# The diploma divide: report

Chapter 3.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter.

## Identification

- Title: The diploma divide
- Chapter: 3.4 (Part III, Participation and coalitions; Coalitions and political differences)
- Question: On which kinds of issues do college graduates and non-graduates differ, and how did that change?
- Dek: In the ANES, college graduates went from voting less Democratic than other voters to voting more Democratic, a gap of +23.3 points of the two-party presidential vote in 2024.
- Grain: individuals
- Status: draft
- Published: 2026-10-03
- Updated: not revised
- Data sources:
  - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1952-2024: presidential vote, party identification, income rank and issue items; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for mode splits
  - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content 2008-2024: presidential vote and party identification; policy items for 2014 and 2020; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative
  - General Social Survey. 1993-2024 waves with the raw-file interview mode: issue items by degree; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use
  - State presidential returns. MIT Election Lab state presidential returns 1976-2024: certified two-party Democratic share for the survey check; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts)
- Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide
- Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report
- Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report.md
- BibTeX key: singh2026thediplomadivide

```bibtex
@misc{singh2026thediplomadivide,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {The diploma divide},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}
```

## Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance.

| Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | +23.3 | 95% CI 19.0 to 27.7 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | v_all_2024 |
| Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | +12.3 | 95% CI 10.8 to 13.8 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | cv_all_2024 |
| Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | −0.8 | 95% CI −5.0 to 3.5 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | v_all_2012 |
| count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval lies below zero | 1956 to 2012 | 8 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_vote_below |
| count of elections | ANES presidential elections with a graduate gap estimate | 1956 to 2012 | 14 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_vote_elections |
| Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | +3.7 | 95% CI 2.2 to 5.2 | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | cv_all_2008 |
| weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2008 | 24.7% | 95% CI 24.1% to 25.3% | 32,800 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_grad_2008 |
| weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 34.8% | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.4% | 60,000 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_grad_2024 |
| weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 1952 | 6.4% | 95% CI 5.2% to 7.5% | 1,790 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | grad_share_1952 |
| weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 34.4% | 95% CI 32.6% to 36.2% | 5,465 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | grad_share_2024 |

## Findings

In 2024 the graduate gap in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote was +12.3 (95% CI 10.8 to 13.8) points in the Cooperative Election Study (CES) and +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) points in the American National Election Studies (ANES). The gap is the share among voters with a four-year degree minus the share among other voters, so graduates were the more Democratic group in both surveys. The ANES sample of 2024 voters is more Democratic than the certified count, and against the CES the excess is concentrated among graduates (Table 3), so the ANES level of the 2024 gap needs the CES beside it. The ANES gap runs from negative to positive. It was −0.8 (95% CI −5.0 to 3.5) points in 2012, an interval that includes zero, and in 8 of the 14 elections from 1956 to 2012 that have an estimate the interval lies below zero, so graduates were the less Democratic group. The CES gap is above zero in every presidential election since 2008, +3.7 (95% CI 2.2 to 5.2) points in 2008. The differences on issues are older than the difference in the vote. On cultural, racial and immigration items the graduate gap was already present in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000, and a later section measures it.

This chapter compares people with a four-year degree or more, called graduates, with everyone else. A graduate holds a college or advanced degree in the ANES, a four-year or postgraduate degree in the CES (24.7% of respondents in 2008 and 34.8% in 2024) and a bachelor's or graduate degree in the General Social Survey (GSS). An associate degree counts as no four-year degree in all three. Education here is a credential, the highest degree a person holds. Income, which Chapter 3.5, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) takes up, is a separate measure of household resources, and occupation is not measured in this chapter; a later section checks whether income rank accounts for the vote gap. Graduates are a growing part of the samples, 6.4% (95% CI 5.2% to 7.5%) of ANES respondents in 1952 and 34.4% (95% CI 32.6% to 36.2%) in 2024, so graduates and non-graduates are different slices of the population in different years. Party identification includes leaners, and white means non-Hispanic white. A gap is the value for graduates minus the value for non-graduates; it describes how two groups differ and cannot say what a degree does to a person's politics. Every estimate carries a 95% confidence interval that treats the weighted sample as a random sample; the methods note gives the details.

### In the ANES the graduate gap went from negative to positive

Table 1 plots the Democratic share of the two-party vote by degree. The share among non-graduates was above the share among graduates in 12 of the 14 elections from 1956 to 2012 that have an estimate. The gap's interval includes zero in 6 of the 14, and in none does it lie above zero. From 2012 to 2016 the gap rose by +12.7 (95% CI 6.5 to 18.9) points, to +11.9 (95% CI 7.4 to 16.4), and it was +14.9 (95% CI 11.6 to 18.1) in 2020 and +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) in 2024. From 2012 to 2024 the graduate share changed by +16.0 (95% CI 11.5 to 20.5) points and the non-graduate share by −8.2 (95% CI −12.2 to −4.1) points.

Table 1. Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016

The white non-Hispanic view shows the same shape with larger gaps. Among white voters the gap was +6.6 (95% CI 1.7 to 11.6) points in 2012, the first election with an interval above zero, and +28.1 (95% CI 23.2 to 33.0) in 2024; Chapter 3.3, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows the vote of other racial and ethnic groups. The vote is the respondent's report of a major-party choice (32,098 ANES respondents in the elections plotted). Two elections, 1952 and 1960, are left out because the graduate cell has fewer than 100 respondents or a Kish effective sample size [1] under 100.

Party identification moved later than the vote. Among ANES respondents who identify with a party, the graduate gap in the Democratic share has an interval below zero in 25 of the 27 studies from 1952 to 2012 that have an estimate. The interval includes zero in the rest. The gap was −5.8 (95% CI −9.7 to −1.9) points in 2012 and +1.6 (95% CI −2.2 to 5.5) in 2016, an interval that includes zero, and then +8.9 (95% CI 5.9 to 11.9) in 2020 and +17.5 (95% CI 13.6 to 21.4) in 2024. Among white respondents the gap was −0.4 (95% CI −5.0 to 4.2) in 2012 and +9.5 (95% CI 5.1 to 13.9) in 2016 (Table 2).

Table 2. Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gap

### The CES and the ANES differ outside 2016 and 2020

The CES has 188,145 respondents with a major-party vote in 2008 to 2024, against 0 in the ANES over the same years. Its vote gap among all voters was +3.7 (95% CI 2.2 to 5.2) points in 2008, +12.3 (95% CI 11.1 to 13.5) in 2016, +15.3 (95% CI 14.1 to 16.5) in 2020 and +12.3 (95% CI 10.8 to 13.8) in 2024. Among white voters it was +9.2 (95% CI 7.6 to 10.8) in 2008 and +16.1 (95% CI 14.5 to 17.7) in 2024. Its party-identification gap among all respondents was −1.6 (95% CI −3.0 to −0.2) in 2008, with an interval below zero, and +12.3 (95% CI 11.1 to 13.5) in 2020 and +9.4 (95% CI 8.0 to 10.9) in 2024.

The two surveys agree where their intervals overlap, in 2016 and 2020, and disagree before and after. The ANES gap minus the CES gap was −9.7 (95% CI −16.7 to −2.6) points in 2008, −6.4 (95% CI −10.9 to −1.9) in 2012 and +11.0 (95% CI 6.5 to 15.6) in 2024. They also disagree about the latest movement: the ANES gap changed by +8.5 (95% CI 3.1 to 13.9) points from 2020 to 2024, and the CES gap by −3.0 (95% CI −4.8 to −1.1) points. Both surveys record the respondent's own report of a vote. The ANES is a probability sample, and the CES is an opt-in online panel whose weights match it to the population.

Certified returns give a benchmark for the level of the Democratic share, though not for the gap (Table 3). In 2024 the ANES voters were 55.3% (95% CI 53.0% to 57.5%) Democratic, the CES voters 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%) and the certified two-party count 49.2%. In 2020 the shares were 56.0% (95% CI 54.3% to 57.7%), 52.5% (95% CI 51.9% to 53.1%) and 52.3%. The ANES share minus the count was +6.0 (95% CI 3.8 to 8.3) points in 2024 and +3.7 (95% CI 2.0 to 5.4) in 2020, while the CES share is within 1.1 points of the count in every election from 2008 to 2024. Against the CES, the ANES Democratic share in 2024 is +12.9 (95% CI 9.8 to 16.0) points higher among graduates (69.0% against 56.1%) and +1.8 (95% CI −1.5 to 5.2) among non-graduates (45.7% against 43.8%). The ANES sample of 2024 voters is therefore more Democratic than the count, and the excess among graduates accounts for most of the ANES-CES difference of +11.0 points in the gap. The count has no breakdown by education, so it cannot show how far either survey's shares for graduates and non-graduates are from the truth.

Table 3. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the certified count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.1 points of it in every election

The choice of weight matters less than the choice of survey. The ANES 2024 gap uses the full-sample weight, which for 2024 is the pre-election weight, and is +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) points; with the post-election weight it is +22.9 (95% CI 18.7 to 27.2). In the CES the gap is +12.3 in 2016 with the cumulative-file weight and +10.1 (95% CI 8.8 to 11.4) with the post-election weight, and in 2020 +15.3, +12.9 (95% CI 11.6 to 14.2) and, with the validated-vote weight, +16.2 (95% CI 14.9 to 17.5). Within a survey the weights move the gap by at most 3.4 points, less than the +11.0 points between the surveys in 2024.

Interview mode is another candidate, and the ANES can speak to it only in part. It interviewed respondents in person and on the web in 2012, 2016 and 2024 and gives each mode its own weight (Table 4), but in 2024 the mode groups cover 2,045 of the 3,918 voters. Panel and paper cases are in neither group, and their gap is +18.5 (95% CI 12.6 to 24.5) points. In both modes the 2012 interval includes zero and the 2016 and 2024 intervals lie above it. The 2024 vote gap was +30.5 (95% CI 20.8 to 40.1) points in person and +20.2 (95% CI 13.5 to 26.9) on the web. The ANES web gap minus the CES gap is +7.9 (95% CI 1.0 to 14.7) points, although the CES is also online, so mode does not account for the difference between the surveys. The web minus in-person difference within the ANES in 2024 is −10.3 (95% CI −22.0 to 1.5) points, an interval that includes zero and reaches past the ANES-CES difference, so the data do not rule out a mode effect. The 2020 ANES was collected without in-person interviews and has no mode weights.

Table 4. The vote gap rose after 2012 in both interview modes, and the in-person estimates are the larger ones in 2016 and 2024

### In the CES the steps between education levels grew

A split at the four-year degree hides the steps on either side of it. Table 5 follows four education levels in the CES. In 2008 the step from some college to a four-year degree was −0.1 (95% CI −2.0 to 1.8) points, an interval that includes zero, and the step from a four-year degree to a postgraduate degree, +6.0 (95% CI 3.6 to 8.4) points, had the largest point estimate of the three. By 2024 every step is above zero: +7.2 (95% CI 5.1 to 9.3) points from a high school education or less to some college, +5.4 (95% CI 3.5 to 7.3) from some college to a four-year degree, and +9.3 (95% CI 7.2 to 11.4) from a four-year degree to a postgraduate degree. Postgraduates were 9.0 (95% CI 6.6 to 11.4) points more Democratic than voters with a high school education or less in 2008 and 21.9 (95% CI 19.6 to 24.2) points in 2024. Among white voters the span was 27.0 (95% CI 24.6 to 29.4) points in 2024. The graduate comparison used in the rest of the chapter is a cut of this gradient at the four-year degree.

Table 5. In the CES the Democratic share rose at each step of education by 2016, while in 2008 a four-year degree did not differ from some college

### Graduates differ most on cultural, racial and immigration items

The differences on issues are older than the difference in the vote. On a cultural index (abortion, gay rights and moral traditionalism), graduates' answers sat +0.30 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.36) standard deviations nearer the liberal end than other respondents' in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000. In 2016 to 2024, pooling in-person and web interviews, the gap was +0.36 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.39). The racial index gives +0.21 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) and +0.31 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.35), and the immigration item +0.36 (95% CI 0.30 to 0.41) and +0.37 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.41). The economic index is the exception, with a gap of −0.32 (95% CI −0.37 to −0.28) in the first period and +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06) in the second, an interval that includes zero. Holding party identification fixed shrinks the cultural gap in 2016 to 2024 to +0.26 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.29) and leaves positive gaps on the racial (+0.18 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.21)) and immigration (+0.30 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.34)) items. It turns the economic gap negative (−0.10 (95% CI −0.13 to −0.07)). These are descriptions of how groups differ, and a later section separates the gaps within each party.

Table 6 gives the graduate gap on each item in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and of 2016 to 2024. Every item is oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer: more government action on the economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on the cultural items, and more immigration. The gap is the weighted mean answer of graduates minus that of other respondents, in standard deviations of the item among all respondents in the period. The racial resentment index is the mean of the items from Kinder and Sanders [2], some worded so that agreement is resentful and the rest so that agreement is sympathetic, which cancels a tendency to agree with any statement. Companion 4.6a, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) defines it. Moral traditionalism is the mean of a pair of items, one worded in each direction. (Note: On the abortion item, a late gap of +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.36) standard deviations is a difference of +14.9 (95% CI 13.0 to 16.9) points in the share saying abortion should always be allowed, 58.2% of graduates against 43.2% of other respondents. On immigration, 26.4% of graduates and 42.0% of other respondents wanted immigration decreased in 2016 to 2024.)

Table 6. The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positive

The economic items have gaps below zero in 1992 to 2000, between −0.36 and −0.10 standard deviations, so graduates were more conservative than other respondents on guaranteed jobs, health insurance, government services and spending on the poor and on welfare. In 2016 to 2024 their gaps lie between −0.04 and +0.09. Of the cultural, racial and immigration items, all but one have gaps above zero in both periods. Affirmative action is the exception, at −0.06 (95% CI −0.11 to −0.01) in the first period and +0.05 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.09) in the second. The racial resentment index has the largest point estimate in both periods, +0.44 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.50) and +0.48 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.52), and immigration is +0.36 (95% CI 0.30 to 0.41) and +0.37 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.41). The abortion gap went from +0.37 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.42) to +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.36), a change whose interval includes zero.

Not every item was asked in every study of a period. Gay adoption was asked in two of the early studies, job protection in three, immigration in 1992 to 1998, and the resentment items are missing in 1996 and in part of 1998. With only the items asked in every study of both periods (jobs and government services, abortion and moral traditionalism, government help and affirmative action), the economic gap went from −0.30 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.25) to +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06). The cultural gap went from +0.27 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.33) to +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.37) and the racial gap from +0.11 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.17) to +0.19 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.24) (the common-items button of Table 8). The racial level depends on the resentment items, which are not in this check: with them the racial index is +0.21 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) and +0.31 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.35). The immigration item has no counterpart because it was not asked in 2000.

The late period mixes interview modes, and mode matters for the size of the gaps and, on economic items, for their sign. Respondents interviewed in person in 2016 and 2024 show larger gaps, as point estimates, than respondents interviewed on the web in the same years on every domain. The cultural index gives +0.46 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.57) in person against +0.34 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.41) on the web, the racial index +0.47 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.59) against +0.22 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.29), and the economic index +0.13 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.24) against −0.08 (95% CI −0.15 to −0.02). The late economic gap is therefore above zero in person and below zero on the web, and the pooled value near zero averages the two. The face-to-face view of Table 6 compares in-person studies with in-person samples. In it the cultural index changes by +0.16 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.28), the racial index by +0.24 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.37) and the economic index by +0.46 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.59), and the immigration index by +0.07 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.20). The all-interview change in the cultural index is +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12), an interval that includes zero but allows a rise of as much as 40% of the 1992 to 2000 gap. The data therefore do not establish that the cultural gap was constant. In the in-person subsample the cultural and racial gaps are larger in 2016 and 2024 than in the 1990s. The immigration change is +0.02 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.09) for all interviews and +0.07 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.20) in person, intervals that include zero and are wide enough to allow a rise.

The GSS and the CES ask other questions (use the buttons on the figure). The GSS agrees in direction on the economic and racial indices: its economic index went from −0.20 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.14) to +0.01 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.07) and its racial index from +0.15 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.20) to +0.29 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.34). Its cultural index went from +0.30 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.35) to +0.23 (95% CI 0.18 to 0.28), a change of −0.07 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.00) that just reaches zero. The item on sex between two adults of the same sex fell the most, +0.44 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.49) to +0.26 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.32), a change of −0.17 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.09), and the items on sex before marriage and on legal marijuana also fell by amounts whose intervals include zero. The CES battery has no racial items after 2014. Its economic, cultural and immigration indices rose from 2014 to 2020, to +0.18 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.21), +0.30 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.32) and +0.18 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.21). The CES economic index is above zero in 2020 while the pooled ANES and GSS estimates are near zero. The CES items (the Affordable Care Act, spending on welfare and on health care) differ from the ANES and GSS items, and the data cannot say whether the difference in level comes from the items or from the sample. The GSS late period includes the 2021 web survey and the mixed 2022 and 2024 surveys. In 2022 and 2024 the GSS gaps in person and on the web differ by at most 0.03 standard deviations on every domain. Each interval for that difference extends at least 0.18 from its estimate, which covers the ANES in-person minus web difference on the cultural index, +0.12 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.25), so the GSS does not rule out a mode difference of that size.

### In the ANES and GSS the economic gap moved to about zero

Table 7 follows one long-running item for each domain, so that the item set does not change from year to year. The ANES jobs item (whether the government should guarantee jobs and a good standard of living) has a negative point estimate in every study from 1974 to 2016, and its interval lies below zero in 15 of those 18 studies. The gap was −0.10 (95% CI −0.17 to −0.02) in 2016, +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.11) in 2020 and +0.07 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.15) in 2024, and the last two intervals include zero. The abortion gap lies between +0.27 and +0.52 in every study since 1980. The gap on government help for Black Americans was +0.04 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.11) in 2012, an interval that includes zero, and +0.25 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.33) in 2024. The immigration gap lies between +0.28 and +0.61 in every study since 1992.

Table 7. The graduate gap on guaranteed jobs rose from below zero to about zero by 2020, while the gaps on abortion and immigration stayed positive in every study

The GSS agrees through 2022. Its economic anchor (government should improve the standard of living of the poor) went from −0.24 (95% CI −0.38 to −0.10) in 2012 to +0.02 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.15) in 2022, and then to −0.13 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.01) in 2024. The change from 2022 to 2024 is −0.14 (95% CI −0.32 to 0.03) standard deviations, an interval that includes zero, so the data do not show whether the 2024 GSS reading is a reversal or sampling variation. The ANES jobs gap does not fall in 2024. In 2016 and 2024 the web samples show lower economic gaps than the in-person samples, so the pooled ANES values near zero average over groups with different gaps.

### Within party the gaps are largest among Democrats

If graduates differed from other respondents only because they had sorted into different parties, the gaps within a party would be zero. Table 8 separates the two. It repeats the early and late comparison on each domain index for all respondents, for Democrats, for Republicans, and net of party identification. The net gap is the graduate coefficient from a weighted regression of the index on a graduate indicator and the seven categories of the party-identification scale.

Table 8. Graduate Democrats stay more liberal than other Democrats on cultural, racial and immigration items, and graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans on economic items

Among Democrats the ANES gap on the cultural index was +0.67 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.75) in 1992 to 2000 and +0.39 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.43) in 2016 to 2024. Among Republicans it was +0.06 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.13) in the first period, an interval that includes zero, and +0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.21) in the second. The overall cultural gap changed by +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12), and the gap within the Democratic Party by −0.28 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.20). The overall gap mixes the two within-party gaps with the difference in party mix between graduates and other respondents, and that difference changed over the same years (Table 2). The racial index shows the same pattern, +0.55 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.64) falling to +0.32 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.38) among Democrats, against +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.11) among Republicans in the first period, an interval that includes zero, and +0.06 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.10) in the second. On immigration the gap persists in both parties, +0.40 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.45) among Democrats and +0.23 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.29) among Republicans in 2016 to 2024, with no change between the periods whose interval excludes zero in either party.

Economic items differ in sign. In 2016 to 2024 the economic gap was +0.09 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.14) among Democrats and −0.27 (95% CI −0.32 to −0.23) among Republicans, so within the Republican Party graduates are more conservative on economic items. The overall economic gap, +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06), combines a small positive gap among Democrats, a larger negative gap among Republicans and a difference in party mix. Net of party identification the economic gap is −0.10 (95% CI −0.13 to −0.07), against −0.21 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.16) in 1992 to 2000.

Among white respondents net of party identification the late gaps were +0.19 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.23) on the cultural index, +0.27 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.31) on the racial index, +0.34 (95% CI 0.29 to 0.38) on immigration and −0.08 (95% CI −0.12 to −0.05) on economic items. The GSS and the CES give positive cultural gaps net of party, +0.18 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.23) and +0.17 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.19). The CES economic gap net of party is 0.00 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.02). The surveys disagree about the Republican cultural gap. It is +0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.21) in the ANES, −0.04 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.05) in the GSS and −0.07 (95% CI −0.10 to −0.05) in the CES, and the ANES abortion item alone gives +0.11 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.17) among Republicans, against negative gaps on the CES abortion items. The data do not settle whether graduate Republicans are more liberal than other Republicans on cultural items. Party identification is itself shaped by the attitudes in question, so these estimates describe where graduates and non-graduates of the same party stand and do not isolate an effect of education. Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates when party gaps on issues became large, and Chapter 1.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions) examines the economic and cultural dimensions themselves.

### Income rank accounts for part of the rise in the vote gap

The ANES records family income as a percentile group within each year, which sets aside the changing value of the dollar. Table 9 compares the vote gap with the gap from a weighted linear probability model that adds the five income groups, and for all voters adds race. In 2024 the gap was +23.6 (95% CI 19.1 to 28.0) points before the adjustment and +22.1 (95% CI 17.2 to 27.0) after it, and in 2020 +15.1 (95% CI 11.8 to 18.4) and +17.5 (95% CI 13.9 to 21.0). In every one of the 17 elections before 2024 the adjusted gap is higher than the unadjusted gap, by 1.3 to 8.3 points. Among voters with the same income rank, graduates were more Democratic relative to non-graduates than the raw comparison shows. In 1992, for example, the gap was −9.8 (95% CI −15.8 to −3.8) raw and −4.1 (95% CI −10.5 to 2.4) net of income rank. The adjustment lowers the 2024 end of the series and raises the earlier years, so it shrinks the rise. From 2012 to 2024 the gap rose by +24.5 (95% CI 18.3 to 30.7) points unadjusted, +18.6 (95% CI 11.9 to 25.4) net of income rank and +16.9 (95% CI 10.4 to 23.4) net of income rank and race. From 2008 the rise was +30.0 (95% CI 21.6 to 38.4) unadjusted and +20.3 (95% CI 11.4 to 29.2) net of income rank.

Table 9. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the vote gap from 2012 to 2024 from +24.5 to +18.6 points and leaves most of it

Income rank as measured here shrinks the rise in the vote gap by 23.9% since 2012 and 32.3% since 2008 and leaves most of it. Chapter 3.5, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) shows that in the CES the highest income bracket became more Democratic after 2008 and that income and education overlap. A study using European survey data argues that workplace experience shapes political views on redistribution, immigration and abortion [3], and this chapter has no measure of occupation to separate that from the degree. A study of Western democracies finds that higher-educated voters moved toward the left while high-income voters stayed on the right [4]. A book-length account of the American case argues that Democrats became the party of highly educated voters with progressive social views and Republicans the party of white voters without college degrees [5]. Companion 8.1a, The diploma map (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map) measures the same education gradient across counties, and Planned, Education and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-and-ideology; planned) asks how education relates to ideology across countries.

### What these data cannot show

Every survey here interviews a new sample each year, so a rising gap can come from people changing their votes, from new voters replacing older ones, or from changes in who has a degree. The graduate share of respondents rose from 6.4% in 1952 to 34.4% in 2024, and the data cannot separate a change in what graduates think from a change in who counts as a graduate. The chapter compares groups and not people. The vote gap is a difference in the Democratic share among voters who chose a major party, and it leaves out nonvoters and third-party voters; Chapter 3.2, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up the composition of each party's voters.

The two vote surveys differ by as much as 11.0 points in the gap in a year. The ANES voters of 2024 are more Democratic than the certified count, with the excess among graduates, and the CES matches the count nationally. The count has no breakdown by degree, so it cannot show which survey is closer on graduates or on the gap, and a national match does not show that the CES is accurate within education groups. The vote is a self-report in both surveys, and no validated vote is available in either file. The ANES mode split has wide intervals, leaves out the panel and paper respondents of 2024 and does not exist for 2020. The in-person ANES samples give larger gaps than the web samples, and the GSS cannot rule out a mode difference of that size. The CES, which is online in every year, has smaller vote gaps than the in-person ANES in 2024.

The issue gaps rest on a few items per domain, and the sets differ across surveys and across studies within a period. A standardized gap depends on how answers spread in each period, so the same difference in the share giving an answer can be a different number of standard deviations in two periods. The CES policy battery ends in 2021 and has no racial item after 2014, and the GSS extract has no immigration item, so the ANES is the only survey here that covers all four domains. The orientation of each item comes from its wording, and a check against the party gap in every year can flag a reversed code but cannot detect a change in what Democrats believe.

Finally, the within-party results describe partisans who have already sorted. Party identification follows attitudes as well as preceding them, so a gap within a party is not the effect of education on that party's voters. The comparison cannot say whether graduate Democrats held their views before they joined the party or acquired them in it. The chapter holds only party, income rank and race fixed. Age, religion, region, occupation and the kind of place a person lives in go with education and are left free.

## Tables

### Table 1. Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by degree, ANES, 1956 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size

| Population | Group | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 31.5 | 23.2 | 39.7 | 124 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 41.2 | 38.3 | 44.1 | 1,136 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 50.0 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 142 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 69.9 | 67.1 | 72.8 | 965 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 37.5 | 30.0 | 45.0 | 160 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 48.1 | 44.6 | 51.7 | 750 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 39.3 | 33.5 | 45.1 | 275 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 34.9 | 32.4 | 37.5 | 1,311 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 37.3 | 31.2 | 43.4 | 250 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 54.4 | 51.4 | 57.5 | 1,069 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 35.0 | 28.0 | 41.9 | 183 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 45.9 | 42.2 | 49.6 | 691 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 41.3 | 35.8 | 46.8 | 305 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 41.9 | 38.9 | 44.8 | 1,063 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 42.2 | 36.8 | 47.5 | 325 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 48.8 | 45.5 | 52.2 | 850 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 51.8 | 46.9 | 56.7 | 401 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 61.9 | 58.7 | 65.0 | 922 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 49.5 | 44.0 | 55.0 | 360 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 62.2 | 58.2 | 66.3 | 672 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 50.4 | 45.3 | 55.4 | 429 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 53.0 | 48.9 | 57.1 | 689 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 50.3 | 44.2 | 56.5 | 289 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 49.7 | 45.0 | 54.4 | 522 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 50.8 | 45.0 | 56.6 | 400 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 56.8 | 53.2 | 60.4 | 1,133 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 53.0 | 49.6 | 56.4 | 1,471 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 53.8 | 51.2 | 56.4 | 2,673 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 60.4 | 57.2 | 63.6 | 1,175 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 48.5 | 45.3 | 51.6 | 1,416 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 64.9 | 62.8 | 67.0 | 2,993 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 50.0 | 47.6 | 52.5 | 3,036 |
| All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 69.0 | 66.1 | 71.9 | 2,013 |
| All voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 45.7 | 42.5 | 48.8 | 1,905 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 30.6 | 22.3 | 38.8 | 121 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 40.1 | 37.1 | 43.0 | 1,086 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 46.6 | 38.1 | 55.1 | 133 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 67.0 | 63.9 | 70.2 | 877 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 33.8 | 26.2 | 41.3 | 151 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 42.6 | 38.9 | 46.4 | 664 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 34.5 | 28.6 | 40.4 | 252 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 29.4 | 26.8 | 32.0 | 1,168 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 36.6 | 30.3 | 42.9 | 237 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 48.9 | 45.6 | 52.1 | 940 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 31.5 | 24.4 | 38.6 | 165 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 37.5 | 33.5 | 41.4 | 574 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 39.6 | 33.8 | 45.5 | 270 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 34.4 | 31.3 | 37.5 | 875 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 38.6 | 32.9 | 44.3 | 280 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 39.1 | 35.4 | 42.8 | 665 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 48.0 | 42.7 | 53.4 | 335 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 54.8 | 51.1 | 58.6 | 693 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 46.6 | 40.8 | 52.5 | 318 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 53.0 | 48.2 | 57.7 | 514 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 48.1 | 42.5 | 53.6 | 357 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 44.6 | 39.9 | 49.2 | 533 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 45.7 | 38.8 | 52.5 | 233 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 39.6 | 34.1 | 45.1 | 368 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 43.3 | 36.5 | 50.0 | 258 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 43.8 | 39.1 | 48.6 | 523 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 47.0 | 43.1 | 50.8 | 1,039 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 40.3 | 37.2 | 43.4 | 1,489 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 55.2 | 51.6 | 58.8 | 937 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 34.1 | 30.6 | 37.6 | 1,010 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 60.2 | 57.8 | 62.6 | 2,339 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 35.6 | 32.9 | 38.3 | 2,230 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 63.9 | 60.6 | 67.3 | 1,591 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 35.8 | 32.3 | 39.4 | 1,390 |

Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters).

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. This leaves out 1952 and 1960, and the line joins the neighboring elections.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/vote_by_degree.json

### Table 2. Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gap

Democratic share among graduates minus the share among other respondents, points, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; presidential vote (voters with a major-party vote) and party identification (identifiers, leaners included); all respondents (the button shows white non-Hispanic respondents)

| Population | Measure | Survey | Study year | Gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.7 | −18.4 | −1.1 | 1,260 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −19.9 | −28.7 | −11.2 | 1,107 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −10.6 | −19.0 | −2.3 | 910 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +4.3 | −2.0 | 10.7 | 1,586 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −17.1 | −24.0 | −10.3 | 1,319 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −10.9 | −18.8 | −3.0 | 874 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | −0.6 | −6.8 | 5.7 | 1,368 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −6.7 | −13.0 | −0.3 | 1,175 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −10.0 | −15.8 | −4.2 | 1,323 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −12.8 | −19.6 | −5.9 | 1,032 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | −2.6 | −9.1 | 3.9 | 1,118 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.1 | 8.4 | 811 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −6.0 | −12.9 | 0.9 | 1,533 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | −0.8 | −5.0 | 3.5 | 4,144 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +11.9 | 7.4 | 16.4 | 2,591 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +14.9 | 11.6 | 18.1 | 6,029 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +23.3 | 19.0 | 27.7 | 3,918 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +3.7 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 23,585 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +5.6 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 37,789 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 40,891 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +15.3 | 14.1 | 16.5 | 43,872 |
| All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +12.3 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 42,008 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −18.5 | −28.1 | −8.9 | 1,602 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.0 | −20.9 | −3.0 | 1,528 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.2 | −31.9 | −12.5 | 1,266 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −8.8 | −17.6 | 0.0 | 1,132 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −18.1 | −26.3 | −9.9 | 1,407 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −21.2 | −30.8 | −11.6 | 1,101 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −22.6 | −30.2 | −14.9 | 1,364 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −16.2 | −24.4 | −8.0 | 1,290 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.4 | −8.7 | 2,293 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −12.7 | −21.6 | −3.9 | 1,290 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −17.9 | −24.1 | −11.7 | 1,869 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −17.3 | −23.2 | −11.4 | 1,893 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −12.5 | −19.5 | −5.6 | 1,365 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −11.5 | −18.6 | −4.5 | 1,216 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −8.3 | −14.2 | −2.5 | 1,938 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −8.3 | −13.9 | −2.8 | 1,845 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −11.3 | −17.0 | −5.5 | 1,751 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −9.9 | −15.7 | −4.1 | 1,702 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −11.8 | −16.7 | −6.8 | 2,099 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −17.8 | −23.8 | −11.8 | 1,555 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −11.1 | −17.0 | −5.1 | 1,546 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −8.0 | −14.9 | −1.1 | 1,119 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −13.3 | −19.0 | −7.6 | 1,566 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −12.4 | −18.8 | −6.1 | 1,363 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | −2.4 | −9.3 | 4.5 | 1,074 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −9.3 | −15.6 | −3.0 | 2,006 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −5.8 | −9.7 | −1.9 | 5,034 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +1.6 | −2.2 | 5.5 | 3,643 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +8.9 | 5.9 | 11.9 | 7,181 |
| All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +17.5 | 13.6 | 21.4 | 5,055 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | −1.6 | −3.0 | −0.2 | 28,600 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +0.5 | −1.8 | 2.8 | 11,436 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +1.9 | 0.6 | 3.2 | 47,861 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +0.2 | −2.1 | 2.4 | 16,696 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +0.8 | −0.7 | 2.2 | 45,847 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +0.7 | −1.8 | 3.1 | 12,834 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +1.5 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 44,776 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +3.6 | 1.0 | 6.2 | 11,559 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +4.5 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 51,986 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +4.8 | 2.5 | 7.2 | 14,360 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +8.2 | 7.0 | 9.4 | 49,327 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +9.1 | 7.0 | 11.2 | 14,767 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 49,769 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +12.1 | 10.4 | 13.9 | 20,584 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +11.3 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 49,520 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +8.9 | 7.0 | 10.7 | 19,715 |
| All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +9.4 | 8.0 | 10.9 | 50,847 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.5 | −18.2 | −0.7 | 1,207 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −20.4 | −29.5 | −11.4 | 1,010 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −8.8 | −17.3 | −0.4 | 815 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +5.2 | −1.3 | 11.6 | 1,420 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −12.3 | −19.3 | −5.2 | 1,177 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −5.9 | −14.1 | 2.2 | 739 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | +5.2 | −1.4 | 11.9 | 1,145 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −0.5 | −7.3 | 6.3 | 945 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −6.8 | −13.3 | −0.3 | 1,028 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −13.8 | 1.2 | 832 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | +3.5 | −3.7 | 10.7 | 890 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +6.1 | −2.7 | 14.8 | 601 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −0.6 | −8.8 | 7.7 | 781 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | +6.6 | 1.7 | 11.6 | 2,528 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +21.1 | 16.1 | 26.1 | 1,947 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +24.6 | 21.0 | 28.2 | 4,569 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +28.1 | 23.2 | 33.0 | 2,981 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +9.2 | 7.6 | 10.8 | 19,889 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +10.2 | 8.6 | 11.9 | 30,356 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +18.6 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 30,727 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +22.7 | 21.5 | 24.0 | 32,857 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +16.1 | 14.5 | 17.7 | 31,857 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −19.4 | −29.2 | −9.5 | 1,464 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.7 | −21.8 | −3.7 | 1,415 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.6 | −32.6 | −12.6 | 1,164 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −7.1 | −16.2 | 2.0 | 1,036 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −16.4 | −24.8 | −7.9 | 1,258 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −18.6 | −28.3 | −8.9 | 978 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −21.5 | −29.4 | −13.6 | 1,206 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −13.8 | −22.2 | −5.4 | 1,148 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.7 | −8.4 | 2,018 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −9.9 | −19.1 | −0.8 | 1,138 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −14.7 | −21.1 | −8.2 | 1,607 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −15.1 | −21.3 | −8.9 | 1,613 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −11.8 | −19.2 | −4.3 | 1,136 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −7.8 | −15.3 | −0.4 | 1,031 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −5.4 | −11.7 | 0.9 | 1,568 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −4.1 | −10.2 | 1.9 | 1,431 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −6.3 | −12.5 | −0.1 | 1,321 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −7.6 | −14.0 | −1.2 | 1,288 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −8.3 | −13.8 | −2.8 | 1,606 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −12.4 | −19.0 | −5.8 | 1,200 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −12.9 | 0.3 | 1,201 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −9.3 | −17.1 | −1.5 | 834 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −9.8 | −16.2 | −3.3 | 1,169 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −8.3 | −15.3 | −1.2 | 1,065 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.3 | 8.7 | 764 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −4.7 | −12.3 | 2.8 | 990 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −0.4 | −5.0 | 4.2 | 2,981 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +9.5 | 5.1 | 13.9 | 2,636 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +18.1 | 14.8 | 21.5 | 5,290 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +23.5 | 19.1 | 27.9 | 3,682 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | +3.8 | 2.3 | 5.3 | 23,608 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +6.8 | 4.2 | 9.4 | 8,366 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +8.0 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 35,480 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +5.6 | 3.1 | 8.2 | 12,698 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +6.8 | 5.1 | 8.4 | 33,444 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +7.0 | 4.2 | 9.8 | 9,468 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +8.1 | 6.6 | 9.6 | 32,357 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +11.1 | 8.2 | 14.1 | 8,233 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +11.6 | 10.3 | 12.9 | 36,202 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +12.2 | 9.5 | 15.0 | 9,458 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +16.5 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 36,733 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +16.6 | 14.3 | 18.9 | 10,414 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +20.8 | 19.5 | 22.1 | 35,942 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +21.3 | 19.3 | 23.4 | 13,665 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +18.2 | 16.8 | 19.6 | 34,004 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +15.6 | 13.5 | 17.8 | 12,444 |
| White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +14.8 | 13.2 | 16.5 | 34,772 |

Views: All respondents (population = All respondents); White non-Hispanic respondents (population = White non-Hispanic respondents).

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. The line joins the neighboring studies where a study is left out.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992); Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_by_survey.json

### Table 3. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the certified count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.1 points of it in every election

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among survey voters minus the certified national share, points, ANES 1976 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; all voters who reported a major-party vote, whether or not education is known (button: the graduate gap under each survey weight); 95% intervals

| View | Row | Survey or weight | Difference or gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| certified | 1976 | ANES | 0.0 | −2.7 | 2.8 | 1,322 |
| certified | 1980 | ANES | −1.2 | −4.5 | 2.1 | 877 |
| certified | 1984 | ANES | +0.9 | −1.7 | 3.5 | 1,376 |
| certified | 1988 | ANES | +0.9 | −1.9 | 3.8 | 1,195 |
| certified | 1992 | ANES | +4.9 | 2.3 | 7.5 | 1,357 |
| certified | 1996 | ANES | +3.6 | 0.3 | 6.9 | 1,034 |
| certified | 2000 | ANES | +1.8 | −1.5 | 5.0 | 1,120 |
| certified | 2004 | ANES | +1.1 | −2.6 | 4.9 | 811 |
| certified | 2008 | ANES | +1.1 | −2.0 | 4.2 | 1,539 |
| certified | 2012 | ANES | +1.6 | −0.4 | 3.6 | 4,188 |
| certified | 2016 | ANES | +1.8 | −0.5 | 4.1 | 2,609 |
| certified | 2020 | ANES | +3.7 | 2.0 | 5.4 | 6,119 |
| certified | 2024 | ANES | +6.0 | 3.8 | 8.3 | 3,948 |
| certified | 2008 | CES | +0.1 | −0.7 | 0.9 | 23,585 |
| certified | 2012 | CES | +1.1 | 0.3 | 1.8 | 37,789 |
| certified | 2016 | CES | −0.2 | −0.8 | 0.5 | 40,891 |
| certified | 2020 | CES | +0.3 | −0.4 | 0.9 | 43,872 |
| certified | 2024 | CES | −0.3 | −1.0 | 0.5 | 42,008 |
| weights | ANES 2016 | Main weight | +11.9 | 7.4 | 16.4 | 2,591 |
| weights | ANES 2016 | Post-election weight | +12.0 | 7.5 | 16.5 | 2,571 |
| weights | ANES 2020 | Main weight | +14.9 | 11.6 | 18.1 | 6,029 |
| weights | ANES 2020 | Post-election weight | +15.4 | 12.1 | 18.8 | 5,987 |
| weights | ANES 2024 | Main weight | +23.3 | 19.0 | 27.7 | 3,918 |
| weights | ANES 2024 | Post-election weight | +22.9 | 18.7 | 27.2 | 3,903 |
| weights | CES 2012 | Main weight | +5.6 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 37,789 |
| weights | CES 2012 | Post-election weight | +4.7 | 3.2 | 6.1 | 37,789 |
| weights | CES 2016 | Main weight | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 40,891 |
| weights | CES 2016 | Post-election weight | +10.1 | 8.8 | 11.4 | 40,891 |
| weights | CES 2020 | Main weight | +15.3 | 14.1 | 16.5 | 43,872 |
| weights | CES 2020 | Post-election weight | +12.9 | 11.6 | 14.2 | 43,871 |
| weights | CES 2020 | Validated-vote weight | +16.2 | 14.9 | 17.5 | 35,746 |
| weights | CES 2024 | Main weight | +12.3 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 42,008 |
| weights | CES 2024 | Validated-vote weight | +12.4 | 10.9 | 14.0 | 32,948 |

Views: Against the certified count (panel = certified); Graduate gap by weight (panel = weights).

Note: The certified share is the Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican candidates' votes in the state returns, summed over states; it is a full count and has no interval. The survey interval is shifted by the count.

Note: ANES 2024 uses the pre-election weight VCF0009z; the weights view shows the post-election weight. The CES weights are the cumulative-file weight, the post-election weight (2012, 2016 and 2020) and the validated-vote weight (2020 and 2024).

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976-2024, and CES cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_postelection, weight_cumulative, weight_post and vvweight, as labelled); MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, 1976-2024; full counts

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/survey_checks.json

### Table 4. The vote gap rose after 2012 in both interview modes, and the in-person estimates are the larger ones in 2016 and 2024

ANES graduate gap in the vote and in party identification by interview mode, 2012, 2016 and 2024, points (button: issue gaps by mode, standard deviations); 95% intervals

| View | Row | Mode | Gap | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| vote | Vote, 2012 | In person | −4.15 | −11.99 | 3.68 | 1,327 |
| vote | Vote, 2012 | Web | +1.16 | −3.84 | 6.16 | 2,817 |
| vote | Vote, 2016 | In person | +15.94 | 7.16 | 24.72 | 745 |
| vote | Vote, 2016 | Web | +10.36 | 5.16 | 15.56 | 1,846 |
| vote | Vote, 2024 | In person | +30.45 | 20.77 | 40.14 | 688 |
| vote | Vote, 2024 | Web | +20.19 | 13.49 | 26.88 | 1,357 |
| vote | Vote, 2024 | Panel and paper | +18.55 | 12.57 | 24.53 | 1,873 |
| vote | Party identification, 2012 | In person | −7.86 | −14.84 | −0.88 | 1,800 |
| vote | Party identification, 2012 | Web | −4.61 | −9.34 | 0.12 | 3,234 |
| vote | Party identification, 2016 | In person | +5.19 | −2.35 | 12.74 | 1,040 |
| vote | Party identification, 2016 | Web | +0.38 | −4.04 | 4.79 | 2,603 |
| vote | Party identification, 2024 | In person | +24.64 | 16.14 | 33.14 | 963 |
| vote | Party identification, 2024 | Web | +15.20 | 9.41 | 20.99 | 1,840 |
| vote | Party identification, 2024 | Panel and paper | +12.71 | 7.13 | 18.29 | 2,252 |
| issue | Economic index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 2,196 |
| issue | Economic index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | −0.08 | −0.15 | −0.02 | 5,094 |
| issue | Cultural index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.46 | 0.35 | 0.57 | 2,195 |
| issue | Cultural index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.34 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 5,077 |
| issue | Racial index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.47 | 0.35 | 0.59 | 1,936 |
| issue | Racial index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.22 | 0.15 | 0.29 | 4,291 |
| issue | Immigration item, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 |
| issue | Immigration item, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.31 | 0.24 | 0.38 | 4,292 |
| issue | Economic index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | −0.03 | −0.18 | 0.13 | 1,724 |
| issue | Economic index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | −0.04 | −0.16 | 0.08 | 2,278 |
| issue | Cultural index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | +0.11 | −0.02 | 0.25 | 2,541 |
| issue | Cultural index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | +0.15 | 0.02 | 0.28 | 1,952 |
| issue | Racial index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | +0.29 | 0.15 | 0.44 | 2,177 |
| issue | Racial index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | +0.29 | 0.18 | 0.40 | 2,782 |

Views: Vote and party identification (panel = vote); Issue gaps (panel = issue).

Note: The ANES has no mode weights for 2020, so 2020 has no row. The panel and paper group uses the full-sample weight and appears for 2024 only, because in 2012 and 2016 every respondent is in a mode group. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Note: In the issue view each mode is standardized within itself, and the GSS in-person and web groups exclude the small residual interview modes.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016 and 2024; weighted (mode weights weight_ftf and weight_web); General Social Survey, 2022 and 2024; weighted (weight_use)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/mode_check.json

### Table 5. In the CES the Democratic share rose at each step of education by 2016, while in 2008 a four-year degree did not differ from some college

Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by highest degree, CES, 2008 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters)

| Population | Education | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| All voters | Four-year degree | 2008 | 54.4 | 53.0 | 55.8 | 5,430 |
| All voters | High school or less | 2008 | 51.3 | 49.9 | 52.8 | 8,004 |
| All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2008 | 60.4 | 58.4 | 62.3 | 2,680 |
| All voters | Some college | 2008 | 54.5 | 53.2 | 55.8 | 7,471 |
| All voters | Four-year degree | 2012 | 54.8 | 53.3 | 56.3 | 9,203 |
| All voters | High school or less | 2012 | 50.8 | 49.3 | 52.2 | 9,248 |
| All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2012 | 60.8 | 59.0 | 62.7 | 5,907 |
| All voters | Some college | 2012 | 52.0 | 50.7 | 53.2 | 13,431 |
| All voters | Four-year degree | 2016 | 56.8 | 55.7 | 57.9 | 10,205 |
| All voters | High school or less | 2016 | 43.9 | 42.5 | 45.3 | 9,580 |
| All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2016 | 64.0 | 62.7 | 65.4 | 6,347 |
| All voters | Some college | 2016 | 50.7 | 49.7 | 51.7 | 14,759 |
| All voters | Four-year degree | 2020 | 58.5 | 57.4 | 59.6 | 11,567 |
| All voters | High school or less | 2020 | 43.8 | 42.4 | 45.2 | 10,646 |
| All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2020 | 67.3 | 66.0 | 68.6 | 7,301 |
| All voters | Some college | 2020 | 49.2 | 48.2 | 50.2 | 14,358 |
| All voters | Four-year degree | 2024 | 52.6 | 51.2 | 53.9 | 10,429 |
| All voters | High school or less | 2024 | 40.0 | 38.3 | 41.6 | 10,255 |
| All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2024 | 61.9 | 60.3 | 63.4 | 6,565 |
| All voters | Some college | 2024 | 47.2 | 45.8 | 48.5 | 14,759 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2008 | 49.6 | 48.1 | 51.1 | 4,676 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2008 | 41.9 | 40.4 | 43.4 | 6,826 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2008 | 58.0 | 55.9 | 60.0 | 2,406 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2008 | 45.4 | 44.0 | 46.8 | 5,981 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2012 | 50.8 | 49.1 | 52.5 | 7,351 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2012 | 42.2 | 40.6 | 43.7 | 7,719 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2012 | 58.9 | 56.9 | 61.0 | 4,867 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2012 | 45.0 | 43.6 | 46.4 | 10,419 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2016 | 52.6 | 51.3 | 53.9 | 7,165 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2016 | 33.2 | 31.9 | 34.6 | 7,960 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2016 | 61.7 | 60.1 | 63.2 | 4,893 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2016 | 41.9 | 40.8 | 43.1 | 10,709 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2020 | 54.0 | 52.8 | 55.2 | 8,433 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2020 | 30.1 | 28.8 | 31.3 | 8,684 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2020 | 64.3 | 62.8 | 65.7 | 5,637 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2020 | 39.8 | 38.8 | 40.9 | 10,103 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2024 | 48.7 | 47.1 | 50.2 | 7,929 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2024 | 31.8 | 30.1 | 33.6 | 8,226 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2024 | 58.8 | 57.1 | 60.5 | 4,888 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2024 | 40.5 | 39.1 | 41.9 | 10,814 |

Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters).

Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/ces_education_levels.json

### Table 6. The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positive

Graduate minus other respondents on each item, standard deviations of the item among all respondents; items oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer; ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: ANES in person only, GSS, CES); 95% intervals

| Survey view | Domain | Item | Early gap (SD) | 95% CI low early | 95% CI high early | n early | Late gap (SD) | 95% CI low late | 95% CI high late | n late | Change (SD) |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| ANES | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.18 | 7,299 | +0.03 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 15,657 | +0.25 |
| ANES | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.23 | −0.29 | −0.17 | 6,153 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 15,720 | +0.32 |
| ANES | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.29 | −0.34 | −0.24 | 6,985 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 15,279 | +0.25 |
| ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.36 | −0.42 | −0.30 | 5,810 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 17,496 | +0.31 |
| ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.05 | 7,492 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 17,475 | +0.19 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 8,731 | +0.32 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 16,947 | −0.05 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 3,741 | +0.24 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 17,295 | −0.08 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.17 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 4,989 | +0.24 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 17,386 | +0.07 |
| ANES | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 8,200 | +0.22 | 0.18 | 0.27 | 15,550 | +0.15 |
| ANES | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.18 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 7,419 | +0.23 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 15,764 | +0.05 |
| ANES | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.01 | 7,977 | +0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 15,261 | +0.11 |
| ANES | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 6,692 | +0.48 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 15,748 | +0.04 |
| ANES | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.37 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 15,694 | +0.02 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.17 | 6,391 | +0.14 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 1,998 | +0.37 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.24 | −0.30 | −0.18 | 5,219 | +0.21 | 0.10 | 0.33 | 2,058 | +0.45 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.28 | −0.33 | −0.22 | 6,131 | +0.04 | −0.08 | 0.16 | 1,914 | +0.32 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.38 | −0.46 | −0.31 | 4,044 | −0.07 | −0.18 | 0.05 | 2,154 | +0.32 |
| ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.16 | −0.04 | 5,723 | +0.20 | 0.09 | 0.32 | 2,149 | +0.30 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,974 | +0.43 | 0.32 | 0.54 | 2,160 | +0.06 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.37 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 2,088 | +0.27 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 2,102 | −0.09 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.20 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 3,519 | +0.29 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 2,132 | +0.10 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 6,659 | +0.31 | 0.18 | 0.43 | 1,952 | +0.24 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.19 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 6,496 | +0.36 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 1,954 | +0.17 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.01 | −0.07 | 0.05 | 6,351 | +0.20 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 1,864 | +0.21 |
| ANES face to face | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.51 | 5,153 | +0.61 | 0.49 | 0.72 | 1,961 | +0.16 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | +0.07 |
| GSS | Economic items | Government should improve the living standards of the poor | −0.22 | −0.27 | −0.17 | 8,451 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,473 | +0.21 |
| GSS | Economic items | Government should help pay for medical care | −0.12 | −0.17 | −0.06 | 8,483 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,496 | +0.11 |
| GSS | Economic items | Too little is spent on welfare | −0.03 | −0.09 | 0.03 | 6,221 | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 7,822 | +0.09 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Legal abortion for any reason | +0.30 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 8,282 | +0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 7,928 | +0.03 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Sex between two adults of the same sex is not wrong | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 8,101 | +0.26 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 10,267 | −0.17 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Sex before marriage is not wrong | +0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 8,425 | +0.09 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 10,480 | −0.04 |
| GSS | Cultural items | Marijuana should be legal | +0.11 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 8,268 | +0.06 | −0.02 | 0.14 | 5,266 | −0.04 |
| GSS | Racial items | Government has a special obligation to help Black Americans | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 8,414 | +0.21 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 10,343 | +0.16 |
| GSS | Racial items | Too little is spent on improving conditions of Black Americans | +0.09 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 5,844 | +0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 7,587 | +0.03 |
| GSS | Racial items | Preferential hiring and promotion of Black Americans | 0.00 | −0.06 | 0.06 | 6,628 | +0.11 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 10,071 | +0.11 |
| GSS | Racial items | Disagree that Black Americans should work up without special favors | +0.39 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 6,980 | +0.49 | 0.43 | 0.54 | 10,528 | +0.09 |
| GSS | Racial items | Black-white differences are mainly due to discrimination | 0.00 | −0.05 | 0.06 | 8,212 | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 8,114 | +0.22 |
| CES | Economic items | Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act | +0.13 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 55,829 | +0.26 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 60,856 | +0.13 |
| CES | Economic items | Increase spending on welfare | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.02 | 48,648 | +0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 51,547 | +0.12 |
| CES | Economic items | Increase spending on health care | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 48,626 | +0.04 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 51,547 | +0.11 |
| CES | Cultural items | Always allow abortion | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 55,678 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 60,982 | +0.11 |
| CES | Cultural items | Oppose banning abortion after 20 weeks | +0.16 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 55,421 | +0.33 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 60,976 | +0.17 |
| CES | Cultural items | Oppose prohibiting public funds for abortion | +0.12 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 55,465 | +0.20 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 60,982 | +0.08 |
| CES | Immigration | Conditional legal status for undocumented immigrants | +0.14 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 56,200 | +0.07 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 60,944 | −0.08 |
| CES | Immigration | Oppose increasing border security | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 56,200 | +0.23 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 60,952 | +0.16 |

Views: ANES (view = ANES); ANES, in person only (view = ANES face to face); GSS (view = GSS); CES (view = CES).

Note: Positive gaps mean graduates gave the more liberal answer: more government action on economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on cultural items and more immigration.

Note: The ANES late period mixes in-person and web interviews and has no mode weights for 2020. The in-person view uses the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024. The racial resentment index and the moral traditionalism item are averages of four and two standardized items.

Note: The CES has no racial item after 2014. The GSS extract has no immigration item.

Note: Items were not asked in every study of a window: gay adoption in 1992 and 2000, job protection in 1992, 1996 and 2000, immigration in 1992 to 1998, the health, poor and welfare items in four of the five early studies, and the resentment items in all but 1996 and part of 1998. The common-items view of the within-party figure uses only items asked in every study.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, General Social Survey, 1993-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2014 and 2020, as the buttons show; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use and weight_cumulative)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/issue_gaps.json

### Table 7. The graduate gap on guaranteed jobs rose from below zero to about zero by 2020, while the gaps on abortion and immigration stayed positive in every study

Graduate minus other respondents on one long-running item per domain, standard deviations of the item among all respondents in the study year; ANES 1970 to 2024 (the button shows the GSS); 95% intervals

| Survey | Item | Study year | Gap (SD) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1980 | +0.46 | 0.34 | 0.59 | 1,545 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1982 | +0.52 | 0.40 | 0.64 | 1,358 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1984 | +0.44 | 0.34 | 0.55 | 2,164 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1986 | +0.38 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 2,102 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1988 | +0.30 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 1,960 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1990 | +0.44 | 0.34 | 0.54 | 1,904 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1992 | +0.39 | 0.31 | 0.48 | 2,346 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1994 | +0.33 | 0.22 | 0.44 | 1,697 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1996 | +0.37 | 0.26 | 0.48 | 1,676 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1998 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.49 | 1,255 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2000 | +0.38 | 0.27 | 0.48 | 1,757 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2004 | +0.39 | 0.25 | 0.53 | 1,047 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2008 | +0.33 | 0.16 | 0.49 | 1,026 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2012 | +0.27 | 0.20 | 0.34 | 5,787 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2016 | +0.32 | 0.25 | 0.39 | 4,176 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2020 | +0.30 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 7,788 |
| ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2024 | +0.35 | 0.28 | 0.43 | 4,983 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1972 | +0.03 | −0.08 | 0.13 | 2,128 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1974 | −0.09 | −0.24 | 0.07 | 1,297 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1976 | −0.11 | −0.22 | 0.00 | 1,784 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1978 | −0.10 | −0.21 | 0.00 | 1,816 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1980 | −0.18 | −0.30 | −0.06 | 1,176 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1982 | −0.23 | −0.35 | −0.10 | 1,209 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1984 | −0.24 | −0.34 | −0.14 | 1,908 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1986 | −0.14 | −0.27 | 0.00 | 1,000 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1988 | −0.20 | −0.30 | −0.10 | 1,690 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1990 | −0.24 | −0.34 | −0.13 | 1,664 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1992 | −0.17 | −0.26 | −0.07 | 2,106 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1994 | −0.32 | −0.43 | −0.20 | 1,616 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1996 | −0.26 | −0.37 | −0.15 | 1,551 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1998 | −0.20 | −0.33 | −0.08 | 1,118 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2000 | −0.23 | −0.36 | −0.10 | 908 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2004 | −0.11 | −0.24 | 0.01 | 1,103 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2008 | −0.17 | −0.33 | −0.01 | 1,020 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2012 | −0.20 | −0.27 | −0.13 | 5,414 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2016 | −0.10 | −0.17 | −0.02 | 3,742 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2020 | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 7,213 |
| ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2024 | +0.07 | −0.01 | 0.15 | 4,702 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1992 | +0.28 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 2,113 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1994 | +0.40 | 0.27 | 0.52 | 1,694 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1996 | +0.41 | 0.29 | 0.52 | 1,496 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1998 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.49 | 1,240 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2004 | +0.61 | 0.48 | 0.74 | 1,047 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2008 | +0.46 | 0.34 | 0.59 | 2,048 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2012 | +0.39 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 5,333 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2016 | +0.33 | 0.26 | 0.41 | 3,597 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2020 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 7,241 |
| ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2024 | +0.37 | 0.29 | 0.45 | 4,856 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1970 | +0.24 | 0.09 | 0.39 | 1,346 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1972 | +0.30 | 0.19 | 0.41 | 1,999 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1974 | +0.30 | 0.15 | 0.45 | 1,333 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1976 | +0.25 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 1,845 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1978 | +0.09 | −0.02 | 0.19 | 2,033 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1980 | +0.21 | 0.08 | 0.34 | 1,200 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1982 | +0.29 | 0.17 | 0.42 | 1,194 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1984 | +0.13 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 1,937 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1986 | +0.20 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 1,931 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1988 | +0.11 | 0.01 | 0.21 | 1,748 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1990 | +0.21 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 1,751 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1992 | +0.28 | 0.19 | 0.38 | 2,168 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1994 | +0.13 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 1,618 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1996 | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 1,560 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1998 | +0.16 | 0.03 | 0.29 | 1,150 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2000 | +0.14 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 923 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2004 | +0.20 | 0.07 | 0.34 | 1,073 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2008 | +0.08 | −0.04 | 0.20 | 1,910 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2012 | +0.04 | −0.04 | 0.11 | 5,131 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2016 | +0.15 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 3,724 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2020 | +0.24 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 7,294 |
| ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2024 | +0.25 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 4,746 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1977 | +0.48 | 0.31 | 0.64 | 1,473 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1978 | +0.50 | 0.31 | 0.70 | 1,481 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1980 | +0.53 | 0.36 | 0.70 | 1,402 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1982 | +0.37 | 0.19 | 0.55 | 1,752 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1983 | +0.58 | 0.41 | 0.75 | 1,514 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1984 | +0.53 | 0.37 | 0.69 | 1,417 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1985 | +0.48 | 0.31 | 0.64 | 1,481 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1987 | +0.47 | 0.32 | 0.62 | 1,722 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1988 | +0.62 | 0.44 | 0.81 | 935 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1989 | +0.36 | 0.18 | 0.54 | 983 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1990 | +0.31 | 0.13 | 0.50 | 873 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1991 | +0.44 | 0.26 | 0.61 | 947 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1993 | +0.34 | 0.18 | 0.50 | 1,009 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1994 | +0.24 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 1,931 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1996 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.46 | 1,814 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1998 | +0.29 | 0.16 | 0.41 | 1,773 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2000 | +0.34 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 1,755 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2002 | +0.26 | 0.08 | 0.44 | 899 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2004 | +0.44 | 0.27 | 0.61 | 852 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2006 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 1,939 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2008 | +0.39 | 0.25 | 0.54 | 1,298 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2010 | +0.39 | 0.24 | 0.54 | 1,230 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2012 | +0.45 | 0.30 | 0.59 | 1,248 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2014 | +0.45 | 0.34 | 0.57 | 1,653 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2016 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 1,808 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2018 | +0.38 | 0.24 | 0.51 | 1,524 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2021 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 1,322 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2022 | +0.28 | 0.10 | 0.45 | 1,136 |
| GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2024 | +0.28 | 0.16 | 0.40 | 2,138 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1975 | −0.25 | −0.40 | −0.10 | 1,447 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1983 | −0.28 | −0.42 | −0.13 | 1,528 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1984 | −0.27 | −0.41 | −0.13 | 1,407 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1986 | −0.23 | −0.36 | −0.10 | 1,429 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1987 | −0.11 | −0.25 | 0.03 | 1,754 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1988 | −0.05 | −0.21 | 0.11 | 971 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1989 | −0.21 | −0.38 | −0.04 | 997 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1990 | −0.20 | −0.37 | −0.04 | 874 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1991 | −0.29 | −0.45 | −0.12 | 980 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1993 | −0.29 | −0.44 | −0.14 | 1,025 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1994 | −0.26 | −0.37 | −0.15 | 1,933 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1996 | −0.23 | −0.34 | −0.12 | 1,845 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1998 | −0.19 | −0.31 | −0.07 | 1,836 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2000 | −0.16 | −0.28 | −0.04 | 1,812 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2002 | −0.07 | −0.23 | 0.09 | 888 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2004 | −0.22 | −0.38 | −0.05 | 864 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2006 | −0.14 | −0.26 | −0.02 | 1,958 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2008 | −0.16 | −0.29 | −0.02 | 1,332 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2010 | −0.18 | −0.32 | −0.05 | 1,340 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2012 | −0.24 | −0.38 | −0.10 | 1,294 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2014 | −0.14 | −0.26 | −0.03 | 1,638 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2016 | +0.02 | −0.10 | 0.13 | 1,884 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2018 | +0.03 | −0.10 | 0.17 | 1,519 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2021 | +0.03 | −0.06 | 0.12 | 2,621 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 | +0.02 | −0.11 | 0.15 | 2,322 |
| GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2024 | −0.13 | −0.25 | −0.01 | 2,127 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1975 | +0.27 | 0.11 | 0.43 | 1,447 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1983 | +0.17 | 0.01 | 0.32 | 1,524 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1984 | +0.09 | −0.06 | 0.25 | 1,397 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1986 | +0.25 | 0.11 | 0.40 | 1,426 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1987 | +0.25 | 0.12 | 0.39 | 1,757 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1988 | +0.28 | 0.10 | 0.45 | 963 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1989 | +0.24 | 0.06 | 0.41 | 995 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1990 | +0.30 | 0.16 | 0.43 | 1,318 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1991 | +0.01 | −0.16 | 0.18 | 977 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1993 | −0.07 | −0.22 | 0.08 | 1,017 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1994 | +0.05 | −0.05 | 0.16 | 1,933 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1996 | −0.01 | −0.12 | 0.11 | 1,847 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1998 | +0.14 | 0.02 | 0.26 | 1,828 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2000 | +0.09 | −0.03 | 0.21 | 1,789 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2002 | +0.14 | −0.03 | 0.31 | 890 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2004 | +0.06 | −0.11 | 0.23 | 858 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2006 | +0.08 | −0.04 | 0.20 | 1,948 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2008 | +0.10 | −0.04 | 0.23 | 1,307 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2010 | −0.06 | −0.20 | 0.08 | 1,322 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2012 | +0.07 | −0.08 | 0.21 | 1,282 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2014 | +0.05 | −0.07 | 0.17 | 1,622 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2016 | +0.16 | 0.04 | 0.28 | 1,872 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2018 | +0.17 | 0.02 | 0.31 | 1,493 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2021 | +0.32 | 0.23 | 0.41 | 2,590 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2022 | +0.31 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 2,283 |
| GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2024 | +0.06 | −0.06 | 0.19 | 2,105 |

Views: ANES (source = ANES); GSS (source = GSS).

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out.

Note: Items are oriented so that a positive gap means graduates gave the more liberal answer. GSS 2021 was collected mostly on the web and GSS 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024; General Social Survey, 1975-2024; weighted (VCF0009z and weight_use)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/anchor_gaps.json

### Table 8. Graduate Democrats stay more liberal than other Democrats on cultural, racial and immigration items, and graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans on economic items

Graduate minus other respondents on each domain index, standard deviations, for all respondents, Democrats, Republicans and net of party identification; ANES 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: white non-Hispanic respondents, in-person samples, items asked in every study, GSS, CES); 95% intervals

| Survey view | Index | Group | Early gap (SD) | 95% CI low early | 95% CI high early | n early | Late gap (SD) | 95% CI low late | 95% CI high late | n late | Change (SD) |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| ANES | Economic index | All respondents | −0.32 | −0.37 | −0.28 | 8,626 | +0.02 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 17,568 | +0.34 |
| ANES | Economic index | Democrats | 0.00 | −0.07 | 0.06 | 4,308 | +0.09 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 8,237 | +0.09 |
| ANES | Economic index | Republicans | −0.41 | −0.48 | −0.35 | 3,316 | −0.27 | −0.32 | −0.23 | 7,419 | +0.14 |
| ANES | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.21 | −0.25 | −0.16 | 8,577 | −0.10 | −0.13 | −0.07 | 17,506 | +0.11 |
| ANES | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 8,405 | +0.36 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 17,532 | +0.05 |
| ANES | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.67 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 4,181 | +0.39 | 0.35 | 0.43 | 8,234 | −0.28 |
| ANES | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.06 | −0.02 | 0.13 | 3,237 | +0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 7,406 | +0.09 |
| ANES | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 8,351 | +0.26 | 0.22 | 0.29 | 17,476 | −0.14 |
| ANES | Racial index | All respondents | +0.21 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 7,974 | +0.31 | 0.27 | 0.35 | 15,664 | +0.09 |
| ANES | Racial index | Democrats | +0.55 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 3,952 | +0.32 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 7,404 | −0.23 |
| ANES | Racial index | Republicans | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 3,124 | +0.06 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 6,613 | +0.01 |
| ANES | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.29 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 7,930 | +0.18 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 15,621 | −0.11 |
| ANES | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.37 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 15,694 | +0.02 |
| ANES | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.49 | 0.41 | 0.58 | 3,282 | +0.40 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 7,418 | −0.10 |
| ANES | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.23 | 0.14 | 0.31 | 2,531 | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.29 | 6,627 | 0.00 |
| ANES | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,510 | +0.30 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 15,647 | −0.07 |
| ANES white | Economic index | All respondents | −0.25 | −0.30 | −0.20 | 6,581 | +0.14 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 12,630 | +0.39 |
| ANES white | Economic index | Democrats | +0.10 | 0.02 | 0.18 | 2,911 | +0.18 | 0.12 | 0.24 | 5,197 | +0.08 |
| ANES white | Economic index | Republicans | −0.38 | −0.44 | −0.31 | 2,913 | −0.24 | −0.29 | −0.20 | 6,252 | +0.13 |
| ANES white | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.16 | −0.20 | −0.11 | 6,545 | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.05 | 12,602 | +0.07 |
| ANES white | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.31 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 6,446 | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 12,617 | +0.08 |
| ANES white | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.69 | 0.60 | 0.77 | 2,842 | +0.31 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 5,199 | −0.38 |
| ANES white | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 2,859 | +0.14 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 6,248 | +0.06 |
| ANES white | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 6,407 | +0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 12,591 | −0.20 |
| ANES white | Racial index | All respondents | +0.35 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 6,173 | +0.47 | 0.43 | 0.52 | 11,396 | +0.12 |
| ANES white | Racial index | Democrats | +0.74 | 0.65 | 0.83 | 2,717 | +0.52 | 0.45 | 0.58 | 4,750 | −0.22 |
| ANES white | Racial index | Republicans | +0.12 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 2,771 | +0.11 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 5,611 | −0.01 |
| ANES white | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 6,139 | +0.27 | 0.23 | 0.31 | 11,375 | −0.12 |
| ANES white | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.41 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 5,042 | +0.48 | 0.43 | 0.53 | 11,410 | +0.08 |
| ANES white | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.58 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 2,245 | +0.46 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 4,752 | −0.12 |
| ANES white | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.26 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 2,249 | +0.26 | 0.20 | 0.33 | 5,621 | 0.00 |
| ANES white | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.41 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 5,018 | +0.34 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 11,386 | −0.07 |
| ANES face to face | Economic index | All respondents | −0.34 | −0.39 | −0.28 | 6,858 | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 2,196 | +0.46 |
| ANES face to face | Economic index | Democrats | +0.01 | −0.06 | 0.08 | 3,435 | +0.20 | 0.07 | 0.34 | 1,047 | +0.20 |
| ANES face to face | Economic index | Republicans | −0.43 | −0.50 | −0.36 | 2,651 | −0.28 | −0.40 | −0.15 | 953 | +0.15 |
| ANES face to face | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.21 | −0.26 | −0.16 | 6,824 | −0.03 | −0.12 | 0.06 | 2,170 | +0.18 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 6,629 | +0.46 | 0.35 | 0.57 | 2,195 | +0.16 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.70 | 0.62 | 0.78 | 3,306 | +0.48 | 0.36 | 0.61 | 1,047 | −0.22 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.03 | −0.05 | 0.12 | 2,566 | +0.16 | −0.01 | 0.33 | 953 | +0.13 |
| ANES face to face | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 6,589 | +0.32 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 2,169 | −0.07 |
| ANES face to face | Racial index | All respondents | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.29 | 6,412 | +0.47 | 0.35 | 0.59 | 1,936 | +0.24 |
| ANES face to face | Racial index | Democrats | +0.61 | 0.51 | 0.70 | 3,190 | +0.49 | 0.33 | 0.64 | 929 | −0.12 |
| ANES face to face | Racial index | Republicans | +0.03 | −0.03 | 0.10 | 2,517 | +0.07 | −0.06 | 0.19 | 844 | +0.03 |
| ANES face to face | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.31 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 6,379 | +0.29 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 1,917 | −0.03 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | +0.07 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.49 | 0.41 | 0.58 | 3,282 | +0.45 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 928 | −0.04 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.23 | 0.14 | 0.31 | 2,531 | +0.21 | 0.04 | 0.37 | 842 | −0.02 |
| ANES face to face | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,510 | +0.34 | 0.23 | 0.45 | 1,915 | −0.03 |
| ANES common items | Economic index | All respondents | −0.30 | −0.36 | −0.25 | 6,540 | +0.02 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 14,092 | +0.32 |
| ANES common items | Economic index | Democrats | 0.00 | −0.07 | 0.07 | 3,227 | +0.01 | −0.04 | 0.06 | 6,755 | +0.01 |
| ANES common items | Economic index | Republicans | −0.40 | −0.47 | −0.33 | 2,655 | −0.22 | −0.27 | −0.17 | 6,079 | +0.18 |
| ANES common items | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.19 | −0.24 | −0.14 | 6,510 | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.08 | 14,058 | +0.08 |
| ANES common items | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.27 | 0.22 | 0.33 | 8,023 | +0.32 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 14,986 | +0.05 |
| ANES common items | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.63 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 3,989 | +0.38 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 7,139 | −0.25 |
| ANES common items | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.04 | −0.03 | 0.12 | 3,117 | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 6,309 | +0.01 |
| ANES common items | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 7,980 | +0.21 | 0.17 | 0.24 | 14,952 | −0.15 |
| ANES common items | Racial index | All respondents | +0.11 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 6,714 | +0.19 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 13,651 | +0.08 |
| ANES common items | Racial index | Democrats | +0.41 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 3,320 | +0.18 | 0.12 | 0.24 | 6,566 | −0.23 |
| ANES common items | Racial index | Republicans | 0.00 | −0.06 | 0.06 | 2,694 | −0.02 | −0.07 | 0.02 | 5,830 | −0.02 |
| ANES common items | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 6,682 | +0.07 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 13,625 | −0.12 |
| GSS | Economic index | All respondents | −0.20 | −0.25 | −0.14 | 8,455 | +0.01 | −0.04 | 0.07 | 10,477 | +0.21 |
| GSS | Economic index | Democrats | +0.04 | −0.04 | 0.11 | 3,868 | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 4,526 | +0.03 |
| GSS | Economic index | Republicans | −0.34 | −0.42 | −0.26 | 3,121 | −0.21 | −0.30 | −0.13 | 3,419 | +0.13 |
| GSS | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.14 | −0.19 | −0.09 | 8,253 | −0.09 | −0.14 | −0.05 | 10,100 | +0.04 |
| GSS | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 12,545 | +0.23 | 0.18 | 0.28 | 12,069 | −0.07 |
| GSS | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.58 | 0.51 | 0.65 | 5,772 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 5,290 | −0.20 |
| GSS | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.11 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 4,579 | −0.04 | −0.14 | 0.05 | 3,920 | −0.15 |
| GSS | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.34 | 0.30 | 0.39 | 12,278 | +0.18 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 11,608 | −0.16 |
| GSS | Racial index | All respondents | +0.15 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 10,162 | +0.29 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 13,038 | +0.14 |
| GSS | Racial index | Democrats | +0.38 | 0.30 | 0.45 | 4,706 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 5,626 | +0.01 |
| GSS | Racial index | Republicans | −0.01 | −0.07 | 0.06 | 3,670 | +0.01 | −0.06 | 0.07 | 4,248 | +0.01 |
| GSS | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 9,957 | +0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 12,564 | −0.01 |
| CES | Economic index | All respondents | +0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 48,781 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 51,551 | +0.15 |
| CES | Economic index | Democrats | +0.17 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 22,211 | +0.17 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 25,217 | 0.00 |
| CES | Economic index | Republicans | −0.16 | −0.19 | −0.14 | 16,996 | −0.15 | −0.18 | −0.12 | 17,944 | +0.01 |
| CES | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.01 | 46,694 | 0.00 | −0.02 | 0.02 | 50,405 | +0.01 |
| CES | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.16 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 55,757 | +0.30 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 60,988 | +0.14 |
| CES | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.36 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 25,526 | +0.40 | 0.37 | 0.42 | 29,351 | +0.04 |
| CES | Cultural index | Republicans | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.04 | 18,935 | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.05 | 20,412 | 0.00 |
| CES | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.14 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 53,057 | +0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 58,620 | +0.02 |
| CES | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.13 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 56,200 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 60,910 | +0.05 |
| CES | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.29 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 25,737 | +0.23 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 29,318 | −0.06 |
| CES | Immigration item | Republicans | −0.03 | −0.06 | 0.00 | 19,039 | −0.09 | −0.12 | −0.06 | 20,377 | −0.06 |
| CES | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.12 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 53,459 | +0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 58,543 | −0.06 |

Views: ANES (view = ANES); ANES, white non-Hispanic (view = ANES white); ANES, in person only (view = ANES face to face); ANES, items asked in every study (view = ANES common items); GSS (view = GSS); CES (view = CES).

Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners; pure independents are in the all-respondents row and the net row only. Each index is standardized among all respondents in the period before the group is selected.

Note: The net row comes from a weighted linear regression with HC3 errors; the other rows use Kish intervals. The CES view compares 2014 with 2020 and has no racial index; the GSS view has no immigration index.

Note: The in-person view uses the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024. The common-items view uses jobs and government services (economic), abortion and moral traditionalism (cultural) and government help and affirmative action (racial), the items asked in every study of both windows; it has no immigration index.

Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, General Social Survey, 1993-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2014 and 2020, as the buttons show; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use and weight_cumulative)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/within_party.json

### Table 9. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the vote gap from 2012 to 2024 from +24.5 to +18.6 points and leaves most of it

Graduate minus other voters in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, ANES 1956 to 2024, from weighted linear probability models on voters with a reported family income; all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% HC3 intervals

| Population | Specification | Election | Gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1956 | −9.4 | −18.3 | −0.5 | 1,210 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1960 | −12.2 | −24.6 | 0.3 | 891 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1964 | −21.3 | −30.2 | −12.4 | 1,070 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1968 | −9.8 | −18.3 | −1.4 | 892 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1972 | +4.6 | −1.8 | 11.0 | 1,546 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1976 | −15.1 | −22.2 | −8.1 | 1,239 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1980 | −11.8 | −20.0 | −3.6 | 793 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1984 | −1.7 | −8.2 | 4.9 | 1,245 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1988 | −7.5 | −14.0 | −0.9 | 1,082 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1992 | −9.8 | −15.8 | −3.8 | 1,238 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1996 | −11.6 | −18.8 | −4.4 | 941 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2000 | −0.3 | −7.4 | 6.8 | 941 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2004 | +1.3 | −6.8 | 9.5 | 729 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2008 | −6.5 | −13.6 | 0.7 | 1,442 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2012 | −0.9 | −5.2 | 3.4 | 4,040 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2016 | +12.1 | 7.6 | 16.6 | 2,542 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2020 | +15.1 | 11.8 | 18.4 | 5,902 |
| All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2024 | +23.6 | 19.1 | 28.0 | 3,570 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1956 | −4.4 | −13.8 | 5.0 | 1,210 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1960 | −8.3 | −21.7 | 5.0 | 891 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1964 | −16.9 | −26.4 | −7.5 | 1,070 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1968 | −8.5 | −17.4 | 0.4 | 892 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1972 | +9.7 | 3.1 | 16.3 | 1,546 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1976 | −8.3 | −15.6 | −0.9 | 1,239 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1980 | −5.8 | −14.3 | 2.7 | 793 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1984 | +5.4 | −1.2 | 12.1 | 1,245 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1988 | −2.4 | −9.3 | 4.5 | 1,082 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1992 | −4.1 | −10.5 | 2.4 | 1,238 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 1996 | −5.3 | −13.0 | 2.5 | 941 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2000 | +5.1 | −2.5 | 12.8 | 941 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2004 | +7.9 | −0.9 | 16.7 | 729 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2008 | +1.8 | −5.6 | 9.2 | 1,442 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2012 | +3.5 | −1.1 | 8.1 | 4,040 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2016 | +15.3 | 10.4 | 20.1 | 2,542 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2020 | +17.5 | 13.9 | 21.0 | 5,902 |
| All voters | Net of income rank | 2024 | +22.1 | 17.2 | 27.0 | 3,570 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1956 | −4.5 | −13.8 | 4.9 | 1,210 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1960 | −8.0 | −21.5 | 5.4 | 891 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1964 | −17.2 | −26.4 | −8.1 | 1,070 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1968 | −7.5 | −16.0 | 1.0 | 892 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1972 | +9.3 | 3.0 | 15.5 | 1,546 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1976 | −6.6 | −13.9 | 0.7 | 1,239 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1980 | −5.0 | −13.4 | 3.3 | 793 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1984 | +6.3 | −0.3 | 12.9 | 1,245 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1988 | −1.4 | −8.1 | 5.3 | 1,082 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1992 | −3.6 | −10.0 | 2.8 | 1,238 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1996 | −3.4 | −11.0 | 4.2 | 941 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2000 | +6.4 | −1.2 | 14.1 | 941 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2004 | +10.1 | 1.7 | 18.4 | 729 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2008 | +4.2 | −3.0 | 11.4 | 1,442 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2012 | +5.8 | 1.3 | 10.3 | 4,040 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2016 | +16.8 | 12.1 | 21.5 | 2,542 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2020 | +18.4 | 15.0 | 21.7 | 5,902 |
| All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2024 | +22.6 | 17.9 | 27.4 | 3,570 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1956 | −9.1 | −18.1 | −0.2 | 1,158 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1964 | −22.1 | −31.3 | −12.9 | 978 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1968 | −8.3 | −16.8 | 0.3 | 803 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1972 | +5.3 | −1.2 | 11.8 | 1,384 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1976 | −10.5 | −17.8 | −3.2 | 1,108 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1980 | −7.1 | −15.6 | 1.3 | 676 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1984 | +3.8 | −3.1 | 10.8 | 1,043 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1988 | −1.6 | −8.7 | 5.4 | 864 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1992 | −6.7 | −13.4 | 0.0 | 964 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1996 | −5.2 | −13.2 | 2.7 | 760 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2000 | +6.3 | −1.6 | 14.1 | 751 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2004 | +6.4 | −2.8 | 15.6 | 544 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2008 | −0.7 | −9.1 | 7.7 | 743 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2012 | +6.5 | 1.5 | 11.5 | 2,466 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2016 | +21.6 | 16.5 | 26.7 | 1,910 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2020 | +25.0 | 21.4 | 28.7 | 4,469 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2024 | +28.5 | 23.3 | 33.6 | 2,738 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1956 | −4.4 | −13.9 | 5.0 | 1,158 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1964 | −18.9 | −28.6 | −9.1 | 978 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1968 | −8.2 | −17.2 | 0.8 | 803 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1972 | +8.6 | 1.9 | 15.4 | 1,384 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1976 | −5.5 | −13.1 | 2.0 | 1,108 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1980 | −3.6 | −12.4 | 5.3 | 676 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1984 | +8.7 | 1.7 | 15.7 | 1,043 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1988 | +1.4 | −5.9 | 8.8 | 864 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1992 | −2.2 | −9.3 | 5.0 | 964 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1996 | −1.4 | −9.8 | 7.0 | 760 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2000 | +9.9 | 1.4 | 18.3 | 751 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2004 | +11.1 | 1.3 | 20.9 | 544 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2008 | +6.7 | −1.9 | 15.3 | 743 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2012 | +8.1 | 2.9 | 13.4 | 2,466 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2016 | +21.6 | 16.3 | 27.0 | 1,910 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2020 | +25.4 | 21.5 | 29.4 | 4,469 |
| White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2024 | +26.7 | 21.1 | 32.4 | 2,738 |

Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters).

Note: Elections where either education group has fewer than 100 voters with a reported income are left out (1952).

Note: Every line comes from the same rows within a view, those with a reported income. Intervals use HC3 robust errors.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_net_of_income.json

## All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (200), sorted by id.

| Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| abort_max | +0.52 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | largest annual gap | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| abort_min | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest annual gap | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1980 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| aid_2012 | +0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, government help for Black Americans item | 2012 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.11 | 5,131 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| aid_2024 | +0.25 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, government help for Black Americans item | 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.33 | 4,746 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_abort_r_late | +0.11 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.17 | 7,142 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_cert_diff_2020 | +3.7 | percentage points (ANES share minus certified share) | ANES weighted Democratic share minus the certified two-party share; the interval is the ANES Kish interval | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 2.0 to 5.4 | 6,119 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_cert_diff_2024 | +6.0 | percentage points (ANES share minus certified share) | ANES weighted Democratic share minus the certified two-party share; the interval is the ANES Kish interval | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 8.3 | 3,948 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_post_2024 | +22.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2024 | 95% CI 18.7 to 27.2 | 3,903 | weight_postelection (V240107b) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_share_2020 | 56.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 54.3% to 57.7% | 6,119 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| anes_share_2024 | 55.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 53.0% to 57.5% | 3,948 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| cert_2020 | 52.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican state vote totals | all voters in the national count | 2020 |   |   | none (full counts) | State presidential returns |   |
| cert_2024 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican state vote totals | all voters in the national count | 2024 |   |   | none (full counts) | State presidential returns |   |
| ces_cert_max | 1.1 | percentage points (absolute CES share minus certified share) | largest absolute difference between the CES weighted Democratic share and the certified two-party share | CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 |   |   | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_cult_late | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, cultural index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.32 | 60,988 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_cult_net_late | +0.17 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | CES respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2020 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.19 | 58,620 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_cult_r_late | −0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican CES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2020 | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.05 | 20,412 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_econ_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, economic index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.21 | 51,551 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_econ_net_late | 0.00 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | CES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2020 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.02 | 50,405 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_grad_2008 | 24.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2008 | 95% CI 24.1% to 25.3% | 32,800 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_grad_2024 | 34.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.4% | 60,000 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_imm_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, immigration index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.21 | 60,910 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_share_2020 | 52.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 51.9% to 53.1% | 43,872 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_share_2024 | 49.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ci_cultural_early | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.33 | 8,023 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ci_cultural_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.37 | 14,986 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ci_economic_early | −0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.25 | 6,540 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ci_economic_late | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.06 | 14,092 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ci_racial_early | +0.11 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.17 | 6,714 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ci_racial_late | +0.19 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.24 | 13,651 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| cp_all_2008 | −1.6 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI −3.0 to −0.2 | 28,600 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cp_all_2020 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 11.1 to 13.5 | 49,769 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cp_all_2024 | +9.4 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 8.0 to 10.9 | 50,847 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_2008 | +3.7 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 2.2 to 5.2 | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_2016 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 | 95% CI 11.1 to 13.5 | 40,891 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_2020 | +15.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 14.1 to 16.5 | 43,872 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_2024 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 10.8 to 13.8 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_grad_2024 | 56.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 55.1% to 57.2% | 16,994 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_all_non_2024 | 43.8% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 42.8% to 44.9% | 25,014 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_chg_2024 | −3.0 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2020; independent samples, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.8 to −1.1 |   | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_post_2016 | +10.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2016 | 95% CI 8.8 to 11.4 | 40,891 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_post_2020 | +12.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2020 | 95% CI 11.6 to 14.2 | 43,871 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_vv_2020 | +16.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the validated-vote weight | 2020 | 95% CI 14.9 to 17.5 | 35,746 | vvweight | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_white_2008 | +9.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 7.6 to 10.8 | 19,889 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| cv_white_2024 | +16.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 14.5 to 17.7 | 31,857 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| d_cultural_chg | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.12 | 25,937 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_cultural_early | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.36 | 8,405 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_cultural_hi_share | 40% | percent of the 1992 to 2000 cultural gap | upper end of the interval for the change in the cultural gap, as a share of the 1992 to 2000 gap | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_cultural_late | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.39 | 17,532 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_economic_early | −0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.37 to −0.28 | 8,626 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_economic_late | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.06 | 17,568 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_immigration_chg | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.09 | 22,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_immigration_early | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.41 | 6,543 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_immigration_late | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.41 | 15,694 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_racial_early | +0.21 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.27 | 7,974 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| d_racial_late | +0.31 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.35 | 15,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_2008 | −9.7 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI −16.7 to −2.6 | 1,533 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_2012 | −6.4 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI −10.9 to −1.9 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_2024 | +11.0 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 6.5 to 15.6 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_grad_2024 | +12.9 | percentage points (ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share) | ANES share minus CES share; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 9.8 to 16.0 | 19,007 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_max_abs | 11.0 | percentage points (absolute ANES minus CES graduate gap) | largest absolute difference between the two surveys' gaps | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | largest of 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_non_2024 | +1.8 | percentage points (ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share) | ANES share minus CES share; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 5.2 | 26,919 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| diff_web_ces_2024 | +7.9 | percentage points (ANES web graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES web gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES web respondents and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 14.7 | 43,365 | weight_web (VCF0009y) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| econ_early_max | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 1992 to 2000 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| econ_early_min | −0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 1992 to 2000 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| econ_late_max | +0.09 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 2016 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| econ_late_min | −0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 2016 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| floor_n | 100 | respondents | minimum respondents in each group of a plotted or tabled estimate, together with a Kish effective sample size of at least 100 | survey cells in this chapter | all years |   |   | none (definition) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_cultural_chg | +0.16 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, cultural | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.28 | 8,824 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_economic_chg | +0.46 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, economic | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.59 | 9,054 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_immigration_chg | +0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, immigration | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.20 | 8,477 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ftf_racial_chg | +0.24 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, racial | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.37 | 8,348 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| grad_share_1952 | 6.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 1952 | 95% CI 5.2% to 7.5% | 1,790 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| grad_share_2024 | 34.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 95% CI 32.6% to 36.2% | 5,465 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| gss_cult_chg | −0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.00 | 24,614 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_cult_early | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.35 | 12,545 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_cult_late | +0.23 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.28 | 12,069 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_cult_net_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | GSS respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.23 | 11,608 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_cult_r_late | −0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican GSS identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.05 | 3,920 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_econ_early | −0.20 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, economic index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.14 | 8,455 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_econ_late | +0.01 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.07 | 10,477 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_help_2012 | −0.24 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2012 | 95% CI −0.38 to −0.10 | 1,294 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_help_2022 | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.15 | 2,322 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_help_2024 | −0.13 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.01 | 2,127 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_help_chg | −0.14 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2022; independent surveys, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.32 to 0.03 | 4,449 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_homosex_chg | −0.17 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.09 | 18,368 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_homosex_early | +0.44 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.49 | 8,101 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_homosex_late | +0.26 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.32 | 10,267 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_mode_halfwidth | 0.18 | standard deviations (smallest half-width of a 95% interval for an in-person minus web gap difference) | smallest half-width, across the three indices, of the interval for the in-person gap minus the web gap | GSS respondents, economic, cultural and racial indices | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_mode_maxdiff | 0.03 | standard deviations (absolute in-person minus web gap) | largest absolute difference between the in-person and web gaps across the three indices | GSS respondents, economic, cultural and racial indices | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_race_early | +0.15 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.20 | 10,162 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| gss_race_late | +0.29 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.34 | 13,038 | weight_use | General Social Survey |   |
| imm_max | +0.61 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | largest annual gap | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| imm_min | +0.28 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest annual gap | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_chg_net_0824 | +20.3 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2008 (income-rank groups added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.4 to 29.2 | 5,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_chg_net_1224 | +18.6 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (income-rank groups added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.9 to 25.4 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_chg_netr_1224 | +16.9 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (income-rank groups and a white indicator added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.4 to 23.4 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_chg_raw_0824 | +30.0 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2008 (no other term); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 21.6 to 38.4 | 5,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_chg_raw_1224 | +24.5 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (no other term); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 18.3 to 30.7 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_diff_max | 8.3 | percentage points (adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | largest difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1956 to 2020 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_diff_min | 1.3 | percentage points (adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | smallest difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1956 to 2020 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_late_maxdiff | 3.2 | percentage points (absolute adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | largest absolute difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2016, 2020 and 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_net_1992 | −4.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1992 | 95% CI −10.5 to 2.4 | 1,238 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_net_2020 | +17.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2020 | 95% CI 13.9 to 21.0 | 5,902 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_net_2024 | +22.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2024 | 95% CI 17.2 to 27.0 | 3,570 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_raw_1992 | −9.8 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1992 | 95% CI −15.8 to −3.8 | 1,238 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_raw_2020 | +15.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2020 | 95% CI 11.8 to 18.4 | 5,902 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_raw_2024 | +23.6 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2024 | 95% CI 19.1 to 28.0 | 3,570 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_shrink_0824 | 32.3% | percent of the unadjusted rise in the graduate gap | one minus the adjusted rise over the unadjusted rise | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| inc_shrink_1224 | 23.9% | percent of the unadjusted rise in the graduate gap | one minus the adjusted rise over the unadjusted rise | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_abortion_early | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.42 | 8,731 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_abortion_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.36 | 16,947 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_affirm_early | −0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, affirmative action item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.11 to −0.01 | 7,977 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_affirm_late | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, affirmative action item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.09 | 15,261 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_immig_early | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.41 | 6,543 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_immig_late | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.41 | 15,694 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_resent_early | +0.44 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial resentment index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.50 | 6,692 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| item_resent_late | +0.48 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial resentment index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.52 | 15,748 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| jobs_2016 | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2016 | 95% CI −0.17 to −0.02 | 3,742 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| jobs_2020 | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2020 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.11 | 7,213 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| jobs_2024 | +0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2024 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.15 | 4,702 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_abort_gap | +14.9 | percentage points (share among graduates minus share among other respondents) | difference in the weighted share saying abortion should always be allowed | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 13.0 to 16.9 | 16,947 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_abort_grad | 58.2% | percent saying abortion should always be allowed | weighted share | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item, graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 56.7% to 59.6% | 7,329 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_abort_non | 43.2% | percent saying abortion should always be allowed | weighted share | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item, non-graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 41.9% to 44.6% | 9,618 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_imm_grad | 26.4% | percent wanting immigration decreased | weighted share answering decreased a little or a lot | ANES respondents who answered the immigration item, graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 25.0% to 27.7% | 7,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_imm_non | 42.0% | percent wanting immigration decreased | weighted share answering decreased a little or a lot | ANES respondents who answered the immigration item, non-graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 40.6% to 43.4% | 8,682 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_cultural_diff | +0.12 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (in-person gap minus web gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | in-person gap minus web gap; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, cultural index | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.25 | 7,272 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) and weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_cultural_ftf | +0.46 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, cultural index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.57 | 2,195 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_cultural_web | +0.34 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, cultural index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.41 | 5,077 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_economic_ftf | +0.13 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, economic index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.24 | 2,196 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_economic_web | −0.08 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, economic index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −0.15 to −0.02 | 5,094 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_racial_ftf | +0.47 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, racial index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.59 | 1,936 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mi_anes_racial_web | +0.22 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, racial index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.29 | 4,291 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_v_diff_2024 | −10.3 | percentage points (web gap minus in-person gap) | web gap minus in-person gap; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI −22.0 to 1.5 | 2,045 | weight_web (VCF0009y) and weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_v_ftf_2024 | +30.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; face-to-face mode weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, interviewed in person | 2024 | 95% CI 20.8 to 40.1 | 688 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_v_other_2024 | +18.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; full-sample weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, panel and paper cases with no mode weight | 2024 | 95% CI 12.6 to 24.5 | 1,873 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| mode_v_web_2024 | +20.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; web mode weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 13.5 to 26.9 | 1,357 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_vote | 32,098 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education, in the elections plotted (1952 and 1960 left out) | 1956 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_anes_vote_0824 | 0 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education | 2008 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_ces_vote | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 |   |   | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| n_inc_elections | 17 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with an income-adjusted estimate | 1956 to 2020 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_jobs_below | 15 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies whose jobs-item gap interval lies below zero | 1974 to 2016 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_jobs_studies | 18 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies with a jobs-item gap estimate | 1974 to 2016 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_mode_2024 | 2,045 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education, in the in-person or web mode group | 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_pid_below | 25 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies whose party-identification gap interval lies below zero | 1952 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_pid_studies | 27 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies with a graduate gap estimate in party identification | 1952 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_vote_2024 | 3,918 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education | 2024 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_vote_below | 8 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval lies below zero | 1956 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_vote_elections | 14 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with a graduate gap estimate | 1956 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_vote_point_below | 12 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap point estimate is below zero | 1956 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_vote_zero | 6 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval includes zero | 1956 to 2012 |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| net_cultural_late | +0.26 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.29 | 17,476 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| net_economic_late | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.13 to −0.07 | 17,506 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| net_immigration_late | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, immigration item, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.34 | 15,647 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| net_racial_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, racial index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.21 | 15,621 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_all_2012 | −5.8 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI −9.7 to −1.9 | 5,034 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_all_2016 | +1.6 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2016 | 95% CI −2.2 to 5.5 | 3,643 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_all_2020 | +8.9 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 5.9 to 11.9 | 7,181 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_all_2024 | +17.5 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 13.6 to 21.4 | 5,055 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_white_2012 | −0.4 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI −5.0 to 4.2 | 2,981 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| p_white_2016 | +9.5 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2016 | 95% CI 5.1 to 13.9 | 2,636 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_cultural_d_chg | −0.28 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.20 | 12,415 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_cultural_d_early | +0.67 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.75 | 4,181 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_cultural_d_late | +0.39 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.43 | 8,234 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_cultural_r_early | +0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.13 | 3,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_cultural_r_late | +0.15 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.21 | 7,406 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_economic_d_late | +0.09 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.14 | 8,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_economic_net_early | −0.21 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.16 | 8,577 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_economic_net_late | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.13 to −0.07 | 17,506 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_economic_r_late | −0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.32 to −0.23 | 7,419 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_immigration_d_late | +0.40 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.45 | 7,418 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_immigration_r_late | +0.23 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.29 | 6,627 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_racial_d_early | +0.55 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.64 | 3,952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_racial_d_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.38 | 7,404 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_racial_r_early | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.11 | 3,124 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| pp_racial_r_late | +0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.10 | 6,613 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ppw_cultural_net_late | +0.19 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, cultural, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.23 | 12,591 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ppw_economic_net_late | −0.08 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, economic, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.12 to −0.05 | 12,602 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ppw_immigration_net_late | +0.34 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, immigration, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.38 | 11,386 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ppw_racial_net_late | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, racial, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.31 | 11,375 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| span_2008 | 9.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 6.6 to 11.4 | 10,684 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| span_2024 | 21.9 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 19.6 to 24.2 | 16,820 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| span_white_2024 | 27.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 24.6 to 29.4 | 13,114 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| step_col_sc_2008 | −0.1 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (College minus Some college); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI −2.0 to 1.8 | 12,901 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| step_col_sc_2024 | +5.4 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (College minus Some college); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 7.3 | 25,188 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| step_pg_col_2008 | +6.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus College); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 3.6 to 8.4 | 8,110 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| step_pg_col_2024 | +9.3 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus College); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 7.2 to 11.4 | 16,994 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| step_sc_hs_2024 | +7.2 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Some college minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 5.1 to 9.3 | 25,014 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| v_all_2012 | −0.8 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI −5.0 to 3.5 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_2016 | +11.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 | 95% CI 7.4 to 16.4 | 2,591 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_2020 | +14.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 11.6 to 18.1 | 6,029 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_2024 | +23.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 19.0 to 27.7 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_chg_1216 | +12.7 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2016 minus gap in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 6.5 to 18.9 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_chg_2024 | +8.5 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2020; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.1 to 13.9 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_grad_2024 | 69.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 66.1% to 71.9% | 2,013 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_all_non_2024 | 45.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 42.5% to 48.8% | 1,905 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_grad_chg | +16.0 | percentage points (change in the Democratic share) | share in 2024 minus share in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.5 to 20.5 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_non_chg | −8.2 | percentage points (change in the Democratic share) | share in 2024 minus share in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.2 to −4.1 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_white_2012 | +6.6 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI 1.7 to 11.6 | 2,528 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| v_white_2024 | +28.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 23.2 to 33.0 | 2,981 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| weight_spread_max | 3.4 | percentage points (largest minus smallest graduate gap across the weights of one survey and year) | largest spread of the graduate gap across the weights defined for a survey and year | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 |   |   | weight (VCF0009z), weight_postelection, weight_cumulative, weight_post and vvweight | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |

## Definitions

- Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
- Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
- Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
- Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight.
- Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
- Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion.
- Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out.
- Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment.
- Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors.

## Methods

Sample: three surveys. The American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File, 1952 to 2024: 34,173 respondents with a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and a known education, and 63,120 respondents with a party identification and a known education. The Cooperative Election Study (CES) cumulative file: 188,145 respondents with a Democratic or Republican presidential vote in 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, and 540,578 respondents with a party identification in 2008 to 2024; the policy items are used for 2014 and 2020 only, because the CES policy battery ends in 2021 and the items used here were asked in both years. The General Social Survey (GSS), 1993 to 2024, with the interview mode joined from the raw file; it supplies issue items only. Education: ANES college_grad, a college or advanced degree (VCF0110 = 4); CES education_4cat, with College and Post-grad as graduates; GSS degree of 3 (bachelor's) or 4 (graduate). A graduate is a respondent with a four-year degree or more; everyone else, an associate degree included, is a non-graduate. Party: ANES pid_7pt, CES pid7_num and GSS partyid, with 1 to 3 (0 to 2 in the GSS) Democratic and 5 to 7 (4 to 6) Republican, leaners included; pure independents are in neither party. White: ANES race_4cat White non-Hispanic and CES race5 White (non-Hispanic); the ANES codes Hispanic origin only where the studies asked it, and the GSS is not split by race. Vote: the share of respondents reporting a Democratic vote among those reporting a Democratic or Republican presidential vote (self-reported; third-party voters and nonvoters excluded). Party identification: the Democratic share of respondents who are Democrats or Republicans. Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z; the cumulative file gives every respondent a weight of one in most studies before 1992, so those studies are unweighted), weight_ftf (VCF0009x) and weight_web (VCF0009y) for the mode splits of 2012, 2016 and 2024; CES weight_cumulative; GSS weight_use. The ANES 2020 study has no mode weights. For 2024 the ANES weight VCF0009z is the pre-election weight (V240107a), although the vote is a post-election item; the post-election weight (weight_postelection, V240107b) is reported as a sensitivity for 2016, 2020 and 2024, together with the CES post-election weight (2012, 2016 and 2020) and the validated-vote weight (2020 and 2024). In the ANES mode splits the face-to-face and web groups use their mode weights; in 2024 they cover respondents in neither group (panel and paper cases), who are reported separately with the full-sample weight. Certified benchmark: the Democratic share of Democratic plus Republican votes in the MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, summed over states (full counts, no interval); the survey share uses every respondent with a major-party vote, whether or not education is known, and the interval is the survey Kish interval shifted by the count. Issue items: every item is oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer (more government action on economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on cultural items, more immigration). The direction is a coding fact. The ANES directions were read from the value labels stored next to each item in the cumulative file, and each clean column was checked against its raw VCF code. The GSS directions were read from the question text in the GSS dictionary and the CES directions from the variable descriptions. Each item was then checked against the Democratic-minus-Republican gap, in standard deviations, in every study year in which it was asked: 181 ANES item-years, 320 GSS item-years and 65 CES item-years, and the build refuses any item-year below 0.25 standard deviations. The smallest was −0.09 standard deviations (ANES abortion, 1982) and −0.16 in the GSS (abany, 1983) and +0.52 in the CES; 4 ANES, 7 GSS and 0 CES item-years have a negative point estimate and 0 ANES, 2 GSS and 0 CES have an interval wholly below zero, all of them early studies of items that cut across the parties. A separate scan of all 52 CES policy items in the cumulative file, by year and with the 2014 ACA recode applied, found a sign change in 3 items (spending_vs_tax_0_100, support_gay_marriage_ban, support_raise_fuel_eff) and a level shift of more than 0.4 standard deviations between adjacent years in 5 items (incometax_vs_salestax_0_100, spending_vs_tax_0_100, support_gay_marriage_ban, support_raise_fuel_eff, support_tariff_china); this chapter uses none of them, and NOTES.md lists the years. Standardized gaps: an item or index is standardized as a weighted z-score among all respondents of the survey in the same unit (a study year, or a pooled window of studies); the gap is the weighted mean z of graduates minus that of non-graduates. Items were asked in different studies within a window (gay adoption in 1992 and 2000, job protection in 1992, 1996 and 2000, immigration in 1992 to 1998, the health, poor and welfare items in four of five early studies, the resentment items in all early studies but 1996 and part of 1998); a check uses only the items asked in every study of both windows (jobs and government services, abortion and moral traditionalism, government help and affirmative action). The windows are the ANES and GSS studies of 1992 to 2000 and of 2016 to 2024 (for the in-person view, the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024), and the CES years 2014 and 2020; windows pool studies with their weights as given. Group restrictions (Democrats, Republicans, white respondents) are applied after standardizing. Indices: the mean of a domain's standardized items for respondents who answered at least two of them (one for the immigration item), standardized again. The racial resentment index is the mean of four standardized items (VCF9039 to VCF9042, two in each direction) for respondents who answered at least two, and moral traditionalism the mean of two items (VCF0852 and VCF0853) for respondents who answered both. Net of party identification: the graduate coefficient from a weighted linear regression of the index on a graduate indicator and the seven party-identification categories (HC3 errors). Intervals: 95%. Shares, means and gaps use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, with the standard errors of independent groups combined in quadrature; changes between studies or windows combine the two gap standard errors in quadrature. The net-of-party rows and the income models are weighted regressions with HC3 robust errors. All intervals are model based: the weighted sample is treated as a random sample and the stages of each sample design are ignored. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals ignore how respondents came to be in the panel. Income: the ANES family income percentile group within the study year (VCF0114, five groups) as a categorical control. Suppression: a cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100, and a gap needs both cells to clear it; this leaves out the ANES vote gap in 1952 and 1960 and the party-identification gap in 1954 and 1960. Rounding: displays round half up from the unrounded estimate and differences are computed before rounding. Survey mode: the ANES has in-person and web interviews in 2012, 2016 and 2024 and web, telephone and video interviews in 2020; the GSS has in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024 and a mostly web sample in 2021; the CES is online in every year.

## What these data cannot show

- Every survey here interviews a new sample each year, so a rising gap can come from people changing their votes, from new voters replacing older ones, or from changes in who has a degree.
- The graduate share of respondents rose from 6.4% in 1952 to 34.4% in 2024, and the data cannot separate a change in what graduates think from a change in who counts as a graduate.
- The chapter compares groups and not people.
- The vote gap is a difference in the Democratic share among voters who chose a major party, and it leaves out nonvoters and third-party voters; Chapter 3.2, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up the composition of each party's voters.
- The two vote surveys differ by as much as 11.0 points in the gap in a year.
- The ANES voters of 2024 are more Democratic than the certified count, with the excess among graduates, and the CES matches the count nationally.
- The count has no breakdown by degree, so it cannot show which survey is closer on graduates or on the gap, and a national match does not show that the CES is accurate within education groups.
- The vote is a self-report in both surveys, and no validated vote is available in either file.
- The ANES mode split has wide intervals, leaves out the panel and paper respondents of 2024 and does not exist for 2020.
- The in-person ANES samples give larger gaps than the web samples, and the GSS cannot rule out a mode difference of that size.
- The CES, which is online in every year, has smaller vote gaps than the in-person ANES in 2024.
- The issue gaps rest on a few items per domain, and the sets differ across surveys and across studies within a period.
- A standardized gap depends on how answers spread in each period, so the same difference in the share giving an answer can be a different number of standard deviations in two periods.
- The CES policy battery ends in 2021 and has no racial item after 2014, and the GSS extract has no immigration item, so the ANES is the only survey here that covers all four domains.
- The orientation of each item comes from its wording, and a check against the party gap in every year can flag a reversed code but cannot detect a change in what Democrats believe.
- Finally, the within-party results describe partisans who have already sorted.
- Party identification follows attitudes as well as preceding them, so a gap within a party is not the effect of education on that party's voters.
- The comparison cannot say whether graduate Democrats held their views before they joined the party or acquired them in it.
- The chapter holds only party, income rank and race fixed.
- Age, religion, region, occupation and the kind of place a person lives in go with education and are left free.

## References

1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
2. Kinder, Donald R.; Sanders, Lynn M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. University of Chicago Press.
3. Kitschelt, Herbert; Rehm, Philipp (2014). Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation. Comparative Political Studies 47(12): 1670-1706. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013516066
4. Gethin, Amory; Martínez-Toledano, Clara; Piketty, Thomas (2022). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1): 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036
5. Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009057141

## Provenance

- Pipeline version: 1.0.0
- Build script: book3/chapters/the-diploma-divide/build.py (sha256 6af5fbba4ec0be32fa86dabb813b4cf6e124d1bce92ca8a9bbb99b4ce39b4d9a)
- Built on: 2026-10-03
- Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs:

| File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- |
| data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 |
| data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 |
| data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b |
| data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 |
| data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 |

Outputs:

| File | SHA-256 |
| --- | --- |
| facts.json | d4ea61c843d7fab76dd1c133028e7847bdd43b7355de79ee8dde88d1d4ff60c6 |
| figures/anchor_gaps.json | e07531ad26974f298cf4d522ac6a8e06887195b55441a7bab0c1a429dbd80256 |
| figures/ces_education_levels.json | bacaac704829f9d5251c44ea4cfe977d0495c7f1ac81ea2bf832d8b5e08e51cf |
| figures/gap_by_survey.json | 193f70e3fa1adf417bf473c7fd750fa6457cd0e71098867722c13cebc805b11c |
| figures/gap_net_of_income.json | 0210adac1ec678a1c087ad3f8c8652e48eb20de7f0712be267366976d36a2b80 |
| figures/issue_gaps.json | 82d7e8126eb995ed4b1f0383cb2955e22a4c1dda55b961846b28e433706db9cc |
| figures/mode_check.json | 4ea694247f2fb2735df7385ec769b8546b4baf28cba48e962aaaacc682a2e584 |
| figures/survey_checks.json | a6dc431a90d18379092fc8a3eb7e91f37aff230c7dbf28bffc0aa411e3b664e5 |
| figures/vote_by_degree.json | 4cd54f14884c535c501dc1d0ec5f54080bf09424fb0bc7530b4916a3c646531a |
| figures/within_party.json | b19e624e80b2fda6ff5c50b429256db9d1a7903cc8036f05a2411b783590cf59 |
| meta.json | 313062ee983b0d3c595b09225fedda8839bb319b4054e66d1509181ffc8b0e0b |
| refs.json | 4b63b57b041259145f13aeca794dad0e2281cbebd17905fd3127e129e51dd304 |

## Machine formats

- Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report
- Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report.md
- Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/facts.json
- Table 1, figure "vote_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/vote_by_degree.json
- Table 2, figure "gap_by_survey" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_by_survey.json
- Table 3, figure "survey_checks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/survey_checks.json
- Table 4, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/mode_check.json
- Table 5, figure "ces_education_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/ces_education_levels.json
- Table 6, figure "issue_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/issue_gaps.json
- Table 7, figure "anchor_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/anchor_gaps.json
- Table 8, figure "within_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/within_party.json
- Table 9, figure "gap_net_of_income" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_net_of_income.json
- Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt