's partisans mostly say worse leaves little room for it.

Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better

In 1990, 72.3% of the president's party and 75.8% of the other party said the economy got worse, and in 2008 the shares were 87.6% and 93.9%. The parties still differed about the president in these years. The approval premium, the share of the president's party approving of the president's job minus the share of the other party, was at least 34.9 points in every ANES survey, including 1990 and 2008.

The 1994 survey does not fit that account. 37.2% of the president's party and 33.2% of the other party said the economy got better, and the premium of 4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3) points has an interval that includes zero. Approval of Clinton divided the parties as usual, by 55.0 (95% CI 50.3 to 59.7) points. The ANES interviewed its 1994 sample after the November election, but it did the same in 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1998, so timing does not separate 1994 from those surveys. These data cannot say whether the state of the economy or a feature of the sample made the premium small. (Note: In only 1 other ANES survey, 1998, was the other party's share saying better higher in the sample than in 1994, at 38.4% (95% CI 33.8% to 43.3%), and that interval overlaps the 1994 interval.)

### Weekly answers moved before the 2021 inauguration

The weekly Nationscape survey shows how quickly answers can change (Table 7). In late February 2020, 74.9% (95% CI 71.7% to 77.8%) of Republican identifiers said the economy got better, and by mid-April the share was 22.0% (95% CI 19.2% to 25.1%). The Democratic share went from 20.0% to 12.1% over the same weeks. A Republican was president, so the premium is the Republican share minus the Democratic share, and it went from 54.9 (95% CI 50.9 to 58.9) points to 10.0 (95% CI 6.2 to 13.7), close to the 10-point cutoff that marks the low-premium surveys above. The pandemic was declared in March, and the survey cannot separate a change in conditions from a change in what partisans say.

The levels differ from the other two surveys. In 2020 the share of Republicans saying better was 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, against 28.2% in Nationscape in the last full week before the election, and the Democratic shares were 5.2%, 5.7% and 10.3%. The surveys differ in mode, sample and timing, and Nationscape leaves out leaners, so this figure is read for its shape.

Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration

The change of president shows up before the inauguration. From the last full week before the election to mid-January the Democratic share rose from 10.3% to 18.2% and the Republican share fell from 28.2% to 18.6%, so the lines met before the new president took office. The Republican share in the election week itself, 33.6%, is above the share in the week before, but the intervals overlap. By the last week of January the shares were 23.6% and 13.3%. Several things changed between November and January, including the election result, and the survey cannot say which of them moved answers.

### Belief and expression give two readings of the gap

The premium shows that partisans answer differently, not why. One reading is that partisans perceive different economies. Bartels found that Democrats and Republicans differ in their perceptions of events that have an objective answer [3]. A panel around the 2006 midterm election found that partisans' economic assessments moved apart after control of Congress changed, and the authors attribute the movement to different views of the parties' economic competence [4].

A second reading is that partisans give congenial answers when asked, even when they know or could infer less flattering facts. In two surveys with experiments, monetary payments and appeals for accuracy reduced the partisan gap in reports of economic conditions [5]. Small payments for correct answers also narrowed partisan gaps on other factual questions [6]. Behavior gives mixed evidence. One study found that consumption changed after a presidential election in line with a county's partisan makeup [7], and a later study of administrative spending data found that partisan shifts in expectations after the 2008 and 2016 elections had no effect on household spending [8].

Nothing in the ANES, CES or Nationscape items can separate these readings. Chapter 2.2, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party) covers how partisans feel about each other. Planned, Trust in government (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trust-in-government; planned) asks whether trust in the federal government also follows the party in the White House. Views about economic policy, such as trade and taxes, are a different subject from perceptions of how the economy performed, and Planned, Trade and economic populism (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trade-and-economic-populism; planned) takes them up. Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates when abortion, religion and racial resentment became partisan divides and finds no sort date for economic perceptions, whose gap follows the party of the president.

### What these data cannot show

The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side. A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty. The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income. The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions.

The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions. The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions. The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation. The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since. Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment. A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view.

The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower. The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only. The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024. The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event. The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give.

## Tables

### Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House

Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; ANES, 1980 to 2024

| Survey year | Grouping | Group | President | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1980 | party | Democrats | Carter | 4.3 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 818 |
| 1980 | party | Republicans | Carter | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 523 |
| 1980 | role | President's party | Carter | 4.3 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 818 |
| 1980 | role | Other party | Carter | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 523 |
| 1982 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 758 |
| 1982 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 22.8 | 19.1 | 26.9 | 435 |
| 1982 | role | President's party | Reagan | 22.8 | 19.1 | 26.9 | 435 |
| 1982 | role | Other party | Reagan | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 758 |
| 1984 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 25.9 | 23.3 | 28.6 | 1,013 |
| 1984 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 63.8 | 60.6 | 67.0 | 868 |
| 1984 | role | President's party | Reagan | 63.8 | 60.6 | 67.0 | 868 |
| 1984 | role | Other party | Reagan | 25.9 | 23.3 | 28.6 | 1,013 |
| 1986 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 17.7 | 15.5 | 20.2 | 1,043 |
| 1986 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 32.3 | 29.1 | 35.7 | 755 |
| 1986 | role | President's party | Reagan | 32.3 | 29.1 | 35.7 | 755 |
| 1986 | role | Other party | Reagan | 17.7 | 15.5 | 20.2 | 1,043 |
| 1988 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 10.8 | 8.9 | 12.9 | 920 |
| 1988 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 29.1 | 26.0 | 32.3 | 801 |
| 1988 | role | President's party | Reagan | 29.1 | 26.0 | 32.3 | 801 |
| 1988 | role | Other party | Reagan | 10.8 | 8.9 | 12.9 | 920 |
| 1990 | party | Democrats | Bush | 3.5 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1,000 |
| 1990 | party | Republicans | Bush | 3.7 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 710 |
| 1990 | role | President's party | Bush | 3.7 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 710 |
| 1990 | role | Other party | Bush | 3.5 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1,000 |
| 1992 | party | Democrats | Bush | 2.4 | 1.7 | 3.5 | 1,217 |
| 1992 | party | Republicans | Bush | 8.1 | 6.5 | 10.0 | 918 |
| 1992 | role | President's party | Bush | 8.1 | 6.5 | 10.0 | 918 |
| 1992 | role | Other party | Bush | 2.4 | 1.7 | 3.5 | 1,217 |
| 1994 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 37.2 | 33.6 | 41.0 | 819 |
| 1994 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 33.2 | 29.6 | 37.0 | 741 |
| 1994 | role | President's party | Clinton | 37.2 | 33.6 | 41.0 | 819 |
| 1994 | role | Other party | Clinton | 33.2 | 29.6 | 37.0 | 741 |
| 1996 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 48.6 | 44.9 | 52.3 | 887 |
| 1996 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 26.2 | 22.6 | 30.2 | 650 |
| 1996 | role | President's party | Clinton | 48.6 | 44.9 | 52.3 | 887 |
| 1996 | role | Other party | Clinton | 26.2 | 22.6 | 30.2 | 650 |
| 1998 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 647 |
| 1998 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 38.4 | 33.8 | 43.3 | 467 |
| 1998 | role | President's party | Clinton | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 647 |
| 1998 | role | Other party | Clinton | 38.4 | 33.8 | 43.3 | 467 |
| 2000 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 49.6 | 45.9 | 53.3 | 879 |
| 2000 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 26.3 | 22.8 | 30.1 | 676 |
| 2000 | role | President's party | Clinton | 49.6 | 45.9 | 53.3 | 879 |
| 2000 | role | Other party | Clinton | 26.3 | 22.8 | 30.1 | 676 |
| 2002 | party | Democrats | Bush | 3.7 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 703 |
| 2002 | party | Republicans | Bush | 6.7 | 4.8 | 9.4 | 665 |
| 2002 | role | President's party | Bush | 6.7 | 4.8 | 9.4 | 665 |
| 2002 | role | Other party | Bush | 3.7 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 703 |
| 2004 | party | Democrats | Bush | 10.1 | 7.7 | 13.1 | 585 |
| 2004 | party | Republicans | Bush | 42.6 | 37.9 | 47.4 | 479 |
| 2004 | role | President's party | Bush | 42.6 | 37.9 | 47.4 | 479 |
| 2004 | role | Other party | Bush | 10.1 | 7.7 | 13.1 | 585 |
| 2008 | party | Democrats | Bush | 1.4 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 1,362 |
| 2008 | party | Republicans | Bush | 3.5 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 651 |
| 2008 | role | President's party | Bush | 3.5 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 651 |
| 2008 | role | Other party | Bush | 1.4 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 1,362 |
| 2012 | party | Democrats | Obama | 48.8 | 46.4 | 51.3 | 3,091 |
| 2012 | party | Republicans | Obama | 9.4 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 1,992 |
| 2012 | role | President's party | Obama | 48.8 | 46.4 | 51.3 | 3,091 |
| 2012 | role | Other party | Obama | 9.4 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 1,992 |
| 2016 | party | Democrats | Obama | 45.0 | 42.3 | 47.7 | 1,934 |
| 2016 | party | Republicans | Obama | 11.2 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 1,726 |
| 2016 | role | President's party | Obama | 45.0 | 42.3 | 47.7 | 1,934 |
| 2016 | role | Other party | Obama | 11.2 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 1,726 |
| 2020 | party | Democrats | Trump | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 3,829 |
| 2020 | party | Republicans | Trump | 36.2 | 34.1 | 38.4 | 3,425 |
| 2020 | role | President's party | Trump | 36.2 | 34.1 | 38.4 | 3,425 |
| 2020 | role | Other party | Trump | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 3,829 |
| 2024 | party | Democrats | Biden | 36.5 | 33.9 | 39.3 | 2,546 |
| 2024 | party | Republicans | Biden | 4.7 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 2,331 |
| 2024 | role | President's party | Biden | 36.5 | 33.9 | 39.3 | 2,546 |
| 2024 | role | Other party | Biden | 4.7 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 2,331 |

Views: Democrats and Republicans (basis = party); President's party and other party (basis = role).

Note: The ANES ran no survey in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 or 2022, so each line joins survey years.

Note: Interviews before 2012 were mainly face-to-face; web samples begin in 2012 (see the mode comparison later in the chapter).

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json

### Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House

Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; CES, 2006 to 2024

| Survey year | Party | President | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2006 | Democrats | Bush | 7.2 | 6.8 | 7.7 | 16,316 |
| 2006 | Republicans | Bush | 70.3 | 69.4 | 71.1 | 14,998 |
| 2007 | Democrats | Bush | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 4,240 |
| 2007 | Republicans | Bush | 25.6 | 23.7 | 27.6 | 3,671 |
| 2008 | Democrats | Bush | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 14,626 |
| 2008 | Republicans | Bush | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 13,856 |
| 2009 | Democrats | Obama | 24.4 | 23.1 | 25.7 | 5,973 |
| 2009 | Republicans | Obama | 5.2 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5,453 |
| 2010 | Democrats | Obama | 36.0 | 35.1 | 37.0 | 23,997 |
| 2010 | Republicans | Obama | 5.9 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 23,350 |
| 2011 | Democrats | Obama | 24.3 | 23.0 | 25.6 | 9,165 |
| 2011 | Republicans | Obama | 4.9 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 7,285 |
| 2012 | Democrats | Obama | 55.9 | 55.0 | 56.9 | 24,943 |
| 2012 | Republicans | Obama | 5.3 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 20,488 |
| 2013 | Democrats | Obama | 46.1 | 44.5 | 47.8 | 7,387 |
| 2013 | Republicans | Obama | 10.5 | 9.4 | 11.8 | 5,253 |
| 2014 | Democrats | Obama | 52.8 | 51.9 | 53.8 | 25,131 |
| 2014 | Republicans | Obama | 11.9 | 11.3 | 12.6 | 18,807 |
| 2015 | Democrats | Obama | 56.3 | 54.6 | 57.9 | 6,480 |
| 2015 | Republicans | Obama | 12.9 | 11.7 | 14.2 | 4,792 |
| 2016 | Democrats | Obama | 52.2 | 51.4 | 53.0 | 30,201 |
| 2016 | Republicans | Obama | 8.6 | 8.1 | 9.1 | 20,484 |
| 2017 | Democrats | Trump | 26.6 | 25.3 | 28.1 | 8,200 |
| 2017 | Republicans | Trump | 75.0 | 73.3 | 76.5 | 5,651 |
| 2018 | Democrats | Trump | 23.3 | 22.6 | 24.1 | 26,244 |
| 2018 | Republicans | Trump | 83.4 | 82.7 | 84.1 | 21,346 |
| 2019 | Democrats | Trump | 26.3 | 25.1 | 27.7 | 8,081 |
| 2019 | Republicans | Trump | 49.3 | 47.7 | 50.8 | 6,363 |
| 2020 | Democrats | Trump | 5.7 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 28,686 |
| 2020 | Republicans | Trump | 44.4 | 43.5 | 45.3 | 19,648 |
| 2021 | Democrats | Biden | 45.5 | 44.3 | 46.7 | 11,808 |
| 2021 | Republicans | Biden | 7.6 | 6.9 | 8.4 | 8,001 |
| 2022 | Democrats | Biden | 25.0 | 24.3 | 25.8 | 28,158 |
| 2022 | Republicans | Biden | 4.2 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 20,127 |
| 2023 | Democrats | Biden | 41.9 | 40.6 | 43.2 | 10,420 |
| 2023 | Republicans | Biden | 8.5 | 7.8 | 9.3 | 8,738 |
| 2024 | Democrats | Biden | 52.5 | 51.5 | 53.5 | 28,671 |
| 2024 | Republicans | Biden | 5.0 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 21,191 |

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json

### Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points

In-party premium, percentage points; partisans including leaners; ANES 1980 to 2024 and CES 2006 to 2024

| Survey year | Survey | President | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1980 | ANES | Carter | 1.4 | −0.6 | 3.4 | 1,341 |
| 1982 | ANES | Reagan | 16.2 | 11.8 | 20.5 | 1,193 |
| 1984 | ANES | Reagan | 38.0 | 33.8 | 42.1 | 1,881 |
| 1986 | ANES | Reagan | 14.6 | 10.5 | 18.6 | 1,798 |
| 1988 | ANES | Reagan | 18.3 | 14.6 | 22.1 | 1,721 |
| 1990 | ANES | Bush | 0.2 | −1.6 | 2.0 | 1,710 |
| 1992 | ANES | Bush | 5.7 | 3.7 | 7.6 | 2,135 |
| 1994 | ANES | Clinton | 4.0 | −1.2 | 9.3 | 1,560 |
| 1996 | ANES | Clinton | 22.3 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 1,537 |
| 1998 | ANES | Clinton | 15.3 | 8.9 | 21.6 | 1,114 |
| 2000 | ANES | Clinton | 23.3 | 18.1 | 28.5 | 1,555 |
| 2002 | ANES | Bush | 3.0 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 1,368 |
| 2004 | ANES | Bush | 32.5 | 27.0 | 38.0 | 1,064 |
| 2008 | ANES | Bush | 2.2 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 2,013 |
| 2012 | ANES | Obama | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 |
| 2016 | ANES | Obama | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 |
| 2020 | ANES | Trump | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 |
| 2024 | ANES | Biden | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 |
| 2006 | CES | Bush | 63.1 | 62.1 | 64.0 | 31,314 |
| 2007 | CES | Bush | 23.5 | 21.5 | 25.6 | 7,911 |
| 2008 | CES | Bush | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 28,482 |
| 2009 | CES | Obama | 19.2 | 17.7 | 20.7 | 11,426 |
| 2010 | CES | Obama | 30.1 | 29.1 | 31.2 | 47,347 |
| 2011 | CES | Obama | 19.4 | 18.0 | 20.9 | 16,450 |
| 2012 | CES | Obama | 50.6 | 49.5 | 51.7 | 45,431 |
| 2013 | CES | Obama | 35.6 | 33.6 | 37.6 | 12,640 |
| 2014 | CES | Obama | 40.9 | 39.8 | 42.1 | 43,938 |
| 2015 | CES | Obama | 43.4 | 41.3 | 45.4 | 11,272 |
| 2016 | CES | Obama | 43.6 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 50,685 |
| 2017 | CES | Trump | 48.3 | 46.2 | 50.4 | 13,851 |
| 2018 | CES | Trump | 60.1 | 59.0 | 61.1 | 47,590 |
| 2019 | CES | Trump | 22.9 | 20.9 | 24.9 | 14,444 |
| 2020 | CES | Trump | 38.7 | 37.7 | 39.7 | 48,334 |
| 2021 | CES | Biden | 37.9 | 36.4 | 39.3 | 19,809 |
| 2022 | CES | Biden | 20.8 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 48,285 |
| 2023 | CES | Biden | 33.4 | 31.9 | 34.9 | 19,158 |
| 2024 | CES | Biden | 47.5 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 49,862 |
| 1980 | ANES average | n/a | 14.8 | n/a | n/a | 9,644 |
| 1990 | ANES average | n/a | 14.8 | n/a | n/a | 9,644 |
| 2001 | ANES average | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| 2012 | ANES average | n/a | 34.0 | n/a | n/a | 20,874 |
| 2024 | ANES average | n/a | 34.0 | n/a | n/a | 20,874 |

Note: The ANES adds web interviews in 2012; the CES is an online panel throughout. Mode comparisons follow in the chapter.

Note: The averages count each survey once and carry no band here: the interval of an average covers sampling error within each survey only, and the yearly premiums vary by more than that.

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z for the ANES, year-specific weight for the CES)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json

### Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990

In-party premium, percentage points, by survey and interview mode; partisans including leaners; 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024

| Year | Survey and mode | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2012 | ANES all modes | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 |
| 2012 | ANES face-to-face | 35.1 | 29.9 | 40.4 | 1,805 |
| 2012 | ANES web | 41.8 | 38.2 | 45.4 | 3,278 |
| 2012 | CES online panel | 50.6 | 49.5 | 51.7 | 45,431 |
| 2016 | ANES all modes | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 |
| 2016 | ANES face-to-face | 38.4 | 32.3 | 44.5 | 1,042 |
| 2016 | ANES web | 32.1 | 28.3 | 35.9 | 2,618 |
| 2016 | CES online panel | 43.6 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 50,685 |
| 2020 | ANES all modes | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 |
| 2020 | CES online panel | 38.7 | 37.7 | 39.7 | 48,334 |
| 2024 | ANES all modes | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 |
| 2024 | ANES face-to-face | 33.3 | 26.9 | 39.7 | 966 |
| 2024 | ANES web | 31.7 | 27.2 | 36.2 | 1,855 |
| 2024 | CES online panel | 47.5 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 49,862 |

Note: The ANES has no mode weights in 2020, so that year shows the all-mode estimate only.

Note: The ANES all-mode estimate for 2024 also includes panel and paper respondents, who have no mode weight.

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z for the ANES, year-specific weight for the CES); weight_ftf and weight_web for the face-to-face and web rows

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json

### Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points

Average, lowest and highest yearly in-party premium in each presidency, percentage points; partisans including leaners; CES, 2006 to 2024

| Presidency | Years | Average premium (points) | Lowest yearly premium | Highest yearly premium |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Bush | 2006 to 2008 | 29.3 | 1.3 | 63.1 |
| Obama | 2009 to 2016 | 35.4 | 19.2 | 50.6 |
| Trump | 2017 to 2020 | 42.5 | 22.9 | 60.1 |
| Biden | 2021 to 2024 | 34.9 | 20.8 | 47.5 |

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json

### Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better

In-party premium against the share of the president's party saying the economy got better, one point per ANES survey, 1980 to 2024; percent and percentage points

| Survey year | President's party saying better (%) | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1980 | 4.3 | 1.4 | −0.6 | 3.4 | 1,341 |
| 1982 | 22.8 | 16.2 | 11.8 | 20.5 | 1,193 |
| 1984 | 63.8 | 38.0 | 33.8 | 42.1 | 1,881 |
| 1986 | 32.3 | 14.6 | 10.5 | 18.6 | 1,798 |
| 1988 | 29.1 | 18.3 | 14.6 | 22.1 | 1,721 |
| 1990 | 3.7 | 0.2 | −1.6 | 2.0 | 1,710 |
| 1992 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 3.7 | 7.6 | 2,135 |
| 1994 | 37.2 | 4.0 | −1.2 | 9.3 | 1,560 |
| 1996 | 48.6 | 22.3 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 1,537 |
| 1998 | 53.7 | 15.3 | 8.9 | 21.6 | 1,114 |
| 2000 | 49.6 | 23.3 | 18.1 | 28.5 | 1,555 |
| 2002 | 6.7 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 1,368 |
| 2004 | 42.6 | 32.5 | 27.0 | 38.0 | 1,064 |
| 2008 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 2,013 |
| 2012 | 48.8 | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 |
| 2016 | 45.0 | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 |
| 2020 | 36.2 | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 |
| 2024 | 36.5 | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 |

Note: The chart shows each survey's estimate without its interval; the data table gives the interval of each premium.

Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json

### Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration

Share of Democratic and Republican identifiers saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by interview week; Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021

| Week starts | Week ends | Party | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2019-07-18 | 2019-07-21 | Democrats | 16.3 | 13.5 | 19.7 | 1,741 |
| 2019-07-18 | 2019-07-21 | Republicans | 70.2 | 66.0 | 74.1 | 1,445 |
| 2019-07-22 | 2019-07-28 | Democrats | 14.8 | 12.3 | 17.7 | 2,252 |
| 2019-07-22 | 2019-07-28 | Republicans | 66.4 | 62.3 | 70.2 | 1,750 |
| 2019-07-29 | 2019-08-04 | Democrats | 14.9 | 12.5 | 17.7 | 2,346 |
| 2019-07-29 | 2019-08-04 | Republicans | 66.1 | 62.2 | 69.7 | 1,814 |
| 2019-08-05 | 2019-08-11 | Democrats | 14.3 | 11.8 | 17.2 | 1,959 |
| 2019-08-05 | 2019-08-11 | Republicans | 64.0 | 60.1 | 67.7 | 1,654 |
| 2019-08-12 | 2019-08-18 | Democrats | 12.3 | 9.9 | 15.1 | 1,970 |
| 2019-08-12 | 2019-08-18 | Republicans | 64.6 | 60.4 | 68.6 | 1,565 |
| 2019-08-19 | 2019-08-25 | Democrats | 12.5 | 10.4 | 14.9 | 2,707 |
| 2019-08-19 | 2019-08-25 | Republicans | 66.9 | 63.5 | 70.2 | 2,152 |
| 2019-08-26 | 2019-09-01 | Democrats | 11.0 | 8.9 | 13.6 | 1,993 |
| 2019-08-26 | 2019-09-01 | Republicans | 64.4 | 60.4 | 68.2 | 1,571 |
| 2019-09-02 | 2019-09-08 | Democrats | 11.4 | 9.3 | 14.0 | 2,119 |
| 2019-09-02 | 2019-09-08 | Republicans | 62.2 | 58.4 | 65.9 | 1,685 |
| 2019-09-09 | 2019-09-15 | Democrats | 11.5 | 9.2 | 14.3 | 2,002 |
| 2019-09-09 | 2019-09-15 | Republicans | 64.7 | 60.6 | 68.6 | 1,632 |
| 2019-09-16 | 2019-09-22 | Democrats | 12.8 | 10.4 | 15.7 | 2,171 |
| 2019-09-16 | 2019-09-22 | Republicans | 66.0 | 61.9 | 69.9 | 1,709 |
| 2019-09-23 | 2019-09-29 | Democrats | 11.4 | 9.2 | 14.2 | 2,044 |
| 2019-09-23 | 2019-09-29 | Republicans | 64.5 | 60.5 | 68.4 | 1,741 |
| 2019-09-30 | 2019-10-06 | Democrats | 12.8 | 10.9 | 15.1 | 3,266 |
| 2019-09-30 | 2019-10-06 | Republicans | 62.7 | 59.3 | 66.0 | 2,579 |
| 2019-10-07 | 2019-10-13 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 1,732 |
| 2019-10-07 | 2019-10-13 | Republicans | 62.1 | 57.6 | 66.3 | 1,377 |
| 2019-10-14 | 2019-10-20 | Democrats | 15.7 | 12.6 | 19.3 | 1,397 |
| 2019-10-14 | 2019-10-20 | Republicans | 68.4 | 63.9 | 72.7 | 1,251 |
| 2019-10-21 | 2019-10-27 | Democrats | 13.1 | 10.8 | 15.9 | 2,337 |
| 2019-10-21 | 2019-10-27 | Republicans | 66.1 | 62.2 | 69.8 | 1,911 |
| 2019-10-28 | 2019-11-03 | Democrats | 16.4 | 13.8 | 19.4 | 2,427 |
| 2019-10-28 | 2019-11-03 | Republicans | 68.4 | 64.7 | 71.9 | 2,030 |
| 2019-11-04 | 2019-11-10 | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.2 | 17.6 | 1,936 |
| 2019-11-04 | 2019-11-10 | Republicans | 69.7 | 66.1 | 73.1 | 1,769 |
| 2019-11-11 | 2019-11-17 | Democrats | 12.9 | 10.9 | 15.3 | 2,565 |
| 2019-11-11 | 2019-11-17 | Republicans | 68.1 | 64.8 | 71.2 | 2,181 |
| 2019-11-18 | 2019-11-24 | Democrats | 17.1 | 13.7 | 21.3 | 1,156 |
| 2019-11-18 | 2019-11-24 | Republicans | 69.8 | 65.2 | 74.1 | 1,158 |
| 2019-11-25 | 2019-12-01 | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.4 | 17.3 | 2,604 |
| 2019-11-25 | 2019-12-01 | Republicans | 69.8 | 66.5 | 72.9 | 2,303 |
| 2019-12-02 | 2019-12-08 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 1,566 |
| 2019-12-02 | 2019-12-08 | Republicans | 68.9 | 64.8 | 72.7 | 1,490 |
| 2019-12-09 | 2019-12-15 | Democrats | 14.0 | 11.9 | 16.4 | 2,706 |
| 2019-12-09 | 2019-12-15 | Republicans | 69.7 | 66.4 | 72.8 | 2,316 |
| 2019-12-16 | 2019-12-22 | Democrats | 18.9 | 16.4 | 21.7 | 2,289 |
| 2019-12-16 | 2019-12-22 | Republicans | 70.0 | 66.7 | 73.2 | 1,996 |
| 2019-12-23 | 2019-12-29 | Democrats | 22.4 | 19.6 | 25.5 | 1,913 |
| 2019-12-23 | 2019-12-29 | Republicans | 73.4 | 69.8 | 76.6 | 1,526 |
| 2019-12-30 | 2020-01-05 | Democrats | 17.8 | 15.7 | 20.0 | 3,131 |
| 2019-12-30 | 2020-01-05 | Republicans | 73.1 | 70.5 | 75.5 | 2,804 |
| 2020-01-06 | 2020-01-12 | Democrats | 19.3 | 16.3 | 22.7 | 1,572 |
| 2020-01-06 | 2020-01-12 | Republicans | 73.7 | 69.9 | 77.2 | 1,401 |
| 2020-01-13 | 2020-01-19 | Democrats | 21.7 | 18.9 | 24.7 | 2,195 |
| 2020-01-13 | 2020-01-19 | Republicans | 70.1 | 66.6 | 73.4 | 1,845 |
| 2020-01-20 | 2020-01-26 | Democrats | 15.9 | 13.6 | 18.5 | 2,370 |
| 2020-01-20 | 2020-01-26 | Republicans | 70.8 | 67.5 | 73.8 | 1,972 |
| 2020-01-27 | 2020-02-02 | Democrats | 17.8 | 14.9 | 21.0 | 1,714 |
| 2020-01-27 | 2020-02-02 | Republicans | 73.1 | 69.2 | 76.6 | 1,417 |
| 2020-02-03 | 2020-02-09 | Democrats | 15.3 | 12.8 | 18.1 | 2,143 |
| 2020-02-03 | 2020-02-09 | Republicans | 73.2 | 69.6 | 76.4 | 1,897 |
| 2020-02-10 | 2020-02-16 | Democrats | 20.7 | 17.9 | 23.9 | 1,935 |
| 2020-02-10 | 2020-02-16 | Republicans | 73.2 | 69.7 | 76.5 | 1,823 |
| 2020-02-17 | 2020-02-23 | Democrats | 20.0 | 17.4 | 22.7 | 2,366 |
| 2020-02-17 | 2020-02-23 | Republicans | 74.9 | 71.7 | 77.8 | 1,967 |
| 2020-02-24 | 2020-03-01 | Democrats | 19.0 | 16.3 | 22.1 | 1,778 |
| 2020-02-24 | 2020-03-01 | Republicans | 68.9 | 65.3 | 72.3 | 1,682 |
| 2020-03-02 | 2020-03-08 | Democrats | 16.4 | 14.0 | 19.2 | 2,264 |
| 2020-03-02 | 2020-03-08 | Republicans | 66.0 | 62.2 | 69.5 | 1,767 |
| 2020-03-09 | 2020-03-15 | Democrats | 14.0 | 11.7 | 16.6 | 2,054 |
| 2020-03-09 | 2020-03-15 | Republicans | 58.9 | 55.2 | 62.5 | 1,803 |
| 2020-03-16 | 2020-03-22 | Democrats | 8.9 | 7.2 | 11.0 | 2,313 |
| 2020-03-16 | 2020-03-22 | Republicans | 44.5 | 40.9 | 48.1 | 1,837 |
| 2020-03-23 | 2020-03-29 | Democrats | 10.3 | 8.5 | 12.6 | 2,097 |
| 2020-03-23 | 2020-03-29 | Republicans | 37.0 | 33.8 | 40.4 | 1,918 |
| 2020-03-30 | 2020-04-05 | Democrats | 9.9 | 8.5 | 11.5 | 3,657 |
| 2020-03-30 | 2020-04-05 | Republicans | 31.1 | 28.7 | 33.6 | 3,108 |
| 2020-04-06 | 2020-04-12 | Democrats | 7.2 | 6.1 | 8.5 | 4,597 |
| 2020-04-06 | 2020-04-12 | Republicans | 28.1 | 26.0 | 30.2 | 3,908 |
| 2020-04-13 | 2020-04-19 | Democrats | 12.1 | 10.0 | 14.5 | 1,857 |
| 2020-04-13 | 2020-04-19 | Republicans | 22.0 | 19.2 | 25.1 | 1,654 |
| 2020-04-20 | 2020-04-26 | Democrats | 7.4 | 5.8 | 9.4 | 1,846 |
| 2020-04-20 | 2020-04-26 | Republicans | 21.5 | 18.6 | 24.6 | 1,566 |
| 2020-04-27 | 2020-05-03 | Democrats | 6.9 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 1,784 |
| 2020-04-27 | 2020-05-03 | Republicans | 24.2 | 21.3 | 27.4 | 1,684 |
| 2020-05-04 | 2020-05-10 | Democrats | 6.6 | 5.2 | 8.3 | 2,556 |
| 2020-05-04 | 2020-05-10 | Republicans | 21.4 | 18.9 | 24.2 | 2,138 |
| 2020-05-11 | 2020-05-17 | Democrats | 10.4 | 8.4 | 12.9 | 1,735 |
| 2020-05-11 | 2020-05-17 | Republicans | 18.1 | 15.4 | 21.1 | 1,583 |
| 2020-05-18 | 2020-05-24 | Democrats | 9.5 | 8.0 | 11.3 | 2,806 |
| 2020-05-18 | 2020-05-24 | Republicans | 23.3 | 20.9 | 25.8 | 2,503 |
| 2020-05-25 | 2020-05-31 | Democrats | 7.6 | 6.0 | 9.7 | 1,799 |
| 2020-05-25 | 2020-05-31 | Republicans | 21.1 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 1,587 |
| 2020-06-01 | 2020-06-07 | Democrats | 6.3 | 4.9 | 8.1 | 2,035 |
| 2020-06-01 | 2020-06-07 | Republicans | 20.1 | 17.5 | 23.0 | 1,757 |
| 2020-06-08 | 2020-06-14 | Democrats | 6.4 | 4.9 | 8.1 | 2,197 |
| 2020-06-08 | 2020-06-14 | Republicans | 22.4 | 19.8 | 25.2 | 2,000 |
| 2020-06-15 | 2020-06-21 | Democrats | 5.9 | 4.6 | 7.6 | 2,214 |
| 2020-06-15 | 2020-06-21 | Republicans | 18.7 | 16.3 | 21.4 | 1,898 |
| 2020-06-22 | 2020-06-28 | Democrats | 6.5 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 2,337 |
| 2020-06-22 | 2020-06-28 | Republicans | 17.2 | 15.0 | 19.8 | 1,991 |
| 2020-06-29 | 2020-07-05 | Democrats | 5.6 | 4.2 | 7.4 | 1,961 |
| 2020-06-29 | 2020-07-05 | Republicans | 21.2 | 18.5 | 24.2 | 1,785 |
| 2020-07-06 | 2020-07-12 | Democrats | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 1,666 |
| 2020-07-06 | 2020-07-12 | Republicans | 20.7 | 17.6 | 24.2 | 1,458 |
| 2020-07-13 | 2020-07-19 | Democrats | 9.0 | 7.7 | 10.5 | 4,172 |
| 2020-07-13 | 2020-07-19 | Republicans | 22.4 | 20.3 | 24.7 | 3,373 |
| 2020-07-20 | 2020-07-26 | Democrats | 6.0 | 4.8 | 7.3 | 3,562 |
| 2020-07-20 | 2020-07-26 | Republicans | 21.0 | 19.0 | 23.2 | 3,379 |
| 2020-07-27 | 2020-08-02 | Democrats | 7.3 | 5.9 | 9.0 | 2,640 |
| 2020-07-27 | 2020-08-02 | Republicans | 14.6 | 12.6 | 16.8 | 2,423 |
| 2020-08-03 | 2020-08-09 | Democrats | 5.3 | 3.9 | 7.2 | 1,739 |
| 2020-08-03 | 2020-08-09 | Republicans | 19.8 | 17.0 | 22.9 | 1,504 |
| 2020-08-10 | 2020-08-16 | Democrats | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 1,849 |
| 2020-08-10 | 2020-08-16 | Republicans | 22.1 | 19.3 | 25.3 | 1,659 |
| 2020-08-17 | 2020-08-23 | Democrats | 5.6 | 4.3 | 7.4 | 2,320 |
| 2020-08-17 | 2020-08-23 | Republicans | 21.3 | 18.8 | 24.1 | 2,237 |
| 2020-08-24 | 2020-08-30 | Democrats | 6.9 | 5.2 | 9.1 | 1,865 |
| 2020-08-24 | 2020-08-30 | Republicans | 26.6 | 23.1 | 30.4 | 1,506 |
| 2020-08-31 | 2020-09-06 | Democrats | 7.6 | 5.8 | 9.8 | 1,875 |
| 2020-08-31 | 2020-09-06 | Republicans | 23.3 | 20.4 | 26.5 | 1,898 |
| 2020-09-07 | 2020-09-13 | Democrats | 8.3 | 6.5 | 10.5 | 1,966 |
| 2020-09-07 | 2020-09-13 | Republicans | 24.3 | 21.2 | 27.7 | 1,669 |
| 2020-09-14 | 2020-09-20 | Democrats | 9.7 | 7.9 | 11.9 | 2,430 |
| 2020-09-14 | 2020-09-20 | Republicans | 28.4 | 25.4 | 31.6 | 2,069 |
| 2020-09-21 | 2020-09-27 | Democrats | 8.5 | 6.5 | 11.1 | 1,809 |
| 2020-09-21 | 2020-09-27 | Republicans | 24.0 | 20.7 | 27.6 | 1,629 |
| 2020-09-28 | 2020-10-04 | Democrats | 8.3 | 6.3 | 10.9 | 1,665 |
| 2020-09-28 | 2020-10-04 | Republicans | 27.1 | 23.7 | 30.9 | 1,673 |
| 2020-10-05 | 2020-10-11 | Democrats | 6.4 | 4.9 | 8.4 | 2,205 |
| 2020-10-05 | 2020-10-11 | Republicans | 20.4 | 17.6 | 23.5 | 2,058 |
| 2020-10-12 | 2020-10-18 | Democrats | 9.0 | 7.2 | 11.3 | 2,127 |
| 2020-10-12 | 2020-10-18 | Republicans | 26.9 | 23.7 | 30.4 | 1,871 |
| 2020-10-19 | 2020-10-25 | Democrats | 9.9 | 7.8 | 12.6 | 1,897 |
| 2020-10-19 | 2020-10-25 | Republicans | 28.0 | 24.4 | 31.9 | 1,669 |
| 2020-10-26 | 2020-11-01 | Democrats | 10.3 | 8.5 | 12.5 | 2,424 |
| 2020-10-26 | 2020-11-01 | Republicans | 28.2 | 25.2 | 31.4 | 2,383 |
| 2020-11-02 | 2020-11-08 | Democrats | 9.9 | 8.0 | 12.2 | 2,050 |
| 2020-11-02 | 2020-11-08 | Republicans | 33.6 | 30.2 | 37.1 | 1,808 |
| 2020-11-09 | 2020-11-15 | Democrats | 14.1 | 11.9 | 16.6 | 2,165 |
| 2020-11-09 | 2020-11-15 | Republicans | 30.8 | 27.5 | 34.2 | 1,790 |
| 2020-11-16 | 2020-11-22 | Democrats | 14.3 | 11.8 | 17.1 | 1,931 |
| 2020-11-16 | 2020-11-22 | Republicans | 25.6 | 22.2 | 29.3 | 1,496 |
| 2020-11-23 | 2020-11-29 | Democrats | 11.9 | 10.0 | 14.1 | 2,520 |
| 2020-11-23 | 2020-11-29 | Republicans | 27.3 | 24.4 | 30.5 | 2,079 |
| 2020-11-30 | 2020-12-06 | Democrats | 15.3 | 13.2 | 17.8 | 2,639 |
| 2020-11-30 | 2020-12-06 | Republicans | 21.3 | 18.7 | 24.3 | 2,209 |
| 2020-12-07 | 2020-12-13 | Democrats | 18.1 | 15.2 | 21.5 | 1,630 |
| 2020-12-07 | 2020-12-13 | Republicans | 24.1 | 20.2 | 28.3 | 1,131 |
| 2020-12-14 | 2020-12-20 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.6 | 15.8 | 2,713 |
| 2020-12-14 | 2020-12-20 | Republicans | 21.4 | 18.8 | 24.2 | 2,125 |
| 2020-12-21 | 2020-12-27 | Democrats | 14.2 | 12.1 | 16.5 | 2,387 |
| 2020-12-21 | 2020-12-27 | Republicans | 21.0 | 18.4 | 23.8 | 1,975 |
| 2020-12-28 | 2020-12-30 | Democrats | 10.2 | 7.9 | 13.1 | 1,334 |
| 2020-12-28 | 2020-12-30 | Republicans | 18.6 | 15.2 | 22.6 | 924 |
| 2021-01-12 | 2021-01-16 | Democrats | 18.2 | 15.2 | 21.7 | 1,647 |
| 2021-01-12 | 2021-01-16 | Republicans | 18.6 | 15.2 | 22.5 | 1,222 |
| 2021-01-21 | 2021-01-24 | Democrats | 18.3 | 15.7 | 21.2 | 1,788 |
| 2021-01-21 | 2021-01-24 | Republicans | 13.8 | 11.3 | 16.7 | 1,404 |
| 2021-01-25 | 2021-01-31 | Democrats | 23.6 | 20.3 | 27.2 | 1,358 |
| 2021-01-25 | 2021-01-31 | Republicans | 13.3 | 10.6 | 16.5 | 1,155 |

Note: Party is the file's three-category party identification, so leaners are not counted with a party. Nationscape recruits online respondents who chose to take part, and the intervals treat it as a probability sample.

Note: The levels differ from the other two surveys: in 2020 the Republican share saying better is 28.2% in the last full week before the election, against 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, so this figure is read for its shape.

Note: The Republican share in the election week (33.6%) is above the share in the week before (28.2%), and its 95% interval overlaps the intervals of the weeks on either side.

Note: No wave was fielded between the end of December 2020 and the middle of January 2021, and the line is not drawn across that gap.

Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021; weighted (survey weight)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json

## All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (104), sorted by id.

| Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| anes_gap_1980 | +1.4 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 | 95% CI −0.6 to 3.4 | 1,341 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_1994 | +4.0 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1994 | 95% CI −1.2 to 9.3 | 1,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2016 | +33.8 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 30.5 to 37.0 | 3,660 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2020 | −31.0 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2020 | 95% CI −33.3 to −28.7 | 7,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_gap_2024 | +31.8 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 28.8 to 34.8 | 4,877 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_n_resp | 42,864 | respondents | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_1984 | 38.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1984 | 95% CI 33.8 to 42.1 | 1,881 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_1990 | 0.2 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1990 | 95% CI −1.6 to 2.0 | 1,710 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_1994 | 4.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1994 | 95% CI −1.2 to 9.3 | 1,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_2002 | 3.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2002 | 95% CI 0.2 to 5.9 | 1,368 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_2004 | 32.5 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 27.0 to 38.0 | 1,064 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_prem_2008 | 2.2 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI 0.3 to 4.0 | 2,013 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_slope | 0.49 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.97 | 42,864 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_slope_ex | 0.37 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1982 to 2024, without 1980 and 1990 | 95% CI −0.16 to 0.89 | 39,813 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| appr_prem_1994 | 55.0 | percentage points | in-party share approving of the president's job minus out-party share, weighted | ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer | 1994 | 95% CI 50.3 to 59.7 | 1,509 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| appr_prem_min | 34.9 | percentage points | smallest yearly premium in approval of the president's job | ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ces_d_share_2020 | 5.7% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 5.3% to 6.1% | 28,686 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_even_mean | 39.7 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums in the even-year surveys, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006, 2008 and every second year to 2024 |   | 441,268 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 10 yearly premiums. |
| ces_gap_2008 | −1.3 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI −1.6 to −0.9 | 28,482 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2009 | +19.2 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2009 | 95% CI 17.7 to 20.7 | 11,426 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2016 | +43.6 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 42.7 to 44.6 | 50,685 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2017 | −48.3 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI −50.4 to −46.2 | 13,851 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2020 | −38.7 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2020 | 95% CI −39.7 to −37.7 | 48,334 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_gap_2021 | +37.9 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 36.4 to 39.3 | 19,809 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_mean_high | 42.5 | percentage points | largest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency |   |   | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys. |
| ces_mean_low | 29.3 | percentage points | smallest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums (Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024), each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency |   |   | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys. |
| ces_n_resp | 568,229 | respondents | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_odd_mean | 31.5 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums in the odd-year surveys, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2007, 2009 and every second year to 2023 |   | 126,961 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 9 yearly premiums. |
| ces_prem_2006 | 63.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 | 95% CI 62.1 to 64.0 | 31,314 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_prem_2008 | 1.3 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.6 | 28,482 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_r_share_2020 | 44.4% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 43.5% to 45.3% | 19,648 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_range_min | 26.7 | percentage points | smallest, across the four presidencies, of the largest minus the smallest yearly premium within the presidency | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency |   |   | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_share_max_2008 | 2.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | larger of the two party shares | partisans of either party | 2008 |   |   | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_slope | 0.53 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.85 to 1.91 | 568,229 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| d_share_2016 | 45.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2016 | 95% CI 42.3% to 47.7% | 1,934 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_share_2020 | 5.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 4.3% to 6.3% | 3,829 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_min | 33.3 | percentage points | smallest of the three face-to-face premiums | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012, 2016 and 2024 |   |   | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_prem_2012 | 35.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI 29.9 to 40.4 | 1,805 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_prem_2016 | 38.4 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI 32.3 to 44.5 | 1,042 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_prem_2024 | 33.3 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 26.9 to 39.7 | 966 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_share_1994 | 37.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the president's party | 1994 | 95% CI 33.6% to 41.0% | 819 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_share_early | 26.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the president's party | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 24.8% to 27.2% | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_share_late | 41.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the president's party | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 40.4% to 42.9% | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_share_max_low5 | 8.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | largest in-party share among those surveys | partisans of the president's party | the five low-premium surveys other than 1994 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_share_min_high | 22.8% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | smallest in-party share among those surveys | partisans of the president's party | the surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_worse_1990 | 72.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the president's party | 1990 | 95% CI 68.8% to 75.4% | 710 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| in_worse_2008 | 87.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the president's party | 2008 | 95% CI 84.3% to 90.2% | 651 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| low_cut | 10 | percentage points | constant | cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| low_share_max_8090 | 4.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | largest of the four shares (both parties, both surveys) | partisans of either party | 1980 and 1990 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| max_low | 5.7 | percentage points | largest premium among the surveys below the cutoff | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | the low-premium surveys |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| min_high | 14.6 | percentage points | smallest premium among the surveys at or above the cutoff | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | the other surveys |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_diff_2012 | −6.7 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI −13.0 to −0.3 |   | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_diff_2016 | +6.3 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI −0.9 to 13.5 |   | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_diff_2024 | +1.6 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI −6.2 to 9.5 |   | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_diff_max | 6.7 | percentage points | largest absolute difference between the face-to-face and web premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012, 2016 and 2024 |   |   | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_both_ci | 4 | changes of party in the White House | count | transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_ci_pos | 15 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_transfers | 6 | changes of party in the White House | count | changes of the president's party between two surveys | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_years | 18 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_ces_both_ci | 3 | changes of party in the White House | count | transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts | 2006 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_ces_ci_pos | 19 | CES survey years | count | CES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero | 2006 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_ces_transfers | 3 | changes of party in the White House | count | changes of the president's party between two surveys | 2006 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_ces_years | 19 | CES survey years | count | CES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 2006 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_high | 12 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_low | 6 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_ns_weeks | 80 | weekly waves | count | Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans | July 2019 to January 2021 |   |   | none (count) | Nationscape |   |
| n_out_above_1994 | 1 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys in which the share of the other party saying better exceeds the 1994 share | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ns_d_apr | 12.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 10.0% to 14.5% | 1,857 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_d_end | 23.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31 | 95% CI 20.3% to 27.2% | 1,358 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_d_feb | 20.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 17.4% to 22.7% | 2,366 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_d_jan | 18.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16 | 95% CI 15.2% to 21.7% | 1,647 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_d_oct | 10.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01 | 95% CI 8.5% to 12.5% | 2,424 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_n_resp | 324,560 | respondent-weeks | count of respondents in the weekly party cells | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | July 2019 to January 2021 |   |   | none (count) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_prem_apr | 10.0 | percentage points | Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 6.2 to 13.7 |   | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_prem_feb | 54.9 | percentage points | Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 50.9 to 58.9 |   | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_apr | 22.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 19.2% to 25.1% | 1,654 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_end | 13.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31 | 95% CI 10.6% to 16.5% | 1,155 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_feb | 74.9% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 71.7% to 77.8% | 1,967 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_jan | 18.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16 | 95% CI 15.2% to 22.5% | 1,222 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_nov | 33.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-11-02 to 2020-11-08 | 95% CI 30.2% to 37.1% | 1,808 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| ns_r_oct | 28.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01 | 95% CI 25.2% to 31.4% | 2,383 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape |   |
| offset_2012 | 11.2 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2012 | 95% CI 8.1 to 14.4 |   | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| offset_2016 | 9.9 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2016 | 95% CI 6.5 to 13.2 |   | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| offset_2020 | 7.7 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2020 | 95% CI 5.2 to 10.2 |   | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| offset_2024 | 15.7 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2024 | 95% CI 12.5 to 19.0 |   | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| out_share_1994 | 33.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the other party | 1994 | 95% CI 29.6% to 37.0% | 741 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| out_share_1998 | 38.4% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the other party | 1998 | 95% CI 33.8% to 43.3% | 467 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| out_share_early | 11.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the other party | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 10.4% to 12.0% | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| out_share_late | 7.7% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the other party | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 6.9% to 8.4% | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| out_worse_1990 | 75.8% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the other party | 1990 | 95% CI 73.0% to 78.4% | 1,000 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| out_worse_2008 | 93.9% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the other party | 2008 | 95% CI 92.0% to 95.3% | 1,362 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_change | 19.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means, standard errors combined in quadrature; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990 | 95% CI 17.2 to 21.3 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_change_ex_svy | 12.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (4 and 4 surveys) | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1982 to 1988 | 95% CI −4.3 to 28.8 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_change_svy | 19.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (6 and 4 surveys) | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990 | 95% CI 4.8 to 33.7 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_early | 14.8 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 13.3 to 16.2 | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_early_ex | 21.8 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1982 to 1988 (four surveys) | 95% CI 19.7 to 23.8 | 6,593 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_late | 34.0 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 32.5 to 35.4 | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_late_max | 39.4 | percentage points | largest of the yearly premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| prem_late_min | 31.0 | percentage points | smallest of the yearly premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| r_share_2016 | 11.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2016 | 95% CI 9.6% to 13.1% | 1,726 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| r_share_2020 | 36.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 34.1% to 38.4% | 3,425 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| web_prem_2012 | 41.8 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI 38.2 to 45.4 | 3,278 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| web_prem_2016 | 32.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI 28.3 to 35.9 | 2,618 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| web_prem_2024 | 31.7 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 27.2 to 36.2 | 1,855 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |

## Definitions

- Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
- Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
- Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
- Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
- Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
- Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.

## Methods

Sample: ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 18 surveys from 1980 to 2024 that ask whether the national economy got better, stayed about the same or got worse over the past year (VCF0870), who identify with or lean toward a party (7-point party identification, 1 to 3 Democratic and 5 to 7 Republican; pure independents are left out) and carry a positive weight: 42,864 respondents. CES cumulative common content respondents in the 19 surveys from 2006 to 2024 (item economy_retro, recoded so that somewhat better and much better count as better and 'not sure' is missing; party by the 7-point scale with leaners): 568,229 respondents. Nationscape weekly waves from July 2019 to January 2021 (economy_better_scale, 3 = better), Democratic and Republican identifiers only because the file's 3-category party identification has no leaners: 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves. Estimand: for each survey year, the weighted share of partisans who say the economy got better, by party and by relation to the president; the in-party premium is the share among partisans of the president's party minus the share among partisans of the other party, in percentage points. The president's party is the party of the president in office at the time of interview (the ANES cumulative file's president variable; for the CES, which is fielded each autumn, the president in office that autumn: Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024). Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the interview-mode comparison in 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was face-to-face only and 2020 has no mode weights); CES year-specific weight; Nationscape survey weight. Intervals: 95% intervals; a share uses the Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size; a premium or gap combines the two normal standard errors in quadrature; an average of yearly estimates counts each survey once and combines the yearly standard errors in quadrature, so its interval covers sampling error within each survey only and not the spread between surveys (the CES presidency averages carry no interval and are shown with their lowest and highest yearly values); the difference between two periods is also given with a Welch t interval on the yearly premiums, which treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread; the difference between the face-to-face and web premiums combines the two standard errors in quadrature; a slope is the least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year with a t interval on the number of surveys minus two. The intervals for shares, premiums, gaps, era averages and mode differences are model based (a weighted simple random sample) and ignore clustering and stratification; the Welch and slope intervals take the yearly premiums as the observations. Suppression: a party-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, a survey needs at least 150 respondents on the item, and a Nationscape party-week cell needs at least 500 respondents; no ANES or CES cell fell below a floor (the smallest cell holds 435 respondents), and 80 weekly Nationscape waves meet the weekly floor while the thin waves after January 2021 do not. Item differences: the ANES item has three answers and the CES item five, so levels differ across the two surveys. Timing: the ANES surveys of 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 have post-election interviews only (no respondent has a pre-election interview in the cumulative file).

## What these data cannot show

- The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side.
- A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty.
- The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income.
- The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions.
- The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions.
- The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions.
- The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation.
- The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since.
- Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment.
- A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view.
- The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower.
- The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only.
- The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024.
- The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event.
- The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give.

## References

1. Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953
2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
3. Bartels, Larry M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. Political Behavior 24(2): 117-150. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021226224601
4. Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2010). Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments. American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 153-173. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00424.x
5. Prior, Markus; Sood, Gaurav; Khanna, Kabir (2015). You Cannot Be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 489-518. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00014127
6. Bullock, John G.; Gerber, Alan S.; Hill, Seth J.; Huber, Gregory A. (2015). Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 519-578. https://nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-14074
7. Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2009). Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?. American Political Science Review 103(3): 407-426.
8. Mian, Atif R.; Sufi, Amir; Khoshkhou, Nasim (2023). Partisan Bias, Economic Expectations, and Household Spending. Review of Economics and Statistics 105(3): 493-510. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/105/3/493/100979/Partisan-Bias-Economic-Expectations-and-Household

## Provenance

- Pipeline version: 1.0.0
- Build script: book3/chapters/perceptions-of-the-economy/build.py (sha256 31dd75a70dfb637a8087213a1c84a702642bb1730768b90f8b04eccba431c84e)
- Built on: 2026-09-30
- Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs:

| File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- |
| data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 |
| data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 |
| data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet | 43,528,088 | 6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4 | 8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44 |

Outputs:

| File | SHA-256 |
| --- | --- |
| facts.json | 3ddb57bf606953b125471134b2ef26b947ac3f9e064599163a7b50263a886d2c |
| figures/ces_by_presidency.json | b4cbe5d9d9d3714c2e8e21ac404973509e45b08e874ef40b14289c86b3214262 |
| figures/instrument_and_mode.json | d68eb8a8498a8d7137bb2e48eedf008d7e2af0a28161d449084f525074b18699 |
| figures/nationscape_weeks.json | c0b7ce9444314a20e47ca205b3e3c2ea1534d836f7126573effda8e728bb6a8e |
| figures/premium_trend.json | b2dc403d3d645d00bfd8ad2ecc6d88074e68c0db0ff5af4799b9b817f49e9a7e |
| figures/premium_vs_in_share.json | 018b86ef761b9bf2473d912c38007035515641ea3fa66c77d84d3c7cc35737ca |
| figures/share_better_anes.json | 6645d8fdb9aa72192defe51b6ef308685eace9fb51bdf6ff146ebd2c4076c5ae |
| figures/share_better_ces.json | ca074729eb21c5dfb80820b996ee35c5d4b3d6739f4f4c68d4f9d61fec3afd73 |
| meta.json | 34455f80583917bcb9d11685cc1f0f22486b2398486d9ee05a27247949f0fb03 |
| refs.json | b813078a3d0da0dd71a4046ec8a7517d1135fae9a69c11b70c66c0985ee81e30 |

## Machine formats

- Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report
- Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md
- Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/facts.json
- Table 1, figure "share_better_anes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json
- Table 2, figure "share_better_ces" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json
- Table 3, figure "premium_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json
- Table 4, figure "instrument_and_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json
- Table 5, figure "ces_by_presidency" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json
- Table 6, figure "premium_vs_in_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json
- Table 7, figure "nationscape_weeks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json
- Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt