# Fifty years of racial attitudes: report

Chapter 4.6 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter.

## Identification

- Title: Fifty years of racial attitudes
- Chapter: 4.6 (Part IV, Issues move on different schedules; Coalitions and political differences)
- Question: Which racial attitudes changed since the 1970s, and when did the post-2012 movement begin?
- Dek: Among white respondents to the General Social Survey, the share attributing racial inequality mainly to discrimination was 30.0% in 2014 and 41.2% in 2018, after equal-treatment answers had risen from the 1970s to the 2000s.
- Grain: individuals
- Status: draft
- Published: 2026-10-03
- Updated: not revised
- Data sources:
  - General Social Survey. Cumulative data 1972-2024 (race, party and the race items; interview mode from the raw file); years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use
  - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1964-2024: thermometers, resentment items, aid to Black Americans, affirmative action, party and presidential vote; mode weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: VCF0009z; VCF0009x and VCF0009y for the mode views
  - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content 2008 and 2012: affirmative action item, party and presidential vote; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single wave)
- Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes
- Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report
- Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report.md
- BibTeX key: singh2026fiftyyearsofracialattitudes

```bibtex
@misc{singh2026fiftyyearsofracialattitudes,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Fifty years of racial attitudes},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}
```

## Principal estimates

The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance.

| Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 30.0% | 95% CI 27.0% to 33.0% | 1,215 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2014 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 41.2% | 95% CI 37.4% to 45.1% | 1,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2018 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 62.6% | 95% CI 59.7% to 65.4% | 1,306 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | marry_1972 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2002 | 87.6% | 95% CI 84.9% to 90.3% | 742 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | marry_2002 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1990 | 35.0% | 95% CI 31.8% to 38.1% | 1,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rel_1990 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 92.4% | 95% CI 90.5% to 94.2% | 1,517 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rel_2024 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1977 | 42.0% | 95% CI 39.0% to 45.0% | 1,273 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_1977 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2004 | 28.8% | 95% CI 24.9% to 32.7% | 694 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2004 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 37.1% | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.2% | 1,332 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2016 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 11.2% | 95% CI 9.2% to 13.2% | 1,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | help_2014 |
| weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 21.4% | 95% CI 18.8% to 24.0% | 1,382 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | help_2016 |
| weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 44.9% | 95% CI 39.6% to 50.2% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | dem_disc_2014 |
| weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 61.6% | 95% CI 55.5% to 67.6% | 392 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | dem_disc_2018 |
| weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 18.2% | 95% CI 14.2% to 22.2% | 468 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rep_disc_2014 |
| weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 23.3% | 95% CI 18.0% to 28.5% | 458 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rep_disc_2018 |
| weighted share who report Hispanic origin | white GSS respondents who answered the Hispanic-origin question | 2012 to 2024 | 11.4% | 95% CI 10.8% to 12.1% | 15,012 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | hisp_white |

## Findings

Among white respondents to the General Social Survey (GSS), the share who oppose a law against marriages between Black people and whites rose from 62.6% in 1972 to 87.6% in 2002, the last year the question was asked. The share who would not oppose a close relative marrying a Black person rose from 35.0% in 1990 to 92.4% in 2024. Items on the causes of racial inequality and on government action followed another schedule. The share who say that Black people's worse jobs, income and housing are mainly due to discrimination fell from 42.0% in 1977 to 28.8% in 2004 and was 30.0% in 2014, then rose to 37.1% in 2016 and 41.2% in 2018. The share who place themselves at the help end of a five-point scale on whether government has a special obligation to improve Black people's living standards (the two answers nearest to government should help) went from 11.2% in 2014 to 21.4% in 2016.

A single step fitted to the in-person interviews of the 2000 to 2018 surveys falls at the 2016 survey for each of six dated explanation and policy items among white respondents, which puts the new level between the 2014 and 2016 surveys. A step is a form assumption, and a kinked trend fits some of the items better. The 2014 and 2016 surveys were conducted mostly in person, so the date does not come from a change of survey mode.

The movement is larger among white Democrats. Their share attributing racial inequality to discrimination went from 44.9% in 2014 to 61.6% in 2018, and white Republicans' share went from 18.2% to 23.3%.

The GSS is a repeated cross-section of US adults, interviewed in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and in person and on the web in 2022 and 2024. The American National Election Studies (ANES) interviewed mainly in person until 2008, added a web sample in 2012, and held no in-person interviews in 2020. The Cooperative Election Study (CES), an online opt-in panel, gives a second reading of the vote in 2008 and 2012. Results for race and party are shown separately. "White respondents" are white in the GSS race coding, which includes Hispanic whites (11.4% of white respondents from 2012 to 2024), and white non-Hispanic in the ANES and CES. Party includes leaners. (Note: Every share and mean is weighted, with 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size [1]. The intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the surveys' clustering, and the CES intervals also ignore how respondents join an opt-in panel. The methods note in the appendix gives the sample floors, the item wording and the years each item was asked.) Two neighboring chapters cover parts of this ground and are summarized here and not rebuilt. Companion 4.6a, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) relates the ANES racial resentment index to ideology between and within parties, and Chapter 4.7, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the year in which the Republican minus Democratic gap on resentment passes a fixed threshold. This chapter dates the level of each item among white respondents, which is a different quantity, and uses the resentment index only in the section on the vote. Planned, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned) covers the weeks after May 2020.

### Four kinds of items

The surveys ask four kinds of question. Principles of equal treatment ask whether Black and white people should be treated alike, for example in marriage, in housing and in a party's choice of a presidential nominee. Explanations of racial inequality ask whether the gap in jobs, income and housing is mainly due to discrimination, to inborn ability, to a lack of chance for education or to a lack of motivation or will power. Policy implementation asks what government should do about the gap: help improve Black people's living standards, spend on it, or give preference in hiring and promotion. Affect is the ANES feeling thermometer, a rating of a group on a scale from zero to one hundred. Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and Krysan separate principles of equality from government implementation of them and add questions about the sources of inequality [2], and Kluegel traced the GSS explanations through 1989 [3]. Each GSS series here is the weighted share of white respondents, among those who answered, who gave the answer named in its label. The government-help question is a five-point scale, and its series counts the two answers nearest to government should help. The chapter dates the answers on discrimination, will power, government help, spending, affirmative action and the special-favors statement, and splits them by party and race. It calls them the dated items.

### Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s

Table 1 plots the answers of white respondents by kind. The share who oppose a law against marriages between Black people and whites went from 62.6% in 1972 to 87.6% in 2002. The share who disagree that white people have a right to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods went from 60.8% in 1972 to 86.8% in 1996, and the share who would vote for a qualified Black nominee of their own party went from 74.0% in 1972 to 95.7% in 2010. The file has no readings of those questions after those years. The two equal-treatment items still asked in 2024 kept rising after 2012. The share who would vote for a law barring housing discrimination went from 35.5% in 1973 to 68.5% in 2012 and 82.8% in 2022, and was 77.7% (95% CI 70.7% to 84.6%) in 2024, when the item went to fewer respondents. The share who would not oppose a relative marrying a Black person went from 78.4% in 2012 to 92.4% in 2024.

Table 1. Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s, and explanation and policy answers other than will power were level from the mid-2000s to 2014 and then moved

Table 2 gives the change between pooled periods of surveys for every item. The equal-treatment items changed most early. From 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 the open-housing item changed by +23.7 (95% CI 21.6 to 25.9) points, the segregation item by +20.3 (95% CI 18.2 to 22.3) and the intermarriage-law item by +14.3 (95% CI 12.6 to 15.9). The shares saying yes to the explanations fell. Over the same years the share attributing the gap to inborn ability changed by −9.6 (95% CI −12.4 to −6.7) points and the share attributing it to will power by −4.5 (95% CI −7.8 to −1.3), and from 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 the share citing discrimination changed by −7.1 (95% CI −9.4 to −4.7) points and the share citing will power by −9.3 (95% CI −11.8 to −6.7).

Table 2. Equal-treatment items changed most before 2008, and the policy items changed most from 2010-2014 on

### Most explanation and policy answers were level from 2004 to 2014

From 2004-2008 to 2010-2014, the pooled periods before and during the Obama presidency, the changes in the dated items lie between −2.5 and +2.1 points, and the interval includes zero for 5 of the six. The exception is the affirmative action item, at +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0) points. The two equal-treatment items asked in both periods kept rising, by +3.4 (95% CI 0.7 to 6.1) points for the open-housing law and +8.6 (95% CI 6.2 to 11.1) for a relative's marriage.

After 2014 the dated items moved. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the share citing discrimination changed by +8.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 11.5) points, the share citing will power by −9.0 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.7), the share at the help end of the government-help scale by +10.0 (95% CI 7.6 to 12.4), the share saying too little is spent on improving the conditions of Black people by +20.9 (95% CI 17.2 to 24.5), the share favoring preference in hiring by +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) and the share rejecting the statement that Black people should work up without special favors by +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.6). The comparison with 2021-2024 pools one web survey and two mixed-mode surveys, so the later years are read by interview mode below. The share citing inborn ability changed by −1.5 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.2) points from 2010-2014 to 2016-2018, an interval that includes zero, so the movement is in the explanations that place the gap in discrimination, education and motivation and not in the one that places it in ability.

### White respondents rated Black and white Americans alike by 2024

White respondents in the ANES rated Black Americans at 60.7 on average in 1964, 69.1 in 2004, 61.8 in 2012 and 69.5 in 2024, and rated white Americans at 86.7 in 1964 and 70.2 in 2024 (Table 3). The average of each respondent's own difference, the rating of white Americans minus the rating of Black Americans, went from 26.1 (95% CI 24.7 to 27.4) in 1964 to 0.7 (95% CI −0.3 to 1.6) in 2024.

Table 3. By 2024 white respondents rated Black and white Americans almost alike, after a fall in the rating of Black Americans from 2008 to 2012

Affect has its own Obama-era change. In face-to-face interviews, the only mode in 2008, the rating of Black Americans among white respondents changed by −3.4 (95% CI −5.5 to −1.3) points from 2008 to 2012, by −3.4 (95% CI −6.7 to −0.1) among white Democrats and by −3.1 (95% CI −6.1 to −0.1) among white Republicans. The fall was similar in the two parties. From 2012 to 2016 the face-to-face rating changed by +7.6 (95% CI 3.4 to 11.9) points among Democrats and +1.9 (95% CI −1.6 to 5.4) among Republicans, an interval that includes zero for Republicans, and the web interviews give +6.4 (95% CI 4.1 to 8.8) and +4.6 (95% CI 2.5 to 6.8). The ANES has no study in 2014, so it dates this rise only to the interval from 2012 to 2016, in face-to-face interviews and on the web.

### Most dated items change between the 2014 and 2016 surveys

Table 4 dates the movement. Each row fits two levels to the yearly shares, one before the first new survey and one from it on, and reports the survey that fits best and how often resampling the respondents agrees. The best-fitting first new survey is 2016 for each dated item among white respondents and among white Democrats. Of the 1,000 bootstrap replicates for each item, the share that choose 2016 runs from 51.4% to 100.0%. The least certain date is for will power, where 51.4% of the replicates choose 2016 and 38.0% choose an earlier survey. In single-survey comparisons the change from 2012 to 2014 has an interval that excludes zero for 0 of the six dated items, and the change from 2014 to 2016 does so for 5. That change is +18.2 (95% CI 12.7 to 23.8) points for spending, +9.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 12.6) for the help end of the government-help scale and +6.3 (95% CI 1.7 to 10.9) for discrimination, and −3.8 (95% CI −8.6 to 1.1) for will power, an interval that includes zero.

A step is a form assumption. A trend that is constant before a kink and linear after it fits the discrimination share better than a step, with a weighted squared error of 2.4 against 8.0, because the share keeps rising from 2016 to 2018. It fits the will-power share better still, 3.0 against 15.2, because that share keeps falling, so will power belongs with trend items more than step items. The step fits the government-help and spending shares better than the kink. The kink falls at 2014.0 (95% CI 2012.0 to 2015.5) for discrimination and at 2011.4 (95% CI 2008.0 to 2014.8) for will power, and the latest upper end of a kink interval across the dated items is 2015.5. By point estimate the kink years run from about 2011 to 2014, so the kinked trend starts the rise at or before the 2014 survey, while the step puts the new level at the 2016 survey.

Table 4. The best single step falls at the 2016 survey for each of the six dated items among white respondents and among white Democrats, and a kinked trend fits discrimination and will power better

### The post-2018 changes depend on interview mode

The GSS interviewed 87.3% of its 2021 respondents on the web and held no in-person interviews that year, so the level after 2018 needs a mode check. Table 5 gives, for each item asked in both modes, the in-person level in 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2022-2024 and the web level in 2022-2024, all for white respondents. By sign, web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of the 9 items and more often on 3. By interval, the gap excludes zero below on 5 items and above on 1, and it is at most 9.9 points.

In person, the share citing discrimination changed by +12.0 (95% CI 5.3 to 18.7) points from 2016-2018 to 2022-2024, the share citing will power by −7.1 (95% CI −13.4 to −0.8), the share favoring preference in hiring by +6.2 (95% CI 1.7 to 10.6) and the share saying too little is spent by −1.3 (95% CI −7.7 to 5.1), an interval that includes zero. The in-person change excludes zero for 4 of the six dated items. The web level in 2022-2024 minus the in-person level in 2016-2018 is +2.1 (95% CI −3.8 to 7.9) points for discrimination, so the post-2018 rise in that share holds in person and not on the web. Spending is lower on the web than in person in 2022-2024, by −7.1 (95% CI −13.9 to −0.3) points, and the in-person change is within sampling error of zero, so the chapter does not read the lower all-interview level after 2018 as a fall.

Table 5. The post-2018 level depends on interview mode: in 2022 and 2024 web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of 9 items

### The movement is larger among white Democrats

Table 6 splits the dated items by party. Among white Democrats the share citing discrimination was 44.9% (95% CI 39.6% to 50.2%) in 2014, 54.6% in 2016, 61.6% in 2018, 81.5% in 2021 and 73.3% in 2024. Among white Republicans it was 18.2% in 2014, 23.3% in 2018 and 21.4% in 2024. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the share citing discrimination changed by +14.8 (95% CI 9.7 to 19.9) points among Democrats and +2.5 (95% CI −1.7 to 6.7) among Republicans, and the share at the help end of the government-help scale by +18.7 (95% CI 14.2 to 23.2) and +5.0 (95% CI 2.3 to 7.6). The interval for the change excludes zero for 6 of the six dated items among Democrats and for 4 among Republicans. The Democratic change minus the Republican change excludes zero on 4 of the six, discrimination and government help among them. For will power the difference is −4.0 (95% CI −11.0 to 3.0) points and for spending +7.3 (95% CI −0.5 to 15.0), both intervals that include zero.

Republicans moved on will power (−8.5 (95% CI −13.7 to −3.3) points) and on spending, by +19.0 (95% CI 13.8 to 24.3) against +26.3 (95% CI 20.5 to 32.1) among Democrats. Republican best step dates differ by item (2004 for discrimination, 2016 for spending and affirmative action, 2018 for the others), so for discrimination the step at a fixed 2016 date is +18.5 (95% CI 14.1 to 23.2) points among Democrats and +0.4 (95% CI −3.3 to 4.3) among Republicans. The Republican spending share was 16.9% among web respondents in 2021 and 27.9% in person in 2022 and 2024 pooled.

Table 6. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white Democrats moved on each of the six dated items and white Republicans on 4, and the Democratic change is separable from the Republican change on 4

The mode view of Table 6 shows that the Democratic web levels lie beyond the 2014 level for every dated item. The pooled 2022-2024 in-person cell clears the sample floor for 4 of the six dated items, and for those it also lies beyond the 2014 level. Among white Democrats the share at the help end of the government-help scale was 19.0% in 2014 and 37.5% in 2016, and in 2022 and 2024 pooled it was 45.9% (95% CI 38.3% to 53.4%) in person and 52.3% (95% CI 46.7% to 57.9%) on the web.

### Black respondents moved in the same direction on some items

Table 7 adds race of respondent. Black respondents give the structural or pro-government answer more often than white respondents in every period on 5 of the six dated items. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the help-end share changed by +9.6 (95% CI 2.4 to 16.8) points among Black respondents and +10.0 (95% CI 7.6 to 12.4) among white respondents, and the share citing discrimination by +7.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 13.8) and +8.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 11.5). Among Black respondents the interval excludes zero for 3 of the six dated items, and among white respondents for 6. Black respondents' shares show no change distinguishable from zero on affirmative action (−0.8 (95% CI −7.7 to 6.2) points) or will power (−0.2 (95% CI −7.1 to 6.7)), but those intervals are wide enough to overlap the white intervals of +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) and −9.0 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.7).

Table 7. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white respondents moved on 6 of the six dated items and Black respondents on 3, with wider intervals for Black respondents

### The tie to the vote rose from 2012 to 2016

The 2008 to 2012 change is within sampling error. In the ANES, a standard deviation more racial resentment goes with 22.1 points more Republican share of the two-party vote among white voters in 2008, 23.2 in 2012 and 31.3 in 2016. The change from 2008 to 2012 is +1.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 4.6) points, an interval that allows a rise of up to 4.6 points but not one as large as the change from 2012 to 2016, +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.5) points. This is an association across elections and not an effect of the Obama presidency.

The vote analysis uses the 16,299 white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate and have a racial resentment index score, in the presidential years from 1988 to 2024 in which the index was asked (it was not asked in 1996). In each year a linear probability model of a Republican vote on an attitude, standardized within the year, gives a slope: the points of Republican two-party vote that go with a standard deviation more of the racially conservative answer. Higher resentment, a colder rating of Black Americans, placing aid to Black Americans at the self-help end and opposing affirmative action are the conservative poles, and the other three attitudes have their own samples, which include 1996.

For the racial resentment index, the slope was 10.1 (95% CI 7.1 to 13.1) in 1988, 17.8 (95% CI 14.1 to 21.5) in 2004, 22.1 (95% CI 19.2 to 25.0) in 2008, 23.2 (95% CI 21.3 to 25.0) in 2012, 31.3 (95% CI 29.9 to 32.8) in 2016, 34.9 in 2020 and 33.0 in 2024 (Table 8). It gained +7.7 (95% CI 2.9 to 12.4) points from 1988 to 2004, +4.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 9.0) from 2004 to 2008, +1.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 4.6) from 2008 to 2012 and +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.5) from 2012 to 2016. The interval for 2004 to 2008 includes zero and reaches above the change from 2012 to 2016, so the data do not rule out a rise of that size during the 2008 campaign. The interval for 2008 to 2012 ends below the lower end of the interval for 2012 to 2016.

Table 8. Among white voters the tie between racial resentment and the Republican vote rose from 1988 to 2004 and from 2012 to 2016, with no rise distinguishable from zero from 2008 to 2012

The 2008 to 2012 comparison is also the change in ANES mode, so the face-to-face views give the cleaner reading. Among face-to-face respondents the slope was 22.1 (95% CI 19.2 to 25.0) in 2008 and 21.8 (95% CI 18.1 to 25.6) in 2012, a change of −0.3 (95% CI −5.0 to 4.5) points, and the 2012 to 2016 change was +8.7 (95% CI 3.9 to 13.4). The CES is online in both years and has one racial policy item in the presidential years, opposition to affirmative action. Its slope was 25.5 (95% CI 24.8 to 26.2) in 2008 and 24.9 (95% CI 24.2 to 25.6) in 2012, a change of −0.6 (95% CI −1.6 to 0.4) points. Tesler finds that racial attitudes became more closely tied to evaluations of politicians and parties and to opinion on policies attached to President Obama [4] [5]. The slope here is for the vote and not for evaluations or policy opinion, and it shows no rise distinguishable from zero between the 2008 and 2012 elections in person or in the CES.

Holding party identification fixed shrinks the slope in every year, to 7.1 in 2012 and 13.4 in 2016 against 23.2 and 31.3. The split between and within parties belongs to Companion 4.6a, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology), which reports the same pattern for ideology, and this chapter does not carry it further. Party identification is measured in the same interview and can follow racial attitudes as well as precede them [6].

Table 9 gives the same relation in levels, with the resentment index cut into thirds inside each year so that the thirds are equal in size. The Republican share among the most resentful third was 79.4% (95% CI 73.9% to 84.9%) in 2008, 78.7% in 2012 and 89.1% in 2016, and among the least resentful third 28.8% (95% CI 22.9% to 34.7%), 27.0% and 17.1%. The gap between the most and least resentful thirds changed by +1.2 (95% CI −8.3 to 10.7) points from 2008 to 2012 and +20.3 (95% CI 13.6 to 27.0) from 2012 to 2016. Fixed index cuts keep the score and not the rank fixed, so the groups change in size. With them the gap changed by +15.7 (95% CI 2.5 to 28.8) points from 2004 to 2008, +0.5 (95% CI −9.2 to 10.3) from 2008 to 2012 and +9.7 (95% CI 2.8 to 16.6) from 2012 to 2016. The size of the 2012 to 2016 rise depends on the cut, and the 2008 to 2012 change is within sampling error under both. The Republican share among all white voters was 56.4% in 2008, 57.1% in 2012 and 57.4% in 2016, so the widening gap came with no comparable change in the white vote as a whole. Sides, Tesler and Vavreck describe changes in the party coalitions along racial and ethnic identities that preceded the 2016 election and were reinforced by the campaign [7].

Table 9. The Republican share among the most resentful third of white voters rose from 79.4% in 2008 to 89.1% in 2016, and fell among the least resentful third from 28.8% to 17.1%

### What these data cannot show

The GSS, ANES and CES interview new respondents in each wave, so a change in a share mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed party and the replacement of older adults by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them. The step dates describe when a new level first appears in surveys fielded in alternate years. The step and the kink are assumptions about the form of change and give different starts, the 2016 survey for the step and the 2014 survey or earlier for the kink. The dates do not say why the level changed, and the 2016 GSS was fielded during the presidential campaign.

The items measure answers to questions and not behavior. The principle items reached ceilings that leave little room to move, three of them have no readings after 2010, and the data cannot tell a change in belief from a change in willingness to say what the question invites. The GSS wording of the group changed over the period from Negroes to Blacks to African Americans, and in 2022 and 2024 the effective samples for party and race cells are small enough that the chapter pools those years. In the in-person view the Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 are suppressed, and Hispanic respondents cannot be separated in the GSS before 2000. The post-2018 levels depend on interview mode on several items, so the later comparisons are read by mode and not as changes over time. Results for Hispanic, Asian and other voters are not shown, and Chapter 3.3, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is where voters of those groups belong.

The vote section describes association across elections. It cannot separate the Obama presidency from the 2012 re-election campaign, the change in candidates in 2016, or the changes in the parties' coalitions, so a rise from 2012 to 2016 is not an effect of either. The vote is self-reported after the election and leans slightly Democratic, the attitude and party identification are measured in the same interview, the resentment index has no 1996 reading, ANES 2020 has no mode weights, and the CES holds one racial policy item in 2008 and 2012. The chapter does not test whether racial attitudes changed how people voted, and the surveys cannot say whether the movement after 2014 comes from the events of those years. Policing items and the weeks after May 2020 are in Planned, Policing (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/policing; planned) and Planned, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned).

## Tables

### Table 1. Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s, and explanation and policy answers other than will power were level from the mid-2000s to 2014 and then moved

Share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named at the right of each line, percent, by survey year, 1972 to 2024, in three panels by kind of item

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | series | view | year |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: |
| 28.40 | 23.10 | 25.80 | 1,267 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1977 |
| 23.50 | 18 | 20.70 | 1,279 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1985 |
| 22.70 | 17.70 | 20.20 | 1,203 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1986 |
| 23.30 | 17.10 | 20.20 | 787 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1988 |
| 19.40 | 13.70 | 16.60 | 819 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1989 |
| 22.30 | 17.10 | 19.70 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1990 |
| 20.50 | 14.60 | 17.50 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1991 |
| 13.20 | 8.60 | 10.90 | 881 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1993 |
| 15.70 | 11.80 | 13.70 | 1,565 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1994 |
| 11.70 | 8.40 | 10 | 1,521 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1996 |
| 12.50 | 8.90 | 10.70 | 1,422 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1998 |
| 14.60 | 10.80 | 12.70 | 1,387 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2000 |
| 15.60 | 9.90 | 12.70 | 701 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2002 |
| 10.40 | 5.80 | 8.10 | 711 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2004 |
| 9.10 | 5.90 | 7.50 | 1,408 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2006 |
| 11.70 | 7.30 | 9.50 | 998 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2008 |
| 11.10 | 6.90 | 9 | 1,046 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2010 |
| 9.80 | 5.70 | 7.70 | 960 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2012 |
| 8.90 | 5.60 | 7.20 | 1,229 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2014 |
| 8.60 | 5.30 | 6.90 | 1,359 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2016 |
| 7.80 | 4.10 | 6 | 1,101 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2018 |
| 5.40 | 3.20 | 4.30 | 2,050 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2021 |
| 8.40 | 3.30 | 5.90 | 817 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2022 |
| 7.20 | 2.70 | 4.90 | 719 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2024 |
| 45 | 39 | 42 | 1,273 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1977 |
| 45.20 | 38.50 | 41.90 | 1,285 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1985 |
| 42.70 | 36.70 | 39.70 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1986 |
| 42.30 | 34.80 | 38.60 | 786 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1988 |
| 42.50 | 35 | 38.70 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1989 |
| 41.60 | 35.20 | 38.40 | 1,087 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1990 |
| 39.80 | 32.20 | 36 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1991 |
| 39.90 | 32.70 | 36.30 | 862 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1993 |
| 37.90 | 32.60 | 35.20 | 1,542 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1994 |
| 37.10 | 31.70 | 34.40 | 1,493 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1996 |
| 33.90 | 28.40 | 31.20 | 1,390 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1998 |
| 35.10 | 29.60 | 32.40 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2000 |
| 34.90 | 27 | 30.90 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2002 |
| 32.70 | 24.90 | 28.80 | 694 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2004 |
| 33 | 27.20 | 30.10 | 1,382 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2006 |
| 34.10 | 27.10 | 30.60 | 977 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2008 |
| 34.50 | 27.60 | 31 | 1,029 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2010 |
| 34.40 | 27.20 | 30.80 | 937 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2012 |
| 33 | 27 | 30 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2014 |
| 40.20 | 34 | 37.10 | 1,332 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2016 |
| 45.10 | 37.40 | 41.20 | 1,076 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2018 |
| 52.10 | 46.70 | 49.40 | 2,043 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2021 |
| 55.30 | 44.30 | 49.80 | 805 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2022 |
| 47.90 | 37.50 | 42.70 | 708 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2024 |
| 54.90 | 48.90 | 51.90 | 1,284 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1977 |
| 55.10 | 48.30 | 51.70 | 1,308 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1985 |
| 52.80 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1986 |
| 56 | 48.20 | 52.10 | 790 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1988 |
| 57.20 | 49.60 | 53.40 | 826 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1989 |
| 53.80 | 47.30 | 50.60 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1990 |
| 55.70 | 47.80 | 51.80 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1991 |
| 55.50 | 48 | 51.80 | 869 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1993 |
| 50.10 | 44.50 | 47.30 | 1,572 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1994 |
| 45.60 | 40 | 42.80 | 1,524 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1996 |
| 44.40 | 38.50 | 41.50 | 1,413 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1998 |
| 45.80 | 40.10 | 42.90 | 1,381 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2000 |
| 45.50 | 37.10 | 41.30 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2002 |
| 43 | 34.50 | 38.70 | 698 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2004 |
| 47.90 | 41.80 | 44.80 | 1,404 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2006 |
| 50.60 | 43.10 | 46.80 | 993 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2008 |
| 49.60 | 42.20 | 45.90 | 1,042 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2010 |
| 44.70 | 37.10 | 40.90 | 953 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2012 |
| 43.30 | 37 | 40.20 | 1,225 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2014 |
| 53.90 | 47.50 | 50.70 | 1,349 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2016 |
| 56.10 | 48.30 | 52.20 | 1,092 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2018 |
| 54.20 | 48.80 | 51.50 | 2,038 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2021 |
| 55.70 | 44.80 | 50.30 | 806 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2022 |
| 52.30 | 41.90 | 47.10 | 710 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2024 |
| 67.30 | 61.50 | 64.40 | 1,256 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1977 |
| 62.80 | 56.10 | 59.50 | 1,275 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1985 |
| 68.10 | 62.20 | 65.20 | 1,198 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1986 |
| 65.90 | 58.40 | 62.10 | 780 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1988 |
| 65.60 | 58.10 | 61.80 | 810 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1989 |
| 67.50 | 61.10 | 64.30 | 1,075 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1990 |
| 65.20 | 57.60 | 61.40 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1991 |
| 57.50 | 50 | 53.70 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1993 |
| 60 | 54.40 | 57.20 | 1,531 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1994 |
| 57.10 | 51.50 | 54.30 | 1,471 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1996 |
| 52 | 46 | 49 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1998 |
| 54.50 | 48.60 | 51.50 | 1,327 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2000 |
| 54.80 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 676 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2002 |
| 54.90 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 686 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2004 |
| 52.90 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,376 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2006 |
| 55.70 | 48.10 | 51.90 | 971 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2008 |
| 54.10 | 46.60 | 50.30 | 1,017 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2010 |
| 52.50 | 44.60 | 48.60 | 928 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2012 |
| 49.20 | 42.70 | 46 | 1,211 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2014 |
| 44.90 | 38.50 | 41.70 | 1,329 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2016 |
| 39.80 | 32.30 | 36 | 1,071 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2018 |
| 32 | 27.10 | 29.60 | 2,032 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2021 |
| 34.20 | 24.30 | 29.30 | 793 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2022 |
| 30.60 | 21.50 | 26.10 | 710 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2024 |
| 12.90 | 8.80 | 10.90 | 1,149 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1994 |
| 13.10 | 9.50 | 11.30 | 1,477 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1996 |
| 13 | 9.30 | 11.10 | 1,373 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1998 |
| 15.50 | 11.60 | 13.50 | 1,362 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2000 |
| 13.40 | 8.10 | 10.80 | 699 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2002 |
| 15.10 | 9.50 | 12.30 | 698 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2004 |
| 12.80 | 8.90 | 10.90 | 1,396 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2006 |
| 14.20 | 9.30 | 11.80 | 972 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2008 |
| 15.10 | 10.10 | 12.60 | 1,019 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2010 |
| 17.10 | 11.60 | 14.40 | 930 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2012 |
| 15.90 | 11.40 | 13.70 | 1,201 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2014 |
| 21.10 | 16 | 18.60 | 1,304 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2016 |
| 23.30 | 16.90 | 20.10 | 1,046 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2018 |
| 22.10 | 17.80 | 19.90 | 2,007 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2021 |
| 26.80 | 20.30 | 23.50 | 1,588 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2022 |
| 24 | 18.10 | 21 | 1,428 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2024 |
| 23 | 18.20 | 20.60 | 1,287 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1975 |
| 15.90 | 11.20 | 13.60 | 1,358 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1983 |
| 17 | 12 | 14.50 | 1,189 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1984 |
| 15 | 10.90 | 12.90 | 1,217 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1986 |
| 18.80 | 14 | 16.40 | 1,182 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1987 |
| 13.10 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 811 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1988 |
| 19.50 | 13.90 | 16.70 | 851 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1989 |
| 18.10 | 13.30 | 15.70 | 1,108 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1990 |
| 18.60 | 13 | 15.80 | 817 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1991 |
| 15.50 | 10.50 | 13 | 858 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1993 |
| 12.30 | 8.90 | 10.60 | 1,621 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1994 |
| 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,519 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1996 |
| 15.70 | 11.70 | 13.70 | 1,447 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1998 |
| 16.30 | 12.30 | 14.30 | 1,432 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2000 |
| 14.70 | 9.30 | 12 | 716 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2002 |
| 13.50 | 8.20 | 10.90 | 695 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2004 |
| 14.60 | 10.40 | 12.50 | 1,422 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2006 |
| 12.80 | 8.30 | 10.50 | 1,017 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2008 |
| 16 | 10.80 | 13.40 | 1,012 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2010 |
| 13.50 | 8.60 | 11.10 | 953 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2012 |
| 13.20 | 9.20 | 11.20 | 1,216 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2014 |
| 24 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,382 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2016 |
| 25.80 | 19.20 | 22.50 | 1,080 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2018 |
| 32.90 | 28 | 30.40 | 2,026 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2021 |
| 29.40 | 22.70 | 26 | 1,639 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2022 |
| 25.70 | 19.60 | 22.60 | 1,450 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2024 |
| 12.20 | 8.30 | 10.20 | 1,193 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1994 |
| 12.80 | 9.40 | 11.10 | 1,548 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1996 |
| 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,459 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1998 |
| 13.60 | 9.90 | 11.80 | 1,420 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2000 |
| 11.50 | 6.60 | 9.10 | 706 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2002 |
| 14.60 | 9.10 | 11.80 | 719 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2004 |
| 12.40 | 8.60 | 10.50 | 1,428 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2006 |
| 13.10 | 8.50 | 10.80 | 1,006 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2008 |
| 14.30 | 9.50 | 11.90 | 1,066 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2010 |
| 13.40 | 8.50 | 11 | 964 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2012 |
| 15.90 | 11.40 | 13.60 | 1,244 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2014 |
| 21.90 | 16.90 | 19.40 | 1,370 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2016 |
| 25 | 18.60 | 21.80 | 1,104 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2018 |
| 30.50 | 25.80 | 28.10 | 2,050 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2021 |
| 33.90 | 26.90 | 30.40 | 1,663 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2022 |
| 27.40 | 21.40 | 24.40 | 1,504 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2024 |
| 31.70 | 26.10 | 28.90 | 1,214 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1973 |
| 29.80 | 24.30 | 27.10 | 1,203 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1974 |
| 25.60 | 20.40 | 23 | 1,210 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1975 |
| 26.90 | 21.80 | 24.40 | 1,259 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1976 |
| 23.90 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,223 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1977 |
| 22.80 | 17.20 | 20 | 1,248 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1978 |
| 25.30 | 19.60 | 22.50 | 1,202 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1980 |
| 26.20 | 20.40 | 23.30 | 1,199 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1982 |
| 30.20 | 24 | 27.10 | 1,280 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1983 |
| 37.60 | 26.80 | 32.20 | 384 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1984 |
| 35.40 | 26.30 | 30.90 | 615 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1985 |
| 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 557 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1986 |
| 39.10 | 28.20 | 33.60 | 371 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1987 |
| 35.50 | 26.90 | 31.20 | 537 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1988 |
| 36 | 27.70 | 31.80 | 591 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1989 |
| 40.70 | 31.60 | 36.20 | 517 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1990 |
| 34.80 | 26.40 | 30.60 | 564 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1991 |
| 36.80 | 28.40 | 32.60 | 599 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1993 |
| 29.20 | 23.40 | 26.30 | 1,130 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1994 |
| 30 | 23.90 | 27 | 1,030 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1996 |
| 33.70 | 27.30 | 30.50 | 991 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1998 |
| 32.60 | 26.30 | 29.50 | 973 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2000 |
| 28.90 | 22.70 | 25.80 | 1,000 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2002 |
| 29.20 | 22.90 | 26 | 1,008 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2004 |
| 32.30 | 25.30 | 28.80 | 981 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2006 |
| 34.60 | 26.40 | 30.50 | 674 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2008 |
| 27.90 | 20.10 | 24 | 663 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2010 |
| 33.60 | 25 | 29.30 | 640 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2012 |
| 29.90 | 23 | 26.40 | 840 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2014 |
| 50.10 | 42.40 | 46.20 | 946 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2016 |
| 53.30 | 44.20 | 48.70 | 778 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2018 |
| 48.10 | 42 | 45 | 1,522 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2021 |
| 48.80 | 39.60 | 44.20 | 1,185 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2022 |
| 44 | 35.90 | 39.90 | 1,089 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2024 |
| 76.60 | 71.30 | 74 | 1,262 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1972 |
| 84.90 | 80.30 | 82.60 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1974 |
| 85.50 | 80.90 | 83.20 | 1,243 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1975 |
| 81.30 | 76.30 | 78.80 | 1,284 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1977 |
| 87.10 | 82.10 | 84.60 | 1,291 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1978 |
| 88.80 | 84.20 | 86.50 | 1,240 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1982 |
| 85.90 | 80.80 | 83.30 | 1,353 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1983 |
| 87.40 | 82.40 | 84.90 | 1,270 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1985 |
| 88.80 | 84.50 | 86.60 | 1,210 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1986 |
| 83.60 | 77.50 | 80.60 | 780 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1988 |
| 85.30 | 79.40 | 82.40 | 812 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1989 |
| 89.30 | 83.80 | 86.60 | 732 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1990 |
| 90.90 | 85.80 | 88.30 | 829 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1991 |
| 90.50 | 85.70 | 88.10 | 858 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1993 |
| 90.70 | 87.20 | 89 | 1,570 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1994 |
| 93.90 | 89.50 | 91.70 | 768 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1996 |
| 95.80 | 92.30 | 94 | 998 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 2008 |
| 97.20 | 94.20 | 95.70 | 1,052 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 2010 |
| 65.40 | 59.70 | 62.60 | 1,306 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1972 |
| 66 | 60.30 | 63.20 | 1,277 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1973 |
| 69.80 | 64.20 | 67 | 1,274 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1974 |
| 66.80 | 61 | 63.90 | 1,289 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1975 |
| 71.50 | 66 | 68.70 | 1,322 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1976 |
| 76.70 | 71.40 | 74 | 1,313 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1977 |
| 73.40 | 67.40 | 70.40 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1980 |
| 72.20 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1982 |
| 77.60 | 71.40 | 74.50 | 1,192 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1984 |
| 77.10 | 71.20 | 74.10 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1985 |
| 78.10 | 72.50 | 75.30 | 1,187 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1987 |
| 78.60 | 71.90 | 75.30 | 775 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1988 |
| 81.70 | 75.50 | 78.60 | 865 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1989 |
| 83.80 | 77.60 | 80.70 | 754 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1990 |
| 82.80 | 76.40 | 79.60 | 799 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1991 |
| 85.40 | 79.60 | 82.50 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1993 |
| 86.60 | 82.60 | 84.60 | 1,606 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1994 |
| 89 | 85.20 | 87.10 | 1,515 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1996 |
| 88.70 | 84.80 | 86.80 | 1,448 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1998 |
| 90.50 | 86.80 | 88.60 | 1,345 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 2000 |
| 90.30 | 84.90 | 87.60 | 742 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 2002 |
| 38.30 | 32.60 | 35.50 | 1,283 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1973 |
| 38.40 | 32.70 | 35.60 | 1,300 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1975 |
| 37.90 | 32.30 | 35.10 | 1,339 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1976 |
| 42.10 | 35.50 | 38.80 | 1,330 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1978 |
| 45.20 | 38.70 | 41.90 | 1,292 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1980 |
| 47.90 | 41.20 | 44.60 | 1,382 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1983 |
| 52.80 | 45.80 | 49.30 | 1,227 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1984 |
| 50.80 | 44.70 | 47.70 | 1,234 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1986 |
| 54.10 | 47.60 | 50.90 | 1,197 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1987 |
| 57.60 | 50.10 | 53.90 | 820 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1988 |
| 61.90 | 54.60 | 58.20 | 864 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1989 |
| 59.80 | 53.30 | 56.50 | 1,116 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1990 |
| 63.70 | 56.20 | 60 | 824 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1991 |
| 66.70 | 59.50 | 63.10 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1993 |
| 64.20 | 58.90 | 61.60 | 1,638 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1994 |
| 69.10 | 61.70 | 65.40 | 786 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1996 |
| 69.60 | 61.70 | 65.60 | 702 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2004 |
| 68.60 | 62.80 | 65.70 | 1,462 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2006 |
| 71.70 | 65 | 68.40 | 1,034 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2008 |
| 74.10 | 67.10 | 70.60 | 973 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2010 |
| 72 | 64.90 | 68.50 | 966 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2012 |
| 73.40 | 67.60 | 70.50 | 1,256 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2014 |
| 79.40 | 74 | 76.70 | 1,372 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2016 |
| 80.80 | 74.50 | 77.60 | 1,129 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2018 |
| 87 | 78.50 | 82.80 | 790 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2022 |
| 84.60 | 70.70 | 77.70 | 279 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2024 |
| 38.10 | 31.80 | 35 | 1,130 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1990 |
| 61 | 53.30 | 57.10 | 767 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1996 |
| 61.50 | 55.80 | 58.60 | 1,472 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1998 |
| 65.70 | 60.80 | 63.30 | 1,782 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2000 |
| 71.70 | 63.80 | 67.70 | 713 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2002 |
| 73.60 | 65.80 | 69.70 | 723 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2004 |
| 73.30 | 67.60 | 70.40 | 1,436 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2006 |
| 77.80 | 71.30 | 74.50 | 1,012 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2008 |
| 81.70 | 75.70 | 78.70 | 1,064 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2010 |
| 81.60 | 75.20 | 78.40 | 972 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2012 |
| 85.40 | 80.50 | 82.90 | 1,238 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2014 |
| 86.40 | 81.80 | 84.10 | 1,375 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2016 |
| 89.90 | 84.80 | 87.40 | 1,114 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2018 |
| 93.60 | 90.70 | 92.10 | 2,056 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2021 |
| 95.10 | 91.40 | 93.30 | 1,679 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2022 |
| 94.20 | 90.50 | 92.40 | 1,517 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2024 |
| 63.70 | 57.80 | 60.80 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1972 |
| 64.40 | 58.60 | 61.50 | 1,330 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1976 |
| 62 | 56 | 59 | 1,296 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1977 |
| 72.10 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,271 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1980 |
| 76.20 | 70.40 | 73.30 | 1,287 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1982 |
| 76.60 | 70.40 | 73.50 | 1,219 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1984 |
| 78.40 | 72.50 | 75.40 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1985 |
| 78.70 | 73.20 | 75.90 | 1,199 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1987 |
| 79.50 | 73 | 76.30 | 783 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1988 |
| 80.10 | 73.80 | 76.90 | 861 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1989 |
| 80.40 | 73.70 | 77.10 | 750 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1990 |
| 83.30 | 77 | 80.20 | 807 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1991 |
| 88.80 | 83.60 | 86.20 | 878 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1993 |
| 85.90 | 81.80 | 83.90 | 1,609 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1994 |
| 89.50 | 84.10 | 86.80 | 746 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1996 |
| 28.40 | 23.10 | 25.80 | 1,267 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1977 |
| 23.50 | 18 | 20.70 | 1,279 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1985 |
| 22.70 | 17.70 | 20.20 | 1,203 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1986 |
| 23.30 | 17.10 | 20.20 | 787 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1988 |
| 19.40 | 13.70 | 16.60 | 819 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1989 |
| 22.30 | 17.10 | 19.70 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1990 |
| 20.50 | 14.60 | 17.50 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1991 |
| 13.20 | 8.60 | 10.90 | 881 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1993 |
| 15.70 | 11.80 | 13.70 | 1,565 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1994 |
| 11.70 | 8.40 | 10 | 1,521 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1996 |
| 12.50 | 8.90 | 10.70 | 1,422 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1998 |
| 14.60 | 10.80 | 12.70 | 1,387 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2000 |
| 15.60 | 9.90 | 12.70 | 701 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2002 |
| 10.80 | 5.60 | 8.20 | 568 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2004 |
| 10 | 6.60 | 8.30 | 1,317 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2006 |
| 12.50 | 7.70 | 10.10 | 855 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2008 |
| 11.70 | 7.20 | 9.50 | 933 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2010 |
| 10.60 | 6.10 | 8.40 | 835 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2012 |
| 9 | 5.40 | 7.20 | 1,060 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2014 |
| 8.90 | 5.40 | 7.20 | 1,257 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2016 |
| 8.70 | 4.60 | 6.70 | 984 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2018 |
| 13.80 | 4.30 | 9 | 344 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2022 |
| 12.10 | 2.90 | 7.50 | 222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2024 |
| 45 | 39 | 42 | 1,273 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1977 |
| 45.20 | 38.50 | 41.90 | 1,285 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1985 |
| 42.70 | 36.70 | 39.70 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1986 |
| 42.30 | 34.80 | 38.60 | 786 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1988 |
| 42.50 | 35 | 38.70 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1989 |
| 41.60 | 35.20 | 38.40 | 1,087 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1990 |
| 39.80 | 32.20 | 36 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1991 |
| 39.90 | 32.70 | 36.30 | 862 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1993 |
| 37.90 | 32.60 | 35.20 | 1,542 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1994 |
| 37.10 | 31.70 | 34.40 | 1,493 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1996 |
| 33.90 | 28.40 | 31.20 | 1,390 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1998 |
| 35.10 | 29.60 | 32.40 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2000 |
| 34.90 | 27 | 30.90 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2002 |
| 34.90 | 26 | 30.40 | 553 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2004 |
| 33.10 | 27.20 | 30.10 | 1,293 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2006 |
| 33.40 | 26.10 | 29.80 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2008 |
| 36.20 | 28.80 | 32.50 | 917 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2010 |
| 34.80 | 27.10 | 31 | 814 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2012 |
| 34.40 | 27.90 | 31.20 | 1,050 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2014 |
| 40.80 | 34.20 | 37.50 | 1,234 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2016 |
| 47.90 | 39.80 | 43.80 | 965 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2018 |
| 64.70 | 47.90 | 56.30 | 333 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2022 |
| 54.90 | 37.10 | 46 | 215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2024 |
| 54.90 | 48.90 | 51.90 | 1,284 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1977 |
| 55.10 | 48.30 | 51.70 | 1,308 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1985 |
| 52.80 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1986 |
| 56 | 48.20 | 52.10 | 790 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1988 |
| 57.20 | 49.60 | 53.40 | 826 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1989 |
| 53.80 | 47.30 | 50.60 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1990 |
| 55.70 | 47.80 | 51.80 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1991 |
| 55.50 | 48 | 51.80 | 869 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1993 |
| 50.10 | 44.50 | 47.30 | 1,572 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1994 |
| 45.60 | 40 | 42.80 | 1,524 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1996 |
| 44.40 | 38.50 | 41.50 | 1,413 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1998 |
| 45.80 | 40.10 | 42.90 | 1,381 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2000 |
| 45.50 | 37.10 | 41.30 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2002 |
| 44.20 | 34.80 | 39.50 | 556 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2004 |
| 48.10 | 41.80 | 45 | 1,312 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2006 |
| 48.80 | 40.80 | 44.80 | 852 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2008 |
| 50.90 | 43.10 | 47 | 929 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2010 |
| 46.20 | 38 | 42.10 | 828 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2012 |
| 42.70 | 35.90 | 39.30 | 1,056 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2014 |
| 53.60 | 46.80 | 50.20 | 1,248 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2016 |
| 56.40 | 48.20 | 52.30 | 979 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2018 |
| 56 | 39.30 | 47.70 | 337 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2022 |
| 57.70 | 39.80 | 48.80 | 216 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2024 |
| 67.30 | 61.50 | 64.40 | 1,256 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1977 |
| 62.80 | 56.10 | 59.50 | 1,275 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1985 |
| 68.10 | 62.20 | 65.20 | 1,198 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1986 |
| 65.90 | 58.40 | 62.10 | 780 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1988 |
| 65.60 | 58.10 | 61.80 | 810 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1989 |
| 67.50 | 61.10 | 64.30 | 1,075 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1990 |
| 65.20 | 57.60 | 61.40 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1991 |
| 57.50 | 50 | 53.70 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1993 |
| 60 | 54.40 | 57.20 | 1,531 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1994 |
| 57.10 | 51.50 | 54.30 | 1,471 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1996 |
| 52 | 46 | 49 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1998 |
| 54.50 | 48.60 | 51.50 | 1,327 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2000 |
| 54.80 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 676 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2002 |
| 55.30 | 45.60 | 50.50 | 548 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2004 |
| 54 | 47.60 | 50.80 | 1,286 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2006 |
| 57.50 | 49.50 | 53.50 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2008 |
| 53.80 | 46 | 49.90 | 909 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2010 |
| 53.20 | 44.80 | 49 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2012 |
| 49.60 | 42.70 | 46.10 | 1,043 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2014 |
| 45.70 | 39 | 42.40 | 1,232 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2016 |
| 39.80 | 31.90 | 35.80 | 957 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2018 |
| 39.20 | 23.80 | 31.50 | 325 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2022 |
| 42.20 | 25.40 | 33.80 | 219 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2024 |
| 12.90 | 8.80 | 10.90 | 1,149 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1994 |
| 13.10 | 9.50 | 11.30 | 1,477 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1996 |
| 13 | 9.30 | 11.10 | 1,373 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1998 |
| 15.50 | 11.60 | 13.50 | 1,362 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2000 |
| 13.40 | 8.10 | 10.80 | 699 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2002 |
| 14.50 | 8.40 | 11.40 | 560 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2004 |
| 13.20 | 9.20 | 11.20 | 1,303 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2006 |
| 14.60 | 9.40 | 12 | 835 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2008 |
| 16.30 | 10.90 | 13.60 | 908 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2010 |
| 17.90 | 12 | 15 | 813 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2012 |
| 15.20 | 10.50 | 12.90 | 1,034 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2014 |
| 21.40 | 16.10 | 18.80 | 1,206 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2016 |
| 24.70 | 17.90 | 21.30 | 938 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2018 |
| 32.10 | 21.20 | 26.70 | 619 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2022 |
| 30.50 | 19.70 | 25.10 | 429 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2024 |
| 23 | 18.20 | 20.60 | 1,287 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1975 |
| 15.90 | 11.20 | 13.60 | 1,358 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1983 |
| 17 | 12 | 14.50 | 1,189 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1984 |
| 15 | 10.90 | 12.90 | 1,217 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1986 |
| 18.80 | 14 | 16.40 | 1,182 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1987 |
| 13.10 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 811 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1988 |
| 19.50 | 13.90 | 16.70 | 851 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1989 |
| 18.10 | 13.30 | 15.70 | 1,108 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1990 |
| 18.60 | 13 | 15.80 | 817 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1991 |
| 15.50 | 10.50 | 13 | 858 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1993 |
| 12.30 | 8.90 | 10.60 | 1,621 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1994 |
| 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,519 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1996 |
| 15.70 | 11.70 | 13.70 | 1,447 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1998 |
| 16.30 | 12.30 | 14.30 | 1,432 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2000 |
| 14.70 | 9.30 | 12 | 716 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2002 |
| 13.50 | 7.70 | 10.60 | 569 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2004 |
| 14.40 | 10.20 | 12.30 | 1,332 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2006 |
| 12.90 | 8.20 | 10.60 | 891 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2008 |
| 16.10 | 10.60 | 13.30 | 898 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2010 |
| 14.30 | 8.90 | 11.60 | 822 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2012 |
| 13.90 | 9.40 | 11.60 | 1,042 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2014 |
| 23.40 | 18.10 | 20.70 | 1,284 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2016 |
| 25.80 | 19.10 | 22.50 | 972 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2018 |
| 31.30 | 20.50 | 25.90 | 649 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2022 |
| 30.30 | 19.10 | 24.70 | 433 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2024 |
| 12.20 | 8.30 | 10.20 | 1,193 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1994 |
| 12.80 | 9.40 | 11.10 | 1,548 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1996 |
| 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,459 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1998 |
| 13.60 | 9.90 | 11.80 | 1,420 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2000 |
| 11.50 | 6.60 | 9.10 | 706 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2002 |
| 15.10 | 8.90 | 12 | 573 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2004 |
| 12.50 | 8.60 | 10.50 | 1,336 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2006 |
| 13.30 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 864 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2008 |
| 14.10 | 9.10 | 11.60 | 949 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2010 |
| 12.60 | 7.70 | 10.20 | 846 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2012 |
| 15.70 | 11 | 13.40 | 1,075 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2014 |
| 21.70 | 16.50 | 19.10 | 1,269 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2016 |
| 26.30 | 19.50 | 22.90 | 988 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2018 |
| 36.40 | 25.50 | 31 | 672 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2022 |
| 25.20 | 15.60 | 20.40 | 476 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2024 |
| 31.70 | 26.10 | 28.90 | 1,214 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1973 |
| 29.80 | 24.30 | 27.10 | 1,203 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1974 |
| 25.60 | 20.40 | 23 | 1,210 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1975 |
| 26.90 | 21.80 | 24.40 | 1,259 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1976 |
| 23.90 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,223 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1977 |
| 22.80 | 17.20 | 20 | 1,248 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1978 |
| 25.30 | 19.60 | 22.50 | 1,202 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1980 |
| 26.20 | 20.40 | 23.30 | 1,199 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1982 |
| 30.20 | 24 | 27.10 | 1,280 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1983 |
| 37.60 | 26.80 | 32.20 | 384 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1984 |
| 35.40 | 26.30 | 30.90 | 615 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1985 |
| 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 557 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1986 |
| 39.10 | 28.20 | 33.60 | 371 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1987 |
| 35.50 | 26.90 | 31.20 | 537 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1988 |
| 36 | 27.70 | 31.80 | 591 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1989 |
| 40.70 | 31.60 | 36.20 | 517 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1990 |
| 34.80 | 26.40 | 30.60 | 564 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1991 |
| 36.80 | 28.40 | 32.60 | 599 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1993 |
| 29.20 | 23.40 | 26.30 | 1,130 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1994 |
| 30 | 23.90 | 27 | 1,030 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1996 |
| 33.70 | 27.30 | 30.50 | 991 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1998 |
| 32.60 | 26.30 | 29.50 | 973 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2000 |
| 28.90 | 22.70 | 25.80 | 1,000 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2002 |
| 26.80 | 19.80 | 23.30 | 778 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2004 |
| 31.70 | 24.80 | 28.20 | 923 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2006 |
| 33.30 | 24.80 | 29 | 588 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2008 |
| 26.70 | 18.50 | 22.60 | 595 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2010 |
| 35.10 | 25.70 | 30.40 | 545 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2012 |
| 31.70 | 24.10 | 27.90 | 715 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2014 |
| 50.20 | 42.10 | 46.20 | 871 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2016 |
| 53.70 | 44.20 | 48.90 | 686 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2018 |
| 54.90 | 39.60 | 47.20 | 456 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2022 |
| 52.20 | 36.30 | 44.30 | 296 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2024 |
| 76.60 | 71.30 | 74 | 1,262 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1972 |
| 84.90 | 80.30 | 82.60 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1974 |
| 85.50 | 80.90 | 83.20 | 1,243 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1975 |
| 81.30 | 76.30 | 78.80 | 1,284 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1977 |
| 87.10 | 82.10 | 84.60 | 1,291 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1978 |
| 88.80 | 84.20 | 86.50 | 1,240 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1982 |
| 85.90 | 80.80 | 83.30 | 1,353 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1983 |
| 87.40 | 82.40 | 84.90 | 1,270 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1985 |
| 88.80 | 84.50 | 86.60 | 1,210 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1986 |
| 83.60 | 77.50 | 80.60 | 780 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1988 |
| 85.30 | 79.40 | 82.40 | 812 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1989 |
| 89.30 | 83.80 | 86.60 | 732 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1990 |
| 90.90 | 85.80 | 88.30 | 829 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1991 |
| 90.50 | 85.70 | 88.10 | 858 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1993 |
| 90.70 | 87.20 | 89 | 1,570 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1994 |
| 93.90 | 89.50 | 91.70 | 768 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1996 |
| 95.80 | 92.10 | 94 | 859 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 2008 |
| 97.10 | 93.90 | 95.50 | 941 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 2010 |
| 65.40 | 59.70 | 62.60 | 1,306 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1972 |
| 66 | 60.30 | 63.20 | 1,277 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1973 |
| 69.80 | 64.20 | 67 | 1,274 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1974 |
| 66.80 | 61 | 63.90 | 1,289 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1975 |
| 71.50 | 66 | 68.70 | 1,322 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1976 |
| 76.70 | 71.40 | 74 | 1,313 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1977 |
| 73.40 | 67.40 | 70.40 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1980 |
| 72.20 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1982 |
| 77.60 | 71.40 | 74.50 | 1,192 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1984 |
| 77.10 | 71.20 | 74.10 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1985 |
| 78.10 | 72.50 | 75.30 | 1,187 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1987 |
| 78.60 | 71.90 | 75.30 | 775 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1988 |
| 81.70 | 75.50 | 78.60 | 865 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1989 |
| 83.80 | 77.60 | 80.70 | 754 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1990 |
| 82.80 | 76.40 | 79.60 | 799 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1991 |
| 85.40 | 79.60 | 82.50 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1993 |
| 86.60 | 82.60 | 84.60 | 1,606 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1994 |
| 89 | 85.20 | 87.10 | 1,515 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1996 |

The first 500 of 559 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json.

Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson).

Note: The GSS was in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, had no 2020 survey, had 87.3% of its 2021 interviews on the web and mixed in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024. The in-person view leaves out 2021 and the telephone interviews and plots only the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024.

Note: Bands are left off because five lines in a panel overlap; the tooltip and the data table give every interval. Each item is asked of a different set of years, and a line joins the years in which its item was asked, so the Black president item joins 1996 to 2008 and the open-housing item joins 1996 to 2004. The help-end line counts the two answers nearest to government should help on a five-point scale.

Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json

### Table 2. Equal-treatment items changed most before 2008, and the policy items changed most from 2010-2014 on

Change in the share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percentage points, between pooled periods of surveys; empty cells are items not asked in both periods

| col | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | row | view |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 15.90 | 12.60 | 14.30 | 13,447 | Principle: no law against intermarriage | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 8.30 | 5.10 | 6.70 | 10,621 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5.70 | 7.70 | 6,579 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | −0.700 | 1.70 | 2,050 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 22.30 | 18.20 | 20.30 | 9,565 | Principle: no right to exclude neighbors | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 25.90 | 21.60 | 23.70 | 10,051 | Principle: open-housing law | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5 | 7.40 | 9,327 | Principle: open-housing law | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 6.10 | 0.700 | 3.40 | 6,393 | Principle: open-housing law | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10 | 4.40 | 7.20 | 5,696 | Principle: open-housing law | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 8.50 | 0.100 | 4.30 | 3,570 | Principle: open-housing law | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 40.20 | 33 | 36.60 | 4,301 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 11.10 | 6.20 | 8.60 | 6,445 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 7.70 | 3 | 5.30 | 5,763 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 7,741 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.70 | −8.30 | −5 | 7,178 | Explanation: discrimination | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.70 | −9.40 | −7.10 | 8,958 | Explanation: discrimination | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.30 | −2.10 | 0.600 | 6,234 | Explanation: discrimination | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.50 | 5.30 | 8.40 | 5,589 | Explanation: discrimination | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 12.50 | 5.90 | 9.20 | 5,964 | Explanation: discrimination | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −6.70 | −12.40 | −9.60 | 7,246 | Explanation: inborn ability | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −6.40 | −9.50 | −7.90 | 9,096 | Explanation: inborn ability | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.30 | −1.90 | −0.300 | 6,352 | Explanation: inborn ability | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 0.200 | −3.10 | −1.50 | 5,695 | Explanation: inborn ability | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −0.200 | −3.30 | −1.70 | 6,046 | Explanation: inborn ability | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 2.10 | −4.60 | −1.20 | 7,282 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4 | −9 | −6.50 | 9,093 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1 | −4.80 | −1.90 | 6,315 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12.40 | 5.90 | 9.10 | 5,661 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 2.30 | −4.40 | −1 | 5,995 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.30 | −7.80 | −4.50 | 7,103 | Explanation: lack of will power | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −6.70 | −11.80 | −9.30 | 8,880 | Explanation: lack of will power | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 0.500 | −5.40 | −2.50 | 6,189 | Explanation: lack of will power | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | −5.70 | −12.20 | −9 | 5,556 | Explanation: lack of will power | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −7.20 | −13.60 | −10.40 | 5,935 | Explanation: lack of will power | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −4.60 | −9.80 | −7.20 | 7,353 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −0.300 | −3.60 | −1.90 | 9,200 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.30 | −1.50 | 0.400 | 6,315 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12.40 | 7.60 | 10 | 5,643 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 7.60 | 2.30 | 4.90 | 7,577 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 7.70 | 3.70 | 5.70 | 10,047 | Policy: too little spending | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 0.100 | −5.10 | −2.50 | 6,601 | Policy: too little spending | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.30 | −4.70 | −1.70 | 4,806 | Policy: too little spending | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 24.50 | 17.20 | 20.90 | 3,867 | Policy: too little spending | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −0.400 | −7.80 | −4.10 | 5,520 | Policy: too little spending | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.80 | 0.600 | 4,215 | Policy: preferential hiring | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | 0.100 | 2.10 | 6,216 | Policy: preferential hiring | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.20 | 3.30 | 5.70 | 5,500 | Policy: preferential hiring | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 4.60 | −0.400 | 2.10 | 7,373 | Policy: preferential hiring | all |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.70 | 0.600 | 4,346 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.30 | −0.500 | 1.40 | 6,427 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10.60 | 5.80 | 8.20 | 5,748 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all |
| 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 9.90 | 4.70 | 7.30 | 7,691 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 15.90 | 12.60 | 14.30 | 13,447 | Principle: no law against intermarriage | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 8.30 | 5.10 | 6.70 | 10,621 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5.50 | 7.70 | 6,440 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | −0.900 | 1.50 | 1,800 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 22.30 | 18.20 | 20.30 | 9,565 | Principle: no right to exclude neighbors | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 25.90 | 21.60 | 23.70 | 10,051 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 10 | 5.10 | 7.60 | 8,950 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 5.40 | −0.400 | 2.50 | 5,597 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10.30 | 4.30 | 7.30 | 5,064 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.60 | 1.60 | 6.10 | 3,175 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 39.40 | 32.10 | 35.80 | 3,915 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 11.70 | 6.40 | 9.10 | 5,645 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.10 | 3 | 5.60 | 5,128 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 8.90 | 2.90 | 5.90 | 3,437 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.70 | −8.30 | −5 | 7,178 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.50 | −9.40 | −6.90 | 8,594 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4.40 | −1.40 | 1.50 | 5,470 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12 | 5.40 | 8.70 | 4,980 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 18.70 | 5.30 | 12 | 2,747 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −6.70 | −12.40 | −9.60 | 7,246 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −5.70 | −9 | −7.30 | 8,719 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.20 | −2.30 | −0.600 | 5,568 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 0.400 | −3.10 | −1.30 | 5,069 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 5.10 | −2.20 | 1.50 | 2,807 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 2.10 | −4.60 | −1.20 | 7,282 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.20 | −9.40 | −6.80 | 8,718 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2 | −4.20 | −1.10 | 5,533 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.80 | 5.10 | 8.50 | 5,040 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 3.70 | −9.70 | −3 | 2,780 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.30 | −7.80 | −4.50 | 7,103 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −5.70 | −11 | −8.30 | 8,515 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | −0.200 | −6.50 | −3.40 | 5,428 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | −5.30 | −12.10 | −8.70 | 4,949 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | −0.800 | −13.40 | −7.10 | 2,733 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −4.60 | −9.80 | −7.20 | 7,353 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −0.400 | −3.70 | −2.10 | 8,858 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.80 | −1.30 | 0.800 | 5,554 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.90 | 6.80 | 9.30 | 5,018 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 8.40 | −0.500 | 3.90 | 3,338 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson |
| 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 7.70 | 3.70 | 5.70 | 10,047 | Policy: too little spending | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −1.20 | −6.60 | −3.90 | 6,227 | Policy: too little spending | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.40 | −3 | 0.200 | 4,144 | Policy: too little spending | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 24.30 | 16.50 | 20.40 | 3,412 | Policy: too little spending | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 5.10 | −7.70 | −1.30 | 2,309 | Policy: too little spending | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3.10 | −1.90 | 0.600 | 3,847 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4.30 | 0.200 | 2.20 | 5,453 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.70 | 3.50 | 6.10 | 4,899 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.60 | 1.70 | 6.20 | 3,192 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson |
| 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.70 | 0.700 | 3,966 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson |
| 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.90 | −1 | 0.900 | 5,643 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson |
| 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.40 | 6.40 | 8.90 | 5,127 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson |
| 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.10 | 1.50 | 5.80 | 3,405 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson |

Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson).

Note: Periods pool the surveys of 1972 to 1977, 1988 to 1994, 2004 to 2008, 2010 to 2014, 2016 to 2018 and 2021 to 2024, after rescaling each year's weights to average one. The last column pools 2021, 2022 and 2024, mostly web and mixed-mode interviews, so a change into it can come from the change of mode; the in-person view uses the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024.

Note: A direction is the answer named in the row label: for example a positive change in the explanation rows is a larger share saying yes to that explanation. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/schedule.json

### Table 3. By 2024 white respondents rated Black and white Americans almost alike, after a fall in the rating of Black Americans from 2008 to 2012

Mean feeling thermometer rating of Black Americans and of white Americans among white non-Hispanic respondents, points on a scale from 0 to 100, 1964 to 2024, all respondents and by party including leaners

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | measure | n | view | year |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: |
| 61.80 | 59.50 | 60.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,366 | all | 1964 |
| 61.80 | 59.10 | 60.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,126 | all | 1966 |
| 62.90 | 60.60 | 61.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,337 | all | 1968 |
| 59.90 | 57.50 | 58.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,285 | all | 1970 |
| 62.10 | 60.30 | 61.20 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,850 | all | 1972 |
| 64.50 | 62 | 63.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,324 | all | 1974 |
| 58.80 | 57 | 57.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,602 | all | 1976 |
| 61.60 | 59.50 | 60.60 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,136 | all | 1980 |
| 63.40 | 60.80 | 62.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,108 | all | 1982 |
| 63.50 | 61.50 | 62.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,516 | all | 1984 |
| 64.20 | 62.20 | 63.20 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,598 | all | 1986 |
| 58.50 | 56.40 | 57.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,315 | all | 1988 |
| 67.80 | 65.50 | 66.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,443 | all | 1990 |
| 62.20 | 60.40 | 61.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,686 | all | 1992 |
| 60.80 | 58.30 | 59.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,317 | all | 1994 |
| 64.10 | 61.90 | 63 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,173 | all | 1996 |
| 67.80 | 65 | 66.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 883 | all | 1998 |
| 65.60 | 63 | 64.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,123 | all | 2000 |
| 67.10 | 64.20 | 65.60 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 987 | all | 2002 |
| 70.60 | 67.60 | 69.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 740 | all | 2004 |
| 67.40 | 64.80 | 66.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,020 | all | 2008 |
| 62.70 | 60.90 | 61.80 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 3,254 | all | 2012 |
| 67.80 | 65.90 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 2,591 | all | 2016 |
| 70.60 | 69.20 | 69.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 5,173 | all | 2020 |
| 70.60 | 68.50 | 69.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 3,374 | all | 2024 |
| 61.90 | 58.90 | 60.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 792 | all | 1964 |
| 62.70 | 58.90 | 60.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 586 | all | 1966 |
| 63.30 | 60 | 61.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 680 | all | 1968 |
| 61.40 | 58.10 | 59.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 659 | all | 1970 |
| 63.40 | 60.90 | 62.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 877 | all | 1972 |
| 65.70 | 62.20 | 64 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 635 | all | 1974 |
| 59.70 | 57.10 | 58.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 728 | all | 1976 |
| 63.80 | 60.80 | 62.30 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 532 | all | 1980 |
| 63.90 | 60.40 | 62.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 559 | all | 1982 |
| 64.80 | 61.70 | 63.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 641 | all | 1984 |
| 65 | 61.90 | 63.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 688 | all | 1986 |
| 60.90 | 57.60 | 59.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 526 | all | 1988 |
| 69.30 | 65.90 | 67.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 673 | all | 1990 |
| 63.70 | 61 | 62.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 747 | all | 1992 |
| 62.60 | 58.50 | 60.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 535 | all | 1994 |
| 66.60 | 63.50 | 65.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 552 | all | 1996 |
| 68.90 | 64.60 | 66.70 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 394 | all | 1998 |
| 68.90 | 65.10 | 67 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 484 | all | 2000 |
| 68.80 | 64.20 | 66.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 404 | all | 2002 |
| 72.40 | 67.70 | 70.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 295 | all | 2004 |
| 70.80 | 66.80 | 68.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 436 | all | 2008 |
| 66.20 | 63.40 | 64.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,283 | all | 2012 |
| 73 | 70 | 71.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,024 | all | 2016 |
| 76.40 | 74.20 | 75.30 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 2,146 | all | 2020 |
| 76.10 | 73.20 | 74.70 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,485 | all | 2024 |
| 64.70 | 60.70 | 62.70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 449 | all | 1964 |
| 62.50 | 58.40 | 60.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 385 | all | 1966 |
| 64 | 60.50 | 62.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 491 | all | 1968 |
| 60 | 56 | 58 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 453 | all | 1970 |
| 61.30 | 58.40 | 59.80 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 712 | all | 1972 |
| 64.70 | 60.50 | 62.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 464 | all | 1974 |
| 59.10 | 56.50 | 57.80 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 614 | all | 1976 |
| 60.70 | 57.10 | 58.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 437 | all | 1980 |
| 64.70 | 60.40 | 62.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 403 | all | 1982 |
| 63.50 | 60.50 | 62 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 698 | all | 1984 |
| 65.40 | 62.30 | 63.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 685 | all | 1986 |
| 58 | 55.10 | 56.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 638 | all | 1988 |
| 68.30 | 64.80 | 66.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 590 | all | 1990 |
| 61.80 | 59.30 | 60.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 734 | all | 1992 |
| 61.10 | 57.60 | 59.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 636 | all | 1994 |
| 63.10 | 59.80 | 61.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 523 | all | 1996 |
| 68.50 | 64.10 | 66.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 384 | all | 1998 |
| 65.30 | 61.50 | 63.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 495 | all | 2000 |
| 68.10 | 64 | 66 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 496 | all | 2002 |
| 72 | 68.10 | 70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 373 | all | 2004 |
| 66.40 | 62.60 | 64.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 457 | all | 2008 |
| 61.50 | 58.90 | 60.20 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,518 | all | 2012 |
| 65.20 | 62.50 | 63.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,255 | all | 2016 |
| 68 | 65.90 | 66.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 2,512 | all | 2020 |
| 68 | 65 | 66.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,698 | all | 2024 |
| 87.60 | 85.80 | 86.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,367 | all | 1964 |
| 86.80 | 84.70 | 85.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,124 | all | 1966 |
| 83.40 | 81.40 | 82.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,343 | all | 1968 |
| 79.90 | 77.80 | 78.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,293 | all | 1970 |
| 80.50 | 78.90 | 79.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,867 | all | 1972 |
| 80.90 | 78.60 | 79.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,336 | all | 1974 |
| 75.50 | 73.80 | 74.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,635 | all | 1976 |
| 78.40 | 76.40 | 77.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,148 | all | 1980 |
| 74.80 | 72.40 | 73.60 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,109 | all | 1982 |
| 75.80 | 74 | 74.90 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,522 | all | 1984 |
| 74.80 | 72.70 | 73.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,324 | all | 1988 |
| 72.30 | 70.50 | 71.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,694 | all | 1992 |
| 72.30 | 70.10 | 71.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,333 | all | 1994 |
| 71.90 | 69.60 | 70.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,164 | all | 1996 |
| 71.20 | 68.40 | 69.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 893 | all | 1998 |
| 74.20 | 71.70 | 73 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,128 | all | 2000 |
| 70 | 67.10 | 68.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 989 | all | 2002 |
| 75.20 | 72.20 | 73.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 739 | all | 2004 |
| 74.50 | 71.90 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,021 | all | 2008 |
| 74 | 72.40 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 3,258 | all | 2012 |
| 74.20 | 72.40 | 73.30 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 2,592 | all | 2016 |
| 72 | 70.50 | 71.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 5,152 | all | 2020 |
| 71.20 | 69.20 | 70.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 3,373 | all | 2024 |
| 89.10 | 86.90 | 88 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 793 | all | 1964 |
| 88.90 | 86.10 | 87.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 584 | all | 1966 |
| 84.60 | 81.90 | 83.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 682 | all | 1968 |
| 82.10 | 79.40 | 80.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 660 | all | 1970 |
| 82.20 | 79.80 | 81 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 885 | all | 1972 |
| 82.60 | 79.40 | 81 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 641 | all | 1974 |
| 76.80 | 74.30 | 75.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 744 | all | 1976 |
| 80.10 | 77.20 | 78.60 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 537 | all | 1980 |
| 76.30 | 73 | 74.70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 556 | all | 1982 |
| 77.50 | 74.90 | 76.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 641 | all | 1984 |
| 76.50 | 73.10 | 74.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 525 | all | 1988 |
| 73.60 | 70.90 | 72.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 751 | all | 1992 |
| 74.40 | 70.90 | 72.70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 542 | all | 1994 |
| 73.80 | 70.60 | 72.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 546 | all | 1996 |
| 71.90 | 67.70 | 69.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 392 | all | 1998 |
| 75.40 | 71.60 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 486 | all | 2000 |
| 70.90 | 66.30 | 68.60 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 404 | all | 2002 |
| 75.80 | 70.50 | 73.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 298 | all | 2004 |
| 75.60 | 71.50 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 435 | all | 2008 |
| 75.30 | 72.70 | 74 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,284 | all | 2012 |
| 74.30 | 71.40 | 72.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,024 | all | 2016 |
| 70.50 | 68.20 | 69.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 2,144 | all | 2020 |
| 70.60 | 67.60 | 69.10 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,489 | all | 2024 |
| 87.20 | 84 | 85.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 449 | all | 1964 |
| 86.50 | 83 | 84.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 385 | all | 1966 |
| 83.20 | 79.90 | 81.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 492 | all | 1968 |
| 79.30 | 75.70 | 77.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 458 | all | 1970 |
| 80.50 | 78 | 79.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 722 | all | 1972 |
| 81.30 | 77.60 | 79.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 470 | all | 1974 |
| 75.80 | 73 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 623 | all | 1976 |
| 78.80 | 75.50 | 77.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 443 | all | 1980 |
| 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 404 | all | 1982 |
| 75.80 | 73.20 | 74.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 703 | all | 1984 |
| 74.90 | 71.90 | 73.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 646 | all | 1988 |
| 72.60 | 69.90 | 71.30 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 738 | all | 1992 |
| 72.40 | 69.40 | 70.90 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 640 | all | 1994 |
| 71.30 | 68 | 69.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 521 | all | 1996 |
| 72.50 | 68.20 | 70.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 387 | all | 1998 |
| 75.10 | 71.60 | 73.30 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 497 | all | 2000 |
| 71.20 | 67.20 | 69.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 499 | all | 2002 |
| 77.10 | 73.10 | 75.10 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 370 | all | 2004 |
| 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 457 | all | 2008 |
| 74.90 | 72.60 | 73.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,520 | all | 2012 |
| 75.40 | 73 | 74.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,256 | all | 2016 |
| 74.40 | 72.50 | 73.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 2,495 | all | 2020 |
| 73.10 | 70.20 | 71.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,692 | all | 2024 |
| 67.40 | 64.80 | 66.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,020 | ftf | 2008 |
| 64.40 | 61.10 | 62.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 852 | ftf | 2012 |
| 68.90 | 64.80 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 699 | ftf | 2016 |
| 73.30 | 68.80 | 71 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 605 | ftf | 2024 |
| 70.80 | 66.80 | 68.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 436 | ftf | 2008 |
| 68 | 62.90 | 65.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 356 | ftf | 2012 |
| 76.40 | 69.70 | 73.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 265 | ftf | 2016 |
| 81.30 | 75 | 78.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 276 | ftf | 2024 |
| 66.40 | 62.60 | 64.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 457 | ftf | 2008 |
| 63.70 | 59.10 | 61.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 395 | ftf | 2012 |
| 65.90 | 60.60 | 63.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 368 | ftf | 2016 |
| 69.20 | 63 | 66.10 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 306 | ftf | 2024 |
| 74.50 | 71.90 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,021 | ftf | 2008 |
| 74.60 | 71.50 | 73.10 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 855 | ftf | 2012 |
| 75.30 | 71.60 | 73.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 699 | ftf | 2016 |
| 71.70 | 67.30 | 69.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 605 | ftf | 2024 |
| 75.60 | 71.50 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 435 | ftf | 2008 |
| 75.70 | 70.90 | 73.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 356 | ftf | 2012 |
| 77.20 | 70.80 | 74 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 265 | ftf | 2016 |
| 73.40 | 66.70 | 70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 277 | ftf | 2024 |
| 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 457 | ftf | 2008 |
| 74.80 | 70.40 | 72.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 397 | ftf | 2012 |
| 76 | 71.30 | 73.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 368 | ftf | 2016 |
| 72.50 | 66.30 | 69.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 305 | ftf | 2024 |
| 62.40 | 60.30 | 61.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 2,402 | web | 2012 |
| 68 | 65.80 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,892 | web | 2016 |
| 70.30 | 67.20 | 68.80 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,163 | web | 2024 |
| 66.10 | 62.90 | 64.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 927 | web | 2012 |
| 72.60 | 69.30 | 71 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 759 | web | 2016 |
| 74.50 | 70 | 72.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 514 | web | 2024 |
| 61 | 58 | 59.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,123 | web | 2012 |
| 65.70 | 62.60 | 64.10 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 887 | web | 2016 |
| 70 | 65.40 | 67.70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 554 | web | 2024 |
| 74.20 | 72.40 | 73.30 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 2,403 | web | 2012 |
| 74.20 | 72.30 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,893 | web | 2016 |
| 71.30 | 68.20 | 69.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,157 | web | 2024 |
| 75.80 | 72.90 | 74.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 928 | web | 2012 |
| 74 | 70.90 | 72.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 759 | web | 2016 |
| 69.10 | 64.60 | 66.90 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 516 | web | 2024 |
| 75.70 | 73.10 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,123 | web | 2012 |
| 75.70 | 73 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 888 | web | 2016 |
| 75.70 | 71.20 | 73.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 548 | web | 2024 |

Views: All interviews (view = all); Face to face (view = ftf); Web (view = web).

Note: Face-to-face and web estimates exist for 2008 (face to face only), 2012, 2016 and 2024; 2020 has no mode weights. The thermometer toward white Americans was not asked in 1986 or 1990.

Note: Ratings of Black Americans by white respondents in 1964 to 1970 come from the same item as later years. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/affect.json

### Table 4. The best single step falls at the 2016 survey for each of the six dated items among white respondents and among white Democrats, and a kinked trend fits discrimination and will power better

Best-fitting single step in the yearly share, by item and group, in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, among white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included); step in percentage points, share of bootstrap replicates choosing each date, and the error of a trend with one kink

| Group | Item | Best-fitting first new survey | Step at that survey (points) | Step at the 2016 survey (points) | 2016 step, lower end | 2016 step, upper end | Replicates at that survey (%) | Replicates at an earlier survey (%) | Error of the best step | Error of the kinked trend | Kink year | Kink year, lower end | Kink year, upper end |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| White respondents | Discrimination | 2016 | +8.9 | +8.9 | +5.8 | +11.6 | 74 | 1 | 8.0 | 2.4 | 2014.0 | 2012.0 | 2015.5 |
| White respondents | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016 | −10.6 | −10.6 | −13.3 | −7.6 | 51 | 38 | 15.2 | 3.0 | 2011.4 | 2008.0 | 2014.8 |
| White respondents | At the help end of the scale | 2016 | +9.2 | +9.2 | +7.0 | +11.6 | 100 | 0 | 9.2 | 12.9 | 2013.9 | 2012.9 | 2014.0 |
| White respondents | Too little spent | 2016 | +20.3 | +20.3 | +17.3 | +23.7 | 100 | 0 | 16.1 | 24.1 | 2013.4 | 2010.9 | 2014.0 |
| White respondents | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +7.2 | +7.2 | +4.9 | +9.8 | 87 | 10 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 2013.6 | 2006.0 | 2014.7 |
| White respondents | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016 | +9.3 | +9.3 | +7.2 | +11.8 | 92 | 7 | 11.2 | 4.6 | 2012.8 | 2011.4 | 2013.9 |
| White Democrats | Discrimination | 2016 | +18.5 | +18.5 | +14.1 | +23.2 | 78 | 20 | 13.1 | 5.5 | 2012.4 | 2007.3 | 2013.8 |
| White Democrats | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016 | −17.6 | −17.6 | −21.4 | −13.3 | 60 | 39 | 15.5 | 6.0 | 2008.6 | 2004.1 | 2013.4 |
| White Democrats | At the help end of the scale | 2016 | +19.1 | +19.1 | +15.1 | +23.4 | 100 | 0 | 9.2 | 14.5 | 2013.5 | 2012.0 | 2014.0 |
| White Democrats | Too little spent | 2016 | +29.1 | +29.1 | +24.0 | +34.3 | 100 | 0 | 15.3 | 20.1 | 2013.5 | 2009.6 | 2014.0 |
| White Democrats | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +13.8 | +13.8 | +9.4 | +18.1 | 65 | 31 | 12.6 | 6.4 | 2011.1 | 2006.0 | 2014.7 |
| White Democrats | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016 | +19.6 | +19.6 | +15.4 | +24.6 | 85 | 15 | 11.2 | 7.1 | 2011.6 | 2008.0 | 2013.4 |
| White Republicans | Discrimination | 2004 | −3.3 | +0.4 | −3.3 | +4.3 | 41 | 0 | 6.4 | 8.3 | 2015.9 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 |
| White Republicans | Lack of motivation or will power | 2018 | −10.4 | −6.8 | −11.2 | −2.5 | 39 | 61 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 2012.6 | 2009.3 | 2015.9 |
| White Republicans | At the help end of the scale | 2018 | +6.3 | +2.9 | +0.5 | +6.1 | 50 | 50 | 11.9 | 10.9 | 2015.4 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 |
| White Republicans | Too little spent | 2016 | +15.0 | +15.0 | +10.6 | +20.2 | 98 | 2 | 10.9 | 14.8 | 2013.5 | 2010.2 | 2014.0 |
| White Republicans | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +1.4 | +1.4 | −1.0 | +4.2 | 28 | 50 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 2014.2 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 |
| White Republicans | Rejects the special-favors view | 2018 | +6.7 | +2.1 | −0.4 | +5.2 | 62 | 38 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 2015.9 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 |

Note: The fit uses the surveys of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018, all conducted in person, so the dates cannot come from the move to the web. A step cannot begin before 2004 or leave fewer than one survey after it. The kinked trend is constant before the kink and linear after it, with the kink anywhere from 2004 to just before 2016. A step and a kink are assumptions about the form of change. The bootstrap resamples respondents within each survey year with replacement (seed 12345) and refits; the interval for a step size or a kink year is the 2.5th to 97.5th percentile. Survey spacing is two years, so a date is a survey and not a month.

Source: General Social Survey, 2000-2018; weighted (weight_use); in-person interviews; white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included), leaners included for party; seeded bootstrap of respondents within each survey year

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/step_dates.json

### Table 5. The post-2018 level depends on interview mode: in 2022 and 2024 web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of 9 items

Share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percent, in-person interviews of 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2022-2024 and web interviews of 2022-2024, 95% intervals

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | item | n | series |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- |
| 81.50 | 78 | 79.80 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 2,860 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 87.20 | 83.50 | 85.30 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 2,268 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 93.60 | 88.80 | 91.20 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 1,169 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 96 | 92.80 | 94.40 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 1,700 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 33.60 | 29.50 | 31.50 | Explanation: discrimination | 2,781 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 42.80 | 37.70 | 40.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 2,199 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 58.50 | 46.10 | 52.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 548 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 47.60 | 37.10 | 42.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 804 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 9.50 | 7.10 | 8.30 | Explanation: inborn ability | 2,828 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 8.30 | 5.60 | 7 | Explanation: inborn ability | 2,241 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 11.80 | 5 | 8.40 | Explanation: inborn ability | 566 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 4.10 | 0.800 | 2.50 | Explanation: inborn ability | 806 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 44.80 | 40.50 | 42.70 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 2,813 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 53.70 | 48.50 | 51.10 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 2,227 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 54.30 | 41.90 | 48.10 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 553 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 54.30 | 43.70 | 49 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 807 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 50.40 | 46 | 48.20 | Explanation: lack of will power | 2,760 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 42.10 | 36.90 | 39.50 | Explanation: lack of will power | 2,189 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 38.10 | 26.70 | 32.40 | Explanation: lack of will power | 544 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 28.40 | 19.40 | 23.90 | Explanation: lack of will power | 803 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 13.60 | 10.70 | 12.20 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 2,762 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 23.60 | 19.40 | 21.50 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 2,256 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 29.30 | 21.50 | 25.40 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 1,082 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 26.20 | 20.50 | 23.30 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 1,726 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 29.30 | 24.50 | 26.90 | Policy: too little spending | 1,855 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 50.50 | 44.30 | 47.40 | Policy: too little spending | 1,557 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 51.70 | 40.50 | 46.10 | Policy: too little spending | 752 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 42.80 | 35.20 | 39 | Policy: too little spending | 1,313 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 15.30 | 12.20 | 13.70 | Policy: preferential hiring | 2,755 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 22 | 17.80 | 19.90 | Policy: preferential hiring | 2,144 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 29.90 | 22.10 | 26 | Policy: preferential hiring | 1,048 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 22.50 | 16.80 | 19.60 | Policy: preferential hiring | 1,672 | Web, 2022-2024 |
| 13.30 | 10.40 | 11.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 2,870 | In person, 2010-2014 |
| 22.90 | 18.70 | 20.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 2,257 | In person, 2016-2018 |
| 30.30 | 22.80 | 26.60 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 1,148 | In person, 2022-2024 |
| 30.90 | 24.60 | 27.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 1,697 | Web, 2022-2024 |

Note: The open-housing item is not shown because it was not asked of web respondents. The telephone and other-mode interviews are left out of both modes. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/mode_gap.json

### Table 6. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white Democrats moved on each of the six dated items and white Republicans on 4, and the Democratic change is separable from the Republican change on 4

Share of white Democrats and white Republicans (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included; leaners included) giving the answer named above each panel, percent, 2000 to 2024, all interviews and by interview mode

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | pooled | series | view | year |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: |
| 44.90 | 35.60 | 40.30 | 523 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 43.90 | 29.90 | 36.90 | 260 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 49.10 | 34.80 | 42 | 258 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 42.10 | 32.40 | 37.20 | 532 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 45.10 | 33.80 | 39.40 | 422 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 47.20 | 35.40 | 41.30 | 423 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 47.60 | 36 | 41.80 | 398 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 50.20 | 39.60 | 44.90 | 471 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 59.70 | 49.60 | 54.60 | 541 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 67.60 | 55.50 | 61.60 | 392 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 84.80 | 78.10 | 81.50 | 858 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 85.40 | 71.70 | 78.50 | 306 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 81 | 65.60 | 73.30 | 237 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 30.40 | 22.10 | 26.20 | 524 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 28.10 | 17.30 | 22.70 | 289 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 21.90 | 12.50 | 17.20 | 316 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 28 | 19.90 | 24 | 585 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 26.50 | 16.80 | 21.70 | 389 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 25.60 | 16.10 | 20.90 | 408 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 25.20 | 14.80 | 20 | 345 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 22.20 | 14.20 | 18.20 | 468 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 25.10 | 17 | 21.10 | 538 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 28.50 | 18 | 23.30 | 458 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 22.70 | 15.90 | 19.30 | 732 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 31.80 | 17 | 24.40 | 321 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 27.80 | 15.10 | 21.40 | 314 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 52.90 | 43.40 | 48.20 | 520 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 55 | 40.30 | 47.70 | 255 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 52.70 | 38.50 | 45.60 | 263 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 47.20 | 37.20 | 42.20 | 531 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 54 | 42.50 | 48.30 | 421 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 45.40 | 33.90 | 39.70 | 417 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 46.80 | 35.10 | 40.90 | 389 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 43 | 32.70 | 37.90 | 470 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 33.20 | 24.10 | 28.60 | 546 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 29.90 | 19.20 | 24.50 | 397 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 18.90 | 12.60 | 15.80 | 856 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 18.80 | 7.50 | 13.20 | 305 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 15.50 | 5.10 | 10.30 | 244 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 59.80 | 50.40 | 55.10 | 518 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 60.60 | 47.20 | 53.90 | 272 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 60.50 | 47.90 | 54.20 | 312 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 62.30 | 52.90 | 57.60 | 583 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 60.50 | 48.50 | 54.50 | 382 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 66 | 54.50 | 60.30 | 403 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 63.60 | 50.60 | 57.10 | 340 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 59.20 | 48.80 | 54 | 466 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 57.10 | 47.10 | 52.10 | 533 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 50.30 | 37.90 | 44.10 | 442 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 49.20 | 40.70 | 45 | 721 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 52.30 | 35.10 | 43.70 | 314 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 48.20 | 33 | 40.60 | 315 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 27.30 | 19.40 | 23.30 | 551 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 21.20 | 11.20 | 16.20 | 284 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 21.60 | 11.30 | 16.50 | 278 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 23.10 | 15 | 19 | 518 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 21.70 | 13.10 | 17.40 | 420 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 26.30 | 16.30 | 21.30 | 422 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 23.10 | 13.80 | 18.50 | 399 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 23.10 | 14.90 | 19 | 471 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 42.30 | 32.80 | 37.50 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 45.10 | 33.60 | 39.30 | 417 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 61.30 | 52.90 | 57.10 | 853 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 57.40 | 45.20 | 51.30 | 592 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 53.10 | 40.70 | 46.90 | 490 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 9.70 | 5.10 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 10.90 | 4 | 7.50 | 280 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 10.30 | 3.90 | 7.10 | 307 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 9.90 | 4.90 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 5.40 | 1.20 | 3.30 | 412 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 8.60 | 3 | 5.80 | 384 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 6.10 | 1.30 | 3.70 | 349 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 5.40 | 1.60 | 3.50 | 463 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 10 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 526 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 15.30 | 7.40 | 11.40 | 457 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 10.40 | 5.70 | 8.10 | 744 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 10.10 | 4 | 7.10 | 667 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 9.60 | 3.90 | 6.70 | 602 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 44 | 33.10 | 38.50 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 40.20 | 28.90 | 34.50 | 368 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 39.80 | 28.70 | 34.30 | 389 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 47 | 34.60 | 40.80 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 46.20 | 33.20 | 39.70 | 292 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 44.60 | 30.40 | 37.50 | 260 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 48.40 | 34.30 | 41.30 | 277 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 42.60 | 31 | 36.80 | 348 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 67.80 | 56.40 | 62.10 | 396 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 74.90 | 61.70 | 68.30 | 288 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 80.40 | 71.80 | 76.10 | 629 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 78.30 | 65.60 | 71.90 | 454 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 74.40 | 60.90 | 67.60 | 370 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 27.20 | 18 | 22.60 | 374 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 20.30 | 12.50 | 16.40 | 431 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 24.10 | 15.50 | 19.80 | 456 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 22.10 | 13.30 | 17.70 | 395 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 27.60 | 15.40 | 21.50 | 253 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 17 | 7.60 | 12.30 | 277 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 23.20 | 11.30 | 17.30 | 230 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 20 | 10.90 | 15.50 | 320 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 38.50 | 27.30 | 32.90 | 377 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 42 | 28.30 | 35.10 | 330 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 19.90 | 12.60 | 16.20 | 550 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 28.60 | 15.40 | 22 | 442 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 23.50 | 13.50 | 18.50 | 442 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 21.90 | 14.50 | 18.20 | 519 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 20.60 | 10.20 | 15.40 | 259 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 19.10 | 9.20 | 14.10 | 263 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 18.10 | 11.10 | 14.60 | 538 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 19.30 | 11 | 15.20 | 414 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 23.40 | 13.90 | 18.60 | 412 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 26.50 | 16.60 | 21.60 | 386 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 24.90 | 16.20 | 20.50 | 460 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 32.40 | 23.30 | 27.80 | 527 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 41.50 | 29.10 | 35.30 | 367 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 43.60 | 35.10 | 39.40 | 839 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 48.80 | 36.80 | 42.80 | 589 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 43.80 | 31.80 | 37.80 | 471 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 11.40 | 6.20 | 8.80 | 543 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | 288 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 10.80 | 4.20 | 7.50 | 317 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 9.30 | 4.50 | 6.90 | 591 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 10.60 | 4.40 | 7.50 | 391 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 11.80 | 5.20 | 8.50 | 402 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 9.10 | 3 | 6.10 | 345 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 10.10 | 4.60 | 7.30 | 464 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 11.60 | 6 | 8.80 | 535 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 11.80 | 4.90 | 8.40 | 450 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 4.40 | 1.50 | 2.90 | 724 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 10.90 | 4.30 | 7.60 | 627 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 11.10 | 5.20 | 8.10 | 626 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 19.60 | 12.80 | 16.20 | 550 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2000 |
| 17 | 7.50 | 12.20 | 264 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2002 |
| 22.90 | 12.10 | 17.50 | 269 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2004 |
| 21.50 | 13.90 | 17.70 | 553 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2006 |
| 19.60 | 11.40 | 15.50 | 436 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2008 |
| 24.70 | 15.20 | 19.90 | 432 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2010 |
| 25.40 | 15.90 | 20.70 | 398 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2012 |
| 27.90 | 19 | 23.50 | 478 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2014 |
| 40.80 | 31.20 | 36 | 557 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2016 |
| 44 | 32 | 38 | 400 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2018 |
| 59.90 | 51.40 | 55.70 | 864 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2021 |
| 64.70 | 53 | 58.90 | 615 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2022 |
| 57 | 45 | 51 | 499 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2024 |
| 11 | 6 | 8.50 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2000 |
| 11.10 | 4.20 | 7.70 | 290 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2002 |
| 12 | 5.10 | 8.60 | 324 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2004 |
| 9.30 | 4.50 | 6.90 | 599 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2006 |
| 9.80 | 3.80 | 6.80 | 393 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2008 |
| 8.50 | 3.10 | 5.80 | 420 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2010 |
| 6.20 | 1.30 | 3.80 | 355 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2012 |
| 9 | 3.90 | 6.40 | 476 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2014 |
| 10 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2016 |
| 16.20 | 8.10 | 12.10 | 463 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2018 |
| 9.40 | 5 | 7.20 | 735 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2021 |
| 17.80 | 9.40 | 13.60 | 651 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2022 |
| 12.90 | 6.60 | 9.70 | 647 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2024 |
| 44.90 | 35.60 | 40.30 | 523 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 43.90 | 29.90 | 36.90 | 260 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 53.40 | 37 | 45.20 | 197 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 42.30 | 32.40 | 37.30 | 498 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 43.60 | 31.40 | 37.50 | 362 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 49.40 | 37 | 43.20 | 379 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 48.10 | 35.70 | 41.90 | 348 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 52.10 | 40.60 | 46.40 | 397 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 61.30 | 50.80 | 56 | 499 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 70.20 | 57.50 | 63.90 | 355 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 85.80 | 78.90 | 82.40 | 775 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 84.90 | 71.70 | 78.30 | 300 | Discrimination | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 30.40 | 22.10 | 26.20 | 524 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 28.10 | 17.30 | 22.70 | 289 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 23.80 | 13.10 | 18.40 | 253 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 28.40 | 20.10 | 24.30 | 548 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 26.10 | 16 | 21.10 | 339 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 26.50 | 16.50 | 21.50 | 361 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 26.20 | 15 | 20.60 | 293 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 24.60 | 15.80 | 20.20 | 417 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 25.30 | 16.90 | 21.10 | 500 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 31 | 19.80 | 25.40 | 409 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 38.10 | 21.70 | 29.90 | 249 | Discrimination | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 22.90 | 15.70 | 19.30 | 621 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 23.80 | 10.90 | 17.40 | 319 | Discrimination | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 52.90 | 43.40 | 48.20 | 520 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 55 | 40.30 | 47.70 | 255 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 53.90 | 37.80 | 45.90 | 201 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 49.80 | 39.60 | 44.70 | 497 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 56.40 | 43.90 | 50.20 | 360 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 46.50 | 34.50 | 40.50 | 373 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 48.80 | 36.10 | 42.50 | 339 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 43.60 | 32.40 | 38 | 395 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 34.10 | 24.40 | 29.30 | 504 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 29.60 | 18.40 | 24 | 359 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 17.90 | 11.50 | 14.70 | 774 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 11.30 | 3 | 7.20 | 301 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 59.80 | 50.40 | 55.10 | 518 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 60.60 | 47.20 | 53.90 | 272 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 60.40 | 46.50 | 53.40 | 249 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 62.60 | 53 | 57.80 | 545 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 61.20 | 48.80 | 55 | 332 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 64.80 | 52.80 | 58.80 | 360 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 65.50 | 51.90 | 58.70 | 289 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 58.20 | 47.20 | 52.70 | 416 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 56.90 | 46.50 | 51.70 | 495 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 51.30 | 38.30 | 44.80 | 395 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 56 | 38.30 | 47.20 | 247 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 49.50 | 40.30 | 44.90 | 612 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 47.10 | 30.50 | 38.80 | 318 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 27.30 | 19.40 | 23.30 | 551 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 21.20 | 11.20 | 16.20 | 284 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 21.40 | 10.20 | 15.80 | 228 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 24 | 15.70 | 19.80 | 481 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 21.40 | 12.60 | 17 | 371 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 26.70 | 16 | 21.30 | 370 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 23.50 | 13.40 | 18.50 | 344 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 24.30 | 15.30 | 19.80 | 400 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 42.20 | 32.50 | 37.40 | 539 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 46.10 | 33.90 | 40 | 367 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 53.40 | 38.30 | 45.90 | 349 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 61.40 | 52.50 | 56.90 | 773 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 57.90 | 46.70 | 52.30 | 630 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 9.70 | 5.10 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 10.90 | 4 | 7.50 | 280 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 10.60 | 3.50 | 7 | 245 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 9.40 | 4.40 | 6.90 | 547 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 6.30 | 1.60 | 3.90 | 361 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 9.50 | 3.20 | 6.40 | 339 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 7.50 | 1.70 | 4.60 | 298 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 5.80 | 1.60 | 3.70 | 401 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 9.80 | 4.40 | 7.10 | 490 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 16.10 | 8 | 12.10 | 418 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 14.60 | 6.30 | 10.40 | 492 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 10.50 | 5.60 | 8.10 | 634 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 5.50 | 1.50 | 3.50 | 663 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 44 | 33.10 | 38.50 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 40.20 | 28.90 | 34.50 | 368 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 34.90 | 22.90 | 28.90 | 293 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 47.20 | 35.30 | 41.20 | 361 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 41.90 | 28.50 | 35.20 | 259 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 43.50 | 28.60 | 36.10 | 230 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 51.70 | 36.50 | 44.10 | 238 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 43.40 | 30.80 | 37.10 | 295 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 69.10 | 57.20 | 63.10 | 360 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 76.10 | 62.40 | 69.30 | 261 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 78.70 | 62 | 70.40 | 265 | Too little spent | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 81.20 | 72.10 | 76.70 | 561 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 76.30 | 64.70 | 70.50 | 491 | Too little spent | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 27.20 | 18 | 22.60 | 374 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 20.30 | 12.50 | 16.40 | 431 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 23.70 | 13.90 | 18.80 | 351 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 20.40 | 11.80 | 16.10 | 373 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 26.10 | 13.80 | 20 | 218 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 17.10 | 7.20 | 12.20 | 253 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 25.20 | 12 | 18.60 | 192 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 22.80 | 12.40 | 17.60 | 271 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 38.40 | 26.70 | 32.50 | 351 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 39.60 | 25.80 | 32.70 | 292 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 36 | 19.70 | 27.90 | 309 | Too little spent | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 20.90 | 12.80 | 16.90 | 462 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 18.60 | 9.80 | 14.20 | 483 | Too little spent | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 21.90 | 14.50 | 18.20 | 519 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 20.60 | 10.20 | 15.40 | 259 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 19.50 | 8.40 | 13.90 | 205 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 18.30 | 11.20 | 14.70 | 504 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 19.70 | 10.70 | 15.20 | 357 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 24.50 | 14.40 | 19.50 | 370 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 25.60 | 15.30 | 20.40 | 335 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 25.80 | 16.30 | 21 | 387 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 33.20 | 23.50 | 28.30 | 483 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 42.20 | 29.20 | 35.70 | 332 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 50.10 | 35.30 | 42.70 | 337 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 43.70 | 34.70 | 39.20 | 758 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 46.20 | 35.10 | 40.60 | 618 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 11.40 | 6.20 | 8.80 | 543 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | 288 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 10.30 | 3.30 | 6.80 | 254 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 9.90 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 552 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 12 | 5.10 | 8.50 | 338 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 13.20 | 5.90 | 9.60 | 358 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 10.70 | 3.70 | 7.20 | 297 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 8.60 | 3.40 | 6 | 413 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 11.60 | 5.70 | 8.70 | 497 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 13.60 | 5.90 | 9.80 | 403 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 17.50 | 8.60 | 13 | 468 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 4.30 | 1.30 | 2.80 | 618 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 4.90 | 1 | 2.90 | 656 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 19.60 | 12.80 | 16.20 | 550 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 17 | 7.50 | 12.20 | 264 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 25 | 12.50 | 18.70 | 206 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 21 | 13.40 | 17.20 | 518 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 20.90 | 11.70 | 16.30 | 374 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 23.20 | 13.60 | 18.40 | 387 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 23.40 | 13.60 | 18.50 | 350 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 27.60 | 18.10 | 22.90 | 403 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 40.90 | 30.80 | 35.80 | 512 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 44.80 | 32.10 | 38.50 | 362 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 62.80 | 48.40 | 55.60 | 370 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 60.90 | 51.90 | 56.40 | 779 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 61.90 | 50.80 | 56.30 | 627 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 |
| 11 | 6 | 8.50 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 |
| 11.10 | 4.20 | 7.70 | 290 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 |
| 13.40 | 5.40 | 9.40 | 259 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 |
| 9.60 | 4.70 | 7.20 | 561 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 |
| 9.90 | 3.70 | 6.80 | 341 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 |
| 9.60 | 3.60 | 6.60 | 373 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 |
| 5.40 | 0.800 | 3.10 | 305 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 |
| 9.50 | 4 | 6.80 | 424 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 |
| 9.70 | 4.40 | 7 | 514 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 |
| 17.80 | 9.10 | 13.40 | 415 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 |
| 18 | 9.20 | 13.60 | 501 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 |
| 9.60 | 4.80 | 7.20 | 625 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 |
| 12.60 | 6 | 9.30 | 662 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 |

Views: All interviews (view = all); By interview mode (view = bymode).

Note: The GSS was in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, had no 2020 survey, had 87.3% of its 2021 interviews on the web and mixed in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024. The mode view plots in-person interviews through 2018 and web interviews from 2021.

Note: The 2022 and 2024 cells alone fall below the effective sample floor for several items, so the mode view pools them in one point at 2023; a point is dropped when the pooled cell is still below the floor, as for in-person Democrats on the discrimination and will-power items. The help-end panel counts the two answers nearest to government should help. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents by party, leaners included (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/party_mode.json

### Table 7. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white respondents moved on 6 of the six dated items and Black respondents on 3, with wider intervals for Black respondents

Share of white (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) and of Black respondents giving the answer named above each panel, percent, by pooled period of surveys, 95% intervals; all interviews and in-person interviews only

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | period | race_label | view |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 59.80 | 50.60 | 55.20 | 669 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 32.50 | 28.60 | 30.60 | 3,181 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 67.20 | 57.20 | 62.20 | 550 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 41.40 | 36.50 | 38.90 | 2,408 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 79.30 | 70.40 | 74.80 | 684 | Discrimination | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 50.40 | 45.90 | 48.20 | 3,556 | Discrimination | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 50.50 | 41.20 | 45.90 | 671 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 50.20 | 46 | 48.10 | 3,156 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 50.80 | 40.50 | 45.60 | 558 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 41.60 | 36.70 | 39.20 | 2,400 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 34.50 | 25.10 | 29.80 | 688 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 30.80 | 26.80 | 28.80 | 3,535 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 44.10 | 34.40 | 39.20 | 617 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 13.20 | 10.50 | 11.90 | 3,181 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 54.10 | 43.60 | 48.90 | 565 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 23.90 | 19.80 | 21.90 | 2,462 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 64.60 | 55.70 | 60.10 | 996 | At the help end of the scale | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 28.50 | 25.10 | 26.80 | 5,115 | At the help end of the scale | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 75.20 | 65.20 | 70.20 | 480 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 28.70 | 24.30 | 26.50 | 2,143 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 84 | 73.70 | 78.90 | 409 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 50.30 | 44.40 | 47.40 | 1,724 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 90 | 82.80 | 86.40 | 781 | Too little spent | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 45.50 | 41.10 | 43.30 | 3,796 | Too little spent | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 47.10 | 37.80 | 42.50 | 641 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 15 | 12.10 | 13.50 | 3,150 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 46.90 | 36.50 | 41.70 | 536 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 21.30 | 17.30 | 19.30 | 2,350 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 48.70 | 39.80 | 44.30 | 1,008 | Favors preferential hiring | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 22.90 | 19.80 | 21.40 | 5,023 | Favors preferential hiring | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 685 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all |
| 13.60 | 10.90 | 12.30 | 3,274 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all |
| 41.50 | 31.50 | 36.50 | 555 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all |
| 22.40 | 18.50 | 20.50 | 2,474 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all |
| 47 | 38.40 | 42.70 | 1,048 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all |
| 29.50 | 26.10 | 27.80 | 5,217 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all |
| 60.20 | 50.50 | 55.30 | 617 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 33.60 | 29.50 | 31.50 | 2,781 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 67.30 | 56.80 | 62 | 514 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 42.80 | 37.70 | 40.30 | 2,199 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 58.50 | 46.10 | 52.30 | 548 | Discrimination | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |
| 50.70 | 41 | 45.90 | 620 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 50.40 | 46 | 48.20 | 2,760 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 52.30 | 41.70 | 47 | 523 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 42.10 | 36.90 | 39.50 | 2,189 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 38.10 | 26.70 | 32.40 | 544 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |
| 43.50 | 33.20 | 38.40 | 567 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 13.60 | 10.70 | 12.20 | 2,762 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 54.60 | 43.80 | 49.20 | 540 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 23.60 | 19.40 | 21.50 | 2,256 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 61.60 | 45.70 | 53.70 | 363 | At the help end of the scale | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 29.30 | 21.50 | 25.40 | 1,082 | At the help end of the scale | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |
| 75.40 | 65 | 70.20 | 448 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 29.30 | 24.50 | 26.90 | 1,855 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 84.60 | 74.10 | 79.40 | 387 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 50.50 | 44.30 | 47.40 | 1,557 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 89.50 | 76.40 | 83 | 279 | Too little spent | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 51.70 | 40.50 | 46.10 | 752 | Too little spent | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |
| 47.10 | 37.40 | 42.20 | 592 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 15.30 | 12.20 | 13.70 | 2,755 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 46.90 | 36.10 | 41.50 | 501 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 22 | 17.80 | 19.90 | 2,144 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 58.10 | 42.20 | 50.20 | 363 | Favors preferential hiring | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 29.90 | 22.10 | 26 | 1,048 | Favors preferential hiring | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |
| 35.10 | 26.20 | 30.60 | 632 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 13.30 | 10.40 | 11.80 | 2,870 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson |
| 41.60 | 31.30 | 36.50 | 521 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 22.90 | 18.70 | 20.80 | 2,257 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson |
| 44.60 | 29.80 | 37.20 | 386 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson |
| 30.30 | 22.80 | 26.60 | 1,148 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson |

Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson).

Note: The in-person view leaves out the 2021 survey and the telephone interviews and uses the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024; in that view Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 fall below the effective sample floor and are not drawn. 'Black' and 'white' are the GSS race codes; Hispanic origin is not separated, and Hispanic respondents appear in whichever race code they chose. The help-end panel counts the two answers nearest to government should help. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white and Black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/by_race.json

### Table 8. Among white voters the tie between racial resentment and the Republican vote rose from 1988 to 2004 and from 2012 to 2016, with no rise distinguishable from zero from 2008 to 2012

Percentage points of the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of each racial attitude, white non-Hispanic voters, ANES 1988 to 2024 and CES 2008 and 2012

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | other | panel | series | year |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: |
| 13.20 | 6.80 | 10 | 867 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1988 |
| 15.10 | 9.20 | 12.20 | 984 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1992 |
| 18.70 | 12.10 | 15.40 | 778 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1996 |
| 12.60 | 2.30 | 7.50 | 443 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2000 |
| 22.80 | 15.10 | 19 | 547 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2004 |
| 22.50 | 15.50 | 19 | 688 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2008 |
| 24.20 | 20.30 | 22.30 | 2,345 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2012 |
| 30.60 | 26.80 | 28.70 | 1,797 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2016 |
| 33.90 | 31.70 | 32.80 | 4,291 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2020 |
| 32.60 | 28.90 | 30.70 | 2,710 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2024 |
| 7.60 | 1.30 | 4.50 | 922 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1988 |
| 5.40 | −0.800 | 2.30 | 1,032 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1992 |
| 8.30 | 0.800 | 4.50 | 808 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1996 |
| 7.20 | 0 | 3.60 | 827 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2000 |
| 5.50 | −3.30 | 1.10 | 588 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2004 |
| 10.40 | 2.80 | 6.60 | 767 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2008 |
| 9.90 | 5.20 | 7.60 | 2,526 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2012 |
| 13.80 | 8.90 | 11.30 | 1,919 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2016 |
| 13.50 | 9.90 | 11.70 | 4,412 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2020 |
| 10.50 | 5.40 | 7.90 | 2,827 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2024 |
| 10.20 | 4.30 | 7.20 | 1,025 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 1992 |
| 12.50 | 4.40 | 8.40 | 778 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 1996 |
| 12 | 4.80 | 8.40 | 822 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2000 |
| 17.80 | 10.20 | 14 | 573 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2004 |
| 16.60 | 9.50 | 13.10 | 738 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2008 |
| 17.10 | 11.90 | 14.50 | 2,489 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2012 |
| 21.10 | 16.40 | 18.70 | 1,911 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2016 |
| 25.70 | 22.30 | 24 | 4,504 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2020 |
| 26.40 | 22.40 | 24.40 | 2,921 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2024 |
| 26.20 | 24.80 | 25.50 | 19,797 | yes | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2008 |
| 25.60 | 24.20 | 24.90 | 30,271 | yes | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2012 |
| 13.10 | 7.10 | 10.10 | 952 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 1988 |
| 16.30 | 11.20 | 13.80 | 1,052 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 1992 |
| 16.30 | 9.50 | 12.90 | 887 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2000 |
| 21.50 | 14.10 | 17.80 | 601 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2004 |
| 25 | 19.20 | 22.10 | 782 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2008 |
| 25 | 21.30 | 23.20 | 2,541 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2012 |
| 32.80 | 29.90 | 31.30 | 1,942 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2016 |
| 35.70 | 34 | 34.90 | 4,574 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2020 |
| 34.40 | 31.60 | 33 | 2,968 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2024 |
| 22.50 | 15.50 | 19 | 688 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2008 |
| 24.60 | 17 | 20.80 | 539 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2012 |
| 32.20 | 24.20 | 28.20 | 483 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2016 |
| 37.10 | 27.90 | 32.50 | 447 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2024 |
| 10.40 | 2.80 | 6.60 | 767 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2008 |
| 11.30 | 3 | 7.10 | 602 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2012 |
| 19.20 | 8.80 | 14 | 511 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2016 |
| 16.90 | 6.60 | 11.80 | 488 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2024 |
| 16.60 | 9.50 | 13.10 | 738 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2008 |
| 15.40 | 5.90 | 10.70 | 566 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2012 |
| 23.90 | 14.20 | 19.10 | 506 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2016 |
| 32.40 | 24.80 | 28.60 | 476 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2024 |
| 26.20 | 24.80 | 25.50 | 19,797 | yes | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2008 |
| 25.60 | 24.20 | 24.90 | 30,271 | yes | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2012 |
| 25 | 19.20 | 22.10 | 782 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2008 |
| 25.60 | 18.10 | 21.80 | 609 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2012 |
| 33.50 | 27.50 | 30.50 | 523 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2016 |
| 37.50 | 31.90 | 34.70 | 495 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2024 |

Views: All interviews (panel = all_free); Face to face only (panel = ftf_free).

Note: Attitudes are oriented so that a high value is the more racially conservative pole: higher resentment, a colder rating of Black Americans, placing Black people's aid on the self-help end, and opposing affirmative action. Each attitude is standardized within the estimation sample, so a slope is per standard deviation of that sample. Party identification is not held fixed in this figure.

Note: The resentment items were not asked in 1996, so that line joins 1992 and 2000; the affirmative action item was not asked in 1988. ANES 2020 has no mode weights, so it is missing from the face-to-face view, and the CES is an online opt-in panel in both years, so its intervals are model based. Intervals are HC3.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024); Cooperative Election Study, 2008 and 2012; weighted (single-wave weight)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_assoc.json

### Table 9. The Republican share among the most resentful third of white voters rose from 79.4% in 2008 to 89.1% in 2016, and fell among the least resentful third from 28.8% to 17.1%

Republican share of the two-party presidential vote among white non-Hispanic voters in the lowest, middle and highest group of the racial resentment index (thirds inside each election year, or fixed index cuts), percent, ANES 1988 to 2024, 95% intervals

| conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | grouping | n | year |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: |
| 53.20 | 42.20 | 47.70 | Least resentful third | exact | 322 | 1988 |
| 37.10 | 27.60 | 32.30 | Least resentful third | exact | 385 | 1992 |
| 44.60 | 32.70 | 38.70 | Least resentful third | exact | 318 | 2000 |
| 43.20 | 29 | 36.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 247 | 2004 |
| 34.70 | 22.90 | 28.80 | Least resentful third | exact | 302 | 2008 |
| 30.60 | 23.30 | 27 | Least resentful third | exact | 962 | 2012 |
| 20.50 | 13.70 | 17.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 672 | 2016 |
| 9.30 | 6 | 7.60 | Least resentful third | exact | 1,927 | 2020 |
| 11.70 | 6.60 | 9.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 1,107 | 2024 |
| 69.10 | 58.60 | 63.80 | Middle third | exact | 400 | 1988 |
| 56.40 | 46.50 | 51.40 | Middle third | exact | 505 | 1992 |
| 62.20 | 50.10 | 56.20 | Middle third | exact | 418 | 2000 |
| 71.60 | 57.80 | 64.70 | Middle third | exact | 227 | 2004 |
| 67.60 | 55 | 61.30 | Middle third | exact | 304 | 2008 |
| 69.50 | 61.90 | 65.70 | Middle third | exact | 1,126 | 2012 |
| 70 | 61.80 | 65.90 | Middle third | exact | 821 | 2016 |
| 66.70 | 60.30 | 63.50 | Middle third | exact | 1,668 | 2020 |
| 63.90 | 55 | 59.50 | Middle third | exact | 1,189 | 2024 |
| 76.20 | 66.30 | 71.20 | Most resentful third | exact | 426 | 1988 |
| 64.40 | 54.30 | 59.40 | Most resentful third | exact | 365 | 1992 |
| 73.70 | 62.40 | 68.10 | Most resentful third | exact | 331 | 2000 |
| 80.70 | 67.80 | 74.30 | Most resentful third | exact | 245 | 2004 |
| 84.90 | 73.90 | 79.40 | Most resentful third | exact | 323 | 2008 |
| 82.10 | 75.30 | 78.70 | Most resentful third | exact | 849 | 2012 |
| 91.90 | 86.30 | 89.10 | Most resentful third | exact | 702 | 2016 |
| 92 | 88 | 90 | Most resentful third | exact | 1,475 | 2020 |
| 91.10 | 85.40 | 88.20 | Most resentful third | exact | 1,028 | 2024 |
| 53.30 | 42.40 | 47.80 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 322 | 1988 |
| 38.50 | 29 | 33.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 385 | 1992 |
| 44.70 | 32.70 | 38.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 318 | 2000 |
| 43.10 | 28.80 | 36 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 206 | 2004 |
| 31.20 | 18.70 | 24.90 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 228 | 2008 |
| 27 | 19.40 | 23.20 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 780 | 2012 |
| 28.60 | 21.60 | 25.10 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 838 | 2016 |
| 25.90 | 21.40 | 23.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 2,530 | 2020 |
| 28.60 | 22.30 | 25.50 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 1,561 | 2024 |
| 69.50 | 60.20 | 64.90 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 407 | 1988 |
| 56 | 46.30 | 51.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 411 | 1992 |
| 63 | 51 | 57 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 316 | 2000 |
| 72 | 58.40 | 65.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 227 | 2004 |
| 67.20 | 54.80 | 61 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 304 | 2008 |
| 69.10 | 61.30 | 65.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 912 | 2012 |
| 76.90 | 68.10 | 72.50 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 555 | 2016 |
| 82.40 | 76.20 | 79.30 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 1,126 | 2020 |
| 80 | 71.10 | 75.50 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 782 | 2024 |
| 78.50 | 66.80 | 72.60 | Index above 75 | fixed | 223 | 1988 |
| 68.90 | 57 | 63 | Index above 75 | fixed | 256 | 1992 |
| 75 | 62.60 | 68.80 | Index above 75 | fixed | 253 | 2000 |
| 82.10 | 67.70 | 74.90 | Index above 75 | fixed | 168 | 2004 |
| 85.10 | 74 | 79.50 | Index above 75 | fixed | 250 | 2008 |
| 81.80 | 74.90 | 78.30 | Index above 75 | fixed | 849 | 2012 |
| 93 | 86.90 | 90 | Index above 75 | fixed | 549 | 2016 |
| 94.50 | 90.10 | 92.30 | Index above 75 | fixed | 918 | 2020 |
| 93.80 | 87.20 | 90.50 | Index above 75 | fixed | 625 | 2024 |

Views: Thirds inside each year (grouping = exact); Fixed index cuts (grouping = fixed).

Note: The resentment index was not asked in 1996, so no group is drawn for that year. In the default view the groups are exact weighted thirds inside each year, with respondents who share an index score split in proportion across the cut. In the fixed-cut view the cuts are at the same index scores in every year (50 and 75, the pooled terciles of white two-party voters), so the groups change in size from year to year. All interview modes are pooled; the mode comparison is in the previous figure. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design.

Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024)

Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_levels.json

## All estimates

Every fact in facts.json (165), sorted by id.

| Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note |
| --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- |
| boot_reps | 1,000 | bootstrap replicates | number of seeded bootstrap replicates behind each step date | each group and item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| ces_2008 | 25.5 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 24.8 to 26.2 | 19,797 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_2012 | 24.9 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 24.2 to 25.6 | 30,271 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ces_ch | −0.6 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | change in the weighted linear probability slope (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −1.6 to 0.4 | 50,068 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study |   |
| ch_0408 | +4.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI −0.4 to 9.0 | 1,383 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_0812 | +1.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −2.4 to 4.6 | 3,323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_0812_hi | 4.6 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | upper end of the 95% interval for the change in the weighted linear probability slope (racial resentment index) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 |   | 3,323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_1216 | +8.2 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.5 | 4,483 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_8804 | +7.7 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 1988 to 2004 | 95% CI 2.9 to 12.4 | 1,553 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_ftf_0812 | −0.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −5.0 to 4.5 | 1,391 | mode weights | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ch_ftf_1216 | +8.7 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 3.9 to 13.4 | 1,132 | mode weights | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| dem_disc_2014 | 44.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 39.6% to 50.2% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_disc_2016 | 54.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 49.6% to 59.7% | 541 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_disc_2018 | 61.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 55.5% to 67.6% | 392 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_disc_2021 | 81.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 78.1% to 84.8% | 858 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_disc_2024 | 73.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 65.6% to 81.0% | 237 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_help_2014 | 19.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 14.9% to 23.1% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_help_2016 | 37.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 32.8% to 42.3% | 584 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_help_ip2224 | 45.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said government should help improve Black people's living standards | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in person interviews | 95% CI 38.3% to 53.4% | 349 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| dem_help_web2224 | 52.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said government should help improve Black people's living standards | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, web interviews | 95% CI 46.7% to 57.9% | 630 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| disc_1977 | 42.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1977 | 95% CI 39.0% to 45.0% | 1,273 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| disc_2004 | 28.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 24.9% to 32.7% | 694 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| disc_2014 | 30.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 27.0% to 33.0% | 1,215 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| disc_2016 | 37.1% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.2% | 1,332 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| disc_2018 | 41.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 37.4% to 45.1% | 1,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| fix16_dem_disc | +18.5 | percentage points | size of the step at the 2016 survey in the weighted share (discrimination) | white democrats (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, step at the 2016 survey | 95% CI 14.1 to 23.2 | 3,818 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| fix16_rep_disc | +0.4 | percentage points | size of the step at the 2016 survey in the weighted share (discrimination) | white republicans (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, step at the 2016 survey | 95% CI −3.3 to 4.3 | 3,933 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| fix_2012 | 7.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 5.5 to 8.8 | 2,535 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| fix_2016 | 13.4 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2016 | 95% CI 11.2 to 15.6 | 1,941 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| fxgapch_0408 | +15.7 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI 2.5 to 28.8 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| fxgapch_0812 | +0.5 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −9.2 to 10.3 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| fxgapch_1216 | +9.7 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.8 to 16.6 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| gap_spend | −7.1 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −13.9 to −0.3 | 2,065 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| help_2014 | 11.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 9.2% to 13.2% | 1,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| help_2016 | 21.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 18.8% to 24.0% | 1,382 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| hisp_white | 11.4% | percent of white respondents who are Hispanic | weighted share who report Hispanic origin | white GSS respondents who answered the Hispanic-origin question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.8% to 12.1% | 15,012 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| ingroup_1964 | 26.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer (rating of white Americans minus rating of Black Americans) | weighted mean of the respondent's own difference in ratings | white respondents who rated both groups | 1964 | 95% CI 24.7 to 27.4 | 1,366 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ingroup_2024 | 0.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer (rating of white Americans minus rating of Black Americans) | weighted mean of the respondent's own difference in ratings | white respondents who rated both groups | 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 1.6 | 3,269 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| ipchg_aff | +6.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI 1.7 to 10.6 | 3,192 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| ipchg_disc | +12.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI 5.3 to 18.7 | 2,747 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| ipchg_spend | −1.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI −7.7 to 5.1 | 2,309 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| ipchg_will | −7.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI −13.4 to −0.8 | 2,733 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| kink_disc | 2014.0 | survey year of the kink | year at which the fitted trend turns from constant to linear (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | 95% CI 2012.0 to 2015.5 | 9,719 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| kink_ub_max | 2015.5 | survey year of the kink | latest upper end of the bootstrap interval for the kink year across the six items | white respondents, in person, six dated items | surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| kink_will | 2011.4 | survey year of the kink | year at which the fitted trend turns from constant to linear (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | 95% CI 2008.0 to 2014.8 | 9,620 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| lv_high_2008 | 79.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2008 | 95% CI 73.9% to 84.9% | 323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_high_2012 | 78.7% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2012 | 95% CI 75.3% to 82.1% | 849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_high_2016 | 89.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2016 | 95% CI 86.3% to 91.9% | 702 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_low_2008 | 28.8% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2008 | 95% CI 22.9% to 34.7% | 302 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_low_2012 | 27.0% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2012 | 95% CI 23.3% to 30.6% | 962 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lv_low_2016 | 17.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2016 | 95% CI 13.7% to 20.5% | 672 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lvgapch_0812 | +1.2 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the most and least resentful thirds | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −8.3 to 10.7 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| lvgapch_1216 | +20.3 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the most and least resentful thirds | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 13.6 to 27.0 |   | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| marry_1972 | 62.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 59.7% to 65.4% | 1,306 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| marry_2002 | 87.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2002 | 95% CI 84.9% to 90.3% | 742 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| mode_gap_max | 9.9 | percentage points | largest absolute difference across the 9 items between web and in-person respondents in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_blk_higher | 5 | items out of six | number of dated items on which the interval for Black respondents lies above the interval for white respondents in all three periods | Black and white respondents | 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2021-2024 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_blk_moved | 3 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share has an interval that excludes zero | Black respondents | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_dem_ip | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose pooled in-person Democratic cell clears the sample floor | white Democrats | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person interviews |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_dem_moved | 6 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that excludes zero | white Democrats | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_dr_sep | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items on which the Democratic change minus the Republican change has an interval that excludes zero | white Democrats and white Republicans | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_ip_moved | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose in-person change has an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_mode_items | 9 | items | number of items with an in-person and a web estimate that clear the floor | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_mode_neg | 5 | items out of 9 | number of items on which web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents, with an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_mode_neg_sign | 6 | items out of 9 | number of items on which the web share is below the in-person share, by the sign of the estimate | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_mode_pos | 1 | items out of 9 | number of items on which web respondents gave the answer more often than in-person respondents, with an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_mode_pos_sign | 3 | items out of 9 | number of items on which the web share is above the in-person share, by the sign of the estimate | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_obama_zero | 5 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that includes zero | six dated items, white respondents | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_rep_moved | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that excludes zero | white Republicans | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_rep_zero | 4 | items out of six | number of items whose step has a bootstrap interval that includes zero | white Republicans | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_vote_res | 16,299 | respondents | count of respondents | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and have a resentment index score | the nine presidential years from 1988 to 2024 in which the index was asked |   |   | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| n_wave1214 | 0 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share among white respondents has an interval that excludes zero | six dated items | 2012 to 2014 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_wave1416 | 5 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share among white respondents has an interval that excludes zero | six dated items | 2014 to 2016 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| n_wht_moved | 6 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share has an interval that excludes zero | white respondents | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| obama_aff | +2.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who favor preference in hiring and promoting Black people | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 0.1 to 4.0 | 6,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| obama_max | +2.1 | percentage points | largest change among six items in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 |   | 6,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| obama_min | −2.5 | percentage points | smallest change among six items in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 |   | 6,189 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| obama_open | +3.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who would vote for a law barring housing discrimination | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 0.7 to 6.1 | 6,393 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| obama_rel | +8.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who would not oppose a close relative marrying a Black person | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 6.2 to 11.1 | 6,445 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| open_1973 | 35.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1973 | 95% CI 32.6% to 38.3% | 1,283 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| open_2012 | 68.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2012 | 95% CI 64.9% to 72.0% | 966 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| open_2022 | 82.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 | 95% CI 78.5% to 87.0% | 790 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| open_2024 | 77.7% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 70.7% to 84.6% | 279 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| p16_max | 100.0% | percent of bootstrap replicates | largest share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, six items | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| p16_min | 51.4% | percent of bootstrap replicates | smallest share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, six items | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| p16_will | 51.4% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, will-power item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_dem_disc | +14.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 9.7 to 19.9 | 2,225 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_dem_help | +18.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 14.2 to 23.2 | 2,293 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_dem_spend | +26.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 20.5 to 32.1 | 1,569 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_rep_disc | +2.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −1.7 to 6.7 | 2,217 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_rep_help | +5.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 2.3 to 7.6 | 2,179 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_rep_spend | +19.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 13.8 to 24.3 | 1,534 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pchg_rep_will | −8.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −13.7 to −3.3 | 2,184 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pdiff_spend | +7.3 | percentage points | Democratic change minus Republican change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) | white Democrats and white Republicans (leaners included) | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −0.5 to 15.0 | 3,103 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pdiff_will | −4.0 | percentage points | Democratic change minus Republican change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white Democrats and white Republicans (leaners included) | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −11.0 to 3.0 | 4,403 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pe_will | 38.0% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of replicates that place the best single step at a survey before 2016 | white respondents, will-power item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 |   | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pres_1972 | 74.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (would vote for a qualified black nominee) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 71.3% to 76.6% | 1,262 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| pres_2010 | 95.7% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (would vote for a qualified black nominee) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010 | 95% CI 94.2% to 97.2% | 1,052 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_aff_b | −0.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −7.7 to 6.2 | 1,177 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_aff_w | +5.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 5,500 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_disc_b | +7.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 0.2 to 13.8 | 1,219 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_disc_w | +8.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.3 to 11.5 | 5,589 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_help_b | +9.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 2.4 to 16.8 | 1,182 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_help_w | +10.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 7.6 to 12.4 | 5,643 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_will_b | −0.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −7.1 to 6.7 | 1,229 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| race_chg_will_w | −9.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −12.2 to −5.7 | 5,556 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rel_1990 | 35.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1990 | 95% CI 31.8% to 38.1% | 1,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rel_2012 | 78.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2012 | 95% CI 75.2% to 81.6% | 972 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rel_2024 | 92.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 90.5% to 94.2% | 1,517 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_disc_2014 | 18.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 14.2% to 22.2% | 468 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_disc_2018 | 23.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 18.0% to 28.5% | 458 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_disc_2024 | 21.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 15.1% to 27.8% | 314 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_spend_ip2224 | 27.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person interviews | 95% CI 19.7% to 36.0% | 309 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| rep_spend_web21 | 16.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 12.8% to 20.9% | 462 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| repshare_2008 | 56.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 | 95% CI 52.5% to 60.3% | 783 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| repshare_2012 | 57.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 | 95% CI 54.7% to 59.5% | 2,555 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| repshare_2016 | 57.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2016 | 95% CI 54.8% to 60.0% | 1,957 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| seg_1972 | 60.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: disagree slightly or strongly (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 57.8% to 63.7% | 1,251 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| seg_1996 | 86.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: disagree slightly or strongly (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 84.1% to 89.5% | 746 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| slope_1988 | 10.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 1988 | 95% CI 7.1 to 13.1 | 952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2004 | 17.8 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2004 | 95% CI 14.1 to 21.5 | 601 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2008 | 22.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 19.2 to 25.0 | 782 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2012 | 23.2 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 21.3 to 25.0 | 2,541 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2016 | 31.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2016 | 95% CI 29.9 to 32.8 | 1,942 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2020 | 34.9 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 34.0 to 35.7 | 4,574 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_2024 | 33.0 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 31.6 to 34.4 | 2,968 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_ftf_2008 | 22.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 19.2 to 25.0 | 782 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| slope_ftf_2012 | 21.8 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 18.1 to 25.6 | 609 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| sse_kink_disc | 2.4 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted kinked trend | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best trend with one kink (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| sse_kink_will | 3.0 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted kinked trend | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best trend with one kink (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| sse_step_disc | 8.0 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted step | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best single step (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| sse_step_will | 15.2 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted step | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best single step (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 |   |   | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| therm_b_1964 | 60.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 1964 | 95% CI 59.5 to 61.8 | 1,366 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_b_2004 | 69.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2004 | 95% CI 67.6 to 70.6 | 740 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_b_2012 | 61.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2012 | 95% CI 60.9 to 62.7 | 3,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_b_2024 | 69.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2024 | 95% CI 68.5 to 70.6 | 3,374 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_ftf_0812 | −3.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | all white respondents who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −5.5 to −1.3 | 1,872 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_ftf_dem_0812 | −3.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −6.7 to −0.1 | 792 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_ftf_dem_1216 | +7.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 3.4 to 11.9 | 621 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_ftf_rep_0812 | −3.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −6.1 to −0.1 | 852 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_ftf_rep_1216 | +1.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −1.6 to 5.4 | 763 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_w_1964 | 86.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of white americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 1964 | 95% CI 85.8 to 87.6 | 1,367 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_w_2024 | 70.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of white americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2024 | 95% CI 69.2 to 71.2 | 3,373 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_web_dem_1216 | +6.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 4.1 to 8.8 | 1,686 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| therm_web_rep_1216 | +4.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 2.5 to 6.8 | 2,010 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File |   |
| w_abil_a | −9.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (inborn ability) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI −12.4 to −6.7 | 7,246 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_abil_c | −1.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who attribute the gap to inborn ability between two pooled periods | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −3.1 to 0.2 | 5,695 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_aff_c | +5.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 5,500 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_disc_b | −7.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 95% CI −9.4 to −4.7 | 8,958 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_disc_c | +8.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.3 to 11.5 | 5,589 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_fav_c | +8.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (rejects that black people should work up without special favors) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.6 | 5,748 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_help_c | +10.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 7.6 to 12.4 | 5,643 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_marry_a | +14.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (no law against black-white marriage) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 12.6 to 15.9 | 13,447 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_open_a | +23.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 21.6 to 25.9 | 10,051 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_seg_a | +20.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 18.2 to 22.3 | 9,565 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_spend_c | +20.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 17.2 to 24.5 | 3,867 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_will_a | −4.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI −7.8 to −1.3 | 7,103 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_will_b | −9.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 95% CI −11.8 to −6.7 | 8,880 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| w_will_c | −9.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −12.2 to −5.7 | 5,556 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| wave_disc | +6.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 1.7 to 10.9 | 2,284 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| wave_help | +9.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 5.6 to 12.6 | 2,326 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| wave_spend | +18.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 12.7 to 23.8 | 1,586 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| wave_will | −3.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI −8.6 to 1.1 | 2,275 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |
| web_2021 | 87.3% | percent of interviews by web | share of interviews conducted on the web (count) | all 2021 GSS respondents | 2021 |   | 4,032 | none (interview count) | General Social Survey |   |
| webchg_disc | +2.1 | percentage points | web share in 2022 and 2024 minus in-person share in 2016 and 2018 who said racial inequality is mainly due to discrimination | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | web interviews of 2022 and 2024 against in-person interviews of 2016 and 2018 | 95% CI −3.8 to 7.9 | 3,003 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey |   |

## Definitions

- Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses.
- Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is.
- Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment.
- Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way.
- Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors.

## Methods

Sample, GSS. White and Black respondents in the GSS cumulative file, 1972 to 2024, read from the raw file because interview mode is only there (59,937 white respondents in all). 'White' and 'Black' are the GSS race codes; Hispanic origin cannot be separated before 2000, so white includes Hispanic whites (11.4% of white respondents from 2012 to 2024 report Hispanic origin). Party is partyid 0 to 2 (Democrats) and 4 to 6 (Republicans), leaners included, and pure independents are left out of party splits. Interview mode is in person (mode in person from 2004, and every survey before 2004 by design), telephone, web or other; the in-person views use in-person interviews only and leave out telephone interviews, and 2021 had no in-person interviews.

Items, GSS (answer counted, years asked, then the label). racmar (No, 1972 to 2002): No law against Black-white marriage; racpres (Yes, 1972 to 2010): Would vote for a qualified Black nominee; racseg (Disagree slightly or strongly, 1972 to 1996): Whites have no right to exclude Black neighbors; racopen (The law that bars refusing to sell because of race, 1973 to 2024): Would vote for a law barring housing discrimination; marblk (Favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose, 1990 to 2024): Would not oppose a relative marrying a Black person; racdif1 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Discrimination; racdif2 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Inborn ability; racdif3 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Lack of chance for education; racdif4 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Lack of motivation or will power; helpblk (1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5), 1975 to 2024): Places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5); natrace (Too little, 1973 to 2024): Too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people; affrmact (Strongly favors or favors, 1994 to 2024): Favors preference in hiring and promoting Black people; wrkwayup (Disagree somewhat or strongly, 1994 to 2024): Rejects that Black people should work up without special favors. The denominator of each share is the respondents with a substantive answer. The value labels of every item were read from the raw file and asserted before recoding. The government-help item (helpblk) is a five-point scale with only the end points and the midpoint labeled; the series counts codes 1 and 2, the two answers nearest to government should help (code 1 alone is a smaller share).

Sample, ANES. White non-Hispanic respondents (VCF0106) in the ANES Cumulative Data File. Affect: the feeling thermometers toward Black Americans (VCF0206) and white Americans (VCF0207), 1964 to 2024. Vote: the two-party presidential vote (VCF0704, major-party candidates only; 17,265 white non-Hispanic voters in the presidential years 1988 to 2024, of whom 16,299 have a racial resentment index score in the nine presidential years that asked it). Attitudes: the racial resentment index (the mean of four 0 to 1 items, VCF9039 to VCF9042, for respondents who answered at least two, times 100; the book's one definition, not asked in 1996), a colder rating of Black Americans (100 minus the thermometer), aid to Black Americans (VCF0830, 7 is the self-help end) and opposition to affirmative action (VCF0867a: raw codes 1, 2, 4 and 5 recoded to 1 to 4, 4 is strongly oppose). Party identification is the seven-point scale (pid_7pt), leaners included in Democrats (1 to 3) and Republicans (5 to 7).

Sample, CES. White non-Hispanic respondents in the 2008 and 2012 surveys of the cumulative file who reported a major-party presidential vote, with opposition to affirmative action on the four-point item (1 strongly support, 4 strongly oppose) and the seven-point party scale. The single-wave weight is used; a post-election weight exists for 2012 only and gives a slope of the same size. The party-gap sign of the item was checked in every year it exists (Republicans more opposed in all seven). The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals are model based.

Weights. GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before); ANES VCF0009z, with weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x and VCF0009y) for the mode views of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, and no mode weights for 2020; CES weight. In a pooled period each year's weights are rescaled to average one over the respondents with an answer.

Estimators and intervals. A share or mean is a weighted mean of the 0/1 or rating with a 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size; a change between two periods or elections is the difference of two independent estimates with the standard errors combined in quadrature, and so is the Democratic minus Republican difference in a change. These intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the designs. A vote slope is the coefficient on the standardized attitude (weighted mean 0 and SD 1 within the year and sample) in a weighted linear probability model of a Republican vote against a Democratic vote, with HC3 errors; the one 'party held fixed' sentence adds a dummy for each of the seven party-identification categories. Groups of the resentment index: in the default view exact weighted thirds inside each year, with respondents who share an index score split in proportion across a cut, so the three thirds hold the same weighted number of voters; in the fixed-cut view the groups are an index of 50 or less, above 50 to 75 and above 75 in every year (50 and 75 are the pooled weighted terciles of white two-party voters, 1988 to 2024), so the group sizes change by year. A gap between groups combines the two Kish standard errors.

Step dates and form check. For one group and item, the yearly weighted shares of the in-person surveys of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 are fitted by two constants, one before the first new survey s and one from s on, with s no earlier than 2004 and at least one survey after it. The best s minimizes the inverse-variance weighted squared error. The step at the fixed survey of 2016 is also reported, because the best date differs by item for white Republicans. As a check on the form, a trend that is constant before a kink and linear after it is fitted to the same shares (kink between 2004.0 and 2015.95 in steps of 0.05, weighted least squares); its weighted squared error is compared with the step's. The bootstrap (1,000 replicates, seed 12345) resamples respondents with replacement within each survey year, recomputes the yearly shares and variances and refits all three; the table reports the share of replicates that choose each date and the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the step size, the step at 2016 and the kink year.

Suppression. A yearly series cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (timeline floor); a party, race, mode, period or pooled cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (subgroup floor); a vote slope needs 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100. The GSS 2022 and 2024 cells alone are often under the effective-sample floor, so the mode views pool the two years and plot the pooled cell at 2023. Rounding: every displayed number and every plotted or tabled value is rounded half up from the unrounded estimate by b3.fmt, and a printed change can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed shares.

Survey mode. GSS: in person through 2018, no 2020 survey, 2021 mostly web (no in-person interviews), 2022 and 2024 in person and web; every estimate after 2020 is shown in the all-interview view and in an in-person or web view or in the mode figure. ANES: in person through 2008, web added in 2012; the mode views use the mode weights. CES: online in every year.

## What these data cannot show

- The GSS, ANES and CES interview new respondents in each wave, so a change in a share mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed party and the replacement of older adults by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them.
- The step dates describe when a new level first appears in surveys fielded in alternate years.
- The step and the kink are assumptions about the form of change and give different starts, the 2016 survey for the step and the 2014 survey or earlier for the kink.
- The dates do not say why the level changed, and the 2016 GSS was fielded during the presidential campaign.
- The items measure answers to questions and not behavior.
- The principle items reached ceilings that leave little room to move, three of them have no readings after 2010, and the data cannot tell a change in belief from a change in willingness to say what the question invites.
- The GSS wording of the group changed over the period from Negroes to Blacks to African Americans, and in 2022 and 2024 the effective samples for party and race cells are small enough that the chapter pools those years.
- In the in-person view the Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 are suppressed, and Hispanic respondents cannot be separated in the GSS before 2000.
- The post-2018 levels depend on interview mode on several items, so the later comparisons are read by mode and not as changes over time.
- Results for Hispanic, Asian and other voters are not shown, and Chapter 3.3, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is where voters of those groups belong.
- The vote section describes association across elections.
- It cannot separate the Obama presidency from the 2012 re-election campaign, the change in candidates in 2016, or the changes in the parties' coalitions, so a rise from 2012 to 2016 is not an effect of either.
- The vote is self-reported after the election and leans slightly Democratic, the attitude and party identification are measured in the same interview, the resentment index has no 1996 reading, ANES 2020 has no mode weights, and the CES holds one racial policy item in 2008 and 2012.
- The chapter does not test whether racial attitudes changed how people voted, and the surveys cannot say whether the movement after 2014 comes from the events of those years.
- Policing items and the weeks after May 2020 are in Planned, Policing (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/policing; planned) and Planned, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned).

## References

1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.
2. Schuman, Howard; Steeh, Charlotte; Bobo, Lawrence; Krysan, Maria (1997). Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, revised edition. Harvard University Press.
3. Kluegel, James R. (1990). Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-White Gap in Socioeconomic Status, 1977-1989. American Sociological Review 55(4): 512-525. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095804
4. Tesler, Michael (2012). The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 690-704. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00577.x
5. Tesler, Michael (2016). Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo22961444.html
6. Engelhardt, Andrew M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1062-1079. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437
7. Sides, John; Tesler, Michael; Vavreck, Lynn (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691174198/identity-crisis

## Provenance

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## Machine formats

- Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report
- Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report.md
- Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/facts.json
- Table 1, figure "kinds_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json
- Table 2, figure "schedule" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/schedule.json
- Table 3, figure "affect" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/affect.json
- Table 4, figure "step_dates" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/step_dates.json
- Table 5, figure "mode_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/mode_gap.json
- Table 6, figure "party_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/party_mode.json
- Table 7, figure "by_race" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/by_race.json
- Table 8, figure "vote_assoc" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_assoc.json
- Table 9, figure "vote_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_levels.json
- Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt