# Political violence and democratic norms: report

Chapter 5.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter.

## Identification

- Title: Political violence and democratic norms
- Chapter: 5.4 (Part V, Institutions and democratic attitudes; Coalitions and political differences)
- Question: How many Americans justify political violence or doubt vote counts, and how does it differ by party?
- Dek: In the 2024 ANES, 17.2% of adult citizens said violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little, with no party gap that the data separate from zero.
- Grain: individuals
- Status: draft
- Published: 2026-10-03
- Updated: not revised
- Data sources:
  - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series full release (May 19, 2026): political violence, vote counts, election legitimacy, the events of January 2021 and democratic norms, with party identification, age, education, race, sex and party thermometers; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107a (pre-election) and V240107b (post-election) with PSU V240107c and stratum V240107d; sample-group weights V240101, V240102 and V240106
- Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms
- Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report
- Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report.md
- BibTeX key: singh2026politicalviolenceanddemocraticnorms

```bibtex
@misc{singh2026politicalviolenceanddemocraticnorms,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Political violence and democratic norms},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}
```

## Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance.

| Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 17.2% | 95% CI 15.6% to 18.9% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_any_all |
| weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 4.6% | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_lot_all |
| Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 2.2 | 95% CI −0.9 to 5.3 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_gap_any |
| upper end of the 95% interval on the Democratic minus Republican gap in the share saying violence is justified at least a little | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 5.3 |   |   | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_gap_any_hi |
| weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 15.0% | 95% CI 13.0% to 17.1% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_any_rep |
| weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 35.1% | 95% CI 32.3% to 37.9% | 2,444 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | acc_low_rep |
| weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 8.2% | 95% CI 6.7% to 9.7% | 2,638 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | acc_low_dem |
| weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 55.5% | 95% CI 52.6% to 58.5% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | trump20_rep |
| weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 4.5% | 95% CI 3.3% to 5.7% | 2,297 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | trump20_dem |
| weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 14.7% | 95% CI 12.4% to 16.9% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | harris24_dem |
| weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 2.3% | 95% CI 1.2% to 3.4% | 2,042 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | harris24_rep |
| respondents in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample (V240003 equal to 1) | panel respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 2,171 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | n_panel |

## Findings

In the 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES), 17.2% of adult citizens said it is justified at least a little for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country, and 4.6% said it is justified a lot or a great deal. The answer scale runs from not at all to a great deal in five steps, and "at least a little" means any answer above not at all. The data show no gap between Democrats and Republicans that is distinguishable from zero: the Democratic share minus the Republican share was 2.2 (95% CI −0.9 to 5.3) points, so a Democratic excess of up to 5.3 points over the Republican share of 15.0% is not ruled out. Beliefs about elections divided the parties. Before the election, 35.1% of Republicans and 8.2% of Democrats expected the November votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately. After it, 55.5% of Republicans and 4.5% of Democrats said Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, and 14.7% of Democrats and 2.3% of Republicans said Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election.

These are answers about approval, expectation and belief. The ANES records no violent act, threat or harassment by a respondent, so the chapter cannot say how many people have acted or would act, and the survey does not say whom the violence would be against or for what goal. The chapter uses one survey, so it describes 2024 and cannot show change over time. The estimates describe adult U.S. citizens at residential addresses. Each interval is a 95% confidence interval that uses the strata and primary sampling units in the file, so it does not treat respondents as independent draws. (Note: The 2024 file combines a fresh sample interviewed mainly in person, a fresh sample interviewed mainly on the web and a panel of 2,171 respondents who were also interviewed in 2016 and 2020. The ANES asks analysts to use the variance strata and primary sampling units in the file [1]. The intervals here use the t distribution with the design degrees of freedom and describe sampling variation only. Question wording, interview mode and nonresponse are other sources of error, and a later section takes up mode.)

Party means party identification, with leaners counted with the party they lean toward, unless the text says without leaners. Adults who name neither party and do not lean toward one are called neither party. Without leaners, Democrats and Republicans are the strong and not very strong identifiers, and the remaining adults are independents and leaners. The party question comes from the pre-election interview, so post-election answers are grouped by the party the respondent reported before the election.

### What each question asks

Table 1 quotes every question the chapter uses, with its answer scale, what it measures and what it is about.

Table 1. The ANES questions measure approval, expectation, perception and belief, and none records an action

The violence question asks, "How much do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country?" Its target is unspecified: the violence is by people in general, for any political goal, against anyone, and the wording does not say what act counts as violence. It asks nothing about what the respondent has done or would do. Westwood and co-authors report from four survey experiments that attitudes toward political violence measured this way are biased upward by respondent disengagement and by wording that allows more than one interpretation [2]. Kalmoe and Mason study partisan violence with questions about one's own party and the other party [3], targets that the ANES item leaves open. A follow-up question asks whether violence used to pursue political goals in the United States has increased, decreased or stayed the same over a four-year comparison period (the table gives the wording), which records a perception and not approval.

The vote-count questions differ in their targets. Before the election the ANES asked how accurately the respondent expected the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted, an expectation about one election given before its result was known. After it, the ANES asked how often votes are counted fairly in this country's elections, a belief about elections in general. A further pre-election question asks how much the respondent trusts the officials who oversee elections where the respondent lives, which concerns local officials and not the count.

Three paired statements ask which of two claims is most likely to be true. They concern who was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, who planned and carried out the events of January 2021 that the item names by date, and who was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election. The January 2021 item offers pro-Trump protesters or FBI agents posing as protesters, and this chapter calls the second answer the FBI account. Each offers two answers, so a respondent who is unsure still chooses one, and a follow-up asks how confident the respondent is. Legitimacy is a judgment about an election and not a count of votes, and the question does not define the term.

Six further questions ask about norms for officeholders and the press. Four ask how important each of four practices is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy. The other two ask whether it would be helpful if presidents could work on the country's problems without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say, and whether the respondent favors elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making. They ask about officials in general and name no president or party.

Pre-election interviews ran from August to Election Day in November 2024, and post-election interviews from the week after the election to February 2025. Pre-election questions use the pre-election weight and post-election questions the post-election weight. A short paper questionnaire, completed by 245 pre-election respondents and 200 post-election respondents, leaves out most of these questions, so those items describe adults who answered on the web or in person. Of the 5,521 respondents in the file, 5,192 gave a usable answer to the violence question. A further 84 refused or broke off before it, and they are left out of its shares.

### No party gap in approval of violence is distinguishable from zero

Most adult citizens, 82.8%, said violence to pursue political goals is not at all justified. At the three cut points of the five-point answer scale, 17.2% (95% CI 15.6% to 18.9%) said it is justified at least a little, 10.8% (95% CI 9.5% to 12.1%) a moderate amount or more and 4.6% (95% CI 3.7% to 5.4%) a lot or a great deal (Table 2). Among Democrats the shares at the first and last cut points were 17.3% (95% CI 14.9% to 19.7%) and 4.1% (95% CI 3.0% to 5.3%), and among Republicans 15.0% (95% CI 13.0% to 17.1%) and 4.8% (95% CI 3.5% to 6.2%). The Democratic-minus-Republican gap was 2.2 (95% CI −0.9 to 5.3) points at the first cut point, 0.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 2.6) at the second and −0.7 (95% CI −2.5 to 1.1) at the third, and each interval includes zero.

Table 2. Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero

Without leaners the Democratic share at the first cut point is 14.8% (95% CI 12.5% to 17.2%) and the Republican share 15.1% (95% CI 12.4% to 17.8%), a gap of −0.3 (95% CI −3.9 to 3.4) points, and the independents and leaners who remain are at 21.3% (95% CI 18.0% to 24.6%). The sign of the gap at the first cut point differs between the two groupings, and neither interval excludes zero.

The highest share is among adults who name neither party and do not lean: 30.5% (95% CI 23.4% to 37.7%) of the 346 who answered said violence is justified at least a little. They are 6.7% (95% CI 5.8% to 7.7%) of adult citizens. They are also the group least likely to say they follow government and politics always or most of the time, at 27.8% against 56.5% of Democrats and 52.8% of Republicans. Adults who follow politics less often than that said violence is justified at least a little more often, at 20.9% (95% CI 18.3% to 23.5%) against 13.9% (95% CI 12.1% to 15.7%). This pattern fits the finding that respondent disengagement inflates estimates of this kind [2], and it fits other differences between these groups. The attention question cannot tell the explanations apart.

On the perception question, 62.7% (95% CI 60.6% to 64.7%) of adult citizens said political violence had increased over the four-year comparison period, as did 62.3% (95% CI 59.3% to 65.4%) of Democrats and 64.4% (95% CI 61.8% to 67.1%) of Republicans, and the two party intervals overlap.

### Younger and less educated adults approve of violence more often

Table 3 splits the share saying violence is justified at least a little by age and by education. In the youngest of the four age groups 31.3% (95% CI 26.1% to 36.4%) gave that answer, against 11.0% (95% CI 8.9% to 13.0%) in the oldest, a difference of 20.3 (95% CI 14.7 to 26.0) points. Among adults with a high school education or less 22.8% (95% CI 19.7% to 25.8%) gave it, against 11.4% (95% CI 9.3% to 13.6%) among adults with a bachelor's degree or more, a difference of 11.4 (95% CI 7.9 to 14.8) points. Both intervals lie above the upper end of the party gap in the previous section.

Table 3. Younger and less educated adults were more likely to say violence is justified than older and college-educated adults, in both parties

The age pattern appears in both parties. In the youngest group the share is 32.1% (95% CI 25.2% to 39.1%) among Democrats and 27.1% (95% CI 19.3% to 35.0%) among Republicans, and in the oldest group 13.0% (95% CI 9.6% to 16.3%) and 8.5% (95% CI 5.7% to 11.2%). Within every age group and every education group the Democratic and Republican intervals overlap. Age, education and attention to politics overlap with one another, and the figure does not separate them.

### Republicans doubt the count and the 2020 result more often

Table 4 shows six measures by party. Before the election 35.1% (95% CI 32.3% to 37.9%) of Republicans expected the votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately, against 8.2% (95% CI 6.7% to 9.7%) of Democrats, a gap of 26.9 (95% CI 23.9 to 30.0) points with Republicans higher. After the election 33.2% (95% CI 30.5% to 35.8%) of Republicans and 19.9% (95% CI 17.5% to 22.2%) of Democrats said votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time, a gap of 13.3 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.8) points. The two gaps come from different questions with different targets, so the smaller post-election gap is not a measured change. Little or no trust in local election officials was 33.0% (95% CI 30.2% to 35.8%) among Republicans and 11.9% (95% CI 10.0% to 13.8%) among Democrats.

Table 4. Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often

On the 2020 election, 55.5% (95% CI 52.6% to 58.5%) of Republicans said Trump was the legitimate winner, against 4.5% (95% CI 3.3% to 5.7%) of Democrats, a gap of 51.0 (95% CI 47.9 to 54.1) points. Without leaners the Republican share is 59.9% (95% CI 56.2% to 63.6%). Of the Republicans who said Trump was the legitimate winner, 52.5% (95% CI 48.2% to 56.8%) were very or extremely confident in that answer, which is 29.1% (95% CI 26.2% to 32.0%) of all Republicans. On the events of January 2021, 46.4% (95% CI 43.0% to 49.7%) of Republicans chose the FBI account, against 4.7% (95% CI 3.5% to 6.0%) of Democrats, and 19.0% (95% CI 16.4% to 21.5%) of Republicans chose it and were very or extremely confident.

The 2024 question points the other way. Among Democrats, 14.7% (95% CI 12.4% to 16.9%) said Harris was the legitimate winner of the election that Trump won, against 2.3% (95% CI 1.2% to 3.4%) of Republicans, a Republican-minus-Democratic gap of −12.3 (95% CI −14.8 to −9.9) points. The gap on the 2024 question is smaller in absolute value than the gap on the 2020 question, and 7.2% (95% CI 5.6% to 8.8%) of Democrats chose Harris and were very or extremely confident.

Adults who name neither party have estimates between those of the two parties on the pre-election count, trust in local officials, the 2020 result and the FBI account, and above both parties on how often votes are counted fairly. On that question 44.8% (95% CI 36.4% to 53.1%) chose the less-than-most-of-the-time answers. Their distance from the midpoint of the two parties' estimates is positive when they are closer to the Republican answer. It is 8.2 (95% CI 1.4 to 15.1) points on the count and 8.4 (95% CI 0.6 to 16.2) on trust in local officials, so on those two they are closer to the Republican answer. On the 2020 result and the FBI account the distances are 2.5 (95% CI −5.8 to 10.7) and 2.5 (95% CI −5.8 to 10.8) points, intervals that include zero, so the data do not place the group nearer either party there. The group is small and its intervals are wide.

### Losing voters disputed the 2020 result more often than the 2024 result

A respondent's view of an election differs with whether the respondent's candidate won, a pattern that has been described as a winner effect in voter confidence [4] and, across countries, as losers' consent [5]. Table 5 puts the two elections on the same footing by showing the share of voters who said the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner. In 2020, 60.6% (95% CI 57.4% to 63.9%) of respondents who recalled voting for Trump said so, against 4.2% (95% CI 3.0% to 5.4%) of those who recalled voting for Biden. In 2024, 12.7% (95% CI 10.3% to 15.0%) of Harris voters said Harris was the legitimate winner, against 1.4% (95% CI 0.4% to 2.4%) of Trump voters. Among the losing side's voters the difference between the two elections is 48.0 (95% CI 44.0 to 52.0) points, and the very or extremely confident answers show the same order (33.3% (95% CI 29.9% to 36.8%) for Trump voters in 2020 and 6.8% (95% CI 5.1% to 8.5%) for Harris voters in 2024).

Table 5. Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%)

The comparison does not isolate a difference between the parties. The 2020 question was asked years after that election and the 2024 question in the months after it, and the survey does not measure what candidates and officials said about either result in between. Winning does not remove all doubt about counts either. After the 2024 election 31.6% (95% CI 28.3% to 34.9%) of Trump voters said votes are counted fairly less often than most of the time, against 13.6% (95% CI 11.3% to 15.8%) of Harris voters. On that question the difference between the sides was in place after the result, although the data cannot show how much it changed.

### Strong Republicans differ from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only

Table 6 uses the seven categories of the party identification question: strong, not very strong and leaning for each party, and neither party. Approval of violence at the first cut point is not higher among strong identifiers than among the other identifiers of their party: strong Democrats minus other Democrats is −4.7 (95% CI −9.2 to −0.2) points and strong Republicans minus other Republicans is −1.2 (95% CI −5.7 to 3.3). Among Democrats the leaners are above the strong identifiers, at 23.4% (95% CI 17.2% to 29.6%), a difference of 8.6 (95% CI 1.9 to 15.3) points, and adults who name neither party have the highest estimate, 30.5% (95% CI 23.4% to 37.7%).

Table 6. Strong Republicans stood apart from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only, and approval of violence did not rise with strength of identification

The three election measures are low and close together across the three Democratic categories and higher among Republicans, where strong identifiers differ from leaners on only one measure. Strong Republicans said Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 at 67.7% (95% CI 63.4% to 71.9%), against 45.7% (95% CI 39.6% to 51.9%) among Republican leaners, a difference of 21.9 (95% CI 14.6 to 29.2) points. On the expected count the two categories are at 39.9% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.0%) and 33.9% (95% CI 28.7% to 39.2%), a difference of 6.0 (95% CI −0.7 to 12.7) points, and on the FBI account at 51.8% (95% CI 47.3% to 56.3%) and 46.9% (95% CI 40.8% to 53.0%), a difference of 4.9 (95% CI −2.6 to 12.4) points. Both of those difference intervals include zero. Strong Republicans have the highest estimate of the seven categories on all three measures, but the data distinguish them from Republican leaners only on the 2020 result. The categories do not form a ladder either. Not very strong Republicans chose the FBI account less often than Republican leaners, by 11.4 (95% CI 2.1 to 20.6) points.

### Cold out-party feelings go with count doubts, not with approval of violence

The feeling thermometer rates a party from the coldest to the warmest answer. Chapter 2.2, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party) follows those ratings over time and owns that trend. Here the out-party rating is a Democrat's rating of the Republican Party or a Republican's rating of the Democratic Party, taken in the same pre-election interview as the violence and count questions. Any pattern below is an association measured at one time, and it does not say which came first or whether one produced the other. Companion 2.2a, Negative partisanship (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship) asks that question for voting.

The coldest bin, defined in Table 7, holds 37.6% (95% CI 35.0% to 40.1%) of Democrats and 40.9% (95% CI 38.5% to 43.3%) of Republicans. Among Republicans in the coldest bin, 47.9% (95% CI 43.6% to 52.2%) expected the votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately, against 32.4% (95% CI 26.8% to 38.0%) in the middle bin and 17.5% (95% CI 13.0% to 22.0%) in the least cold bin. Each ten-point step colder goes with 5.6 (95% CI 4.4 to 6.8) points more Republican doubt about the count, and with 5.9 (95% CI 4.7 to 7.2) points after holding age, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification fixed in a linear probability model. Among Democrats the slope is −0.6 (95% CI −1.5 to 0.2) points, an interval that includes zero.

Table 7. Colder ratings of the other party went with more doubt about the count among Republicans, and with no more approval of violence in either party

For approval of violence at the first cut point the slope per ten-point step colder is −0.4 (95% CI −1.5 to 0.6) points among Republicans and −1.8 (95% CI −3.2 to −0.4) among Democrats, and 0.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 1.5) and −0.9 (95% CI −2.3 to 0.5) after the same adjustment. The Democratic estimate without adjustment has an interval below zero, so each step colder goes with fewer Democrats saying violence is justified, the opposite of what an account in which hostility produces approval would predict. The adjusted Democratic interval includes zero. No interval for violence reaches past 3.2 points per step in either direction. The link between cold ratings and count doubts among Republicans is not evidence that hostility produces doubt. Republicans who rate the Democratic Party coldest also differ from other Republicans in ways the adjustment does not hold fixed, such as what they have heard about the count, which the survey does not measure.

### Answers differ by sample group on some items

The 2024 ANES interviewed three groups separately: a fresh sample interviewed mainly in person, a fresh sample interviewed mainly on the web and a panel interviewed on the web. Each has its own weight and design variables. The user guide cautions against attributing differences among interview modes to the mode itself, because respondents within a sample group were not assigned a mode at random [1]. Table 8 repeats four estimates for each group.

Table 8. Republican doubt about the count and Democratic doubt about the 2024 result were lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, and the party gap on the 2020 result did not differ

Republican doubt about the count differs with the sample group. In the in-person sample 26.2% (95% CI 20.3% to 32.1%) expected an inaccurate count, against 40.1% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.4%) in the web sample and 40.0% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.1%) in the panel, and the web sample minus the in-person sample is 13.9 (95% CI 6.7 to 21.1) points. The Democratic answer that Harris was the legitimate winner of 2024 is lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, at 9.3% (95% CI 5.2% to 13.4%) against 20.4% (95% CI 16.2% to 24.5%), a difference of 11.1 (95% CI 5.3 to 16.8) points, and the panel lies between them at 14.3% (95% CI 10.7% to 18.0%). The Republican-minus-Democratic gap on the 2020 result is similar across the groups, at 51.3 (95% CI 46.1 to 56.5), 50.3 (95% CI 45.2 to 55.4) and 53.6 (95% CI 47.7 to 59.6) points in the in-person, web and panel groups. The gap on the expected count is smaller in the in-person group, at 19.3 (95% CI 13.4 to 25.3) points, than in the web and panel groups, at 32.4 (95% CI 27.6 to 37.3) and 31.3 (95% CI 26.3 to 36.2). Approval of violence at the first cut point is lower in the panel, at 13.4% (95% CI 10.8% to 15.9%), than in the web sample, at 18.5% (95% CI 16.2% to 20.8%).

Interviewer presence can change answers to sensitive questions [6]. The panel members also differ from fresh respondents in having been interviewed in 2016 and 2020, so the data cannot say whether these differences come from the interview mode or from the people in each group. The estimates in the rest of the chapter pool the groups with the full-sample weights, so a pooled share on an item that differs by group averages over that spread.

### Both parties call the norms important, with gaps of different sizes

Table 9 gives the share who said each of four practices is very or extremely important to the United States maintaining a strong democracy, and the shares answering the questions about presidents and the press. For news organizations being free to criticize political leaders the Democratic share is 65.4% (95% CI 62.7% to 68.1%) and the Republican share 50.8% (95% CI 47.4% to 54.2%), a Republican-minus-Democratic difference of −14.6 (95% CI −18.8 to −10.3) points. For the other three practices the Republican shares run from 69.6% to 86.1% and the Democratic shares from 78.2% to 91.7%, with Republicans lower on each.

Table 9. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to rate four democratic practices important and more likely to favor presidential freedom from Congress and the courts or limits on journalists

Among Democrats 16.0% (95% CI 13.7% to 18.4%) and among Republicans 20.0% (95% CI 17.7% to 22.3%) said it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say, a difference of 4.0 (95% CI 0.9 to 7.0) points. Among Democrats 11.1% (95% CI 9.1% to 13.2%) and among Republicans 15.8% (95% CI 13.6% to 18.0%) favored restricting journalists' access to information, a difference of 4.7 (95% CI 1.8 to 7.6) points. The presidential question is related to the strong-leader questions asked in other surveys, and Chapter 5.3, Support for democracy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy) takes up those questions across countries. Chapter 5.2, Tolerance of speech (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech) covers willingness to let speakers speak.

These are stated commitments to a practice in general. A respondent can call a practice important and still accept a violation by a favored official, and the survey has no question that pairs a norm with a violation by the respondent's own side.

### What these data cannot show

One cross-section cannot show change. The cumulative ANES file used elsewhere in this book has no item on political violence, on votes counted accurately or on the legitimacy of an election, so no earlier ANES study on disk is comparable. The 2024 file carries identifiers that link panel respondents to the 2016 and 2020 studies, but those studies are not in the data used here. Whether approval of violence or doubt about counts rose or fell needs surveys that repeat the questions over time. Projects that field repeated survey questions on political violence, democratic norms and the legitimacy of elections include the Polarization Research Lab (America's Political Pulse) and Bright Line Watch. This chapter does not use them and reports nothing from them.

The file records no action. It has no question about violence, threats or harassment by the respondent, or about taking part in the events of January 2021. The only actions it records are ordinary participation such as voting and joining a protest march, rally or demonstration. Approval in the abstract is not evidence that a respondent would act, and an estimate of how many have acted would need administrative records, such as law-enforcement case files, that the survey cannot supply.

The violence question does not say who would be hurt, for what goal or by what act, so the shares cannot be sorted into approval of attacks on officials, on the other party or on no one in particular. The answer "a little" accounts for 6.4% (95% CI 5.3% to 7.6%) of adult citizens, about as many as the 6.2% (95% CI 5.1% to 7.3%) who chose "a moderate amount", and it is the answer whose meaning the wording leaves most open. The data cannot separate respondents who read the question carefully from respondents who did not, and the attention pattern above is a description and not a correction.

The thermometer, strength and age results are associations and make no claim about cause. Neither the party gap nor the gaps by age and education are adjusted for one another, except where the text says so. The 2020 and 2024 legitimacy questions were asked at different distances from their elections and carry different histories of statements by candidates and officials, which the survey did not measure, so a difference between them mixes timing, who won and party.

The population is adult citizens at residential addresses. It leaves out noncitizens, people in institutions and group quarters, and, for the in-person sample, residents of Alaska and Hawaii. Respondents who refused a question, and paper respondents who were not asked, are left out of its shares, and nonresponse to the survey itself is handled only through the weights. The intervals describe sampling variation. They do not include the differences among sample groups shown above or the effect of question wording.

## Tables

### Table 1. The ANES questions measure approval, expectation, perception and belief, and none records an action

Each question used in this chapter, with its variable, exact wording, answer scale, what it measures and what it is about; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews

| Question | Variable | Wording | Answers | What it measures | What it is about | Asked | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: |
| Violence justified | V241579 | On another topic: How much do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country? | Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; A great deal | Hypothetical approval, in the abstract | People in general, any political goal, no act or victim named | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,192 |
| Violence increased or decreased | V241580 | Compared to four years ago, do you think violence used to pursue political goals in the United States has: | Increased; Decreased; Stayed the same (a follow-up asks how much) | Perception of change | Violence to pursue political goals in the United States, by anyone | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,181 |
| Votes counted accurately | V241314 | In the November 2024 general election, how accurately do you think the votes will be counted? | Not at all accurately; A little accurately; Moderately accurately; Very accurately; Completely accurately | Expectation, before the result was known | Votes in the 2024 general election, anywhere in the country | Pre-election; all modes | 5,478 |
| Trust in election officials | V241315 | How much do you trust the officials who oversee elections where you live? | Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; A great deal | Trust | Officials who run elections where the respondent lives | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,243 |
| Votes counted fairly | V242207 | In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections: Votes are counted fairly? | All of the time; Most of the time; About half of the time; Some of the time; Never | Belief about elections in general, after the result | Elections in this country in general | Post-election; all modes | 4,926 |
| Legitimate winner of 2020 | V242567 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election / Joe Biden was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242568) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about a past result | The 2020 presidential election | Post-election; not on paper | 4,612 |
| Who carried out January 6 | V242571 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? The events on January 6, 2021 were planned and carried out by pro-Trump protesters / The events on January 6, 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242572) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about who acted | Who planned and carried out the events of that day | Post-election; not on paper | 4,551 |
| Legitimate winner of 2024 | V242575 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election / Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242576) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about a result just decided | The 2024 presidential election | Post-election; not on paper | 4,633 |
| Free news organizations | V241324 | For the next few items, we would like to know how important you think each one is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy. First, how important is it that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | News organizations and political leaders in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,241 |
| Branches check one another | V241325 | How important is it that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government keep one another from having too much power? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | The three branches in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,242 |
| Consequences for misconduct | V241326 | How important is it that elected officials face serious consequences if they engage in misconduct? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | Elected officials in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,250 |
| Agreement on basic facts | V241327 | How important is it that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | People in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,233 |
| Presidents and Congress and the courts | V241328 | Would it be helpful, harmful, or neither helpful nor harmful if U.S. presidents could work on the country's problems without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say? | Helpful; Harmful; Neither helpful nor harmful (a follow-up asks how much) | Stated view of a hypothetical change | U.S. presidents in general, no president named | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,210 |
| Journalists' access | V241331 | Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making? | Favor; Oppose; Neither favor nor oppose (a follow-up asks how much) | Stated view of a hypothetical change | Elected officials in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,219 |

Note: Variable names are those of the ANES 2024 Time Series file. The paper questionnaire omitted every question marked not on paper.

Note: The file also holds a version of the violence question for the spouses and partners of respondents. That version is answered by a different set of people and is not used.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election and post-election questionnaires, 2024; counts are unweighted numbers of respondents

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/items.json

### Table 2. Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero

Share of adult citizens saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at three cut points of the five-point answer scale, by party identification; pre-election 2024

| Grouping | Cut point | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| with leaners | At least a little justified | All adult citizens | 17.2 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 5,192 |
| with leaners | At least a little justified | Democrats | 17.3 | 14.9 | 19.7 | 2,532 |
| with leaners | At least a little justified | Neither party | 30.5 | 23.4 | 37.7 | 346 |
| with leaners | At least a little justified | Republicans | 15.0 | 13.0 | 17.1 | 2,290 |
| with leaners | A moderate amount or more | All adult citizens | 10.8 | 9.5 | 12.1 | 5,192 |
| with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Democrats | 10.0 | 8.4 | 11.6 | 2,532 |
| with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Neither party | 21.7 | 14.8 | 28.7 | 346 |
| with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Republicans | 9.9 | 8.0 | 11.9 | 2,290 |
| with leaners | A lot or a great deal | All adult citizens | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 5,192 |
| with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Democrats | 4.1 | 3.0 | 5.3 | 2,532 |
| with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Neither party | 6.3 | 2.5 | 10.1 | 346 |
| with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Republicans | 4.8 | 3.5 | 6.2 | 2,290 |
| without leaners | At least a little justified | All adult citizens | 17.2 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 5,192 |
| without leaners | At least a little justified | Democrats | 14.8 | 12.5 | 17.2 | 1,848 |
| without leaners | At least a little justified | Independents and leaners | 21.3 | 18.0 | 24.6 | 1,695 |
| without leaners | At least a little justified | Republicans | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.8 | 1,625 |
| without leaners | A moderate amount or more | All adult citizens | 10.8 | 9.5 | 12.1 | 5,192 |
| without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Democrats | 8.9 | 7.0 | 10.8 | 1,848 |
| without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Independents and leaners | 13.1 | 10.7 | 15.6 | 1,695 |
| without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Republicans | 10.2 | 7.8 | 12.5 | 1,625 |
| without leaners | A lot or a great deal | All adult citizens | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 5,192 |
| without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Democrats | 4.1 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 1,848 |
| without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Independents and leaners | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.2 | 1,695 |
| without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Republicans | 4.9 | 3.3 | 6.4 | 1,625 |

Views: With leaners (variant = with leaners); Without leaners (variant = without leaners).

Note: The first view counts leaners with the party they lean toward and shows adults who name neither party separately. The second view counts only strong and not very strong identifiers as Democrats or Republicans and groups the remaining adults as independents and leaners.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_levels.json

### Table 3. Younger and less educated adults were more likely to say violence is justified than older and college-educated adults, in both parties

Share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little, by age group and education, for all adult citizens and for Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024

| Dimension | Category | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Age | 18 to 29 | All adult citizens | 31.3 | 26.1 | 36.4 | 513 |
| Age | 18 to 29 | Democrats | 32.1 | 25.2 | 39.1 | 275 |
| Age | 18 to 29 | Republicans | 27.1 | 19.3 | 35.0 | 188 |
| Age | 30 to 44 | All adult citizens | 18.0 | 15.1 | 20.9 | 1,268 |
| Age | 30 to 44 | Democrats | 14.1 | 10.4 | 17.7 | 610 |
| Age | 30 to 44 | Republicans | 19.5 | 15.0 | 23.9 | 541 |
| Age | 45 to 59 | All adult citizens | 14.1 | 11.4 | 16.9 | 1,155 |
| Age | 45 to 59 | Democrats | 14.0 | 10.0 | 17.9 | 558 |
| Age | 45 to 59 | Republicans | 12.1 | 8.2 | 16.0 | 508 |
| Age | 60 or older | All adult citizens | 11.0 | 8.9 | 13.0 | 2,027 |
| Age | 60 or older | Democrats | 13.0 | 9.6 | 16.3 | 1,004 |
| Age | 60 or older | Republicans | 8.5 | 5.7 | 11.2 | 935 |
| Education | High school or less | All adult citizens | 22.8 | 19.7 | 25.8 | 1,148 |
| Education | High school or less | Democrats | 23.6 | 18.6 | 28.6 | 441 |
| Education | High school or less | Republicans | 18.7 | 14.9 | 22.5 | 581 |
| Education | Some college | All adult citizens | 17.7 | 14.8 | 20.6 | 1,632 |
| Education | Some college | Democrats | 18.1 | 13.7 | 22.4 | 703 |
| Education | Some college | Republicans | 16.0 | 11.5 | 20.5 | 796 |
| Education | Bachelor's degree or more | All adult citizens | 11.4 | 9.3 | 13.6 | 2,370 |
| Education | Bachelor's degree or more | Democrats | 12.8 | 9.8 | 15.7 | 1,371 |
| Education | Bachelor's degree or more | Republicans | 9.0 | 6.2 | 11.8 | 893 |

Note: Age is age on Election Day in four groups; education is the five-category ANES summary collapsed to high school or less, some college, and a bachelor's degree or more. Respondents with no age or education answer are left out of those panels.

Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_by_age_edu.json

### Table 4. Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often

Share giving the doubting answer on six measures, by party identification; two measures from the pre-election interview and four from the post-election interview, 2024

| Grouping | Measure | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | All adult citizens | 21.8 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 5,478 |
| with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Democrats | 8.2 | 6.7 | 9.7 | 2,638 |
| with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Neither party | 29.9 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 373 |
| with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Republicans | 35.1 | 32.3 | 37.9 | 2,444 |
| with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | All adult citizens | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.4 | 4,926 |
| with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Democrats | 19.9 | 17.5 | 22.2 | 2,407 |
| with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Neither party | 44.8 | 36.4 | 53.1 | 320 |
| with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Republicans | 33.2 | 30.5 | 35.8 | 2,177 |
| with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | All adult citizens | 22.5 | 20.9 | 24.2 | 5,243 |
| with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Democrats | 11.9 | 10.0 | 13.8 | 2,551 |
| with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Neither party | 30.9 | 23.3 | 38.4 | 349 |
| with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Republicans | 33.0 | 30.2 | 35.8 | 2,323 |
| with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 29.2 | 27.3 | 31.0 | 4,612 |
| with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Democrats | 4.5 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 2,297 |
| with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Neither party | 32.5 | 24.5 | 40.5 | 289 |
| with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Republicans | 55.5 | 52.6 | 58.5 | 2,009 |
| with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | All adult citizens | 24.5 | 22.6 | 26.4 | 4,551 |
| with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Democrats | 4.7 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 2,291 |
| with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Neither party | 28.1 | 20.1 | 36.0 | 284 |
| with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Republicans | 46.4 | 43.0 | 49.7 | 1,965 |
| with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 9.3 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 4,633 |
| with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.4 | 16.9 | 2,283 |
| with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Neither party | 16.4 | 9.5 | 23.2 | 293 |
| with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Republicans | 2.3 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 2,042 |
| without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | All adult citizens | 21.8 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 5,478 |
| without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Democrats | 7.2 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 1,926 |
| without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Independents and leaners | 24.0 | 20.8 | 27.1 | 1,795 |
| without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Republicans | 35.7 | 32.5 | 38.8 | 1,734 |
| without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | All adult citizens | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.4 | 4,926 |
| without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Democrats | 18.7 | 15.9 | 21.5 | 1,765 |
| without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Independents and leaners | 31.0 | 27.2 | 34.7 | 1,597 |
| without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Republicans | 33.9 | 30.4 | 37.3 | 1,542 |
| without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | All adult citizens | 22.5 | 20.9 | 24.2 | 5,243 |
| without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Democrats | 9.9 | 7.7 | 12.1 | 1,863 |
| without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Independents and leaners | 26.5 | 23.1 | 29.8 | 1,715 |
| without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Republicans | 32.7 | 29.4 | 36.1 | 1,645 |
| without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 29.2 | 27.3 | 31.0 | 4,612 |
| without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Democrats | 3.9 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 1,684 |
| without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Independents and leaners | 27.4 | 23.7 | 31.0 | 1,487 |
| without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Republicans | 59.9 | 56.2 | 63.6 | 1,424 |
| without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | All adult citizens | 24.5 | 22.6 | 26.4 | 4,551 |
| without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Democrats | 5.0 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 1,681 |
| without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Independents and leaners | 25.8 | 22.2 | 29.5 | 1,459 |
| without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Republicans | 46.1 | 42.3 | 50.0 | 1,400 |
| without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 9.3 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 4,633 |
| without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Democrats | 15.6 | 13.0 | 18.2 | 1,675 |
| without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Independents and leaners | 8.8 | 6.7 | 10.9 | 1,497 |
| without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Republicans | 2.5 | 1.1 | 3.8 | 1,446 |

Views: With leaners (variant = with leaners); Without leaners (variant = without leaners).

Note: The first view counts leaners with the party they lean toward and shows adults who name neither party separately. The second view counts only strong and not very strong identifiers as Democrats or Republicans and groups the remaining adults as independents and leaners.

Note: Two measures come from the pre-election interview and use the pre-election weight; the other four come from the post-election interview and use the post-election weight. Party identification comes from the pre-election interview in all six.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json

### Table 5. Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%)

Share saying the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner, by the voter's choice in each election; post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025

| Election and voters | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2020 election: Trump voters | 60.6 | 57.4 | 63.9 | 1,495 |
| 2020 election: Biden voters | 4.2 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 2,135 |
| 2024 election: Harris voters | 12.7 | 10.3 | 15.0 | 1,976 |
| 2024 election: Trump voters | 1.4 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 1,547 |

Note: The 2020 vote is the vote recalled in the 2024 pre-election interview (V241106x), restricted to Biden and Trump voters. The 2024 vote is the post-election report of the presidential vote (V242067), restricted to Harris and Trump voters.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025; weighted (V240107b); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/losers.json

### Table 6. Strong Republicans stood apart from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only, and approval of violence did not rise with strength of identification

Share giving the answer named above each panel, by the seven categories of party identification; pre-election and post-election interviews, 2024

| Measure | Party identification | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Violence justified at least a little | Strong Democrat | 14.8 | 11.8 | 17.8 | 1,252 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Not very strong Democrat | 15.0 | 10.9 | 19.0 | 596 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Leans Democratic | 23.4 | 17.2 | 29.6 | 684 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Neither party | 30.5 | 23.4 | 37.7 | 346 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Leans Republican | 14.9 | 11.6 | 18.2 | 665 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Not very strong Republican | 16.5 | 11.4 | 21.5 | 539 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Strong Republican | 14.4 | 11.1 | 17.6 | 1,086 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Strong Democrat | 6.9 | 4.7 | 9.1 | 1,311 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Not very strong Democrat | 7.8 | 4.8 | 10.8 | 615 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Leans Democratic | 10.7 | 7.4 | 14.1 | 712 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Neither party | 29.9 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 373 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Leans Republican | 33.9 | 28.7 | 39.2 | 710 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Not very strong Republican | 27.6 | 22.5 | 32.7 | 577 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Strong Republican | 39.9 | 35.9 | 44.0 | 1,157 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Strong Democrat | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.0 | 1,154 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Not very strong Democrat | 5.8 | 2.7 | 9.0 | 530 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Leans Democratic | 6.2 | 3.9 | 8.5 | 613 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Neither party | 32.5 | 24.5 | 40.5 | 289 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Leans Republican | 45.7 | 39.6 | 51.9 | 585 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Not very strong Republican | 45.0 | 38.0 | 52.0 | 466 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Strong Republican | 67.7 | 63.4 | 71.9 | 958 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Strong Democrat | 5.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 1,152 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Not very strong Democrat | 4.8 | 2.2 | 7.5 | 529 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Leans Democratic | 4.1 | 2.5 | 5.8 | 610 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Neither party | 28.1 | 20.1 | 36.0 | 284 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Leans Republican | 46.9 | 40.8 | 53.0 | 565 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Not very strong Republican | 35.5 | 28.1 | 42.9 | 466 |
| FBI account of the January 2021 events | Strong Republican | 51.8 | 47.3 | 56.3 | 934 |

Note: The count and violence measures come from the pre-election interview and the 2020 and FBI measures from the post-election interview. Each uses the weight for its interview. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/by_strength.json

### Table 7. Colder ratings of the other party went with more doubt about the count among Republicans, and with no more approval of violence in either party

Share giving each answer by the party member's rating of the other party on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024

| Measure | Out-party rating | Party | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Democrats | 15.5 | 11.8 | 19.2 | 1,024 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Republicans | 14.3 | 11.1 | 17.5 | 1,013 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Democrats | 14.2 | 10.8 | 17.6 | 933 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Republicans | 14.2 | 10.2 | 18.2 | 737 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Democrats | 23.1 | 17.0 | 29.2 | 565 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Republicans | 17.6 | 12.5 | 22.6 | 532 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Democrats | 7.2 | 4.7 | 9.8 | 1,077 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Republicans | 47.9 | 43.6 | 52.2 | 1,095 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Democrats | 6.5 | 4.0 | 9.1 | 960 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Republicans | 32.4 | 26.8 | 38.0 | 774 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Democrats | 10.7 | 7.4 | 14.0 | 590 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Republicans | 17.5 | 13.0 | 22.0 | 567 |

Note: The out-party rating is the Democratic Party rating (V241166) for Republicans and the Republican Party rating (V241167) for Democrats. The top bin runs from 31 to 100, and so includes ratings at the scale midpoint of 50 and above, because the narrower top bins had too few respondents to plot.

Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/thermometer.json

### Table 8. Republican doubt about the count and Democratic doubt about the 2024 result were lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, and the party gap on the 2020 result did not differ

Share giving the answer named above each panel, by ANES sample group, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews

| Measure | Sample group | Party | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Violence justified at least a little | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 17.5 | 12.8 | 22.3 | 522 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 14.7 | 11.0 | 18.3 | 436 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 19.0 | 15.7 | 22.4 | 956 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 15.2 | 12.0 | 18.5 | 862 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Panel (web) | Democrats | 12.7 | 9.2 | 16.3 | 1,054 |
| Violence justified at least a little | Panel (web) | Republicans | 12.9 | 9.6 | 16.3 | 992 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 6.9 | 3.9 | 9.8 | 524 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 26.2 | 20.3 | 32.1 | 437 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 7.7 | 5.4 | 10.1 | 969 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 40.1 | 35.9 | 44.4 | 882 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Panel (web) | Democrats | 8.7 | 6.1 | 11.3 | 1,058 |
| Expected count inaccurate | Panel (web) | Republicans | 40.0 | 35.9 | 44.1 | 999 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 3.8 | 1.7 | 5.9 | 465 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 55.1 | 49.7 | 60.5 | 381 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 4.9 | 3.2 | 6.6 | 831 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 55.2 | 50.4 | 60.0 | 712 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Panel (web) | Democrats | 5.1 | 2.6 | 7.6 | 1,001 |
| Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Panel (web) | Republicans | 58.7 | 53.4 | 64.0 | 916 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 9.3 | 5.2 | 13.4 | 457 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 389 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 20.4 | 16.2 | 24.5 | 826 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 3.5 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 722 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Panel (web) | Democrats | 14.3 | 10.7 | 18.0 | 1,000 |
| Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Panel (web) | Republicans | 1.6 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 931 |

Note: Each sample group uses its own weights and variance variables: V240101 for the fresh in-person sample, V240102 for the fresh web sample (web interviews, without the paper cases) and V240106 for the panel. The in-person sample excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Intervals use the t distribution with each group's own design degrees of freedom, which are smallest for the in-person sample and the panel.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/sample_groups.json

### Table 9. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to rate four democratic practices important and more likely to favor presidential freedom from Congress and the courts or limits on journalists

Share giving the stated answer on six norm questions, by party identification with leaners; pre-election 2024

| Question and answer | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents |
| --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Democrats | 65.4 | 62.7 | 68.1 | 2,548 |
| News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Neither party | 42.9 | 35.0 | 50.8 | 347 |
| News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Republicans | 50.8 | 47.4 | 54.2 | 2,320 |
| Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Democrats | 83.9 | 81.9 | 86.0 | 2,545 |
| Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Neither party | 57.7 | 50.4 | 65.0 | 351 |
| Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Republicans | 78.5 | 75.6 | 81.4 | 2,325 |
| Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Democrats | 91.7 | 90.0 | 93.4 | 2,549 |
| Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Neither party | 74.6 | 68.1 | 81.0 | 352 |
| Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Republicans | 86.1 | 83.7 | 88.5 | 2,325 |
| Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Democrats | 78.2 | 75.7 | 80.6 | 2,540 |
| Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Neither party | 53.4 | 45.2 | 61.6 | 352 |
| Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Republicans | 69.6 | 66.5 | 72.8 | 2,321 |
| Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Democrats | 16.0 | 13.7 | 18.4 | 2,531 |
| Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Neither party | 17.9 | 11.8 | 24.1 | 347 |
| Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Republicans | 20.0 | 17.7 | 22.3 | 2,315 |
| Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Democrats | 11.1 | 9.1 | 13.2 | 2,537 |
| Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Neither party | 13.2 | 8.0 | 18.4 | 349 |
| Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Republicans | 15.8 | 13.6 | 18.0 | 2,314 |

Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners. The four importance questions ask how important each practice is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy; very or extremely important are the top two of five answers. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor.

Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions.

Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/norms.json

## All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (136), sorted by id.

| Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| acc_low_dem | 8.2% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 6.7% to 9.7% | 2,638 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| acc_low_gap | 26.9 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting the votes to be counted not at all or a little accurately; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 23.9 to 30.0 | 5,082 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| acc_low_rep | 35.1% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 32.3% to 37.9% | 2,444 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| age_gap | 20.3 | percentage points | share saying violence is justified at least a little among the youngest age group (18 to 29) minus the oldest (60 or older); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 14.7 to 26.0 | 2,540 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| among_trump20_rep | 52.5% | percent of the group | weighted share very or extremely confident (V242568 answers 4 and 5) among Republicans who said Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election | Republicans including leaners who said Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 and gave a confidence answer | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 48.2% to 56.8% | 1,110 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| attn_hi_viol | 13.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence is justified at least a little among those who pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time | adult U.S. citizens who follow government and politics always or most of the time and answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.1% to 15.7% | 2,999 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| attn_lo_viol | 20.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence is justified at least a little among those who pay attention to government and politics about half the time, some of the time or never | adult U.S. citizens who follow government and politics about half the time or less and answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 18.3% to 23.5% | 2,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| dem_attn_hi | 56.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 53.8% to 59.2% | 2,644 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| edu_gap | 11.4 | percentage points | share saying violence is justified at least a little among adults with a high school education or less minus adults with a bachelor's degree or more; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 7.9 to 14.8 | 3,518 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_harrisvoters | 13.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 11.3% to 15.8% | 2,007 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_low_dem | 19.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 17.5% to 22.2% | 2,407 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_low_gap | 13.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying votes are counted fairly less often than most of the time; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 9.7 to 16.8 | 4,584 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_low_nei | 44.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 36.4% to 53.1% | 320 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_low_rep | 33.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 30.5% to 35.8% | 2,177 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fair_trumpvoters | 31.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Trump voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 28.3% to 34.9% | 1,570 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fbi_dem | 4.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.5% to 6.0% | 2,291 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fbi_firm_rep | 19.0% | percent of the group | weighted share choosing the FBI account of the events of January 2021 and very or extremely confident (V242571 answer 2 with V242572 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 16.4% to 21.5% | 1,965 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| fbi_rep | 46.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 43.0% to 49.7% | 1,965 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| firm_lose20 | 33.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election and very or extremely confident, among recalled 2020 Trump voters | Trump voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 29.9% to 36.8% | 1,495 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| firm_lose24 | 6.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election and very or extremely confident, among 2024 Harris voters | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.1% to 8.5% | 1,976 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| harris24_dem | 14.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 12.4% to 16.9% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| harris24_firm_dem | 7.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election and very or extremely confident (V242575 answer 2 with V242576 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.6% to 8.8% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| harris24_gap | −12.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −14.8 to −9.9 | 4,325 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| harris24_rep | 2.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 1.2% to 3.4% | 2,042 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| lose20_biden | 4.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Biden voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.0% to 5.4% | 2,135 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| lose20_trump | 60.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Trump voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 57.4% to 63.9% | 1,495 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| lose24_harris | 12.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 10.3% to 15.0% | 1,976 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| lose24_trump | 1.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Trump voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 0.4% to 2.4% | 1,547 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| losers_gap | 48.0 | percentage points | share of 2020 Trump voters saying Trump was the legitimate 2020 winner minus share of 2024 Harris voters saying Harris was the legitimate 2024 winner; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | voters on the losing side of each election among adult U.S. citizens who answered the items | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 44.0 to 52.0 | 3,471 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_file | 5,521 | respondents | respondents in the ANES 2024 Time Series file | all respondents in the file | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_nei_viol | 346 | respondents | respondents naming neither party and not leaning who answered V241579 | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_panel | 2,171 | respondents | respondents in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample (V240003 equal to 1) | panel respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_paper_post | 200 | respondents | respondents interviewed by paper-and-pencil in the post-election study (V240002b equal to 3) | post-election paper respondents | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_paper_pre | 245 | respondents | respondents interviewed by paper-and-pencil in the pre-election study (V240002a equal to 3) | pre-election paper respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_viol_declined | 84 | respondents | respondents who refused V241579 or broke off before it, among those not interviewed on paper | pre-election respondents asked the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| n_viol_valid | 5,192 | respondents | respondents with a usable answer to V241579 (violence justified) | pre-election respondents asked the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| nei_attn_hi | 27.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 21.5% to 34.1% | 379 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| nei_mid_acc | 8.2 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares expecting the count to be inaccurate (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 15.1 | 5,455 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| nei_mid_fbi | 2.5 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares choosing the FBI account (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −5.8 to 10.8 | 4,540 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| nei_mid_t20 | 2.5 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares saying Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −5.8 to 10.7 | 4,595 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| nei_mid_trust | 8.4 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares little or no trust in local election officials (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 0.6 to 16.2 | 5,223 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_conseq_dem | 91.7% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that elected officials face serious consequences for misconduct (V241326 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 90.0% to 93.4% | 2,549 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_conseq_rep | 86.1% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that elected officials face serious consequences for misconduct (V241326 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 83.7% to 88.5% | 2,325 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_facts_dem | 78.2% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically (V241327 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 75.7% to 80.6% | 2,540 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_facts_rep | 69.6% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically (V241327 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 66.5% to 72.8% | 2,321 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_journ_dem | 11.1% | percent of the group | weighted share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making (V241331 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.1% to 13.2% | 2,537 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_journ_gap | 4.7 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.8 to 7.6 | 4,851 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_journ_rep | 15.8% | percent of the group | weighted share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making (V241331 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.6% to 18.0% | 2,314 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_media_dem | 65.4% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders (V241324 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 62.7% to 68.1% | 2,548 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_media_gap | −14.6 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −18.8 to −10.3 | 4,868 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_media_rep | 50.8% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders (V241324 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 47.4% to 54.2% | 2,320 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_pres_dem | 16.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say (V241328 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.7% to 18.4% | 2,531 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_pres_gap | 4.0 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to Congress and the courts; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 0.9 to 7.0 | 4,846 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| norm_pres_rep | 20.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say (V241328 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 17.7% to 22.3% | 2,315 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| rep_attn_hi | 52.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 50.3% to 55.3% | 2,459 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_diff | 13.9 | percentage points | Republican share expecting an inaccurate count in the fresh web sample minus the fresh in-person sample (independent samples; Welch degrees of freedom); the two estimates come from independent samples, so the interval adds their variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 6.7 to 21.1 | 1,319 | sample-specific weights V240102a and V240101a | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_gap_ftf | 19.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the fresh in-person sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.4 to 25.3 | 961 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_gap_panel | 31.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.3 to 36.2 | 2,057 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_gap_web | 32.4 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the fresh web sample (web interviews); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 27.6 to 37.3 | 1,851 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_rep_ftf | 26.2% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the fresh in-person sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 20.3% to 32.1% | 437 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_rep_panel | 40.0% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.1% | 999 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_acc_rep_web | 40.1% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.4% | 882 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_h24_dem_ftf | 9.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the fresh in-person sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.2% to 13.4% | 457 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_h24_dem_panel | 14.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 10.7% to 18.0% | 1,000 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_h24_dem_web | 20.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 16.2% to 24.5% | 826 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_h24_diff | 11.1 | percentage points | Democratic share saying Harris was the legitimate 2024 winner in the fresh web sample minus the fresh in-person sample (independent samples; Welch degrees of freedom); the two estimates come from independent samples, so the interval adds their variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.3 to 16.8 | 1,283 | sample-specific weights V240102b and V240101b | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_t20_gap_ftf | 51.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the fresh in-person sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 46.1 to 56.5 | 846 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_t20_gap_panel | 53.6 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.7 to 59.6 | 1,917 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_t20_gap_web | 50.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the fresh web sample (web interviews); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 45.2 to 55.4 | 1,543 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_viol_panel | 13.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 10.8% to 15.9% | 2,153 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| samp_viol_web | 18.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 16.2% to 20.8% | 2,015 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| share_nei | 6.7% | percent of the group | weighted share of adult citizens who name neither party and do not lean toward one (V241227x answer 4), among those with a party identification answer | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.8% to 7.7% | 5,483 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_acc_dem | −0.6 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 0.2 | 2,627 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_acc_rep | 5.6 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 4.4 to 6.8 | 2,436 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_acc_rep_adj | 5.9 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 7.2 | 2,264 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_viol_bound | 3.2 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | largest absolute interval end among the four slopes of the share saying violence is justified at least a little on out-party coldness (two parties, with and without adjustment) | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_viol_dem | −1.8 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −3.2 to −0.4 | 2,522 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_viol_dem_adj | −0.9 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.3 to 0.5 | 2,407 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_viol_rep | −0.4 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 0.6 | 2,282 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| slope_viol_rep_adj | 0.3 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.9 to 1.5 | 2,134 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_acc_gap_sl | 6.0 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners expecting the count to be inaccurate; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.7 to 12.7 | 1,867 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_acc_lrep | 33.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 28.7% to 39.2% | 710 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_acc_srep | 39.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.0% | 1,157 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_fbi_gap_ln | 11.4 | percentage points | share of Republican leaners minus share of not very strong Republicans choosing the FBI account; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | leaning and not very strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 2.1 to 20.6 | 1,031 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_fbi_gap_sl | 4.9 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners choosing the FBI account; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −2.6 to 12.4 | 1,499 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_fbi_lrep | 46.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 40.8% to 53.0% | 565 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_fbi_srep | 51.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.3% to 56.3% | 934 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_t20_gap_sl | 21.9 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners saying Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 14.6 to 29.2 | 1,543 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_t20_lrep | 45.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 39.6% to 51.9% | 585 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_t20_srep | 67.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 63.4% to 71.9% | 958 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_viol_gap_ld | 8.6 | percentage points | share of Democratic leaners minus share of strong Democrats saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democratic leaners and strong Democrats among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.9 to 15.3 | 1,936 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_viol_gap_sdem | −4.7 | percentage points | share of strong Democrats minus share of other Democrats (not very strong and leaners) saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −9.2 to −0.2 | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_viol_gap_srep | −1.2 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of other Republicans (not very strong and leaners) saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −5.7 to 3.3 | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| str_viol_ldem | 23.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democratic leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 17.2% to 29.6% | 684 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| therm_acc_cold | 47.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 43.6% to 52.2% | 1,095 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| therm_acc_mid | 32.4% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 11 to 30 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.8% to 38.0% | 774 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| therm_acc_warm | 17.5% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 31 to 100 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.0% to 22.0% | 567 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| therm_share_dem | 37.6% | percent of the group | weighted share rating the Republican Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer (V241167) | Democrats including leaners with a Republican Party rating | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.0% to 40.1% | 2,632 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| therm_share_rep | 40.9% | percent of the group | weighted share rating the Democratic Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer (V241166) | Republicans including leaners with a Democratic Party rating | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 38.5% to 43.3% | 2,451 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trump20_dem | 4.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.3% to 5.7% | 2,297 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trump20_firm_rep | 29.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election and very or extremely confident (V242567 answer 1 with V242568 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 26.2% to 32.0% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trump20_gap | 51.0 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.9 to 54.1 | 4,306 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trump20_rep | 55.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 52.6% to 58.5% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trump20_rep_nl | 59.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 56.2% to 63.6% | 1,424 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trust_low_dem | 11.9% | percent of the group | weighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 10.0% to 13.8% | 2,551 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| trust_low_rep | 33.0% | percent of the group | weighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 30.2% to 35.8% | 2,323 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_old | 11.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 8.9% to 13.0% | 2,027 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_old_dem | 13.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.6% to 16.3% | 1,004 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_old_rep | 8.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.7% to 11.2% | 935 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_young | 31.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.1% to 36.4% | 513 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_young_dem | 32.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 25.2% to 39.1% | 275 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_age_young_rep | 27.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 19.3% to 35.0% | 188 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_all | 17.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 15.6% to 18.9% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_dem | 17.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 14.9% to 19.7% | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_dem_nl | 14.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.5% to 17.2% | 1,848 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_ind_nl | 21.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | independents and leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 18.0% to 24.6% | 1,695 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_nei | 30.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 23.4% to 37.7% | 346 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_rep | 15.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.0% to 17.1% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_any_rep_nl | 15.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.4% to 17.8% | 1,625 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_edu_ba | 11.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens with a bachelor's degree or more who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.3% to 13.6% | 2,370 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_edu_hs | 22.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens with a high school education or less who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 19.7% to 25.8% | 1,148 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_gap_any | 2.2 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.9 to 5.3 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_gap_any_hi | 5.3 | percentage points | upper end of the 95% interval on the Democratic minus Republican gap in the share saying violence is justified at least a little | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 |   |   | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_gap_any_nl | −0.3 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share without leaners saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans without leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −3.9 to 3.4 | 3,473 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_gap_lot | −0.7 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified a lot or a great deal; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.5 to 1.1 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_gap_mod | 0.1 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified a moderate amount or more; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.4 to 2.6 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_inc_all | 62.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 60.6% to 64.7% | 5,181 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_inc_dem | 62.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 59.3% to 65.4% | 2,526 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_inc_rep | 64.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 61.8% to 67.1% | 2,285 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_little_all | 6.4% | percent of the group | weighted share answering that violence to pursue political goals is justified a little (V241579 answer 2) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.3% to 7.6% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_lot_all | 4.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_lot_dem | 4.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.0% to 5.3% | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_lot_rep | 4.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.5% to 6.2% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_mod_all | 10.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a moderate amount or more (V241579 answers 3 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.5% to 12.1% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_moderate_all | 6.2% | percent of the group | weighted share answering that violence to pursue political goals is justified a moderate amount (V241579 answer 3) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.1% to 7.3% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |
| viol_none_all | 82.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is not at all justified (V241579 answer 1) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 81.1% to 84.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series |   |

## Definitions

- Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused.
- Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise.
- Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
- Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way.
- Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors.

## Methods

Sample. ANES 2024 Time Series, full release of May 19, 2026: 5,521 respondents in the pre-election study, 4,964 of whom completed the post-election interview. The target population is U.S. citizens aged 18 or older at residential addresses (48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia for the fresh in-person sample, 50 states and the District for the fresh web sample and the panel). The file has a fresh in-person sample (1,042 respondents), a fresh web sample (2,308, including paper cases) and a panel of 2016 and 2020 respondents (2,171). Paper-and-pencil respondents (245 before the election, 200 after) were not asked most of the questions used here.

Weights and design. Pre-election items use V240107a and post-election items V240107b, with variance PSU V240107c and variance stratum V240107d, as the user guide directs for the full release. The sample-group figure uses each sample group's own weight, PSU and stratum (V240101a, V240101b, V240101c and V240101d for the fresh in-person sample; V240102 for the fresh web sample, which excludes the paper cases; V240106 for the panel). Estimates and intervals are not computed with the model-based Kish formula used in other chapters.

Estimator and intervals. A share is the weighted ratio of an indicator within a domain. The variance is a Taylor-series linearization with one-stage stratified cluster sampling and no finite-population correction. Domains stay inside the design (a subpopulation), so a stratum is never left with one PSU by dropping rows. A difference of two shares in one sample linearizes the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared PSUs create. Intervals are 95% intervals from the t distribution with the design degrees of freedom: PSU-stratum units minus strata, 2,339 for the pre-election design (2,473 units, 134 strata) and 2,000 for the post-election design (2,134 units, 134 strata). A difference between two sample groups combines two independent variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. An interval is cut at 0 and 100 for a share; one cell, Republicans in the fresh in-person sample on the 2024 winner, is cut at 0. For the 161 shares plotted in the figures, the design effect (the design-based variance divided by the model-based variance with the same weights) runs from 0.5 to 1.7 with a median of 1.1, so design-based intervals are narrower than model-based intervals for some cells and wider for others.

Items and cut points. Violence justified (V241579): at least a little is answers 2 to 5, a moderate amount or more is 3 to 5, a lot or a great deal is 4 and 5. Expected count (V241314): not at all or a little accurately is answers 1 and 2. Votes counted fairly (V242207): less often than most of the time is answers 3 to 5. Trust in local election officials (V241315): not at all or a little is 1 and 2. 2020 winner (V242567): answer 1 is Trump. Events of January 2021 (V242571): answer 2 is the FBI account. 2024 winner (V242575): answer 2 is Harris. Very or extremely confident is answers 4 and 5 of the follow-up (V242568, V242572, V242576). Norm items: very or extremely important is answers 4 and 5 (V241324 to V241327); helpful is answer 1 of V241328; favor is answer 1 of V241331. Refusals, don't-know answers, break-offs and respondents not asked are missing (the loader sets negative codes to missing) and are excluded from the denominator of each share.

Groups. Party is the pre-election seven-point summary (V241227x): with leaners, answers 1 to 3 are Democrats, 5 to 7 Republicans and 4 neither party; without leaners, answers 1 and 2 are Democrats, 6 and 7 Republicans and 3 to 5 independents and leaners. Age is age on Election Day (V241458x, with the paper age V241457 where only that was given) in four groups; education is V241465x collapsed to high school or less, some college, and a bachelor's degree or more. The 2020 vote is the recalled vote (V241106x), the 2024 vote the post-election report (V242067). Attention to politics is V241004 (always or most of the time against about half the time or less).

Thermometer and regressions. The out-party rating is V241166 for Republicans and V241167 for Democrats, grouped as 0 to 10, 11 to 30 and 31 to 100 (the top bin of 51 to 100 had an effective sample under 100 for some cells and was merged). Slopes come from weighted linear probability models fit separately within each party, with the Taylor-series sandwich variance on the same strata and PSUs. The adjusted model adds age group, education, sex (V241550, which was also asked on paper), race and ethnicity (V241501x) and strength of party identification (strong, not very strong, leaner).

Suppression. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100; no plotted cell fell below the floor.

Checks. A set of 66 estimates and intervals (headline shares, party, age and education gaps, losing-side shares, strength-of-identification contrasts, neither-party distances from the party midpoint, sample-group cells and five regression slopes) was reproduced with the survey package in R (svydesign with nest = TRUE, subset domains, svycontrast and svyglm); every estimate and interval end agrees to the digits printed, and verify_independent.py in the chapter folder repeats the comparison. Within a sample group the interview mode was not assigned at random, so mode effects are not separated from sample differences.

## What these data cannot show

- One cross-section cannot show change.
- The cumulative ANES file used elsewhere in this book has no item on political violence, on votes counted accurately or on the legitimacy of an election, so no earlier ANES study on disk is comparable.
- The 2024 file carries identifiers that link panel respondents to the 2016 and 2020 studies, but those studies are not in the data used here.
- Whether approval of violence or doubt about counts rose or fell needs surveys that repeat the questions over time.
- Projects that field repeated survey questions on political violence, democratic norms and the legitimacy of elections include the Polarization Research Lab (America's Political Pulse) and Bright Line Watch.
- This chapter does not use them and reports nothing from them.
- The file records no action.
- It has no question about violence, threats or harassment by the respondent, or about taking part in the events of January 2021.
- The only actions it records are ordinary participation such as voting and joining a protest march, rally or demonstration.
- Approval in the abstract is not evidence that a respondent would act, and an estimate of how many have acted would need administrative records, such as law-enforcement case files, that the survey cannot supply.
- The violence question does not say who would be hurt, for what goal or by what act, so the shares cannot be sorted into approval of attacks on officials, on the other party or on no one in particular.
- The answer "a little" accounts for 6.4% (95% CI 5.3% to 7.6%) of adult citizens, about as many as the 6.2% (95% CI 5.1% to 7.3%) who chose "a moderate amount", and it is the answer whose meaning the wording leaves most open.
- The data cannot separate respondents who read the question carefully from respondents who did not, and the attention pattern above is a description and not a correction.
- The thermometer, strength and age results are associations and make no claim about cause.
- Neither the party gap nor the gaps by age and education are adjusted for one another, except where the text says so.
- The 2020 and 2024 legitimacy questions were asked at different distances from their elections and carry different histories of statements by candidates and officials, which the survey did not measure, so a difference between them mixes timing, who won and party.
- The population is adult citizens at residential addresses.
- It leaves out noncitizens, people in institutions and group quarters, and, for the in-person sample, residents of Alaska and Hawaii.
- Respondents who refused a question, and paper respondents who were not asked, are left out of its shares, and nonresponse to the survey itself is handled only through the weights.
- The intervals describe sampling variation.
- They do not include the differences among sample groups shown above or the effect of question wording.

## References

1. American National Election Studies (2026). ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release [dataset and documentation], May 19, 2026 version. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/
2. Westwood, Sean J.; Grimmer, Justin; Tyler, Matthew; Nall, Clayton (2022). Current research overstates American support for political violence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(12): e2116870119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2116870119
3. Kalmoe, Nathan P.; Mason, Lilliana (2022). Radical American Partisanship: Mapping Violent Hostility, Its Causes, and the Consequences for Democracy. University of Chicago Press.
4. Sinclair, Betsy; Smith, Steven S.; Tucker, Patrick D. (2018). "It's Largely a Rigged System": Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016. Political Research Quarterly 71(4): 854-868. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918768006
5. Anderson, Christopher J.; Blais, Andre; Bowler, Shaun; Donovan, Todd; Listhaug, Ola (2005). Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199276382.001.0001
6. Tourangeau, Roger; Yan, Ting (2007). Sensitive Questions in Surveys. Psychological Bulletin 133(5): 859-883. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859

## Provenance

- Pipeline version: 1.0.0
- Build script: book3/chapters/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/build.py (sha256 bdd42c2c0da5cdb701ae668ef421db5e5995278d481e9becd2f1e7308492a46c)
- Built on: 2026-10-03
- Site commit: 16414b2c7257546a7042d0b1734657f208999f60

Inputs:

| File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- |
| data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 |

Outputs:

| File | SHA-256 |
| --- | --- |
| facts.json | b121e31f8c9f36df289ff59de20bcc7acb3d62ddbc3e7c5eaae6c796c9d14ff6 |
| figures/by_strength.json | 60ca8f17b876490dbe8d1eacdc5d63992f9e96d3534a1be72fd6badd0b5d8200 |
| figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json | 1ddb721cf3a19f1fdc195e88a7efc1dfa3736703c296db9bd3d1ff0ce8a1295d |
| figures/items.json | 3e903b6900c375d1f35a797b54b1659effe22b381d017158a14009f4bc3e35f0 |
| figures/losers.json | bcc6718e2944649d2c1229a41d2615fb9164883311bbc678034db33bba941096 |
| figures/norms.json | eae9a812e94761e5df23afe61d7b3a455351c72daf90e5c2e4a8b86e32e3d646 |
| figures/sample_groups.json | da508e001304e61c9f006e070119dd390f9146534b137cbeb895636fa99177e3 |
| figures/thermometer.json | ea7aa784778a158cb3ef31b85f619461dba363de0b053ba2a778176666b98172 |
| figures/violence_by_age_edu.json | accc3e9a28e22d0b18a8004f90cc9702115261d9b1fd29f37e7b152c7faf9934 |
| figures/violence_levels.json | 5b20587af1fbf34228c3d0e1e4463ddad0b138cc50f6f97ba8c5936ec39e36d7 |
| meta.json | 32fdfa9c7a3ff4822686ad68789f23a670e933b588109af6aa4de802e6fa220c |
| refs.json | 22560c39d68a3b814a36074364419b7234093a56c3eba22359d0808fc4792a79 |

## Machine formats

- Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report
- Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report.md
- Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/facts.json
- Table 1, figure "items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/items.json
- Table 2, figure "violence_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_levels.json
- Table 3, figure "violence_by_age_edu" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_by_age_edu.json
- Table 4, figure "counts_and_legitimacy" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json
- Table 5, figure "losers" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/losers.json
- Table 6, figure "by_strength" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/by_strength.json
- Table 7, figure "thermometer" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/thermometer.json
- Table 8, figure "sample_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/sample_groups.json
- Table 9, figure "norms" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/norms.json
- Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt